This was offered merely as a theoretical example representing how, in the view of a number of practitioners, dukkha does not utterly cease while the khandhas are present. It was not offered as an analysis of how clinging could or could not work in this particular situation.
In other words, if there’s no dukkha when the khandas are present then endless rebirth would not be a problem, even if it arose randomly or by chance. But the point of the N8FP is the complete ending of rebirth which the Buddha explained was the utter ending of dukkha, (parinibbāna).
The example wasn’t meant as a point for detailed debate, but rather as a kind of “metaphor” for how the ending of all rebirth and the khandhas is the goal, rather than any existence with the khandhas, even without clinging.
But I don’t think it’s worth getting caught up dissecting the example itself.
In one sense, the khandhas are just naturally changing phenomena and the ending of attachment, craving, and identification with them is the cessation of much dukkha and the ending of rebirth.
At the same time, as written before, the body is still present, so pain will still be present, and pain is uncomfortable, especially severe pain, and that can be seen as a form of dukkha. This appears to be the crux of the issue and the main area of disagreement.
True, the “mind” of an arahant will not be suffering with the second arrow of aversion, fear, anger, etc. But I don’t think anyone has argued that pain won’t be experienced in and of itself.
Again, some don’t see this as a kind of dukkha. Others do, as in SN 22.76, "What’s impermanent is suffering. Yad aniccaṁ taṁ dukkhaṁ; " and many other suttas in which the khandhas are shown to be impermanent and hence suffering. Sabbe sankhāra dukkha. Here, sankhāra points to all conditional phenomena.
So we may wish to consider: is pain, intrinsic to the presence of the khandhas whether clinging and ignorance are present or not, a form of *dukkha (*the first arrow), or not? You and others appear to say, “No.” Ok.
But could that first arrow and pain be present after the death of an arahant (parinibbāna) when all the khandhas have utterly ceased? I think there will be agreement: No.
And if the extinguishment of pain and the first arrow after parinibbāna is understood as a relief (even just from the physical), compared to the presence of pain while the khandas are present then…
I understand and respect the points you and others have made regarding this issue and appreciate the Dhamma-exercise of sharing about these and other issues as a form of practice.
I offer my respect and gratitude to you and others who continue to share on this forum in this way!
Nibbana is not saṅkhārā, Nibbana is anattā, unconditioned. So when one has attained Nibbana, there are no conditioned phenomena, because they are understood as impermant, not-self and dukkha. But since Nibbana is experienced ‘alive’, this begs the question as to how it can be that when one has attained Nibbana that there are no conditioned phenomena? I explained this in a post above.
When one has attained Nibbana, and one stubs his toe, one cannot say that one suffers, because one must first identify oneself in order for suffering to be applied, even though the pain is felt. Since upon attaining Nibbana one is not-self, no suffering can be applied.
Agree, and I don’t think anyone is saying otherwise. Sabbe sankhāra dukkha was cited in the last post specifically to support the fact that the khandhas, being conditional/impermanent, are dukkha.
While the latter part of this is true, the former part about “no conditional phenomena” does not apply to niibbāna realizedcwhile an arahant is still alive. A number of posts in this thread attest to this, including that existence, bhava, is still present.
Iti44 differentiates between nibbāna with residue (khandhas, conditional phenomena; sa-upādisesa nibbāna dhatu) and nibbāna without residue or conditions (anupādisesa nibbāna dhatu). It’s important to know which is being pointed to in a given teaching.
There remain different viewpoints as to whether pain itself is a form of dukkha, even without clinging or identification, or whether it isn’t. My last post asked if there would be any relief when the khandhas fully cease in parinibbāna compared to having to experience any pain. And if so, then…
Examples have been offered for both sides. Everyone can choose for themselves, of course.
This is irrelevant, because Nibbana is unconditioned. The commentaries explain Nibbana in this way, whereby the nature of Nibbana as explained in the suttas is changed, in order to make a coherent story out of their wrong understanding of DO. The commentaries hold DO to be speaking of insight into the workings of the universe as to how human child-birth comes to be, which is impossible to know, because we can never have any understanding beyond our own cognition. Instead, actually, DO explains how the process of cognition leads to the appropriation of that what is cognized as child-birth to be that of the self.
The first, wrong, understanding leads to liberation from suffering only at death, and until death, life in its entirety is experienced as suffering.
The second, right, understanding leads to liberation from suffering at the moment anatta is understood.
Indeed, people should determine for themselves what might be the actual teaching and worthwhile to follow.
