Really?
Now at that time one of the monks had the thought, “How do you know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life?”
Then the Buddha, knowing what that monk was thinking, addressed the mendicants:
And because the Buddha phrases it in first person like those having the this view, hence the ”I” and with you being 100% certain there is no self whatsoever (despite the Buddha saying this view is wrong) we truly are going around in circles…(???)
The ”I” in the phrase means nothing.
Ending the defilements leads to nibbāna. The sutta does not directly deal in an ontological or “descriptive” sense with nibbāna, as some other suttas do. It deals with obstructing views of self, eternalism and annihilationism.
Not that nibbāna can be pinned down. But see Iti44,
AN6.101: "It’s quite possible for a mendicant who regards extinguishment as pleasurable to accept views that agree with the teaching. …”
‘So vata, bhikkhave, bhikkhu nibbānaṁ sukhato samanupassanto anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato bhavissatī’ti ṭhānametaṁ vijjati."
AN9.34, AN9.49, and many others.
Frankly, I have no idea what you’re getting at here. There is no specific phrase in the suttas “There is no self” and yet the Buddha’s teachings on anattā are foundational.
Again, I’ll be leaving this thread and thanks for the convo.
This is without doubt the worst argument in Buddhism. It is made once, in a poem, by a nun, talking to Mara, and is made nowhere else in the ebt.
“Cart” is NOT the name for a collection of cart parts. That would be “cart parts”. “Cart” is the name for a cart. Similarly if i wish to refer to “the collection of things that constitute the parts of a person” i cannot simply say “person” because that is not what “person” means.
If i have a pile of cart-parts, even if i have ALL the cart parts, i do not have a cart. Cart is the word we use for the whole, intact, actuall cart.
If the word for anything that is made of parts is “only a name” for something that does not in fact exist then NOTHING in fact exists, since EVERYTHING (sans perhaps some sort of Spinoza-esqe God-Substance) is made of parts.
If the argument applies to everything, then it cant pick out a self to be unreal and an “impersonal aggregate” to be real.
Also, aggregate LITERALLY means “made of parts”, so if there is anything not real by the niave nominalism of the “just a name” crowd it would BE the aggregates!!
I agree with your take in general about this issue, but to play mara’s advocate, here is how I would respond to this argument:
The person is merely a collection of aggregates and so not real in any significant sense. Furthermore, the aggregates already mean “made of parts,” so the person is merely “made of parts” which are themselves “made of parts,” and so the person is doubly unreal! 
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Sure, but by the argumnet as given the “suffering of old age AND death” isnt real, certainly the “8fold” path isnt real, the “12 links” arnt real… I just do not understand what possible reason anyone would ever have, again, unless your Spinoza or Parmenides, for thinking that things that have parts aren’t real?
Watches arent real
Telephones arnt real
Pyramids arent real…
Sentences arent real because thier made of words, words arent real because thier made of letters…
Its just a silly, silly, silly argument.
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Because, as you said, to do so would be to encourage either an annihilationist view, if we were to imply the existence of the self, or a nihilist view, if we were to deny the existence of the self, for example by saying that in the absolute sense everything is just causes and effects, or dhammas, or kalapas, or atoms and nerve impulses, and so on. To say that ‘in the absolute sense there is no self’ is exactly that - an attempt to deny annihilation with nihilism, to deny one extreme wrong view with another extreme wrong view - it is a fallacy of reasoning.
More than that, it is an unresolvable philosophical paradox: it is impossible to deny one’s own existence, because for that one must exist in the first place. Or, from the atta’s point of view, it is impossible to deny the existence of the atta, because to do so you have to have control over yourself in order to carry out that denial, and that control over yourself is nothing other than the atta.
To say in any way that the Buddha taught the absence of self, that anatta means ‘no self’, is to make him a fool and his teaching an incoherent, self-contradictory mess.
That’s why he didn’t encourage all these views.
