Wrong views due the khandhas being impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Sasha_A

And the way arguments are presented in this sutta is not that of denying the existence of the self: ‘this thing is empty of self’ does not equate to ‘there is no self at all’, but precisely to ‘this is not self’.

Do you agree that saying that the khandas are not-self is a denial of the existence of the self within and inside the khandas, or a self made of the khandas?

If not, what does it mean to say that they are not-self?

@Sasha_A

What we are discussing here is the validity of interpreting anatta as ‘no self’ in the sense of the absolute non-existence of self - ‘there is no self at all’.

I am giving away some glass jars that I used make fermented food if I say there is absolutely no self inside those glass jars, absolute non-existence of self inside my fermentation jars, would you agree?

@josephzizys

Yeah, roughly, you observe phenomena and conclude that “no phenomena are a self”, which is fine, but to conclude things like “phenomena are all that there are” is not warranted.

Can I conclude “phenomena are all that I can know anything about and say something meaningful about”?

@josephzizys

SN and AN are decades if not centuries later than the core arguments in DN, and DN looks clearly later than the athakkavagga, and this has nothing to do with grammer or vocab or metre but just with simple doctrinal and meditative ideas that show obvious and significant development and elaboration across the volumes.

I prefer to treat the suttas as a coherent whole. To each her own I guess

[josephzizys]

@Erika_ODonnell

Can I conclude “phenomena are all that I can know anything about and say something meaningful about”?

No!

But as to mynrrasoning ill have to get back to you in the morning

@Erika_ODonnell

I prefer to treat the suttas as a coherent whole. To each her own I guess

I mean that would be my prefrence too but unfortunately they are not, and where actual contradictions occur hard descisions havento be made

[Saurabh]

I know this is not directed to me, but I wish to be of help to @Erika_ODonnell to understand what @Sasha_A is saying. My reason is that I want to witness the counter arguments to the explanation given by @Sasha_A if there are any.

@Erika_ODonnell

Do you agree that saying that the khandas are not-self is a denial of the existence of the self within and inside the khandas, or a self made of the khandas?

If not, what does it mean to say that they are not-self?

I believe what @Sasha_A would mean is this - when we say, khandas are ‘not self’, it simply means, ‘there is no self in khandas’ or simply, ‘self cannot be found in khandas’ and for that one doesn’t need to deny the absolute existence of self. (plz correct me @Sasha_A if I am wrong)
For example if person X goes to search for something thay he always thought he had with himself but now he is trying to find it, and he is not in any luck of finding that. In other words, suppose he is trying to find key to his car, he goes in his house and he searches for the key, but he doesn’t see/can’t find any key even though he has searched inside all over of his house. So after searching for key in the whole house and not finding, he would reflect, ‘there is no key in the house’ or simply, ‘key is not to be seen/found in the house’, that’s all…only that would be correct. But instead of that if he denies the absolute presence of key in his house, he would be wrong! also if he accepts the absolute presence of key in the house, still he would be wrong and also if he denies the presence of key outside the house, still he would be wrong and finally if he accepts the absolute presence of key outside the house, still he would be wrong! (because his job is just to search for the key and not hold on and make the statements/view about where is key, because purpose is to search for the key that’s all and no need to form any view about that).

@Erika_ODonnell

I am giving away some glass jars that I used make fermented food if I say there is absolutely no self inside those glass jars, absolute non-existence of self inside my fermentation jars, would you agree?

Then I believe you are siding with the, ‘there is no self at all’, and it is an extreme/absolutism hence not correct. Whereas if you say, “these glass jars are empty of self” or “there is not self in glass jars”, then you would be siding with ‘this thing is empty of self’(‘this is not self’).

Having said that, kindly you don’t have to reply to me sir, I just tried to put @Sasha_A 's reasoning in simpler words, again reason being, ‘to listen to probable counter arguments from you or anyone here’, that is if there are any. So wait for Sasha_A’s response and reply to that, don’t reply to me, just read and ignore, because already there are so many messages/posts here on this thread. Moreover I might even be wrong in interpreting what Sasha-A said.

[Invo]

@Erika_ODonnell

There seems to be three positions on nibbana:

1. cessation
2. invisible consciousness outside the five khandas
3. don’t have a view about it/indescribable by words/ineffable

Nice list. Thing is that both cessation and consciousness outside the five kandhas are ineffable.

But cessation makes more sense. Vinnana means there is awareness of something. So there has to be an object of consciousness. Even if consciousness would be unbounded, then still this unbounded consciousness if it were consciouss, it would be consciouss of something - hence having some form of object. Because of that it seems impossible to imagine consciousness outside of kandhas.

I think the only thing to defend idea that there is consciousness outside of kandhas is that vinnana would not have to mean consciousness, but some other mental process related to cognition, but not pure awareness.

