I think this is a good point. A good example of this is the definition of sankhārā in SN 12.2. Many people have used that definition to say that this nidāna refers to breathing, thinking, and perception/feeling, or something along those lines. We see more nuanced, complex, and somewhat ‘messy’ descriptions elsewhere that are pieced together to describe sankhārā. SN 12.2 though uses the term in 1) the singular, and 2) it uses the word cittasankhāro. Clearly there seems to be a textual disagreement here that contradicts other suttas descriptions in certain ways.
If one uses the standardized Vibhanga definitions to guide an interpretation, it wouldn’t be the first time it’s been done, and it has led to misunderstandings. Tanhā is another good example already given. This is why I think we should look to other suttas that might not blatantly say “THIS IS THE BHAVA LINK,” just like the ‘cetanā’ suttas do not say ‘THIS IS THE SANKHARA LINK,’ despite it seeming to be the case upon further inspection. We have plenty of examples of how upādāna relates to/conditions something which conditions suffering, rebirth, etc., so they can definitely be put to more use in understanding bhava even if not directly.
This is interesting! There is clearly much to this. I’ll have to reflect on it a bit further and consider the relationship to upādāna-paccayā bhavo.
Indeed. Rebirth is really just an especially significant shift in our experience of the world and the following stability of that shift until the next rebirth.
Tying bhava simply to only that which precedes birth may be too restrictive. If we take dependent origination linearly, this means that upādāna, which precedes bhava would also only be related to birth and not to anything else.
Since upādāna can occur at any point during life, it seems reasonable to think that bhava can also happen at any point during life.
I believe in one of the suttas, the Buddha says something to the effect of birth is ended, the holy life has been fulfilled. This is despite the Buddha not being physically in the process of being reborn.
The idea that we become in the moment is not incompatible with the idea that we become just prior to physical birth. Becoming prior to birth can be regarded as a special case of becoming in general.
This part too shows that bhava need not necessarily always be bound up with rebirth.
The issue I have with translating bhava as existence (as opposed to becoming) is that the word existence is not particularly well defined. If nothing is static, to what extent does it exist? If all phenomena can be regarded as processes that flow from one to the next, any existence is in a constant state of becoming anyway.
When you look at yourself, look away and look back, you still see yourself there. Because of this, you say I exist. But the only reason you’re able to maintain some continuity of I and claim existence is because you abstract away any change to the I such that its general outline appears constant.
“Reverends, the venerable named Puṇṇa son of Mantāṇī was very helpful to me when I was just ordained. He gave me this advice: ‘Reverend Ānanda, the notion “I am” occurs because of grasping, not by not grasping. Grasping what? The notion “I am” occurs because of grasping form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness, not by not grasping.
Suppose there was a woman or man who was young, youthful, and fond of adornments, and they check their own reflection in a clean bright mirror or a clear bowl of water. They’d look because of grasping, not by not grasping. In the same way, the notion “I am” occurs because of grasping form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness, not by not grasping.
Having said this, I checked the commentary, and it had a slightly different take:
Upādāyāti āgamma ārabbha sandhāya paṭicca
Upādāya means relying on, resting on, supported by, depending on
The point here is not that the youth is attached to their gorgeous visage, but that they rely on the mirror to see themselves.
If this reading was adopted, it would require recasting the whole sutta (and a bunch of others that have similar wording!) Instead of:
The notion “I am” occurs because of grasping form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness
We would have:
The notion “I am” occurs in reliance on form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness
I have a pretty clear childhood memory of identifying with my inner monologue. I remember thinking something like “Wow, this is me, this is my self talking … to myself!”
Right now I think of this as upadana-ing a theory of self. I.e., part of “normal” human development is to acquire a self-theory that makes one a functional member of worldly society (capable of working 9-to-5, basically ), relying on the five khandas.
It seems to me Ven. @Brahmali you are emphasizing more the content of the self-theory. E.g., if I got into some jhanas and developed a new self-theory around them (merging with the cosmic self or something like that) that mental inclination would take me towards an existence (bhava) that corresponds to that jhana-state when i die.
But Ven. @Sunyo it seems you are arguing for not having an emphasis on the content, i.e., no acquisition of an identity in bhava? Would you put it in upadana in stead, then?
Hey. Sorry, you didn’t want to go much deeper into the discussion. I tried to honor that, but my reply ended up much longer than I intended!
I referenced one bhava corresponding to one set of aggregates, which does not imply that bhava is a temporary mental existence.
You quoted Ajahn Brahmali who used the terms “mental existence”, and you said it was a good point. So I assumed you understood the concept in the same way. But you suggest yet another interpretation, then. You can hopefully excuse my mistake, for this is like the 20th alternative interpretation of bhava I’ve come across by now, one more complicated than the other. I can’t keep them all apart in the details.
