“What do you think, brahmin, is there an element of exertion … is there an element of effort … is there an element of steadfastness … is there an element of persistence … is there an element of endeavoring?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“When there is an element of endeavoring, are endeavoring beings clearly discerned?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“So, brahmin, when there is the element of endeavoring, endeavoring beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer, this, the other-doer. I have not, brahmin, seen or heard such a doctrine, such a view as yours. How, indeed, could one—moving forward by himself, moving back by himself—say ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer’?”
This refers to the view that suffering is created by oneself or others. Refers to various doctrines that consider free will and the participation of individuals in their destiny, the meaning of their actions. Regarding the question of the existence of atta as an agent who performs actions, such an atta-doer is completely denied in the suttas. And it is denied on the basis of paticca-samuppada, which explains the existence of aggregates, actions, karma and fruits, rebirths without the participation of any atta in any form.
Here is the most striking example of SN 12.12
When this was said, the Venerable Moḷiyaphagguna said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, who consumes the nutriment consciousness?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One consumes.’ If I should say, ‘One consumes,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who consumes?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, for what is the nutriment consciousness a condition?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘The nutriment consciousness is a condition for the production of future renewed existence. When that which has come into being exists, the six sense bases come to be; with the six sense bases as condition, contact.’”
“Venerable sir, who makes contact?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One makes contact.’ If I should say, ‘One makes contact,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who makes contact?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does contact come to be?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With the six sense bases as condition, contact comes to be; with contact as condition, feeling.’”
“Venerable sir, who feels?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One feels.’ If I should say, ‘One feels,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who feels?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does feeling come to be?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with feeling as condition, craving.’”
“Venerable sir, who craves?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One craves.’ If I should say, ‘One craves,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who craves?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does craving come to be?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With feeling as condition, craving comes to be; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.’
Begging the question at hand is not “representing the text accurately”, it’s prosecuting your own position. Your statement is also a form of ad hominen by implying your opponents are intentionally or unintentionally misrepresenting texts. You therefore manage to cram 2 fallacies into as many sentences.
As for
the very same sutta says:
‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This sentient being—where did it come from? And where will it go?’ ‘ahaṁ nu khosmi? No nu khosmi? Kiṁ nu khosmi? Kathaṁ nu khosmi? Ayaṁ nu kho satto kuto āgato? So kuhiṁ gāmī bhavissatī’ti?
If “am I not” still has an “I” in it then “no self” still has a “self” in it. You can’t have it both ways.
Also, in terms of misrepresenting texts, claiming that the sutta is really about the me and not the atta in natthi me attā seems disingenuous at best, I have never seen a sutta that corrects an interlocuter for having the temerity to refer to themselves in the first person, perhaps you could point out the suttas where the buddha takes issue with this mode of speech, and maybe while you are at it you can explain the occurance of me in;
When their mind has become immersed in samādhi like this—purified, bright, flawless, rid of corruptions, pliable, workable, steady, and imperturbable—they project it and extend it toward knowledge and vision.
So evaṁ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte ñāṇadassanāya cittaṁ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti.
They understand:
So evaṁ pajānāti:
‘This body of mine is physical. It’s made up of the four primary elements, produced by mother and father, built up from rice and porridge, liable to impermanence, to wearing away and erosion, to breaking up and destruction.
‘ayaṁ kho me kāyo rūpī cātumahābhūtiko mātāpettikasambhavo odanakummāsūpacayo aniccucchādanaparimaddanabhedanaviddhaṁsanadhammo;
And this consciousness of mine is attached to it, tied to it.’
idañca pana me viññāṇaṁ ettha sitaṁ ettha paṭibaddhan’ti.
DN2
Is there some secret way of knowing when we are to read me as
Or do we merely infer it from the context by working out when it might contradict Theravadin orthodoxy?
Perhaps to really bring home the issues with me you could wrap things up by explaining why the word is used over 4000 times throughout the entirety of the canon without ever being explicated as a mistaken form of speech and why it’s one of the first 3 words of practically every sutta in the canon which pretty much all begin with Evaṁ me sutaṁ?
As for MA62, it also states:
Thereupon, Venerable Mahākāśyapa, assuming the form of the wish-fulfilling jewel, disappeared from his seat and emerged from the east. He soared through the empty sky, displaying four kinds of postures: walking, standing, sitting, and lying down. Furthermore, he entered the fire meditation, and as he entered the fire meditation, various flames emanated from his body, with colors of blue, yellow, red, and white, resembling the brilliance of clear water. Flames emerged from his lower body, and water emerged from his upper body, and vice versa. This display continued in the south, west, and north directions, soaring through the empty sky and manifesting the four postures: walking, standing, sitting, and lying down.