The crucial point here is to understand that the teaching is not about the existence or non-existence of the self, the teaching is only about dukkha and the elimination of dukkha. And the only way to understand dukkha and uproot dukkha is to do skillful actions and not to do unskillful actions. In other words, the teaching is to answer the single question, “What must I do to eliminate my suffering once and for all?” And to achieve this goal there is no need for insoluble delusional speculations about the existence of the self.
All this confusion arises from the one false assumption that for any appropriation to exist, there must be a self, an appropriator. But in fact it’s quite the opposite: every view about the self is the result of appropriation. For there to be appropriation, there is no need for any views about the self, or even the ability to form such views, like in the case of animals or babies. Such views are nothing more than the result of attempts to rationalise this appropriation: there is ‘me’ because there is already ‘mine’ and ‘for me’, and not otherwise. So the crucial question is not “Do I exist?” but “Is what I take to be mine and for me really mine and for me, and if it isn’t, how can I see that for myself?”
Anatta is not about ‘no atta’ but about ‘not atta’ - about lack of mastery and control over that which I take to be mine and for me. ‘Self cannot be found’ is not the same as ‘There is no self’.
So what have aggregates of clinging got to do with all this? Aggregates of clinging are what has to be appropriated, mastery and control over what has to be assumed in order for the person to act and attend to objects as a self, as a subject. If, for example, there is action with desire out of feeling for some pleasing visible forms, then what is implicitly appropriated is not the forms, but the very feeling on account of these forms.
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In addition to the Vajir Sutta, there is a similar one - SN 5.9. And in this sutta SN 12.15, the Buddha utters the same words as Vajira, that only suffering, when it arises, arises. etc. As for the cart as a name for parts and elements, everything is very simple. Indeed, a pile of parts is not a car, absolutely true. A car is a pile of necessary parts + their position and location. This is the same element of information and it is also a necessary condition. A necessary condition for what? - movement functions. A function is the effect of necessary conditions and causes, constituent elements. Parts and their location are necessary conditions. A car is an example of a combination of conditions for the occurrence of a consequence - the element of movement/driving/transportation.
Another excellent sutta, already given by the Buddha, on this topic. The sound arises not simply from the parts of the lute, but from the correct position of the parts, the efforts of the musician, etc.
SN 35.246
“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a king or a royal minister who had never before heard the sound of a lute. He might hear the sound of a lute and say: ‘Good man, what is making this sound—so tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling?’ They would say to him: ‘Sire, it is a lute that is making this sound—so tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling.’ He would reply: ‘Go, man, bring me that lute.’
“They would bring him the lute and tell him: ‘Sire, this is that lute, the sound of which was so tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling.’ The king would say: ‘I’ve had enough with this lute, man. Bring me just that sound.’ The men would reply: ‘This lute, sire, consists of numerous components, of a great many components, and it gives off a sound when it is played upon with its numerous components; that is, in dependence on the parchment sounding board, the belly, the arm, the head, the strings, the plectrum, and the appropriate effort of the musician. So it is, sire, that this lute consisting of numerous components, of a great many components, gives off a sound when it is played upon with its numerous components.’
“The king would split the lute into ten or a hundred pieces, then he would reduce these to splinters. Having reduced them to splinters, he would burn them in a fire and reduce them to ashes, and he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Then he would say: ‘A poor thing, indeed sir, is this so-called lute, as well as anything else called a lute. How the multitude are utterly heedless about it, utterly taken in by it!’
“So too, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu investigates form to the extent that there is a range for form, he investigates feeling to the extent that there is a range for feeling, he investigates perception to the extent that there is a range for perception, he investigates volitional formations to the extent that there is a range for volitional formations, he investigates consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness. As he investigates form to the extent that there is a range for form … consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness, whatever notions of ‘I’ or ‘mine’ or ‘I am’ had occurred to him before no longer occur to him.”