In my previous post I explained that this is impossible when one has attained Nibbana.
We may wish to be careful before making statements like:
Probably no one on this forum is an arahant and since only arahants have unsurpassable Right View/Understanding…
I mean, someone saying the Dhamma is about stealing and clinging – sure, obviously mistaken. But more subtle aspects are probably best approached with open-hearted curiosity and consideration. Just saying…
Also, we may also wish to consider that a number of very experienced Venerables take the former position, the one you label as “wrong.”
For example, in a different topic a Venerable wrote:
"Suffering is more than just craving. The khandhas themselves are suffering too.
“You should abandon desire for what is suffering. And what is suffering? Form, feeling, perception, will (sankhāras), and consciousness are suffering.” (SN22.140)
So if you want to end suffering, the khandhas have to end. That’s why final nibbāna is stated to be the cessation of existence. Because only that is the complete end of suffering."
Now we may agree or disagree with this, and we may agree to disagree!
I think this was all taken in the light of genuine desire for discussion around an issue that @Sunyo quite adeptly identified. He is talking about momentary, intentional, sequential conscious, which in consideration of many things … is quite an advanced approach, and he is objecting to it as an interpretation, perhaps even a doctrine common to certain abhidhamma. He’s taken in up in a way that, to me, seems designed to make his thoughts as simple as possible.
He led me to some questions, for instance, what does ‘viññāṇāhāro āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbattiyā paccayo, tasmiṁ bhūte sati saḷāyatanaṁ, saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso’”ti. in SN 12.12 actually mean …
This punabbhavābhinibbattiyā is causing me problems as a first stop.
@Brahmali. Hmmm, I’m a bit sad now! I thought I almost made you see the light, Ajahn. Haha! But no worries. Because of course I also have no vested interest in these kinds of things. Otherwise I’d just be asking for headaches!
Thanks for your thoughts!
OK, it’s true these factors are not the exact same. But then still, the idea of the six senses developing after nāmarūpa is also not explained very often or clearly in the suttas, nor is it pragmatically very relevant. In other words, these links, still set a precedence for bhava > jati as I understand it, in that they mainly give us different ways to contemplate the same general idea, instead of being truly distinct ideas. And the sequential idea here is not too different, actually, from bhava leading to birth as I see those factors. For one thing, because the definition of birth also mentions ‘obtaining the ayatanas’ which seems to mean the six senses, so I wouldn’t rule out that it also includes physical birth. Which bhava precedes.
But is this really the main reason, then, to give bhava this meaning of changes within life? That’s not the best reason of all time, I think you can agree.
Because the problem remains, as I said before, that the idea doesn’t fit bhava as it is used throughout the suttas. Stream enterers not taking an eighth bhava, for example, clearly doesn’t mean that their lives can only “take shape” a maximum of seven times. It fits none of the examples I’ve given at the start (putting aside AN3.76-77 for a moment, on which we disagree). They all talk about rebirth and/or bhava in a the sense of a whole life. None are about a change of “existence” in this life. (Except perhaps the sutta on arahants being the highest bhava, which, being about arahants, doesn’t fit your ideas of bhava = kamma either, is quite clearly a pun on bhava, and also equates it to ‘abode’.)
I’ve asked everybody here for examples of bhava happening or changing in this life or being directly linked with kamma, but nobody has supplied any, nor could I find any myself. Aside from you mentioning AN3.76-77, but I showed how it can be interpreted differently. Even if I got kittāvatta wrong, the suttas still specifically mention punabbhava at the conclusion and therefore are also about rebirth.
It may be a rare concept. But significantly, the suttas that do talk about it in some detail actually specifically use bhava (AN4.131) and craving + upādāna (SN44.9). I don’t think it’s far-fetched to assume the words are used here in the same general sense as in DA. In fact, it would be strange to not do so, since the context is essentially the same: that of rebirth.
I’m not sure if we agree on the process! But, yes, I think the noble truths suffices to get insight into the dhamma, and I also think even arahants may get technical or linguistic details about DA completely wrong. So in that sense it doesn’t matter.
But it does change where we direct our contemplation. Your interpretation moves these factors away from contemplating rebirth. (And is, as far as I’m aware, not much different from some people’s ideas of “becoming”.) But to me these factors of Dependent Arising really intent to convey how rebirth occurs. Rebirth occurs because, out of craving we take up (upādāna) the aggregates again after death. (Which is one reason they are called upādānakkkhanhas, aggregates which are taken.) This leads to further existence after death and then to birth. This is analogous to the second noble truth on the origin of suffering: it is the that craving leads to punabbhava. I see bhava in DA as the functional equivalent of punabbhava in the second noble truth. That makes contemplating this truth and these factors of DA essentially the same, namely about rebirth.
