Wrong views due the khandhas being impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self

[Dhabba]

Pretty much the same thing as the Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Mahīśāsaka despising Mahākāśyapa as with Sāriputta in Mahayana:

While depictions of Śāriputra in the Pāli Canon generally portray him as a wise and powerful arhat , second only to the Buddha, Mahayanatexts give him a wider range of depictions. Some Mahayana sutras portray him as a great Buddhist disciple while others portray him as a counterpoint with insufficient understanding of Mahayana doctrine, representative of the Hinayana tradition.[94][95][96] Buddhist studies scholar Donald S. Lopez Jr. describes the latter as “intentional irony” aimed at depicting how profound Mahayana doctrine is by showing that even the wisest “Hinayana” disciple had difficulty understanding it.[91]

[Dhabba]

Since I already have a copy of

Great Disciples of the Buddha: Their Lives, Their Works, Their Legacy (The Teachings of the Buddha).

(that has just been there on the book shelf collecting dust)

I now, after finding out about this whole Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Mahīśāsaka despising Mahākāśyapa, really have an urge to thoroughly study it!

Great Disciples of the Buddha - The Wisdom Experience

[Erika_ODonnell]

I’m really confused by this thread

There seems to be three positions on nibbana:

1. cessation
2. invisible consciousness outside the five khandas
3. don’t have a view about it/indescribable by words/ineffable

Am I missing something? Is anyone saying anything else than one of these three?

[Soren]

I think thats about it, but I think 2 & 3 are often treated as the same

[Erika_ODonnell]

And everyone agrees that the sentence “there is no self” is true if we restrict ourselves to the five khandas?

Edit: ‘True’ in the sense of reflecting what the Buddha means when he says the khandas are anatta.

Does anyone object to sentences like “there’s no self in the five khandas”?

Is there a difference between saying the khandas are not-self, and saying things like “no self exists in the five khandas”?

[Soren]

I haven’t been keeping up with this thread, but I think that “everyone” agrees with that. However, check out this link, How Early Buddhism differs from Theravada: a checklist and look at the first topic “overdetermination of not-self.”

Some Bhikkhus argue that “there is no self” was less of an ontological teaching, but instead more of a perception that one develops (in or out of meditation) to perform the duties of the four noble truths. (Look up Thanissaro’s Selves and Not Self).

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Soren

Some Bhikkhus argue that “there is no self” was less of an ontological teaching, but instead more of a perception that one develops (in or out of meditation) to perform the duties of the four noble truths. (Look up Thanissaro’s Selves and Not Self).

Yeah, the way I see it, Ven. Thanissaro, being a proponent of nibbana as extra-khandic consciousness, has to solve the problem of why this type of consciousness can’t be called a self (since it would be eternal and blissful). That’s how I understand Selves and Not self.

But I feel like I’ve “heard it all” re. this debate, so I’m more trying to learn whether any new, interesting arguments were made that I missed in this thread

[Soren]

In that case, maybe you can learn something new by having me play devil’s advocate.

When you claim that there is a problem to be solved about whether or not that type of consciousness can be called a self, you are assuming a certain definition of self. One of Thanissaro’s points is that any definition of self when clung to will contain stress, any notion of being a being will contain stress, and he also doesn’t agree that “self = permanent, blissful.” (Furthermore, he doesn’t describe this consciousness as eternal).

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Soren

When you claim that there is a problem to be solved about whether or not that type of consciousness can be called a self, you are assuming a certain definition of self. One of Thanissaro’s points is that any definition of self when clung to will contain stress, any notion of being a being will contain stress, and he also doesn’t agree that “self = permanent, blissful.”

Right, and this does a good job of “dissolving” the problem of whether nibbanic consciousness could rightly be called a self or not. Don’t even try to take a position on it! That will just lead to suffering.

But that’s not convincing to me. Chuck it up to different priors, I dunno

@Soren

(Furthermore, he doesn’t describe this consciousness as eternal).

If it’s not eternal, then it’s suffering, and it can’t be nibbana.

But that’s using words and concepts to describe the indescribable! This is ineffable stuff!

To me this is the equivalent of saying “just believe me”. Fair enough, but it’s not a style of argument that I like

[Soren]

@Erika_ODonnell

If it’s not eternal, then it’s suffering, and it can’t be nibbana.