Also, two sticks do not generate fire and are not a means of making fire. An element of applied effort is needed, an element of correct placement - and then there will be an effect - fire. And the sticks are already called differently, although they have not changed their essence. Likewise, the elements of the body and mind do not change their nature just because they are included in the system of the being.
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But Sunyata is
The world and dhammas are empty of the self and that which belongs to the self simply means that there is no self in the world. Like a jug empty of water simply tells us that there is NO water in the jug. Sunyata is realized through anatta. In the beginning there is a subjective position “I am” - this is mine, this is not mine. But then all positions dissolve into emptiness.
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Hmm, maybe this is the essence of ending suffering. In any case, one of the suttas says that for the Arahant there is no death. 
However, death is not described in personal categories in the suttas, as the destruction of a being - but in categories of phenomena and experience: disintegration of aggregates, destruction of the body. This is the phase of massive cessation of dhammas.
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But SN5.9 is similar in form only, the argument it makes is completely different:
“This puppet isn’t self-made,
“Nayidaṁ attakataṁ bimbaṁ,
nor is this misery made by another.
nayidaṁ parakataṁ aghaṁ;
It comes to be because of a cause,
Hetuṁ paṭicca sambhūtaṁ,
and ceases when the cause breaks up.
hetubhaṅgā nirujjhati.
It says that the puppet arises and ceases dependent on conditions, aka dependent origination, this is the most repeated, most basic, most widespread and most often attested as enligtening argument in the whole of buddhism, repeated in different ways hundreds if not thousands of times.
SN5.10 on the other hand says
When the parts are assembled
Yathā hi aṅgasambhārā,
we use the word ‘chariot’.
hoti saddo ratho iti;
So too, when the aggregates are present
Evaṁ khandhesu santesu,
‘sentient being’ is the convention we use.
hoti sattoti sammuti.
This is a different argument, made here, and arguably (but im less sure) in the Yamaka, and made almost nowhere else.
The abayakata/dependent origination argument makes no appeal to nominalism, nor does it need to to cohere.
As for SN35.246 I would just point out that the lute does in fact make a sound when played, so it is pretty unclear what exactly the analogy is trying to accomplish.
As for the rest of what you say I can’t make head nor tail of it, elements, functions etc etc, just not sure what you are trying to say.
If there is no self, then there is no good or bad action, no responsibility for your actions, no kamma, no birth, no death, no mother and father, no dukkha, no appropriation, no desire, and so on and so on. - This is a wrong view, but it is just covered up by another wrong view using a fancy scientifically-sounding fallacy of reasoning. There’s no way to prove that the self doesn’t exist without falling into some kind of f wrong view. And this is just the tip of the iceberg, because the moment we start speculating about the absence of self and the mechanical nature of the universe, we are inevitably faced with another set of questions about the limits of the world in space and time - the very questions that Buddha deliberately set aside because they are not useful for the purpose of the teaching.
Once again, the problem is not the existence of the self, the problem is the wrong understanding of dukkha and the wrong understanding of the uprooting of dukkha. Everyone’s starting point is from the position of ignorance: I am undeniably existing, and there is that which is mine and for me. To be ignorant or not, to appropriate aggregates or not, is not a matter of personal preference or clever choice of wording, it is only a matter of the factual presence of ignorance, and as long as ignorance is there, there by the fact cannot not be appropriation, there cannot not be at least that which is mine and for me (like in the case of aryas, with exception of arahats), there cannot not be dukkha.
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Paticcha samuppada is the answer to the question of how actions, karma, responsibility, etc. exist without the presence of self and soul in the absolute sense. There is also a load bearer - but it is a skillful use of conventional language to explain the dhamma. at the level of dhammas there is nothing like that.
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@Sasha_A I was close to writing ”Amen!” to both your excellent posts and then realised ”Sadhu! Sadhu! Sadhu!” would be better!
Thank you for sharing this in the thread in such a well written way! 
AN 6.38 Attakārīsutta ???