(Also, if bhava were to be changes or karmic processes in this life, how does punabbhava mean rebirth? If bhava changed within one life, than literally speaking you can also have punabbhava (another bhava) within a single life. The word is much more naturally read as “again existence” i.e. “another life”, with bhava meaning a life that starts after death, essentially.)
It takes away from the depth of DA too. The stream enterer’s insight of DA is insight into rebirth. That’s something very different from seeing how our craving influences the way we live our lives (or how our life takes shape), which is something everybody can kind of understand. You need no jhanas or deep insights for that. Also, any such processes in life do not really lead to birth. But continued existence (after death) does very directly lead to rebirth. And so that’s what I think bhava means.
Anyway, I suppose you have considered most of this before. I see you wanted to end the discussion, so let’s, as they say, agree to disagree! I’ll consider your ideas again in future.
Much metta and be safe on your travels, doctor!
Continuing in the same post because of the 30 minute thing…
Hey, perhaps this helps:
As Ven. Bodhi notes, bhute must refer here to the being that is reborn. So my translation is: "The nutriment of consciousness is a condition for the production of continued existence in a future life. When the being is born, there are the six senses.” The idea is that consciousness needs to continue from a past life in order for there to be rebirth. It explains, as the sutta starts, how the nutriment of consciousness “help[s] those that are about to be born.”
Punabbhavābhinibbattiyā is somewhat clumsy to translate, because the temrs punabbhava and abhinibbatti are very similar. In my translation they are more or less: “production (abhinibbatti) of continued existence (bhava) in a future life (ayatiṃ)”.
Ven. Sujato has: “Consciousness is a fuel that conditions rebirth into a new state of existence in the future. When that which has been reborn is present, there are the six sense fields.”
Ven. Bodhi has: “The nutriment consciousness is a condition for the production of future renewed existence. When that which has come into being exists, the six sense bases come to be; with the six sense bases as condition, contact.”
The idea is the same.
But to come back to the topic, in this compound also bhava refers to a future life, not to “becoming”.
All other Pali dictionaries I have say essentially the same.
The word can also be used in a more “daily-life” sense of ‘production’, like producing a painting, but in the compound “punabbhavābhinibbatti” and similar contexts it always refers to rebirth.
I fully agree that bhava generally means existence, like existence in the human realm after human rebirth. At the same time, your mind may already be inclining towards rebirth in the devaloka while you exist in the human realm. It is as if your existence is divided into two aspects: the realm you are stuck in as a consequence of where you were born and the realm that your mind is inclining to. This sort of analysis is what you find in places like SN12.38, SN12.39, and SN12.40. It is the mental “existence” that determines where you get reborn in your next life, and thus there is a continuity of the bhava, which matches the whole idea of kamma leading to a particular rebirth.
No-la! The factor of jāti is still there. Rebirth is as important as ever. And yes this is exactly the insight of the stream-enterer. And so no, it does not take away from the depth of DO.
Because bhava means existence, punabhava means rebirth. The usage in DO is an extension of the usual meaning. But it might well be, as you suggest, that the antarabhava is an important component of bhava. This does match the (rare) distinction the suttas make between bhavasaṃyojana (the fetter of existence) and upapattisaṃyojana (the fetter of rebirth). So perhaps this is an area where we can find common ground. I have to admit that the idea of bhava including (but please note the word “including”) a kammic aspect is perhaps not as strong as I had thought.
Sorry, I made the mistake of thinking the discussion was over. A typical failure of the imagination …
If you were to ask me, I would say that it says “because of our experience of consciousness (our grasping of it) we believe in the transcendence of conditioned rebirth.”
For people not interested in becoming a monk, doctrinal orthodoxy really isn’t important, they just want to get close to what Buddha was actually teaching. And that was cessation, not rebirth.
And just to be thorough; the suttas explicitly state that the clinging aggregates are suffering, and not the aggregates as such. The sutta that you quoted doesn’t say that the aggregates are suffering.
The aggregates give rise to sankhāras when, out of ignorance, they are taken to be as self, i.e. are clung to. When the aggregates are understood as not-self, there is no clinging, no arising of sankhāras, hence no suffering, i.e. Nibbana. Profoundly simple.