I must say I agree with Venerable Sunyo interpretation.

[Sasha_A]

@Erika_ODonnell

I am giving away some glass jars that I used make fermented food if I say there is absolutely no self inside those glass jars, absolute non-existence of self inside my fermentation jars, would you agree?

Yes, you can say that there is absolutely no self in your jar, but not because for you there is no self in the jar or in the clinging aggregates, but because that jar in that situation is not you at all: It is not the jar that is giving itself away, it is you yourself. The self here is the one who is giving away the jar, who is exercising this assumed mastery and control to give away the jar. So this jar in this situation is not even clinging aggregates because clinging aggregates are what the self is made of - clinging aggregates are what has to be implicitly appropriated in order for there to be you as an individual acting as a self, as a person, acting with craving, acting as someone who doesn’t even question his mastery and control to give away this jar - who doesn’t even question the reality and existence of his self, atta.

@Erika_ODonnell

Do you agree that saying that the khandas are not-self is a denial of the existence of the self within and inside the khandas, or a self made of the khandas?

It is impossible to directly deny that existence of self because the self is allways that what is exercising that deny and not that is denyed. What you are looking at is not your self, always. The indirect method is required.

@Erika_ODonnell

If not, what does it mean to say that they are not-self?

To say that they are not the self is an invitation to ask “Why?” and “How can I know this for myself?” But if we are to deny the existence of the self from the very beginning (which again is nothing more than delusion and denial of kamma), then there is no place for such questions - there is no place at all for understanding what is atta and what is aggregates of clinging, the 1NT. There is no way to understand correctly what anatta is without understanding what atta is.

[Sasha_A]

@Saurabh

This kind of asserts possibility that existing individual literally cannot be destroyed! I hope I am right if I say this? @Sasha_A?

For clarification, this quotation is a critical analysis of the traditional interpretation of the sutta on the chariot. The logical conclusion about the indestructibility of a creature is an inevitable consequence of the traditional interpretation if we accept it as the truth - it’s an argument against the traditional interpretation.

[Notez]

Alhamdubuddhaya

It’s like talking about ‘what happens after time?’
If time is ended then there is no after to talk about no matter how much one would want to.

It’s as if we talk about holding a stick or a piece of rope with two ends and a middle.

Here is one end, there another end and this is the middle.
One can grasp one end of the rope, one can grasp the middle of the rope and one can grasp the other end of the rope, but one can’t grasp if there is no more rope.

In as far as the rope goes that is how far grasping goes and we can’t grasp at beyond the rope’s end.

Similarly when talking about the change in constructed.
Past is one end, future is another end and present is in the middle; before is one end, after is another end and a neither before nor an after is in the middle.

In how far the sense bases go that is in as far as sense impression goes, that is in as far as before & after goes, that is in as far as the constructed goes and that is in as far as the narrative of a being goes.

The cessation of sense bases is something, it is a truth & reality, but it is neither a before nor an after or in between.

The cessation of the constructed is unconstructed.

The unconstructed cannot be reified as a continuation of the constructed because past, present, future, only go in as far as we talk about discernment of the change in the constructed as it persists.

It cannot be reified as something that comes after the constructed because it doesn’t pertain to the narrative. The unconstructed is that in dependence on which the end is discerned, one can say it is the end, but the end is not a sequel.

And yet it must be reified as something that is discerned as persisting without change just like the constructed is discerned as changing as it persists.

It is certainly not a nothing or not-existent because if it was nothing and non-existent then there would be no end to that which changes as it persists.

[Notez]

@Notez

And yet it must be reified as something that is discerned as persisting without change just like the constructed is discerned as changing as it persists.

It is certainly not a nothing or not-existent because if it was nothing and non-existent then there would be no end to that which changes as it persists.

These last two paragraphs are much disagreeable to those who believe that upadanakhandas arise & cease in the world like fire. However this ‘consciousness is extinguished exactly like a fire’ is a not a very good interpretation because

1. Extinguishing of a fire is constructed not unconstructed
2. When a person is reborn, comes again or reconnects, however you want to pin it, his consciousness having arisen as one thing here ceases as another thing there.

Nothing like this happens to a fire. No fire can burn out here and be reborn as to continue burning there.

It is exactly why normal naive-realist- materialists don’t believe in rebirth even tho they also believe that consciousness is essentially like a flame arising in the world and they conceive of death in exact same way as the buddhist-naive-realist- materialists conceives of parinibbana.

[josephzizys]

@Erika_ODonnell

Can I conclude “phenomena are all that I can know anything about and say something meaningful about”?

Just to expand on my cheeky “No!” A bit before i go off and try to compose my essay, the reason i wouldnt like to say something like “phenomena are all i can say something meaningful about” is because i appear to thereby say something about the non-phenomenal, i.e “meaningful statments cannot be made about the non-phenomenal.” And this appears to be a meaningful statement, and that appears to be a contradiction.