Once again, Mahākāśyapa entered the fire meditation, and as he did so, various flames emanated from his body, with colors of blue, yellow, red, and white, resembling the brilliance of clear water. Flames emerged from his lower body, and water emerged from his upper body, and vice versa.
After these displays, Mahākāśyapa ceased the miracles and paid homage to the Buddha, saying, “World-Honored One, you are my teacher, and I am a disciple of the Buddha. The Buddha possesses all wisdom, while I have no wisdom whatsoever.”
The World-Honored One responded, “Exactly so, Mahākāśyapa. Exactly so, Mahākāśyapa. I possess all wisdom, while you have no wisdom whatsoever.”
(translation by ChatGPT3.5)
So you will forgive me if I suspect it is a later production.
“How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“Then, Master Gotama, is suffering created by another?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“How is it then, Master Gotama: is suffering created both by oneself and by another?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“Then, Master Gotama, has suffering arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?”
“It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.”
“Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?”
“It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.”
“Whether you are asked: ‘How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?’ or ‘Is it created by another?’ or ‘Is it created by both?’ or ‘Is it created by neither?’ in each case you say: ‘Not so, Kassapa.’ When you are asked: ‘How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.’ When asked: ‘Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.’ Venerable sir, let the Blessed One explain suffering to me. Let the Blessed One teach me about suffering.” “Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism. But, Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”
I have no clue which doctrines of free will and the participation of individuals in their destiny, the meaning of their actions you are referring to?
But what about The Arising of the Buddha Metteyya DN 26 in the buddhist doctrine?
DN 26:
The Arising of the Buddha Metteyya
And the Blessed One named Metteyya will arise in the world—perfected, a fully awakened Buddha, accomplished in knowledge and conduct, holy, knower of the world, supreme guide for those who wish to train, teacher of gods and humans, awakened, blessed, — just as I have arisen today.
He will realize with his own insight this world—with its gods, Māras and Brahmās, this population with its ascetics and brahmins, gods and humans—and make it known to others, just as I do today. He will teach the Dhamma that’s good in the beginning, good in the middle, and good in the end, meaningful and well-phrased. And he will reveal a spiritual practice that’s entirely full and pure, just as I do today. He will lead a Saṅgha of many thousand mendicants, just as I lead a Saṅgha of many hundreds today.
Then King Saṅkha will have the sacrificial post once built by King Mahāpanāda raised up. Having reigned, he will abdicate, offering charity to ascetics and brahmins, paupers, vagrants, nomads, and beggars. Then, having shaved off his hair and beard and dressed in ocher robes, he will go forth from the lay life to homelessness in the Buddha Metteyya’s presence. Soon after going forth, living withdrawn, diligent, keen, and resolute, he will realize the supreme end of the spiritual path in this very life. He will live having achieved with his own insight the goal for which gentlemen rightly go forth from the lay life to homelessness.
Obviously not denied in AN 6.38 The Self-Doer.
The sutta is not about the things you brought up like ”that suffering is created by oneself or others” nor ”doctrines of free will and the participation of individuals in their destiny, the meaning of their actions”
Regarding the view that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, ‘nothing else exists’, = ”final Nibbāna is nothing apart from the cessation of the khandhas” is completely denied in the suttas. And it is denied on the basis of the Tetralemma.
Here is the most striking example: AN 4.174
“Then Venerable Ānanda went up to Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, Ānanda sat down to one side, and said to Mahākoṭṭhita:
“Reverend, when these six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, does anything else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Does nothing else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Do both something else and nothing else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Do neither something else nor nothing else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Reverend, when asked these questions, you say ‘don’t put it like that’. … How then should we see the meaning of this statement?”
“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, something else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.
If you say that ‘nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘both something else and nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.
If you say that ‘neither something else nor nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.
The scope of proliferation extends as far as the scope of the six fields of contact. The scope of the six fields of contact extends as far as the scope of proliferation.
When the six fields of contact fade away and cease with nothing left over, proliferation stops and is stilled.”
There you go! No matter what the perspectives and views are regarding ALL phenomena, your preconceived nihilist view also turns out to be nothing more than just a conditioned phenomena (!)
