As I understand, anicca and anatta (and dukkha) are characteristics of conditional existence.
Indeed. Interpretations vary on whether you can remove the dukkha from conditioned existence.
The Bhikkhu does say that “Because these things are always changing, impermanent, unsatisfactory, and beyond our control, we realize anatta, also.”
Actually I think that in the suttas anatta is mainly discussed in terms of identification, assuming the aggregates to be “me” and “mine”.
Yes, that is correct we have the five aggregates of rūpa (form), vedana (feeling), sañña (perception), saṅkhāra (mental formation) and viññāṇa (consciousness).
The anicca, dukkha and anatta characteristics also applies to the things that we desire to have which we will not be getting what we desires (anicca) in the long run as we have no control (anatta) over what we will not be getting what we desires due to the true nature of things (yathābhūta) which are of the following:
- impermanence (addhuva)
- disintegrating (paloka)
- fickle (caḷa)
- perishable (pabhaṅgu)
- subject to change (vipariṇāmadhamma)
- conditioned (saṅkhata)
- worthless (asāraka)
- subject to death (maraṇadhamma)
- non existence (vibhava)
- anicca summaries the above nine as “not getting what one desires”
- anatta - we have no control over item 1 to 10.
If we desire for things (craving [taṇhā]), sufferings (dukkha) is the end result.
Below is a short passage of the MN 35 The Shorter Discourse With Saccaka - Cūḷasaccakasutta sutta giving details about the aggregates of rūpa, vedana, sañña, saṅkhāra and viññāṇa and revealing (
see verse 13.3 ) that the real meaning of attā as “with control” and that of anattā as “without control” (implied meaning).
Meaning of vaso from Pali-Dictionary Vipassana Research Institute:
vaso：and（vasaṃ） Wish, desire; will, authority, power, influence, control, mastership, ownership.
11.7 “Then, Master Gotama, what I am saying is this:
“Ahañhi, bho gotama, evaṃ vadāmi:11.8 ‘Rūpaṃ to me are attā (with control), vedanā to me are attā (with control), saññā to me are attā (with control), saṅkhārā to me are attā (with control), viññāṇaṃ to me are attā (with control)’.”
‘rūpaṃ me attā, vedanā me attā, saññā me attā, saṅkhārā me attā, viññāṇaṃ me attā’”ti.12.1 “Well then, Aggivessana, I’ll ask you about this in return, and you can answer as you like.
“Tena hi, aggivessana, taññevettha paṭipucchissāmi, yathā te khameyya tathā naṃ byākareyyāsi.12.2 What do you think, Aggivessana?
Taṃ kiṃ maññasi, aggivessana,12.3 Consider an anointed king such as Pasenadi of Kosala or Ajātasattu Vedehiputta of Magadha.
vatteyya rañño khattiyassa muddhāvasittassa sakasmiṃ vijite vaso—12.4 Would they have the power (vaso) in their own realm to execute, fine, or banish those who are guilty?”
ghātetāyaṃ vā ghātetuṃ, jāpetāyaṃ vā jāpetuṃ, pabbājetāyaṃ vā pabbājetuṃ, seyyathāpi rañño pasenadissa kosalassa, seyyathāpi vā pana rañño māgadhassa ajātasattussa vedehiputtassā”ti?12.5 “An anointed king would have such power (vaso), Master Gotama.
“Vatteyya, bho gotama, rañño khattiyassa muddhāvasittassa sakasmiṃ vijite vaso—12.6
ghātetāyaṃ vā ghātetuṃ, jāpetāyaṃ vā jāpetuṃ, pabbājetāyaṃ vā pabbājetuṃ, seyyathāpi rañño pasenadissa kosalassa, seyyathāpi vā pana rañño māgadhassa ajātasattussa vedehiputtassa.12.7 Even federations such as the
Imesampi hi, bho gotama, saṃghānaṃ gaṇānaṃ—12.8 Vajjians and Mallians
Seyyathidaṃ—vajjīnaṃ mallānaṃ—12.9 have such power (vaso) in their own realm.
vattati sakasmiṃ vijite vaso—12.10
ghātetāyaṃ vā ghātetuṃ, jāpetāyaṃ vā jāpetuṃ, pabbājetāyaṃ vā pabbājetuṃ.12.11 So of course an anointed king such as Pasenadi or Ajātasattu
Kiṃ pana rañño khattiyassa muddhāvasittassa, seyyathāpi rañño pasenadissa kosalassa, seyyathāpi vā pana rañño māgadhassa ajātasattussa vedehiputtassa?12.12 would wield such power (vaso), as is their right.”