It’s not eternal, but because it lies outside time altogether, it is not anicca either. Anyway, this will be my last post about the topic. Feel free to have the last word if you wish.

[Erika_ODonnell]

It’s not really clear to me what it means for anything to be outside time (or space, which IIRC is also part of Ven. T’s description). What notion of time and space is being appealed to here?

It’s unclear what it means within the thought world of the EBTs, but also today, say within contemporary physics.

I don’t understand why someone would read that and think “outside of space and time, yeah that makes sense”.

Thank you for giving me the last word

Edit: Like, I don’t understand the background information and assumptions against which that statement makes sense.

Is Ven. T’s nibbanic consciousness impermanent or permanent? Neither, because it’s outside time and space.

I don’t have the priors to make sense of that answer.

[Sasha_A]

@Erika_ODonnell

And everyone agrees that the sentence “there is no self” is true if we restrict ourselves to the five khandas?

No.

@Erika_ODonnell

Is there a difference between saying the khandas are not-self, and saying things like “no self exists in the five khandas”?

Yes.
“No self” is the denial of one’s own existence, which is an oxymoron and a self-delusion.
"Not-self is a denial of mastery and control over that which is already taken as mine and for me.

The problem is not a self, the problem is taking out of ignorance as mine and for me that which cannot be mine and for me. Any view of the self is just one of the results of such an appropriation that is already happening. And the fact of the presence of the appropriation is not a matter of personal choice and preference, but only of the presence of ignorance. If there is ignorance, there is yours and for you, whether you want it or not and whatever views you hold.

There is you because there is yours and for you, not the other way round. There are views of the self because there is appropriation and the capacity to form such views, not the other way round.

At the level of sotopanna, the views about the self are already eliminated, but the appropriation is still there until the very end of ignorance - arahatship. Animals and babies are not even capable of forming views about self, but the appropriation is already there and they are in the state of maximum ignorance.

The elimination of any and all views about the self does not eliminate the appropriation of the aggregates, does not eliminate ignorance, does not eliminate craving, does not eliminate dukkha. The presence of views about the self is merely a symptom of the illness and not the illness itself.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Sasha_A

“No self” is the denial of one’s own existence, which is an oxymoron and a self-delusion.
"Not-self is a denial of mastery and control over that which is already taken as mine and for me.

According to the Cambridge dictionary “No and not are the two most common words we use to indicate negation.”

So this difference in meaning doesn’t seem to come from English and different uses of ‘no’ and ‘not’ – they basically both convey negation in English.

Within Buddhism, I have never seen anyone argue that anatta should be understood as an oxymoronic, self-deluded denial of one’s own existence.

Like, it’s not a real position that anyone takes or argues for.

What gives?

[Saurabh]

@Erika_ODonnell

But I feel like I’ve “heard it all” re. this debate, so I’m more trying to learn whether any new, interesting arguments were made that I missed in this thread

I will try to give you a summary.

Check this first:

@Dhabba

Without the Buddha’s incredible insights I would have never been able to write the following.

Let us take this from a whole nother perspective.

Imagine the laypeople and the ordained of the annihilationist ascetic sect having this discussion we are having right, but instead regarding their Dhamma.

@Dhabba

Some would very sure about themselves and their understanding and answer that existence ceases completely, because our teacher says specifically to: ”be repulsed by continued existence and not be repulsed by the cessation of continued existence”.

Then some would ask, has consciousness ceased altogether in the dimension of nothingness?

The answer to this would be: Of course it has! ”Going totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness, aware that ‘there is nothing at all’, one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.”

Is it possible to somehow be conscious of this nothingness?
Nope. It is IMPOSSIBLE to cognize nothingness because the cessation of consciousness already took place in the dimension of infinite consciousness.

But hold on, doesn’t our teacher say that ”aware that ‘there is nothing at all’, one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.”
So how can one even be aware that ‘there is nothing at all’ if one is truly annihilated?

@Dhabba

This ”awareness” takes place in the dimension of infinite consciousness.
With the insight ‘there is nothing at all’ there is the cessation of infinite consciousness. With cessation of infinite consciousness there is the entering and remaining in the in the dimension of nothingness, which our teacher says is the cessation of continued existence.