There is absolutely no need to be an arya to conclude that this or that interpretation of the teaching, if it is based on fallacies or contains self-contradictions, is undoubtedly untrue and wrong. Reasoning alone is more than enough for this.
Mahākāśyapa was one of the most revered of the Buddha’s disciples, the renunciant par excellence.[33][34] He was praised by the Buddha as foremost in ascetic practices (Pali: dhutavādānaṃ) and a foremost forest dweller.[35] He excelled in supernatural accomplishments (Pali: iddhi; Sanskrit: ṛddhi) and was equal to the Buddha in meditative absorption (Pali: jhāna; Sanskrit: dhyāna).[36] He is depicted as a monk with great capacity to tolerate discomfort and contentment with the bare necessities of life.
Pāli texts state that the Buddha regarded Mahākāśyapa as his equal in exhorting monks to lead active and zealous lives, and the Buddha praised him for his capacity to instill faith in lay people by teaching. Karaluvinna believes that the Buddha may have been grooming Mahākāśyapa for his later role as leader of the saṃgha.[34]
In the Saṃyutta discourses featuring Mahākāśyapa in the Pāli and its Chinese parallels, Mahākāśyapa is raised as an example of teaching doctrine from a pure and compassionate intention.[61][62] Religion scholar Shayne Clarke argues that the aloof and austere ascetic as he is presented in most texts does not provide a complete picture.[63] Anālayo notes that he did take an active concern in community matters, spent time teaching doctrine and persuaded fellow monastics to practice asceticism. This is also shown in his role as leader of the First Council.[64] The Sanskrit Mahākarmavibhaṅga states that Mahākāśyapa carried out important teaching work, and was able to bring Buddhism to the people in the northwest, starting with Avanti.[65]
However, because of his stern tone of teaching and his being selective in people to teach, his teaching style came under criticism by other monks and bhikṣunīs:[60] he was not popular, especially among bhikṣunīs.[49] This caused him to gradually withdraw from teaching, Anālayo argues. Such an ideal of an enlightened disciple with ascetic values, as depicted in Mahākāśyapa and in a more extreme form in the disciple Bakkula, could reflect sentiments and inclinations among some groups of early Buddhists.[66]
Clarke argues that the image of Mahākāśyapa as a detached ascetic was the way he was “branded” by the early Buddhists to the public in general. Studying Mūlasarvāstivāda texts of monastic discipline, Clarke points out that there is also an “in-house” perspective on Mahākāśyapa, which shows that he interacted with his former wife turned bhikṣunīfrequently to mentor her. Shortly after Mahākāśyapa became ordained under the Buddha, he met his former wife Bhadra, who had joined an order of naked ascetics led by Nirgrantha Pūraṇa (Pali: Pūraṇa Kassapa). She was regularly targeted for rape by her fellow ascetics, however. Mahākāśyapa pitied her and persuaded her to become ordained as a Buddhist bhikṣunī instead.[note 7] Nevertheless, she was still harassed often, but now only when going outside. Since this happened when Bhadra went out in villages to obtain alms, Mahākāśyapa requested the Buddha’s permission to daily give half of the alms food he had gained to her, so she did not need to go out anymore. His actions came under criticism, however, from a group of monks called the Group of Six, as well as Sthūlanandā. Although these monastics were known for their misbehavior, Clarke thinks their criticism was probably indicative of “the general monastic ambivalence toward those of an ascetic bent”.[68] Writing about Sthūlanandā, Ohnuma says that Sthūlanandā went against the idea of detachment and renunciation as generally advocated in early Buddhist monasticism, which is why she hated Mahākāśyapa and Bhadra. She expressed criticism of Mahākāśyapa often, even when he did not act with typical ascetic detachment.[69]
Could have been due to this drama above and even more drama that we even find such a sutta as this in the first place!
The most well-known version of the First Council is that of Mahākāśyapa being the head. However, texts of the Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Mahīśāsaka traditions relate that this was Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya (Pali: Añña-Koṇḍañña) instead, as Kauṇḍinya was the most senior disciple.
This explains everything!
I had no clue the Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Mahīśāsaka despised Mahākāśyapa to such a degree as to make him out as someone who has no wisdom whatsoever in their clearly sectarian text MA62.
Mahākāśyapa’s insistence on accepting offerings from the poor and refusing those from high-standing or supernatural donors was part of the anti-establishment character with which Mahākāśyapa is depicted. This also includes his long hair and beard.
Pretty much the same thing as the Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Mahīśāsaka despising Mahākāśyapa as with Sāriputta in Mahayana:
While depictions of Śāriputra in the Pāli Canon generally portray him as a wise and powerful arhat , second only to the Buddha, Mahayanatexts give him a wider range of depictions. Some Mahayana sutras portray him as a great Buddhist disciple while others portray him as a counterpoint with insufficient understanding of Mahayana doctrine, representative of the Hinayana tradition.[94][95][96] Buddhist studies scholar Donald S. Lopez Jr. describes the latter as “intentional irony” aimed at depicting how profound Mahayana doctrine is by showing that even the wisest “Hinayana” disciple had difficulty understanding it.[91]
Great Disciples of the Buddha: Their Lives, Their Works, Their Legacy (The Teachings of the Buddha).
(that has just been there on the book shelf collecting dust)
I now, after finding out about this whole Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Mahīśāsaka despising Mahākāśyapa, really have an urge to thoroughly study it!
I haven’t been keeping up with this thread, but I think that “everyone” agrees with that. However, check out this link, How Early Buddhism differs from Theravada: a checklist and look at the first topic “overdetermination of not-self.”
Some Bhikkhus argue that “there is no self” was less of an ontological teaching, but instead more of a perception that one develops (in or out of meditation) to perform the duties of the four noble truths. (Look up Thanissaro’s Selves and Not Self).
Yeah, the way I see it, Ven. Thanissaro, being a proponent of nibbana as extra-khandic consciousness, has to solve the problem of why this type of consciousness can’t be called a self (since it would be eternal and blissful). That’s how I understand Selves and Not self.
But I feel like I’ve “heard it all” re. this debate, so I’m more trying to learn whether any new, interesting arguments were made that I missed in this thread
In that case, maybe you can learn something new by having me play devil’s advocate.
When you claim that there is a problem to be solved about whether or not that type of consciousness can be called a self, you are assuming a certain definition of self. One of Thanissaro’s points is that any definition of self when clung to will contain stress, any notion of being a being will contain stress, and he also doesn’t agree that “self = permanent, blissful.” (Furthermore, he doesn’t describe this consciousness as eternal).
Right, and this does a good job of “dissolving” the problem of whether nibbanic consciousness could rightly be called a self or not. Don’t even try to take a position on it! That will just lead to suffering.
But that’s not convincing to me. Chuck it up to different priors, I dunno
If it’s not eternal, then it’s suffering, and it can’t be nibbana.
But that’s using words and concepts to describe the indescribable! This is ineffable stuff!
To me this is the equivalent of saying “just believe me”. Fair enough, but it’s not a style of argument that I like
It’s not eternal, but because it lies outside time altogether, it is not anicca either. Anyway, this will be my last post about the topic. Feel free to have the last word if you wish.
It’s not really clear to me what it means for anything to be outside time (or space, which IIRC is also part of Ven. T’s description). What notion of time and space is being appealed to here?
It’s unclear what it means within the thought world of the EBTs, but also today, say within contemporary physics.
I don’t understand why someone would read that and think “outside of space and time, yeah that makes sense”.
Thank you for giving me the last word
Edit: Like, I don’t understand the background information and assumptions against which that statement makes sense.
Is Ven. T’s nibbanic consciousness impermanent or permanent? Neither, because it’s outside time and space.
I don’t have the priors to make sense of that answer.
Yes.
“No self” is the denial of one’s own existence, which is an oxymoron and a self-delusion.
"Not-self is a denial of mastery and control over that which is already taken as mine and for me.
The problem is not a self, the problem is taking out of ignorance as mine and for me that which cannot be mine and for me. Any view of the self is just one of the results of such an appropriation that is already happening. And the fact of the presence of the appropriation is not a matter of personal choice and preference, but only of the presence of ignorance. If there is ignorance, there is yours and for you, whether you want it or not and whatever views you hold.
There is you because there is yours and for you, not the other way round. There are views of the self because there is appropriation and the capacity to form such views, not the other way round.
At the level of sotopanna, the views about the self are already eliminated, but the appropriation is still there until the very end of ignorance - arahatship. Animals and babies are not even capable of forming views about self, but the appropriation is already there and they are in the state of maximum ignorance.
The elimination of any and all views about the self does not eliminate the appropriation of the aggregates, does not eliminate ignorance, does not eliminate craving, does not eliminate dukkha. The presence of views about the self is merely a symptom of the illness and not the illness itself.