Vatteyya, bho gotama, vattituñca marahatī”ti.13.1 “What do you think, Aggivessana?
“Taṃ kiṃ maññasi, aggivessana,13.2 When you say,
yaṃ tvaṃ evaṃ vadesi:13.3 ‘Rūpaṃ to me are attā (with control),’ do you have power (vaso) over that rūpe to say:
‘rūpaṃ me attā’ti, vattati te tasmiṃ rūpe vaso—13.4 ‘May my rūpaṃ be like this! May my rūpaṃ not be like that’?”
evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosī”ti?13.5 When he said this, Saccaka kept silent.
Evaṃ vutte, saccako nigaṇṭhaputto tuṇhī ahosi.
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Why is atta equated with control?
13.3 ‘Rūpaṃ to me are attā (with control),’ do you have power (vaso) over that rūpe to say:
‘rūpaṃ me attā’ti, vattati te tasmiṃ rūpe vaso—13.4 ‘May my rūpaṃ be like this! May my rūpaṃ not be like that’?”
evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosī”ti?
If you read the above with understanding, you will come to realize that you have no control over not only rūpa but also vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, and viññāṇaṃ (all five aggregates).
If you equate attā (plural) as selves, do you have so many selves for rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, and viññāṇaṃ (all five aggregates)?
[atta is singular and attā is plural]
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There’s a rather interesting article by Karunadasa, which I came across on the web, that touches on such issues: “The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self, and the Problem of the Over-Self”.
The later part of the article mostly deals with the “over-self” idea, but the earlier part of the article deals with characteristics of atta and anatta that can be inferred from the suttas (four senses in which anatta seems to have been understood in early Buddhism are listed).
The fourth sense indeed relates to control and discusses MN35. To quote the article:
A fourth sense in which the term anatta is used could be detected from the Culasaccaka Sutta of the Majjhimanikaya, which records the well-known debate between the Buddha and Saccaka. The theme, of the debate was the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. Saccaka’s argument is based on the premise that just as any kind of seed or vegetable grows and comes to maturity depending on the earth, even so whatever act a person commits, whether it is meritorious or demeritorious, depends entirely on the five aggregates (khandhas). Hence he concludes that the five aggregates constitute an individual’s atta or self. In order to prepare the background for counterargument, the Buddha asks Saccaka whether the King of Kosala or Magadha has power or sovereignty over his subjects so that he could put to death one deserving to be put to death or to banish one deserving to be banished. When Saccaka admits that this is so, the Buddha puts this question to him: “When you assert that the five khandhas are yourself, have you power over them, have you control over them, so that you can say: ‘Let my five khandhas be thus, let my five khandhas be not thus’?” Saccaka fails to give a satisfactory answer and admits that he was sadly mistaken in this matter.
What is most significant for our purpose here is the way the Buddha sought to refute Saccaka. It is based on the observation that if anything could be called atta or one’s own self, one should have full control over it. The same idea is expressed in a number of other suttas in a slightly different form. We give below one relevant quotation:
"If, for instance, the physical body could be considered as the self, then this physical body would not be subject to affliction; one should be able to say (with practical results): 'Let my physical body be like this; let not my physical body be like that.' Because the physical body is not self, therefore it is subject to affliction."This quotation also clearly shows that Buddhism understands atta as something over which one should have full control, so that it behaves in the way one wants it to behave. If something can be called my own, I should be able to exercise full sovereignty over it. This is the Buddhist definition of possession. What is hinted at is the idea that, since we do not have full control over our possessions, we are being possessed by our own possessions.
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Sure, we have very limited control over what we experience, but what is that to do with not having a “soul” ( atta )? Why would having a “soul” imply that one has control over one’s everyday experience? You could argue that belief in a “soul” is a way of coping with life’s transience and unpredictability, but that is another matter.
But why? Why should atta be something one should have control over? I confess I’ve never really understood this argument.
Also I still don’t understand what exactly anatta is negating - it is atta as in “soul”, or is it just self-view, the sense of “me”?
The suttas also say that the aggregates are impermanent, therefore unsatisfactory, and not to be regarded as self. But I’m pretty sure somebody practicing in a Hindu tradition wouldn’t regard the aggregates as atta, quite the contrary - I think they would view atta as underlying phenomenal experience. Possibly this formula in the suttas is more to do with nibbida ( disilluionment ), but to me this lack of control argument doesn’t really make sense as a negation of atta.
Also in my experience it’s quite possible to have a strong sense of “me”, but not feel at all in control! Again the argument doesn’t really make sense to me.