So one is truly annihilated with nothing left?
YES! One is completely annihilated in the dimension of nothingness.
If ”nothing” could truly be cognized the cognizer of ”nothing” must be ”something”. But in the dimension of nothingness there is not a single ”something”,
only nothingness and nothing but nothingnes.
(Since infinite conscioussness has been transcended)

While still having a physical body you can only have a glimpse of this nothingness, but with the death of the physical body not hampering you anymore you enter and remain in the dimension of nothingness.

See how IMPOSSIBLE it would be to refute this as untrue? , anyone would be convinced of it being accurate. The words, the phrasing, the whole logic behind it make it seem like the dimension of nothingness truly is the highest attainment and more importantly annihilation.

@Dhabba

Only the advocates of the ultimate purity of the spirit, that is, who go totally beyond the dimension of nothingness, enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception could refute it BUT they teach Dhamma in order to directly know and realize this. ”Some sentient beings have such a doctrine. But even the sentient beings who have such a doctrine decay and perish.”

How does the Buddha know they will decay and perish?

So based on this following conclusion/argument results…

1) If person X is convinced that, ‘I have no self’ and he rejects eternalism, he comes in the category of those who hold such a views which leads one to “getting repulsed by continued existence and not repulsed by cessation of continued existence”(this view buddha asks to let go of), such person X will most likely miss nibbana and after break up of body, enter and remain in formless realm of dimension of nothingness because in the dimension of nothingness, because of(mistakenly) believing that there is nothing & everything is annihilated at death, continued existence is actually ceased but in reality even that is not permanent because if that were permanent(as those born in realm of nothingness view), then those who have reached dimension of nothingness would never perish and again become something (get borned)!

Another conclusion/argument is as given by @Sasha_A, for that check this…

@Sasha_A

here is Ven. Nanavira:

PARAMATTHA SACCA
The passage quotes the two lines (5 & 6) containing the simile of the chariot. They are used to justify the following argument. The word ‘chariot’ is the conventional name given to an assemblage of parts; but if each part is examined individually it cannot be said of any one of them that it is the chariot, nor do we find any chariot in the parts collectively, nor do we find any chariot outside the parts. Therefore, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no chariot. Similarly, an ‘individual’ (the word puggala is used) is merely a conventional name given to an assemblage of parts (parts of the body, as well as khandhā), and, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no individual. That is all.

@Sasha_A

9. Let us first consider the validity of the argument. If a chariot is taken to pieces, and a man is then shown the pieces one by one, each time with the question ‘Is this a chariot?’, it is obvious that he will always say no. And if these pieces are gathered together in a heap, and he is shown the heap, then also he will say that there is no chariot. If, finally, he is asked whether apart from these pieces he sees any chariot, he will still say no. But suppose now that he is shown these pieces assembled together in such a way that the assemblage can be used for conveying a man from place to place; when he is asked he will undoubtedly assert that there is a chariot, that the chariot exists. According to the argument, the man was speaking in the conventional sense when he asserted the existence of the chariot, and in the highest sense when he denied it. But, clearly enough, the man (who has had no training in such subtleties) is using ordinary conventional language throughout; and the reason for the difference between his two statements is to be found in the fact that on one occasion he was shown a chariot and on the others he was not.

@Sasha_A

If a chariot is taken to pieces (even in imagination) it ceases to be a chariot; for a chariot is, precisely, a vehicle, and a heap of components is not a vehicle—it is a heap of components. (If the man is shown the heap of components and asked ‘Is this a heap of components?’, he will say yes.) In other words, a chariot is most certainly an assemblage of parts, but it is an assemblage of parts in a particular functional arrangement, and to alter this arrangement is to destroy the chariot. It is no great wonder that a chariot cannot be found if we have taken the precaution of destroying it before starting to look for it. If a man sees a chariot in working order and says ‘In the highest sense there is no chariot; for it is a mere assemblage of parts’, all he is saying is ‘It is possible to take this chariot to pieces and to gather them in a heap; and when this is done there will no longer be a chariot’. The argument, then, does not show the non-existence of the chariot; at best it merely asserts that an existing chariot can be destroyed. And when it is applied to an individual (i.e. a set of pañcakkhandhā) it is even less valid; for not only does it not show the non-existence of the individual, but since the functional arrangement of the pañcakkhandhā cannot be altered, even in imagination, it asserts an impossibility, that an existing individual can be destroyed. As applied to an individual (or a creature) the argument runs into contradiction; and to say of an individual ‘In the highest sense there is no individual; for it is a mere asemblage of khandhā’ is to be unintelligible.