All these different existing interpretations are, to me, a good indication that we should use Occam’s Razor and go for the simplest one. I know my interpretation of bhava to be continued existence after death may sound simplistic to some, and I know it is very close to jati. But that very simplicity may indicate it may be the right one. I mean, it’s easy to expand on ideas in so many ways. It’s sometimes hard to just keep it simple.
(Also, I don’t seem to have this “general phenomenon” of misinterpreting ideas when I discuss the same topics with others, so I don’t know if I’m to blame here. Perhaps your ideas are just not as transparent as you think they are. Not to me anyway; maybe they are to others. I feel like you assume not just knowledge of the suttas, but also assume we already are aware of much of your ideas. )
you use the sutta about arahants having a unique form of bhava as proof for another argument
There is a sutta which says arahants are the best of all bhavas (SN22.76), but that’s quite clearly a bit of a pun, as I said from the start. It’s a pun because elsewhere the highest bhava is more correctly said to be the devas of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (note it says the devas of this state, not the state itself, which you can attain in as a human also. AN5.170) Because it is a pun, I did not reference it in my reply to you. If I remember, I’ve brought it up only when people insisted arahants had no bhava, not when I explained how the concept of bhava should be interpreted in DA, except once when I specifically said I’d put it aside for now because of the pun.
That was to Ajahn Brahmali, when I said that “perhaps” that sutta talks about a change bhava in this life, so we didn’t have to argue over that idea. But I myself actually think it is more naturally read with bhava in the normal sense of the word: A human arahant still has a human bhava. But this bhava is better than the pinnacle of bhava, not because it is actually higher or somehow unique, but because the one who “has” it is enlightened, while the devas of neither-perception-nor-non-perception are not. Of course, that is exactly the point of the pun: that enlightenment is more valuable than even the highest type of existence. The point is not to define a unique kind of bhava for the arahant; it is to say that being an arahant is better than existence in the highest heaven.
So, no, there is no contradiction in those two statements. Although I do understand why you came to that conclusion, because you assumed a unique bhava for the arahant. (For reference, Iti44 also implies the arahant still has bhava, and it has no pun.)
I think that sakkāya is related to bhava.
I explained my idea on sakkāya before to somebody else in this thread. Ven. Bodhi wrote that ‘identity’ was a wrong translation by him and I agree. It means literally ‘existent (sat) being (kāya)’, as Bodhi notes. Suttas support his change of mind too, not just the etymology, but for brevity I let those be. Anyway, even so, I belief it is you who relate it to bhava, not the suttas.
Ven. Ānanda says that he learned that the notion ‘I am’ occurs dependent on upādāna
I do agree, of course, that taking up (upādāna) in some suttas is said to lead to a sense of self. But before concluding that the sense of self must therefore equal bhava, we first must ask whether this is actually the same use of upādāna as in Dependent Arising. Words are used in different contexts. There are also suttas that talk about “taking up the body” at birth (SN12.61) (which I would actually say is more in line with how upādāna is used in Dependent Arising), or about a seed taking up nutrients from the soil, for example. (AN1.315) Clearly these contexts are not that of a sense of self, which shows that upādāna is used in different ways.
The word comes from a verb, and its verb form is used in many of these suttas. And almost all verbs have so many different applications. Even in English we can say “I take it to be my self” and “I take rebirth” and “I take a break” and so on. Obviously these are the same verb but very different ideas. To connect them together because they share the word ‘take’ would be ill-advised.
To me, that’s what’s happening with upādāna here. When it precedes bhava it is a different context from when it precedes the sense of ‘I’. As far as I know, this “upādāna > sense of self” is not linked very directly to jati, which shows it’s not about the link bhava > jati, and therefore also not upādāna > bhava. Which is why we find it mostly in SN22 and not SN12.
But most importantly, there simply is no sutta that clearly equates bhava to this sense of “I”, of that I am now quite convinced. There’s only suttas that use it in the context of rebirth, which I showed. So the suttas don’t mention this equivalence not because it’s “hiding in plain sight”. It’s because bhava just doesn’t mean that.
For in grasping I would grasp only at form, feeling, perception, choices, or consciousness.
The idea to me seems that they stop grasping (or taking up) as soon as they no longer see a self in the aggregates. Which means the sense of self preceded the grasping here. They grasped the aggregates because they saw a self in there.
I do not agree with you that the sense of self precedes craving, and I would ask for you to provide a sutta that indicates this.
Craving always relies on ignorance, which implies a sense of self:
I tell you the craving to exist has its nutriment, it is not without nutriment. And what is the nutriment for the craving to exist? Ignorance, you should answer.” (AN10.62)
“When the unlearned ordinary person experiences a feeling which is accompanied by ignorance, then craving arises. (SN22.81)
When does craving stop? When you see anicca, dukkha, and anatta. So no sense of self > no craving > no taking up. It’s not like you stop craving and thereafter suddenly the sense of self disappears. Therefore the sense of self comes first. (I’m not saying it is in reality this linear. The mind is complicated. