I already know my own interpretation of this sutta. Please try to answer my question.
Or, if you don’t feel like engaging in discussion, feel free to say so. Don’t just post a sutta I mean come on.
Isn’t the sutta clear enough? 
Is there even a special own interpretation one can make? Mind sharing yours? 
I don’t have my own interpretation, after all it is the Tetralemma.
So I’m bound to proliferate the unproliferated with an
”interpretation”…
Are you saying you are reading the sutta without interpreting it?
Do you do that with all texts or just the suttas?
Please don’t change the subject, you obviously missed that I wrote Tetralemma. Or did you? 
It is a Tetralemma sutta, remember?
Your interpretation of this specific sutta aught to hold up to ALL Tetralemma suttas, no matter the context of the sutta.
So please share your interpretation if you feel like it. 
Is my thread about SN 22.81 an interpretation? 
I am asking you to clarify what you wrote earlier in this post. I asked you whether what you wrote meant that nothing can be said about what happens next after the six fields of contact fade away, or you mean the six fields of contact don’t actually fade away?
Like, am I understanding what you’re trying to say here? That’s what I’m trying to do.
You then posted AN 7.141.
I assume you feel that AN 7.141 answers the question I asked, but I don’t understand how you see it as an answer to my question unless you make that connection explicit for me. You are typically expected to explain your point of view in a discussion this is a discussion forum! I can’t read your mind
First of all while the account of annihilationism in DN1 does talk of selves and thier annihilation it is not clear at all that some substantial hindu style atman is meant, nor how such a thing could be meant as how could something subst…
This conversation is moving too quickly for me to keep up on my phone so i will look to get to my computer this evening to really delve into all this stuff, but in terms of apples,
“These are not apples” and “There are no apples” do convey different things.
“This is not the self” and “there is no self” also convey different things.
And re
I think everyone (even me who thinks the “khandas” are a scholastic muddying of the philosophical waters) agree that they dont contain a self.
The problem is at
This is an inference from the observation that any phenomena or combination of 0henomena are not the self, and it is an unwarranted inference that the buddha does not make in the ebt outside of a handful of cases, mostly in SN, that i argue are late and that do in fact, contradict the abayakata, which is early and universally attested across all nikayas and agamas, something btw that cannot be said for khandas, or for the metaphysical reading of anatta as nominalist metaphysics.
Anyway, i will get on my compuyer later and see if i can address some of this in a more comprehensive fashion.
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Hi everyone.
It seems that things are getting a little heated in this thread.
We will put it on slow mode for everyone’s sake.
Here are a few reminders from the guidelines which I’ve highlighted for everyone’s convenience. 
This might seem obvious, but sometimes we need to be explicit, so let me be just that.
It matters not how intelligent or eloquent you are with regards to a topic, what matters is how you respond to someone, ideally with kindness and compassion
Thanks everyone.
Adrian (on behalf of the moderators)
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- Sunyata
- Anatta
If it is outside of time and space. Then it is nowhere (space); it does not arise, does not exist and does not disappear (time). That is, it does not exist anywhere. It simply doesn’t exist. Since existence occurs only in time-space. In fact, Christian theology resolves the issue of the constancy and causelessness of God in exactly the same way - he is outside of time-space, before it, above it, since he created this continuum. Thanisaro with a Western Christian background could not help but bring Christian theology to Buddhism and Einstein’s understanding of time as the fourth dimension, which allows us to perceive all events of the past and future as a kind of static canvas along which the impulses of existence rush. This static canvas is precisely the same view that “the winds do not blow, the rivers do not flow, the sun does not rise, but the world stands motionless like a column.” This view is described in one of the sanyuts. The Buddha rejected such views. In his mind there is no past and future, there is only a changing present. The past has passed, the future has not come. A mind that has become independent of past present and future aggregates is one that is not attached to memories of the past, is not attached to plans for the future, and is not attached to the changing present. And through non-grasping, he liberated himself and went beyond the limits of the past, present, future, through non-clinging, disidentification. But this does not lead the changeable mind into some kind of black hole, singularity. Since the nature of the mind, the very way of its existence, is to be in time, to experience something every moment. The cessation of moments of cognition is the cessation of the mind.
Before the stuff above, is saying the khandas don’t contain a self different or the same as saying the khandas aren’t self or that there’s no self in the khandas?
In what way is it unwarranted?
Please quote the sutta that defines sunyata through the existence of the self.
Sunyata is emptiness from dukkha caused by defilements, emptiness from defilements:
MN121:
When they’re freed, they know they’re freed.
Vimuttasmiṁ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṁ hoti.They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’
‘Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ, kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ, nāparaṁ itthattāyā’ti pajānāti.They understand:
So evaṁ pajānāti:
‘Here there is no stress due to the defilements of sensuality, desire to be reborn, or ignorance.
‘ye assu darathā kāmāsavaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, ye assu darathā bhavāsavaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, ye assu darathā avijjāsavaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, atthi cevāyaṁ darathamattā yadidaṁ—
There is only this modicum of stress, namely that associated with the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
imameva kāyaṁ paṭicca saḷāyatanikaṁ jīvitapaccayā’ti.
They understand: ‘This field of perception is empty of the perception of the defilements of sensuality, desire to be reborn, and ignorance.
So ‘suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ kāmāsavenā’ti pajānāti, ‘suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ bhavāsavenā’ti pajānāti, ‘suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ avijjāsavenā’ti pajānāti, ‘atthi cevidaṁ asuññataṁ yadidaṁ—
There is only this that is not emptiness, namely that associated with the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
imameva kāyaṁ paṭicca saḷāyatanikaṁ jīvitapaccayā’ti.
And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what remains they understand that it is present.
Iti yañhi kho tattha na hoti tena taṁ suññaṁ samanupassati, yaṁ pana tattha avasiṭṭhaṁ hoti taṁ ‘santamidaṁ atthī’ti pajānāti.
That’s how emptiness is born in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure.
Evampissa esā, ānanda, yathābhuccā avipallatthā parisuddhā paramānuttarā suññatāvakkanti bhavati.Whatever ascetics and brahmins enter and remain in the pure, ultimate, supreme emptiness—whether in the past, future, or present—all of them enter and remain in this same pure, ultimate, supreme emptiness.
Yepi hi keci, ānanda, atītamaddhānaṁ samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā parisuddhaṁ paramānuttaraṁ suññataṁ upasampajja vihariṁsu, sabbe te imaṁyeva parisuddhaṁ paramānuttaraṁ suññataṁ upasampajja vihariṁsu.
See SN 35.85:
“Ānanda, they say that ‘the world is empty’ because it’s empty of self or what belongs to self.
“Yasmā ca kho, ānanda, suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā tasmā suñño lokoti vuccati.
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Not sure what you mean by “before the stuff above”? But yeah, I think they all mean more or less the same thing, the basic idea being that no phenomena or combination of phenomena are stable, complete, purely happy, etc, and therefore none are fit to be identified with/as ones self.
Its not warrented the same way that observing that no oranges are apples and infering that this implies apples do not exist is not warrented.
Finally, I want to say just generally that i think there is a fair amount of variation in what people. Think they are talking about so i will clarify that for myself:
“Self”, “self”, “(my) person”, “identity”, “ones seld”, “subjectivity” etc all mean roughly the same thing. I totally agree that “Soul” or “Atman” or whatever can conote a theory of self that seeks to explain the “self” or the “subjectivity” via a theory of substance, and that this theory is rejected by Buddhism.
I also think that the marerialist philosophies described in for example DN2 are not coherently charectoriezed as “believing in a self that is destroyed”, and think that the "four men carry the corpse " pericope is clearly nihilistic and makes no assertion whatsoevr that there is a “self” that is destroyed, however this is much to close to the “anatta as no person exists” so the commentarial tradition has to gloss it that way.