Based on this 2nd argument/conclusion is…

2) When we apply Paticcha Samuppada to chariot and panchaskandhas…only reason being, chariot’s functional arrangement can be changed into heap of parts but it’s not the case with panchaskandhas! Their functional arrangement cannot be changed! This kind of asserts possibility that existing individual literally cannot be destroyed!

@Erika_ODonnell sir, I pointed out only 2 arguments because, I felt these are new arguments(sry if I’m missing any other argument, I hope somebody can kindly add them), which you might have missed in this thread because of too many messages and also they are very interesting, I am not completely confident about them(although I am actually confident about and agree with 1st one) but I honestly couldn’t counter them(I don’t think that’s necessary though).
There are many other arguments against above arguments, there are also neutral arguments against them(if you know what I mean)…but them you can directly locate I guess.

Sry for bad English.

[Sasha_A]

@Erika_ODonnell

So this difference in meaning doesn’t seem to come from English and different uses of ‘no’ and ‘not’ – they basically both convey negation in English.

No self = there is no self.
Not-self = this is not self.

@Erika_ODonnell

Within Buddhism, I have never seen anyone argue that anatta should be understood as an oxymoronic, self-deluded denial of one’s own existence.

You are using a straw man fallacy here: the original post does not mention anatta, only ‘no self’. No self and not-self are different ways of interpreting the term anatta.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Sasha_A

No self = there is no self.
Not-self = this is not self.

There’s no apples, there’s not any apples. What’s the difference? Seems to mean the same in English?

@Sasha_A

You are using a straw man fallacy here: the original post does not mention anatta, only ‘no self’.

You are using the straw man, you’re presenting a “no self” a view which is obviously bad. I’m pointing it out that you’re doing that.

@Sasha_A

No self and not-self are different ways of interpreting the term anatta.

Who interprets anatta the way you describe as the no self view?

[Dhabba]

@Erika_ODonnell

Who interprets anatta the way you describe as the no self view?

Make what you will out of the following regarding the no self view:

@Sunyo

Since you yourself do not regard the five aggregates as self, in your view the ”I” or self can only cease to be thanks to something else than the five aggregates….
Nibbāna?*

I would appreciate it if you don’t try to tell me what my view is, because it’s not this. You seem to misunderstand something here. I don’t think there is a real “I” or self at all, so it can’t cease either.

You’re addressing the view of the annihilationists instead. And you seem to assume there are just the five aggregates and nibbāna, nothing else. Fair enough. But that is not the assumption of the eternalists and annihilationists make in this sutta. Not necessarily being Buddhists, they probably don’t even believe in nibbāna in the first place. But more importantly, some of them think there is still a self or “I” outside of the aggregates—that’s the point I perceive is being made here. That self or “I” could for example be the incorrectly perceived owner or experiencer of the aggregates. Eternalists think this continues forever after death; annihilationists think it is destroyed at death. But since such a thing doesn’t exist in the first place, both views are wrong.

@Sunyo

@Dhabba

So this not-real ”I” or self can’t even cease by attaning Nibbāna?

How can something that is not real cease to exist?

It seems you have difficulty separating the annihilationist position from the Buddha’s as I understand it. I’ll try to explain once more. The annihilationist imagines a self, or “I”, or “me”, whether inside or outside of the aggregates. Such a thing doesn’t really exist, but they think that it does. As annihilationists they think it is destroyed at death. The Buddha saw reality as it is and realized there is no self or “I” or “me” at all. So it can’t be destroyed at death either.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Dhabba

Make what you will out of the following regarding the no self view:

I think you ought to make your point/argument explicit if you want to engage in productive discussion

[Dhabba]

All the sayings in bold letters!

[Erika_ODonnell]

I challenge you to be explicit and prove you’re not being intentionally vague to hide the fact that you don’t have a good argument