6.38. The Self-Doer
Then a certain brahman approached the Blessed One; having approached the Blessed One, he exchanged friendly greetings. After pleasant conversation had passed between them, he sat to one side. Having sat to one side, the brahman spoke to the Blessed One thus:
“Venerable Gotama, I am one of such a doctrine, of such a view: ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer.’”
“I have not, brahman, seen or heard such a doctrine, such a view. How, indeed, could one—moving forward by himself, moving back by himself —say: ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer’? What do you think, brahmin, is there an element or principle of initiating or beginning an action?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“When there is an element of initiating, are initiating beings clearly discerned?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“So, brahmin, when there is the element of initiating, initiating beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer, this, the other-doer.
“What do you think, brahmin, is there an element of exertion … is there an element of effort … is there an element of steadfastness … is there an element of persistence … is there an element of endeavoring?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“When there is an element of endeavoring, are endeavoring beings clearly discerned?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“So, brahmin, when there is the element of endeavoring, endeavoring beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer, this, the other-doer. I have not, brahmin, seen or heard such a doctrine, such a view as yours. How, indeed, could one—moving forward by himself, moving back by himself—say ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer’?”
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Exactly what question the PS answers, and how that answer is to be understood, depends entirely on who is reading the suttas on PS. There is more than one interpretation of the PS. At least there are interpretations that don’t make the Buddha look like a fool and his teachings an incoherent pile of contradictions.
Because neither a particular part of the chariot is a chariot, nor all the parts of a chariot piled up in a heap is a chariot. The chariot is an assembly of parts in a particular order that can be used as a vehicle. The chariot is a vehicle and it exists as a vehicle, and as a vehicle it can only be found at the level of vehicles, not at the level of parts.
The parts of a chariot and a chariot are completely different things. Chariot parts exist as parts of a chariot. A chariot exists as a vehicle.
In the same way, dhammas or body parts or tissue cells or atoms or force fields exist as such - as dhammas, body parts, tissue cells, atoms, force fields. All of these by themselves, or piled up in a random heap, are not a being. There is no being that can be found at the level of dhammas, body parts, tissue cells, atoms, force fields, not because there is no being at all, but because none of these things is a being: the being is a completely different thing from its parts, but it exists as a being and can be found at the level of beings.
Or here is Ven. Nanavira:
PARAMATTHA SACCA
The passage quotes the two lines (5 & 6) containing the simile of the chariot. They are used to justify the following argument. The word ‘chariot’ is the conventional name given to an assemblage of parts; but if each part is examined individually it cannot be said of any one of them that it is the chariot, nor do we find any chariot in the parts collectively, nor do we find any chariot outside the parts. Therefore, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no chariot. Similarly, an ‘individual’ (the word puggala is used) is merely a conventional name given to an assemblage of parts (parts of the body, as well as khandhā), and, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no individual. That is all.9. Let us first consider the validity of the argument. If a chariot is taken to pieces, and a man is then shown the pieces one by one, each time with the question ‘Is this a chariot?’, it is obvious that he will always say no. And if these pieces are gathered together in a heap, and he is shown the heap, then also he will say that there is no chariot. If, finally, he is asked whether apart from these pieces he sees any chariot, he will still say no. But suppose now that he is shown these pieces assembled together in such a way that the assemblage can be used for conveying a man from place to place; when he is asked he will undoubtedly assert that there is a chariot, that the chariot exists. According to the argument, the man was speaking in the conventional sense when he asserted the existence of the chariot, and in the highest sense when he denied it. But, clearly enough, the man (who has had no training in such subtleties) is using ordinary conventional language throughout; and the reason for the difference between his two statements is to be found in the fact that on one occasion he was shown a chariot and on the others he was not. If a chariot is taken to pieces (even in imagination) it ceases to be a chariot; for a chariot is, precisely, a vehicle, and a heap of components is not a vehicle—it is a heap of components. (If the man is shown the heap of components and asked ‘Is this a heap of components?’, he will say yes.) In other words, a chariot is most certainly an assemblage of parts, but it is an assemblage of parts in a particular functional arrangement, and to alter this arrangement is to destroy the chariot. It is no great wonder that a chariot cannot be found if we have taken the precaution of destroying it before starting to look for it. If a man sees a chariot in working order and says ‘In the highest sense there is no chariot; for it is a mere assemblage of parts’, all he is saying is ‘It is possible to take this chariot to pieces and to gather them in a heap; and when this is done there will no longer be a chariot’. The argument, then, does not show the non-existence of the chariot; at best it merely asserts that an existing chariot can be destroyed. And when it is applied to an individual (i.e. a set of pañcakkhandhā) it is even less valid; for not only does it not show the non-existence of the individual, but since the functional arrangement of the pañcakkhandhā cannot be altered, even in imagination, it asserts an impossibility, that an existing individual can be destroyed. As applied to an individual (or a creature) the argument runs into contradiction; and to say of an individual ‘In the highest sense there is no individual; for it is a mere asemblage of khandhā’ is to be unintelligible.