I think this is a good and important point. This is a brief description of my understanding of bhava:
We take up, due to taṇhā, certain aspects of our experience—primarily explained in terms of the pañcupādānakkhandha. Those aspects which are taken up become what we are. In other words, we become them. So in truth it is not that “I grasp the aggregates,” but rather, “the aggregates are grasped, and thus I am.” This is what we really are: that which we take up. This is extremely important to the dhamma and it is expressed perfectly in upādānapaccayā bhavo.
I think that the Buddha emphasized this in a certain light though—specifically in light of saṁsāra and the stationing of consciousness. That is, there are three main spheres or domains in which we may exist and float around due to our grasping (upādāna): the sensual sphere, form sphere, or formless sphere. An anāgāmi does not have any sensual upādāna, nor the fetter to sensual desire or sensual rebirth. We can already assume from the sutta mentioned here about the arahant that the same can be said of the anāgāmi for instance: they are not existing in the same way that a sensual being is in the sensual sphere.
Once we exist in this sense though, it doesn’t just stop; no, it leads to birth accordingly. In other words, bhavapaccayā jāti. And I think we can also bring in the ideas of the antarabhava and whatnot if needed. That is, for me, bhava never actually ceases and re-starts. We say “punabbhava” because it’s a concrete and reasonable way of speaking. But if we look at things from a bigger picture, there is no clear ending and beginning point: consciousness is just being established and arising continuously in places throughout saṁsāra. The Buddha clearly used the simile of fire in many cases (for consciousness, for craving/saṁsāra, etc.) and I think due to the use of the term upādāna the same simile can be applied when looking at bhava:
Based off of the fuel (upādāna) of the aggregates, a fire comes into being and exists. So long as there is still fuel, that fire will continue to burn. However, the fuel is gradually changed out. Say we put 3 oak logs in the fire, and an oak-fire is born. Then, right before that fuel runs out, we put in a birch log: now there’s a birch-fire. The entire time, fire exists in the sense that there is burning. And yet, there are different “births” or manifestations of fires that we can separately designate as coming into existence and then going out of existence (the oak fire stopped existing and the birth fire began).
Our existence if the fire burning, and the individual births are the sets of aggregates we take up in each life. The thing is: you cannot separate the existence of fire from the individual “births” of different types of fire. If the fire is burning, it must be some type of fire. In other words, there cannot be a fire—dependent on fuel—that is burning without that automatically implying the birth of an oak-fire, birch-fire, etc. However, the burning of fire generally in dependence on fuel is, in a sense, more fundamental than the changing manifestations of particular types of fires. In the same way, bhava is going to continue, and there will be different jātis that manifest on account of that, while bhava implies jāti and vice versa.
This can be applied to the current life or to contemplation of saṁsāra generally: if we exist and were born, and we exist now like a fire ablaze due to its dependency on upādāna, then there is no reason for that to cease—the fire can just pick up more fuel to keep burning, and it goes back into the past where it existed and picked up the current khandhas to burn. In a sense, you can feel the length of saṁsāra and of existence when contemplating it. Also though, it shows the selflessness of it all: a fire is not an actual thing—it’s just a bunch of changing energy. It’s not really the same fire “jumping” from fuel to fuel and still burning; it’s actually just the continuation of combustion (forgive my very basic scientific knowledge of fire lol). We can see how our existence, our sense of self, our individuality—which has continued from past lives and is not going to stop in the future unless the fire is put out—is actually just a kind of burning from upādāna (and ultimately avijjā-taṇhā); there is nothing substantial there, and it’s rooted in delusion.
I personally find this simile very helpful and I think it is quite accurate. I’m not sure if @Sunyo would agree with this understanding of bhava—I’d be curious to know your thoughts
Sorry, I should have phrased myself better. It perhaps doesn’t take away from the overall depth of DA once we consider all factors. But it does distance bhava, taṇhā, and upādāna further from jati. Which means these factors become less about rebirth, and the depth of these individual factors is reduced. That was the point I tried to make. Anyway, that wasn’t not really an important point nor was it (dis)proving anything. So I just say this to clarify some of the sentiments underlying my posts, including the topic in the first place. Namely, how central I feel rebirth is to the whole thing. To me, seeing bhava as sort of “existences” in this life dilutes this message.
I’m happy to hear that: “I have to admit that the idea of bhava including […] a kammic aspect is perhaps not as strong as I had thought.” But I’m sorry to hear: “Sorry, I made the mistake of thinking the discussion was over.” I apologize to have kept you occupied! But don’t worry, it is over now, haha. I’m getting tired of it myself. Thanks for the nice exchange. I learned new things too. Most important common ground, of course, in that jati is a physical birth, not a mental event.
Hey, nice to see you again, kaccayana . I will sound like a record stuck on repeat, but I’ll say it once again: Give me one concrete example from the suttas where bhava is used in this sense, and I might be convinced. I never found any such instances and instead only instances that imply something else, namely rebirth only. For example, the Buddha coming from heaven to a human bhava doesn’t mean that he already “mentally existed” in the human bhava before he died. Or the stream winners that only have one life (bhava) as a human left, doesn’t mean they only have one “mental existence” as a human left. (AN3.87-88, AN9.12) I get the feeling people aren’t really reading the references, so let’s look at one in full:
"Most people, mum, ignorant of the truths taught by the excellent Buddha, look forward to the next life (bhava), longing for rebirth among the gods. Yet even rebirth among the gods in an impermanent existence (bhava) is not eternal. But fools are not scared, of being reborn time and again. " (Thig16.1)
This has nothing to do with mind states or existence in this life, and all with rebirth in a particular realm or existence (bhava) as a god.
The moment of death is when you move from one bhava to another, not while alive. I’m not sure why this is such a big issue, lol. Isn’t it clear, at least to some people reading this?
Also, bhava meaning a sense of self or “I am” doesn’t really align with arahants still having bhava and with bhava ceasing at parinibbāna. This sense of self or “I exist” was abandoned by them at enlightenment already.
The sense of self is already incorporated in avijjā (ignorance), and is already implied throughout the whole origination chain. It is also not craving that leads to a sense of self, like you imply with, “due to taṇhā […] the aggregates are grasped, and thus I am.” The sense of self precedes craving. And this craving then leads to rebirth, which is when we pick up the burden of the aggregates:
So, what is the burden? The five taken up aggregates, you should answer. What five? The taken up aggregates of form, perception, perception, will, and consciousness. That is what is meant by the burden.
And what is picking up the burden? It is the craving that leads to a next life, which along with enjoyment and desire looks for happiness in all sorts of realms. (SN22.22)
The stationing of consciousness is also about rebirth. You can’t station your consciousness in a heaven realm while you are a human, for example. The stations of consciousness are explicitly said to be certain beings such as humans and devas, not states of mind. (AN7.44) The sutta also says how beings arrive at those stations: by faring on (upaga), which a study of the term will show means to be actually reborn there, hence Ven. Sujato translates it exactly like that. This is why AN3.76 talks about the three broad realms of bhava using the same idea of establishing consciousness and connect it with punabbhava. You establish consciousness in the rūpadhatū, for example, when you are reborn (punabbhava) there, not while you are alive:
“So with deeds as the field, consciousness as the seed, and craving as the moisture, the consciousness of beings who are obstructed by ignorance and fettered by craving is planted in the middle realm. That is how continued existence in a future life is produced." (evaṁ āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti.) (AN3.76)
(Sorry, it’s easier to copy from my own translations when I have them. Of course they are biased, as all translations are, so also look at Vens. Bodhi and Sujato’s translations. They say essentially the same.)
This is where the earlier quoted line is also relevant: “The nutriment of consciousness is a prerequisite for the production of continued existence in a future life. When the being is born, there are the six senses.” (SN 12.12) This implies consciousness moving on the the next life. Notice also how “production of continued existence in a future life” clearly means rebirth, since it speaks about a being. Elsewhere this line is followed directly by birth, so it effectively takes the place of bhava in the chain of factors in Dependent Arising, showing that punabbhava and bhava are functionally equivalent: “Where continued existence in a future life is produced (āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbatti), there is future birth, old age, and death.” (E.g. SN12.38)
The thing is, suttas aside, moving on to another life is a very different process from existing in this life or from having a sense of self. To try to capture these very different ideas with a single term fails to recognize this. But at death is when the big changes happen. This is also when the body can change to a new type of existence. And Dependent Arising is not just a mental process, it includes the arising of the body too, and it is also incorporated in bhava. As long as you’re a human, your body is human and therefore has a human bhava. You can’t change this while alive.
At death is also when all our attachment are challenged the most, which is why the Buddha focus the teachings around rebirth, just like the second truth does with taṇhā ponobbhavika.
