Wrong views due the khandhas being impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Sasha_A

“No self” is the denial of one’s own existence, which is an oxymoron and a self-delusion.
"Not-self is a denial of mastery and control over that which is already taken as mine and for me.

According to the Cambridge dictionary “No and not are the two most common words we use to indicate negation.”

So this difference in meaning doesn’t seem to come from English and different uses of ‘no’ and ‘not’ – they basically both convey negation in English.

Within Buddhism, I have never seen anyone argue that anatta should be understood as an oxymoronic, self-deluded denial of one’s own existence.

Like, it’s not a real position that anyone takes or argues for.

What gives?

[Saurabh]

@Erika_ODonnell

But I feel like I’ve “heard it all” re. this debate, so I’m more trying to learn whether any new, interesting arguments were made that I missed in this thread

I will try to give you a summary.

Check this first:

@Dhabba

Without the Buddha’s incredible insights I would have never been able to write the following.

Let us take this from a whole nother perspective.

Imagine the laypeople and the ordained of the annihilationist ascetic sect having this discussion we are having right, but instead regarding their Dhamma.

@Dhabba

Some would very sure about themselves and their understanding and answer that existence ceases completely, because our teacher says specifically to: ”be repulsed by continued existence and not be repulsed by the cessation of continued existence”.

Then some would ask, has consciousness ceased altogether in the dimension of nothingness?

The answer to this would be: Of course it has! ”Going totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness, aware that ‘there is nothing at all’, one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.”

Is it possible to somehow be conscious of this nothingness?
Nope. It is IMPOSSIBLE to cognize nothingness because the cessation of consciousness already took place in the dimension of infinite consciousness.

But hold on, doesn’t our teacher say that ”aware that ‘there is nothing at all’, one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.”
So how can one even be aware that ‘there is nothing at all’ if one is truly annihilated?

@Dhabba

This ”awareness” takes place in the dimension of infinite consciousness.
With the insight ‘there is nothing at all’ there is the cessation of infinite consciousness. With cessation of infinite consciousness there is the entering and remaining in the in the dimension of nothingness, which our teacher says is the cessation of continued existence.

So one is truly annihilated with nothing left?
YES! One is completely annihilated in the dimension of nothingness.
If ”nothing” could truly be cognized the cognizer of ”nothing” must be ”something”. But in the dimension of nothingness there is not a single ”something”,
only nothingness and nothing but nothingnes.
(Since infinite conscioussness has been transcended)

While still having a physical body you can only have a glimpse of this nothingness, but with the death of the physical body not hampering you anymore you enter and remain in the dimension of nothingness.

See how IMPOSSIBLE it would be to refute this as untrue? , anyone would be convinced of it being accurate. The words, the phrasing, the whole logic behind it make it seem like the dimension of nothingness truly is the highest attainment and more importantly annihilation.

@Dhabba

Only the advocates of the ultimate purity of the spirit, that is, who go totally beyond the dimension of nothingness, enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception could refute it BUT they teach Dhamma in order to directly know and realize this. ”Some sentient beings have such a doctrine. But even the sentient beings who have such a doctrine decay and perish.”

How does the Buddha know they will decay and perish?

So based on this following conclusion/argument results…

1) If person X is convinced that, ‘I have no self’ and he rejects eternalism, he comes in the category of those who hold such a views which leads one to “getting repulsed by continued existence and not repulsed by cessation of continued existence”(this view buddha asks to let go of), such person X will most likely miss nibbana and after break up of body, enter and remain in formless realm of dimension of nothingness because in the dimension of nothingness, because of(mistakenly) believing that there is nothing & everything is annihilated at death, continued existence is actually ceased but in reality even that is not permanent because if that were permanent(as those born in realm of nothingness view), then those who have reached dimension of nothingness would never perish and again become something (get borned)!

Another conclusion/argument is as given by @Sasha_A, for that check this…

@Sasha_A

here is Ven. Nanavira:

PARAMATTHA SACCA
The passage quotes the two lines (5 & 6) containing the simile of the chariot. They are used to justify the following argument. The word ‘chariot’ is the conventional name given to an assemblage of parts; but if each part is examined individually it cannot be said of any one of them that it is the chariot, nor do we find any chariot in the parts collectively, nor do we find any chariot outside the parts. Therefore, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no chariot. Similarly, an ‘individual’ (the word puggala is used) is merely a conventional name given to an assemblage of parts (parts of the body, as well as khandhā), and, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no individual. That is all.

@Sasha_A

9. Let us first consider the validity of the argument. If a chariot is taken to pieces, and a man is then shown the pieces one by one, each time with the question ‘Is this a chariot?’, it is obvious that he will always say no. And if these pieces are gathered together in a heap, and he is shown the heap, then also he will say that there is no chariot. If, finally, he is asked whether apart from these pieces he sees any chariot, he will still say no. But suppose now that he is shown these pieces assembled together in such a way that the assemblage can be used for conveying a man from place to place; when he is asked he will undoubtedly assert that there is a chariot, that the chariot exists. According to the argument, the man was speaking in the conventional sense when he asserted the existence of the chariot, and in the highest sense when he denied it. But, clearly enough, the man (who has had no training in such subtleties) is using ordinary conventional language throughout; and the reason for the difference between his two statements is to be found in the fact that on one occasion he was shown a chariot and on the others he was not.

@Sasha_A

If a chariot is taken to pieces (even in imagination) it ceases to be a chariot; for a chariot is, precisely, a vehicle, and a heap of components is not a vehicle—it is a heap of components. (If the man is shown the heap of components and asked ‘Is this a heap of components?’, he will say yes.) In other words, a chariot is most certainly an assemblage of parts, but it is an assemblage of parts in a particular functional arrangement, and to alter this arrangement is to destroy the chariot. It is no great wonder that a chariot cannot be found if we have taken the precaution of destroying it before starting to look for it. If a man sees a chariot in working order and says ‘In the highest sense there is no chariot; for it is a mere assemblage of parts’, all he is saying is ‘It is possible to take this chariot to pieces and to gather them in a heap; and when this is done there will no longer be a chariot’. The argument, then, does not show the non-existence of the chariot; at best it merely asserts that an existing chariot can be destroyed. And when it is applied to an individual (i.e. a set of pañcakkhandhā) it is even less valid; for not only does it not show the non-existence of the individual, but since the functional arrangement of the pañcakkhandhā cannot be altered, even in imagination, it asserts an impossibility, that an existing individual can be destroyed. As applied to an individual (or a creature) the argument runs into contradiction; and to say of an individual ‘In the highest sense there is no individual; for it is a mere asemblage of khandhā’ is to be unintelligible.

Based on this 2nd argument/conclusion is…

2) When we apply Paticcha Samuppada to chariot and panchaskandhas…only reason being, chariot’s functional arrangement can be changed into heap of parts but it’s not the case with panchaskandhas! Their functional arrangement cannot be changed! This kind of asserts possibility that existing individual literally cannot be destroyed!

@Erika_ODonnell sir, I pointed out only 2 arguments because, I felt these are new arguments(sry if I’m missing any other argument, I hope somebody can kindly add them), which you might have missed in this thread because of too many messages and also they are very interesting, I am not completely confident about them(although I am actually confident about and agree with 1st one) but I honestly couldn’t counter them(I don’t think that’s necessary though).
There are many other arguments against above arguments, there are also neutral arguments against them(if you know what I mean)…but them you can directly locate I guess.

Sry for bad English.

[Sasha_A]

@Erika_ODonnell

So this difference in meaning doesn’t seem to come from English and different uses of ‘no’ and ‘not’ – they basically both convey negation in English.

No self = there is no self.
Not-self = this is not self.

@Erika_ODonnell

Within Buddhism, I have never seen anyone argue that anatta should be understood as an oxymoronic, self-deluded denial of one’s own existence.

You are using a straw man fallacy here: the original post does not mention anatta, only ‘no self’. No self and not-self are different ways of interpreting the term anatta.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Sasha_A

No self = there is no self.
Not-self = this is not self.

There’s no apples, there’s not any apples. What’s the difference? Seems to mean the same in English?

@Sasha_A

You are using a straw man fallacy here: the original post does not mention anatta, only ‘no self’.

You are using the straw man, you’re presenting a “no self” a view which is obviously bad. I’m pointing it out that you’re doing that.

@Sasha_A

No self and not-self are different ways of interpreting the term anatta.

Who interprets anatta the way you describe as the no self view?

[Dhabba]

@Erika_ODonnell

Who interprets anatta the way you describe as the no self view?

Make what you will out of the following regarding the no self view:

@Sunyo

Since you yourself do not regard the five aggregates as self, in your view the ”I” or self can only cease to be thanks to something else than the five aggregates….
Nibbāna?*

I would appreciate it if you don’t try to tell me what my view is, because it’s not this. You seem to misunderstand something here. I don’t think there is a real “I” or self at all, so it can’t cease either.

You’re addressing the view of the annihilationists instead. And you seem to assume there are just the five aggregates and nibbāna, nothing else. Fair enough. But that is not the assumption of the eternalists and annihilationists make in this sutta. Not necessarily being Buddhists, they probably don’t even believe in nibbāna in the first place. But more importantly, some of them think there is still a self or “I” outside of the aggregates—that’s the point I perceive is being made here. That self or “I” could for example be the incorrectly perceived owner or experiencer of the aggregates. Eternalists think this continues forever after death; annihilationists think it is destroyed at death. But since such a thing doesn’t exist in the first place, both views are wrong.

@Sunyo

@Dhabba

So this not-real ”I” or self can’t even cease by attaning Nibbāna?

How can something that is not real cease to exist?

It seems you have difficulty separating the annihilationist position from the Buddha’s as I understand it. I’ll try to explain once more. The annihilationist imagines a self, or “I”, or “me”, whether inside or outside of the aggregates. Such a thing doesn’t really exist, but they think that it does. As annihilationists they think it is destroyed at death. The Buddha saw reality as it is and realized there is no self or “I” or “me” at all. So it can’t be destroyed at death either.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Dhabba

Make what you will out of the following regarding the no self view:

I think you ought to make your point/argument explicit if you want to engage in productive discussion

[Dhabba]

All the sayings in bold letters!

[Erika_ODonnell]

I challenge you to be explicit and prove you’re not being intentionally vague to hide the fact that you don’t have a good argument

[josephzizys]

@Erika_ODonnell

Am I missing something? Is anyone saying anything else than one of these three?

Yes, you are missing my position which is that nibanna just means the extinguishment of greed hate and confusion, and that it is not “nibanna” that is “ineffable” rather it is the person of one who has achieved the extinguishment of greed hate and confusion that is ineffable.

So that would be option 4 i guess.

[Erika_ODonnell]

I don’t think anyone contests nibbana as the ending of greed, hatred and delusion?

Or as not including their ending.

[josephzizys]

@Erika_ODonnell

So this difference in meaning doesn’t seem to come from English and different uses of ‘no’ and ‘not’ – they basically both convey negation in English.

Is English your second language @Erika_ODonnell ? Because I assure you this is not the case.

For example “it is not skin off my nose” and “it is no skin off my nose” mean completely different things.

[josephzizys]

The difference is they all say there is more to it than that, while i claim there is nothing more to it than that. Can you see the difference? For example I dont think nibanna has anything to do with the aggregates, and i dont think there is any such thing as “parinibanna” (because what could that mean, do greed hate and confusion end twice? Like “end” and then “really end”?)

[Erika_ODonnell]

@josephzizys

Is English your second language @Erika_ODonnell ? Because I assure you this is not the case.

For example “it is not skin off my nose” and “it is no skin off my nose” mean completely different things.

Is English your second language?

Are you saying that the difference between between not-self and ‘no self’ is analogous to the difference between an idiom (it is no skin off my nose) and an unnatural way to say that something is not one’s nose skin?

Edit:
There are no apples, there are not any apples. These are just two ways of expressing the idea of the absence of apples. There’s minimal, even no, informational difference between these two sentences, they express the same idea.

[josephzizys]

@Erika_ODonnell

Within Buddhism, I have never seen anyone argue that anatta should be understood as an oxymoronic, self-deluded denial of one’s own existence.

Like, it’s not a real position that anyone takes or argues for.

What gives?

It absolutely is a position taken by people within Buddhism, in fact it is taken by people on this very board and in this very thread:

@Sunyo

The annihilationist imagines a self, or “I”, or “me”, whether inside or outside of the aggregates. Such a thing doesn’t really exist, but they think that it does. As annihilationists they think it is destroyed at death. The Buddha saw reality as it is and realized there is no self or “I” or “me” at all. So it can’t be destroyed at death either.