So i would rather say that most statments that take the non-phenomenal as thier subject are false and or meaningless, but there are some statments, to do with delimiting what can and cant be spoken of, that do take the non-phenomenal as thier subject, without therby implying the “existence” of the non-phenomenal.

All of this is to say that language is a tricky thing and we need to be careful, probably even more careful than i have been above, but i am just trying to get the gist of my worry accross.

Anyway, my buddhist specific worry is that “phenomena are all i can know” reduces to Belaṭṭhiputta style skepticism and bars abayakata type arguments that seem to assert a kind of knowlege about things we cant know to be true or false, and this is to my mind the central philosophical contribution of early buddhism to the world, as opposed to the “Im not real i just think i am so i suffer endlessly until i understand im not real” interpretation of anatta, which as i say, gets going in maybe a half dozen suttas in SN out of the 10,000 or so suttas of the 4 principle nikayas.

Anyway, i am finding many of the posts in this thread now so incoherant and bizzare that i will bow out, and as i say, attempt to gather my thoughts on this issue into an essay that will hopefully give a clearer, more quantitative picture of what i am talking about.

[Charlie]

@Dhabba

If no one cares about the implications of what is being said in this quote I see no point whatsoever discussing anything related to the topic with ANY annihilation/nihilism/”cessation” devotee ever again.

Belief systems are a mightier fortress than the greatest of walls. Best not to beat your head against them. Here is a nice quote from that great 20th century explorer of consciousness Sri Aurobindo:

Non-being is only a word. When we examine the fact it represents, we can no longer be sure that absolute non-existence has any better chance than the infinite Self of being more than an ideative formation of the mind. We really mean by this Nothing something beyond the last term to which we can reduce our purest conception and our most abstract or subtle experience of actual being as we know or conceive it while in this universe. This Nothing then is merely a something beyond positive conception…

Edit: Might as well throw in another Aurobindo while I am here:

It threw me suddenly into a condition above and without thought, unstained by any mental or vital movement; there was no ego, no real world—only when one looked through the immobile senses, something perceived or bore upon its sheer silence a world of empty forms, materialized shadows without true substance. There was no One or many even, only just absolutely That featureless, relationless, sheer, indescribably, unthinkable, absolute, yet supremely real and solely real. This was no mental realization or something glimpsed somewhere above,–no abstraction,–it was positive, the only positive reality—although not a spatial physical world, pervading, occupying or rather flooding and drowning this semblence of a physical world, leaving no room or space for any reality but itself, allowing nothing else to seem at all actual, positive or substantial…What it [this experience] brought was an inexpressible Peace, a stupendous silence, an infinity of release and freedom.

Source: Sri Aurobindo or The Adventure of Consciousness p 130.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Sasha_A

Yes, you can say that there is absolutely no self in your jar, but not because for you there is no self in the jar or in the clinging aggregates, but because that jar in that situation is not you at all: It is not the jar that is giving itself away, it is you yourself.

I’m still confused as to whether you agree or not that we can look at a jar an conclude that there’s absolutely no self in the jar

Like, why would there be a self for me in the jar? I’m confused!

@Sasha_A

It is impossible to directly deny that existence of self because the self is allways that what is exercising that deny and not that is denyed. What you are looking at is not your self, always. The indirect method is required.

Do you mean the ‘not this, not this’ method of the Upanishads?

@Sasha_A

There is no way to understand correctly what anatta is without understanding what atta is.

I do not know what you or other people are referring to when you speak of the self. I’m trying to find out though

@josephzizys

Just to expand on my cheeky “No!” A bit before i go off and try to compose my essay, the reason i wouldnt like to say something like “phenomena are all i can say something meaningful about” is because i appear to thereby say something about the non-phenomenal, i.e “meaningful statments cannot be made about the non-phenomenal.” And this appears to be a meaningful statement, and that appears to be a contradiction.

What do you mean by non-phenomenal here?

@Dhabba

I will not create any more threads or even bring it up in future threads.

Good on ya for showing restraint

[Layman]

Summary of this thread

Yaṃ sañjānāti, taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi, taṃ papañceti

In my opinion sanna is such a incredibly ‘vicitta’ dhamma there is really no limits to the diversity of philosophies.

Philosophy can be useful, but remember, sanna is lickened to a mirage.The quest for an ‘aviparita’ philosophy, I just find a laughable notion. Diagnosing sanna(and so forth) is the way.

[Nikolas]

Buddha did not deny thinking and knowledge. He did not deny the correct view, although it is not worth clinging to either. The Buddha’s view is essentially simple and does not need to be expanded upon. There is only the dependent arising of empty suffering. With the cessation of ignorance there is a dependent cessation of empty suffering. That’s the whole point. There is nowhere to expand mentally. I do not experience problems with mental expansion, adhering to this view. It’s really mediocre. And the Buddha taught that paticcha-samuppada is the middle ground between all extremes. The one who sees dependent arising sees the Dhamma. He who sees the Dhamma sees the Buddha.

[dhammapala]

A sense of self arises because of a mating pair coming together to create a four elemental body that is endowed with the capacity for mind.

Because of the feeling of being alive, one comes to create a mental image of themselves (a view, perception, a mental abstraction), hence ‘i’. The error arises in taking this to be the entirety of ones mind-body. In the same way the word ‘hand’ isn’t in itself is the same way the ‘I’ isn’t the entirety of ones mind-body: yet many people are often caught within self reflective thinking. Middle way seeing requires one looks at the causal relationships that led to the arising of X, Y and Z. This is the middle way view where one sees things clearly as compared to investing in blind faith belief.

It is the four elemental body, the sprouting of mindfulness, and a view formed of the feeling of being alive that gives rise to the sense of self because of the fact that ‘one is aware, or knows, that they are aware or alive’. ‘The one who knows’. The aggregates factors are just an operating system and one is the knowing as well as charioteer that arises at the intersection of all these factors.

This neither denies nor affirms a self. Instead: it encourages one to inspect ones experience. The middle way is apprehending tathata and dwelling in the suchness of things as they are instead of being lost in endless mental abstraction. Mental abstraction serves a function or a utility but can also become a trap.

In the same way, life or oneself is neither ‘eternal nor annihilatory’. When one rests in just looking, just hearing, there is just that-ness which is simply thus. It is then the habit of intellectualising that causes one to put endlessly narrate and push experience into boxes… hence the ‘thicket of views’.

[Ceisiwr]

@josephzizys

It would be wonderful to get a refrence to that @Ceisiwr !

Sorry for the late reply. Here it is

[yeshe.tenley]

Very nice citation. This is something I have been searching for quite awhile and missed. I have this book and this gives me enthusiasm to reread, thank you!

[yeshe.tenley]

I also have not kept up with this thread, but I am quite sure there are many more than this. This list does not come close to being exhaustive and my own very small and limited understanding is not present nor do I recognize the understanding of many I hold in very high regard.

[yeshe.tenley]

Respectfully, there is a formal and rigorous logical way to understand the difference between these two understandings of anatta:

1. no self
2. not self

We can take the first one as the end conclusion of a classical logic indirect “proof by contradiction” that relies upon the Law of the Excluded Middle.

We can take the second one as the end conclusion of a constructive logical “refutation by contradiction” that does not go the one step further of double negation elimination to form an indirect proof.

These are not just syntax disagreements. They are not just “strategies” but rather they point to deep questions about what are appropriate ways of knowing and what are not. That is where I part ways with Venerable Thanissaro regarding not self as just a strategy.

Interestingly, if you think the Teacher did not believe LEM was appropriate - as Venerable @sujato has suggested - then it is the latter interpretation of anatta that is correct: not self.

Why is this interesting? Because to my mind Venerable @sujato is a proponent of #1 and not #2. This is inconsistent to my mind, but to understand why someone really does need to understand deeply the formal difference between these two theories of logic.

Another way to look at it: #1 might very well be correct, but if you don’t subscribe to LEM then you can not arrive at the truth of #1 through logic. If you don’t assume LEM, then only #2 is suitable to be arrived at through logic. This seems to me a crucial thing to understand, yet quite subtle.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@yeshe.tenley

I also have not kept up with this thread, but I am quite sure there are many more than this. This list does not come close to being exhaustive and my own very small and limited understanding is not present nor do I recognize the understanding of many I hold in very high regard.

Feel free to add to the list

@yeshe.tenley

These are not just syntax disagreements. They are not just “strategies” but rather they point to deep questions about what are appropriate ways of knowing and what are not. That is where I part ways with Venerable Thanissaro regarding not self as just a strategy.

Does this apply equally to

1. I have no apples
2. I do not have apples

?

Like, to me these just two ways of speaking that basically mean the same thing. I don’t think natural language is loaded with deep philosophical meaning in the way you seem to describe there. And I think the Buddha was speaking mostly in natural language. E.g. there are, AFAIK, vastly more practical, naturalistic similes and analogies in the EBTs than technical philosophical language.

[Ceisiwr]

@Sasha_A

It is impossible to directly deny that existence of self because the self is allways that what is exercising that deny and not that is denyed. What you are looking at is not your self, always. The indirect method is required.

Denying the atta isn’t asserting the atta. By denying it one doesn’t confirm its existence. Perhaps this is true in the Neo-Abhidharma of Phenomenological Buddhism, buts its not the case in Buddhadhamma.