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This… 1)st point
And this… 2)nd
And this… 3)rd
And this… 4)th (This 4th argument, is I believe actually core of what you mean to say.)
And finally this… 5)th
These 5 points are pinned by me as a summary/essense of what you said. I am amazed to realize that, results are not the same, when we apply Paticcha Samuppada to chariot and panchaskandhas…only reason being, chariot’s functional arrangement can be changed into heap of parts but it’s not the case with panchaskandhas! Their functional arrangement cannot be changed! This kind of asserts possibility that existing individual literally cannot be destroyed! I hope I am right if I say this? @Sasha_A?
I don’t see anything wrong in above arguments, in fact, from the look of it, these points are very easy to be ignored (just as one who is convinced ‘I have no self’ also denies eternalism, actually might miss nibbana and land in dimension of nothingness or formless realms, by mistaking it to be ultimate truth).
Now I am wondering how the counter arguments will be against them or how above arguments will be proven wrong. I tried to counter it but I couldn’t(for that I am glad though ), but again I am just having Pov of puthujana.
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MA62 states:
There is no self; there is nothing that belongs to a self; [all this] is empty of a self and empty of anything that belongs to a self. When phenomena arise, they arise; when phenomena cease, they cease. All this is [just] a combination of causes and conditions, giving rise to suffering. If the causes and conditions were not present, then all suffering would cease.
In MN2 the wrong consideration is “I have no self” (or “there is no self for me”). This is still a thought of “I”. It doesn’t say “there is no self”, nor does any other sutta say that this is a wrong view.
Take from that what you will. I don’t want to argue, but let’s at least represent the texts accurately.
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An unknown sutra that has no parallel in the Pāli corpus proves that we misrespresent texts?
Texts maybe, but not the teaching.
Are there more like this? Or is this the only one? 
Doesn’t the parallel to Attakārīsutta The Self-Doer
AN 6.38 - SA 459 contradict MA62 completely?
On top of that the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma The Aṭṭha Vimokkhe (Eight Liberations) also contradict some cherished views with the following:
The seventh liberation is transcending all aspects of neither perception nor non-perception and abiding in a state beyond thought and non-thought.
The eighth liberation is transcending all aspects of thought and non-thought, illuminating all worlds equally, and remaining motionless.
So how should one go about representing the texts accurately if the texts themselves contradict each other?
Is the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma The Aṭṭha Vimokkhe (Eight Liberations) an accurate text representing the teaching?
Is SA 459 an accurate text representing the teaching?
What is the criteria?
@Sunyo Do all dhammas exist in the past, present and future?
"He who affirms the existence of the dharmas of the three time periods [past, present and future] is held to be a Sarvāstivādin.”
What do you consider are the wrong views of the Sarvāstivāda?