So the short answer is, no, I don’t agree. Bhava in the suttas is always connected directly with birth, not indirectly through some sense of self or becoming a sort of mental existence. But I do agree there is a continuum of bhava also, which is why bhava only really ceases at parinibbāna. However, the significant changes within this continuum happen on a bigger scale than a single life.
Nice to see you as well I don’t really want to ‘argue’ or spend a lot of time pulling up all kinds of references to convince people of anything and force ideas into their mind. I’m going to put something together, but only to contribute a bit to some of the things here, not to drive home an agenda. If you’re looking to be convinced with heavy-hitting arguments this may not be the post lol.
I’m responding to the end of this post because I feel it sums up a general phenomenon here: you seem to have misinterpreted what I said to be something it is not. I referenced one bhava corresponding to one set of aggregates, which does not imply that bhava is a temporary mental existence. One set of khandhas is acquired once per life. I’d also point out that earlier on in this post I posted some Vedic references in the Aitareya Upaniṣad that refer to rebirth and relate to the concept of bhava to contribute to the some of the same ideas you presented. Also: I agree with you on the kamma thing; I always found this kind of strange in the commentarial exegesis. I just do not see this in the suttas anywhere nor in the meaning of the word as ‘existence.’
These two statements contradict one another. In one, you say that a bhava transitions from one life to the next. In the following statement, you use the sutta about arahants having a unique form of bhava as proof for another argument. We can’t use something for one argument and then shove it aside for another, of course. We also can’t say that some part of it is valid while another part is not with any certainty here, IMO. For instance, one could argue that this is not a strong doctrinal statement and is more a special point the Buddha is making, using the term flexibly, and that for this reason we cannot say that bhava shifts in one life. But if we make this argument, we also have to say that we can’t conclude that the arahant has bhava in the same sense: perhaps the ‘play’ is that the highest bhava is no bhava. Once we start making these divisions, we have stepped into a more uncertain realm of rhetoric.
I’m not making that argument, but what I’m saying is that we have to embrace the entirety of the statement if we are going to consider what it means. It seems to safely lead us to two main conclusions which you also seem to have acknowledged:
The arahant has a type of bhava while still alive in their last life.
The arahant has a different bhava from other beings—which, by necessity, has changed.
I extended this to the anāgāmi because they also have a different existence: they have no sensuality whatsoever, and abide in jhānic states (even if not in jhāna, their mind is equanimous and rid of sensuality, in the same way a non-sensual being would be). I agree with you that bhava primarily refers to one existence/life—this is generally what the words mean in English as well. I already mentioned how I referred to a “set of khandhas” and how this is not compatible with “mental becomings.” That said, I think there is some flexibility here. I think the point of this ‘play’ is precisely that although the arahant appears to be in the sensual-realm and in a sense the khandhas are, at the same time they are not exactly existing in the sensual realm because they have transcended it.
I also think you are creating a division between punabbhava and (present life) bhava / asmīmāna that is not really there. I think the connection between these things is essential and extremely practical. I will expand some on this.
As for sutta references to this, I would argue that some of them are hiding in plain sight. Sometimes things in the suttas are not spelled out as directly as they should be. One example for this is how the cetanā suttas in SN12 do not mention the 3 saṅkhārā in SN 12.2, but we make the connection between the ideas expressed there to see that those suttas are referring to the same thing. All throughout the khandha saṁyutta we see references to that which is conditioned by upādāna and which leads to rebirth without directly naming bhava. The main connection is with sakkāya. I think that sakkāya is related to bhava. Both are conditioned by upādāna; both make reference to ‘existence’ (sat+kāya); both are are connected to the 5 aggregates.
There are too many to cite in full. In SN 22.83, Ven. Ānanda says that he learned that the notion ‘I am’ occurs dependent on upādāna, and that this is what led to his stream-entry. If this were irrelevant to dependent origination, I’m not sure how this would have led to him “comprehending the Dhamma.” Similar suttas regarding upādāna → sakkāya/identity are: SN 22.44, MN 44, SN 22.35-26 (one is not defined or reckoned by that which there is no upādāna in), SN 22.63-64, SN 22.78, SN 22.43, SN 22.29. My main point here is that: freedom from upādāna → freedom from identification/dukkha→freedom from jāti and jarāmaraṇa; this is where bhava would go and there are some connections.
Of the ascetics and brahmins who say that through annihilation of existence one escapes from continued existence, none have themselves escaped from continued existence, I say.
For this suffering originates dependent on all attachment. With the ending of all grasping there is no origination of suffering.