Anyway, I don’t want to derail the discussion, these questions might make a new thread?
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Take the idea of a dependent origination process, a kind of causal thread running between lives. I suppose the argument is not that such a thread doesn’t exist at all, but that this process isn’t worthy of the label “atta” (or “soul”) though some people might be inclined to attach that label to it.
Karunadasa does also argue that the idea of atta being something one should have full control does crop up in the sequence of the three characteristics, i.e. why does something being a source of dukkha necessarily imply it is anatta? :
In fact, it is this same idea of atta that comes into focus in the logical sequence or interconnection between the three signs of existence (tilakkhana), namely impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and anatta. How the first two characteristics lead to the idea of anatta is shown as follows:
"Whatever is impermanent is suffering (yad aniccam tam dukkham); whatever is suffering is anatta (yam dukkham tad anatta)"The question that arises here is why the idea of anatta is said to follow as a corollary from the fact of dukkha or suffering. This should become clear if we examine the three signs of existence in their reverse order. When examined in this context, the following facts become clear: I cannot consider anything as my own or as belonging to me (=atta), because whatever I consider so, is a source of suffering (dukkha). Why is it so? Because what I mistakenly consider as my own does not behave in the way I want it to behave. Why is it so? Because whatever I mistakenly consider to be my own is subject to constant change (anicca).
Or going back to this thread/DO process:
What is denied in Buddhism is not the concept of person which is called puggala, but a self-subsisting entity within the puggala, which answers to the definition of atta. Therefore, Buddhism has no objection to the concept of puggala, if by puggala is understood, not an entity distinct from the sum total of the properly organized five aggregates, nor a substance enduring in time, nor an agent within the five aggregates. The puggala (person) is the sum total of the five aggregates combined according to the principles of dependent origination and which are constantly in a state of flux.
I suppose to clarify what is being negated/denied in the term anatta, it’s necessary know what exactly is positively meant by “atta” (perhaps not such a straightforward thing to do! 
).
This makes sense in the way Thanissaro Bhikkhu explains his choice of “inconstancy” rather than “impermanance” for translating anicca. He notes that nicca means constant, ongoing, stable, as well as, by extension, permanent.
As example he mentions that one knows that one’s automobile, for instance, is “impermanent”, as a rather distant abstraction. One expects, however, the car to be serviceable in the meantime. When it suddenly breaks-down at the point one really needs (and expects, desires) to use it – that’s the making of “suffering”.
You may have not read the article that @suaimhneas posted which elaborate on the issues of “Four Interconnected Senses of atta or anatta”. Please read the article “The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self, and the Problem of the Over-Self by Y. Karunadasa” (arrange in better format for reading with bookmark) and you will know that the word “atta” can be use as “self” (3rd sense) or “with control” (4th sense) where “anatta” will be “without control”.
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Thanks, but that doesn’t answer the question I posed. Why does not having control over the aggregates mean there is no “soul”, given that a “soul” would be “beneath” the aggregates?
It’s an interesting interpretation, though it assumes the primary meaning of “anatta” is “not belonging to me”, and I don’t think that’s clear from the suttas.
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Ok, I have not understood you question.
Have you read the sutta “SN 44.10 With Ānanda – Ānandasutta” that I have put it in a file in the post " Attā and anattā real meaning reveal in the sutta " that the Buddha did not answer questions from Vacchagotta on whether “does the self exist absolutely?” or “does the self not exist absolutely?”.
That is to say that the Buddha did not approve of a “self” (in your case “soul”) and also did not disapprove of “no self”.
Your misunderstanding arise in post 25 with the question of “Why is atta equated with control?” The reply was that there are four interconnected senses of atta or anatta. If you have atta as “self” (sense 3) , you will not have “with control” and if atta is “with control” (sense 4), you will not have “self”. Both “self” and “with control” for atta do not exists at the same time.
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My favourite translation for anicca is “transient”.
For the deeper teachings it often takes me quite a while of reflection, and ‘accepting’ various facets of exposition, before a clear understanding results. Sometimes it can take years. Perhaps be a bit more gentle on yourself, and put aside the urgent need to know for the time being
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Though I assume that here “self” refers to self-view, rather than to “soul”?
Thanks, but it has been years, and I still don’t really get it. The explanations look a little too convoluted for my taste, and I see quite a lot of ambiguity in the suttas. Anyway, no problem, I will stop thinking for a while. 
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Perhaps also as used s/t referring to “homeless” people – involuntary renunciates, so to speak.