??

[Erika_ODonnell]

@josephzizys

It absolutely is a position taken by people within Buddhism, in fact it is taken by people on this very board and in this very thread:

@Sunyo

The annihilationist imagines a self, or “I”, or “me”, whether inside or outside of the aggregates. Such a thing doesn’t really exist, but they think that it does. As annihilationists they think it is destroyed at death. The Buddha saw reality as it is and realized there is no self or “I” or “me” at all. So it can’t be destroyed at death either.

??

I must be missing something, as that is a standard account of annihilationism, i.e. the belief in a self that is destroyed when the body dies.

How is it oxymoronic to think that the khandas don’t contain a self? What’s going on here?

[josephzizys]

@Erika_ODonnell

Are you saying that the difference between between not-self and ‘no self’ is analogous to the difference between an idiom (it is no skin off my nose) and an unnatural way to say that something is not one’s nose skin?

Well yes, “not self” and “no self” are the chosen idioms for the two sides of a debate about the interpretation of the pali term anatta, with one group adopting a fictionalist account of persons and the other arguing that this account goes to far and we should restrict ourslelves to acknowledging that no phenomena or combination of phenomena are a self.

Im sorry but im perhaps getting a little confused, are you doing something rhetorical? I get that tone is difficult to convey in this format, but I genuinely thought you where asking about no amd not, and now im just not sure what your getting at - there is a very real, very long standing controversy here that is discussed often on this board and has been discussed often in the history of buddhism and for that matter in the history of westen philosophy, if you are genuinely unaware of the issue please ask any questions you have, if you are being rhetorical, or “trolling” perhaps you could assist me with emojies or something to make that more explicit. (Something I should have perhaps done for @Sunyo with my “Thervada Orthodoxy” crack, but i assumed he is well aware of my bent from previous debates)

[Erika_ODonnell]

@josephzizys

Well yes, “not self” and “no self” are the chosen idioms for the two sides of a debate about the interpretation of the pali term anatta, with one group adopting a fictionalist account of persons and the other arguing that this account goes to far and we should restrict ourslelves to acknowledging that no phenomena or combination of phenomena are a self.

Which one is being called the deluded and oxymoronic one?

@josephzizys

Im sorry but im perhaps getting a little confused, are you doing something rhetorical?

I am confused if people are saying the two views you are describing above are grammatically implied or somehow encoded in English by the use of not- vs. no.

[Dhabba]

The best approach might be:

Any view/concept/idea regarding ending the defilements PRIOR to actually ending the defilements is a conditioned phenomena.

Since one is clearly only caught up with proliferating the unproliferated.

If, just as an example, cessation was really true, then we wouldn’t have the following:

“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, ‘nothing else exists’,
you’re proliferating the unproliferated.

So since it can’t be said to be true prior to ending the defilements, khandhas, this means it can’t even be said to be true AFTER ending the defilements… Right?

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Dhabba

If, just as an example, cessation was really true, then we wouldn’t have the following:

“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, ‘nothing else exists’,
you’re proliferating the unproliferated.

So since it can’t be said to be true prior to ending the defilements, khandhas, this means it can’t even be said to be true AFTER ending the defilements… Right?

Do you mean that nothing can be said about what happens next after the six fields of contact fade away?

Edit: Or do you mean the six fields of contact don’t actually fade away?

[Dhabba]

AN 4.174

“Then Venerable Ānanda went up to Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, Ānanda sat down to one side, and said to Mahākoṭṭhita:

“Reverend, when these six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, does anything else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

“Does nothing else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

“Do both something else and nothing else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

“Do neither something else nor nothing else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

“Reverend, when asked these questions, you say ‘don’t put it like that’. … How then should we see the meaning of this statement?”

“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, something else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.

If you say that ‘nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘both something else and nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.

If you say that ‘neither something else nor nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.

The scope of proliferation extends as far as the scope of the six fields of contact. The scope of the six fields of contact extends as far as the scope of proliferation.

When the six fields of contact fade away and cease with nothing left over, proliferation stops and is stilled.”