Ud 3.10
The ending of suffering is the end of upādāna, which means freedom from bhava and notions of existence or annihilation.
Dukkhavepakkaṁ yadatthi kammaṁ,
Uddhamadho tiriyaṁ vāpi majjhe
Paribbājayitvā pariññacārī,
Whatever action that is ripening in suffering—
whether in the upper world, below, between or in the middle—
he is an avoider of that, faring with full knowledge
Snp 3.6
Bhava is defined as kamma ripening in any of the 3 realms. This sutta says that the arahant dodges that.
There are these two views: Views favoring continued existence and views favoring ending existence.
A noble disciple reflects on this: ‘Is there anything in the world that I could grasp without fault?’
They understand: ‘There’s nothing in the world that I could grasp without fault.
For in grasping I would grasp only at form, feeling, perception, choices, or consciousness.
That grasping of mine would be a condition for continued existence. Continued existence is a condition for rebirth.
SN 22.80
Tendency towards bhava or vibhava in present resolved by giving up upādāna.
When one gives up upādāna, all conceit and notions of self cease. This is extremely clear in the suttas. I do not agree with you that the sense of self precedes craving, and I would ask for you to provide a sutta that indicates this. I have provided several above that say that the sense of self is due to upādāna. When all notions of self cease, notions of bhava and vibhava cease, because one sees that there is no self to “exist”—it is merely the experience of the aggregates, not “me.” All forms of existence are then relinquished and craving is impossible because one no longer appropriates the experience of the aggregates; they simply are and remain until their cessation. In a certain sense, there is still bhava because consciousness is still established in a particular realm until its cessation (and in this we certainly agree). It is in this way that bhava is not completely ended. However, in another sense, that consciousness—no longer being appropriated, clung to, etc.—cannot be identified with or reckoned in terms of the arahant who has transcended it and dodged the kamma ripening on account of it (by removing all upādāna and thus removing them’self’ from the equation). This all means that there is no way for existence to be renewed (punabbhava), because all ties to existence (bhava) have been severed in the present despite its remnants still hanging around.
Sorry if this is not the most clear or concise argument. This is already assuming a good familiarity with the Dhamma for it to make any sense. It’s not the best general post for anyone to stumble on, nor is it meant to be a world-shattering argument (as I mentioned at the beginning it is meant more to contribute some related thoughts and support some of the reasoning behind what I’ve said). I would also like to repeat what I said earlier on here and thank you for some of the ‘pushback’ on popular ideas and your vigilance in wanting sutta references for ideas. I think that is very important and honorable, and I know you are looking for the authentic message of the Buddha to the best of your ability as we all should be. I think you’ve made lots of solid arguments with several things for everyone (myself included) to consider!
Well hmm … this is actually exactly how I understand this: There must have been a certain inclination towards human rebirth before he went there. Why then did he not just get reborn again in a heavenly realm? There must have been some inclination as to the direction of the upcoming rebirth, that’s how I see it.
I have to admit, I see it this way since I read Ajahn @Brahmali’s essays on dependent origination and dependent liberation and translated them into German. And in this respect I also have to admit that I do have some vested interest here, in a way. I found these essays so convincing and inspiring and don’t like to see this enthusiasm of mine be at stake …
It does mean, as I understand it, that they have one life as a human left because their mental condition only inclines to a human existence once. There must be a reason why they go into this particular direction … no?
Does “people look forward to the next life, longing for rebirth among the gods” not mean exactly this? I understand “they long for rebirth among the gods” to mean “their mind inclines into that direction”, so—unless they do bad deeds that obstruct this—they might get reborn in this realm after death.
I don’t actually see so much contradiction between your points, @Brahmali and @Sunyo.
I have to apologize that I am a bit late to the party …
To conclude this investigation for anyone who has read my comments in this topic; in order to gain the right understanding of DO and sankhāras, including bhava, and how to cessate them in order to realize anattā and attain Nibbana;
MN 1, SN 35.95, and AN 4.24 explain exactly what to practice in order to realize anattā and cessate sankhāras. When one has realized anattā, one has gained right understanding. When one has gained right understanding, sankhāras and the rest of DO do not rise. And when one cessates sankhāras and DO, one attains the unconditioned.