Anyhow, hope you are happy to debate robustlynand I am not causing you any distress! I am enjoying this conversation immensly myself, it would be a shame if we got throttled by then mods, after all we are all grown ups 
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SN 35.85
Also Ven. Bhante Sunyo quoted above
MA 62 states:
There is no self; there is nothing that belongs to a self; [all this] is empty of a self and empty of anything that belongs to a self. When phenomena arise, they arise; when phenomena cease, they cease. All this is [just] a combination of causes and conditions, giving rise to suffering. If the causes and conditions were not present, then all suffering would cease.
Right, so I guess my initial assumption was that no one would object to various similar ways of formulating not-self if given the assumption that we are restricting ourselves to the five khandas.
Since the nibbanic consciousness is supposed to be outside the five khandas, the nibbanic consicousness people would not object to no self within the five khandas. Cessationists should obviously not object to this either.
But then we got into the whole idea that there’s a big difference between saying the khandas are not-self and that there’s no self in the khandas. To me there’s doesn’t seem to be a big difference.
Regarding “there’s no self” not qualified by being restricted to the khandas – I am open to the idea of the Buddha not wanting to make statements where it seems like he is talking about stuff outside of the six senses. To my mind, reality extends only as far as the six senses. I think it’s literally meaningless to speak about anything beyond that.
From this point, AFAIK, some people will say that outside the six senses is precisely where this ineffable nibbanic consciousness lives. I don’t think so, but I also think it doesn’t make sense to deny it, because in my view it’s just incoherent and meaningless to imagine anything outside the six senses.
Anyway, I think I am just trying to find some common ground, something that everyone agrees on as a basis for the discussion.
Are the oranges changing phenomena and the apples a self in this example?
Right, to my mind “believing in a self that is destroyed” is an inference to the best explanation, aka abductive logic.
What is being explained is why the Buddha put his selflessness message the way he did. Why he said it the way he did. It is true that he very rarely says a blanket “there’s no self”, it’s almost always the five khandas are not self, or using a concept like emptiness as in SN 35.85.
There are other ways to reconcile the difference as well, of course.
I’m happy, but I have to say I am more interested in understanding what others are thinking than convincing anyone of my own view
Edit: I’m also happy to have my own views interrogated. I try not to hold them too tightly. I think basically that nothing in experience can justifiably be called me, mine a self. I don’t think there’s anything meaningful we can say about something outside experience, experience is all there is.
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I’m sorry, I should have clarified that I’m not saying all suttas are misrepresented here. I was referring specifically to MN2.
“Misrepresent” also was too strong a word choice, for which I apologize as well.
I quoted a Sarvastastivada text to show “there is no self” is the interpretation of anattā not just of the Theravada but of other early schools as well. I don’t think I have to agree with all the Sarvastivada has to say in order for that to be the case. There are flaws in the Chines canons as well as the Pali, but the common elements point us at the understanding of the early community.
I don’t want to discuss the interpretation of anatta further here, but for those interested, this topic is of relevance: Bodhi vs Ṭhānissaro debate
I think “nothing” is a mistranslation. Venerable Sujato still hasn’t updated his translation of AN4.174, unfortunately. AN3.173 is updated, however:
The statement “something else no longer exists” assumes something existed outside of the six senses, that now also ceases. Like a self, for example. This is different from “nothing else exists.”
In the sutta, Sariputta says all four statements proliferate beyond the scope of proliferation, which is the six senses. To say “there is nothing”, however, doesn’t proliferate beyond the six senses, exactly because it assumes they are all that there is. That’s another indication that this translation misses the point. “Something else no longer exists”, however, does proliferate beyond the scope of the six senses, because it assumes “something else” beyond them, even if it’s impermanent.
When interpreted like this, which is grammatically more acceptable as well, the sutta actually confirms that the six senses are all there is. That agrees with SN35.28, where the six senses (and experiences through them) are “the all” or “everything”. To say there is another “all”, i.e. to say there is something beyond the six senses, “They’d have no grounds for [saying] that”.
Either way, the old translation you quoted also says that “there is something else” is equally wrong, so according to this the view that something remains after parinibbana is incorrect as well.
All in all, I wonder whether all these recent discussions on this topic are going in a productive direction. Apparently it’s a hot topic. But at least we can accept the other’s perspective, hopefully, even if we don’t agree with it. There’s no need to call each other’s views “nothing more than just a conditioned phenomena”, even if we believe that to be the case.
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That “the world” in this sutta is defined only as a set of very specific things: “the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact, feeling, arising from eye contact, ear…”.
“Ānanda, they say that ‘the world is empty’ because it’s empty of self or what belongs to self.
“Yasmā ca kho, ānanda, suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā tasmā suñño lokoti vuccati.
And what is empty of self or what belongs to self?
Kiñca, ānanda, suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā?
The eye,
Cakkhu kho, ānanda, suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā.
sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact are empty of self or what belongs to self. …
Rūpā suññā attena vā attaniyena vā, cakkhuviññāṇaṁ suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā, cakkhusamphasso suñño attena vā attaniyena vā …pe…The pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by mind contact is also empty of self or what belongs to self.
yampidaṁ manosamphassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṁ sukhaṁ vā dukkhaṁ vā adukkhamasukhaṁ vā tampi suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā.
They say that ‘the world is empty’ because it’s empty of self or what belongs to self.”
Yasmā ca kho, ānanda, suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā, tasmā suñño lokoti vuccatī”ti.
And the way arguments are presented in this sutta is not that of denying the existence of the self: ‘this thing is empty of self’ does not equate to ‘there is no self at all’, but precisely to ‘this is not self’.
What we are discussing here is the validity of interpreting anatta as ‘no self’ in the sense of the absolute non-existence of self - ‘there is no self at all’.
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Yeah, roughly, you observe phenomena and conclude that “no phenomena are a self”, which is fine, but to conclude things like “phenomena are all that there are” is not warranted.
I should just stress that i think it is also not warranted to infer that “phenomena are not all that there are” and so I fo not think there is an “ineffable something” any more than i think there is a nothing.
Frankly i think lot of the debate relys on accepting that the bulk of the four million plus words of the 4 principle nikayas are more or less all equally the teacjings of the buddha and i have come to the realisation that that position is absurd and obviously absurd when you interrogate the material in any systematic way.
SN and AN are decades if not centuries later than the core arguments in DN, and DN looks clearly later than the athakkavagga, and this has nothing to do with grammer or vocab or metre but just with simple doctrinal and meditative ideas that show obvious and significant development and elaboration across the volumes.
When you actually look at the frequency of particular philosophical positions on this topic across the 4 main collections it is obvious that the abayakata argument is by far the preponderant argument and the fictionalist idea appears in SN and there only rarely.
The fact, as @Sunyo points out, that the early schools all end up embracing the fictionalist idea to some extent or another os niethwr here nor there from my perspective, as i am interested in what the texts actually say in the topic, and as i have said, in the texts the abayakata are the clear and unambiguous mainline position.
The abayakata is not compatible with an interpretation of anatta that implies fictionalism, but i am mihht have to go off and have a think about all this and maybe put my position in an essaay in a new thread as i feel like maybe i am being mistaken for an “ineffable something” type.
Namo Buddhaya!
People say that there is no reality apart from spacetime just due to having confined reality to spacetime. Thus they have locked themselves up in a prison of their thinking by assuming to live in a model of reality rather than reality.
Models of reality are not reality and are inherently limited.
The Einsteinean model works well only up until you run into singularities at the bottom of a black hole and another at the beginning of time.
So how on earth do you assume it to work in describing the cessation of observation?
This is like running into Zeno’s paradoxes due to being locked into a certain way of thinking.
To understand the cessation of the constructed as the unconstructed one absolutely has to crawl out of these prisons.
This Dhamma that I have attained is deep, hard to see, hard to realize, peaceful, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise.
I believe this point is very important, regardless of what our views are, there is need to accept that, as even having a view itself can be wrong(regardless of we thinking it’s right view) because maybe whatever we think or talk, the moment we start to think or talk we will be proliferating the unproliferated! We cannot avoid proliferating beyond scope of proliferation, just as we cannot avoid the death once we start this life!