From SN 35.95 “When, Maluṅkyaputta, regarding things seen, heard, sensed, and cognized by you, in the seen there will be merely the seen, in the heard there will be merely the heard, in the sensed there will be merely the sensed, in the cognized there will be merely the cognized, then, Maluṅkyaputta, you will not be ‘by that.’ When, Maluṅkyaputta, you are not ‘by that,’ then you will not be ‘therein. ’ When, Maluṅkyaputta, you are not ‘therein,’ then you will be neither here nor beyond nor in between the two. This itself is the end of suffering.”
From AN 4.24 Amid those who are self-constrained, the Stable One would not posit as categorically true or false anything seen, heard, or sensed, clung to and considered truth by others.
Since they have already seen this dart to which people cling and adhere, saying “I know, I see, it is just so,” the Tathāgatas cling to nothing.
Hi Venerable, I’m enjoying reading this discussion and I feel like I understand your arguments. It’s certainly making me think about DO
What do you make of the following from DN 15 though?:
Suppose there were totally and utterly no grasping … at sensual pleasures, views, precepts and observances, and theories of a self. When there’s no grasping at all, with the cessation of grasping, would continued existence still be found?”
I think these different points of emphasis on bhava comes from the wish to define bhava in such a way that it makes sense that there’s no bhava in the absence of taking up any sensual pleasures and (self)views.
How would you explain the dependence of bhava on ‘grasping at sensual pleasures, views, precepts and observances, and theories of a self’ (in the light of your arguments about how to understand bhava)?
Is ‘sensual pleasures…theories of a self’ basically equivalent to the fetters? Like, is the Buddha saying something like “Ananda, if everyone was an arahant, would anyone get reborn?” ?
I am still not happy with the outcome of our discussion. To me AN3.76 and AN3.77, the “Bhava Suttas”, deserve careful consideration, and so I’d like too look at them in little bit more detail. There is no need to respond if you do not wish to.
I still haven’t studied kittāvatā as carefully as I would have liked to, but I am happy to work on the basis that it means “to what extend” or “what is the limit”. So far as I can tell, neither of these renderings support your understanding of the Bhava Suttas. If these suttas do indeed set a limit on bhava, then that limit would have to encompass the entire content of the these suttas. It is artificial to understand only part of the suttas to be included within this limit. To make this claim you would at least have to make a careful analysis of how kittāvātā is used in elsewhere, specifically that the discussion can include material that is not really relevant to the said “limit”.
Your case would have been strong if kittāvatā referred to causality. In other words, if the Bhava Suttas concerned the reason why there is bhava, we could expect the causes of bhava to be expressed. In such a case the analysis would include both causes and the resultant bhava. But so far as I can see, this is not what kittāvatā is about.
You argue that the common definition of bhava is much simpler, usually consisting of a mere enumeration of the three realms of existence. While you are clearly right about this, this does not exclude the possibility that we may find different levels of description. A more detailed level is not necessarily inconsistent with a more basic level. It may just be that they serve different purposes.
The definition you point to, such as it is found at SN12.2, can be regarded as slightly commentarial in nature. It comes after the standard enumeration of the factors of DO, and then defines these in a fairly stereotypical fashion, much as we one would expect of a slightly later layer of text. (Analyses are by definition always later than the core doctrines on which they comment.) A quick look at the definitions found in SN12.2 does indeed confirm this impression. For instance, taṇhā is defined as the standard set of six cravings (one for each of the six senses) rather than the more unorthodox definition of three craving found in the second noble truth. Here the sometimes flattening tendency of the commentaries is in full view. We see a similar tendency in the definition of nāma, which is reduced to a set of easily recognisable mental factors. The nuance of why nāma specifically is used in DO is then easily missed. Given this context, it is easy to see why bhava, too, is here given a simple, stereotypical definition. But just as with the other definitions in DO, this does not preclude a more detailed and probably also more interesting discussion elsewhere. In fact I would argue that the discussion in the Bhava Suttas should be given precedence precisely because of its greater detail and less “commentarial” nature. It is here that we find the fullest analysis of the meaning of bhava.
Also, I would like to repeat my previous argument - because you didn’t comment on it - that bhava as a factor that precedes rebirth is closely linked to the idea of the inclination of the mind, which is well attested in the suttas in such places as SN12.38. That is, we are not dealing with some sort of revolutionary reinterpretation of DO.
Haha! But no worries. Because of course I also have no vested interest in these kinds of things. Otherwise I’d just be asking for headaches! 
But, yes, I think the noble truths suffices to get insight into the dhamma, and I also think even arahants may get technical or linguistic details about DA completely wrong. So in that sense it doesn’t matter.
perhaps this helps:
Isn’t it clear, at least to some people reading this?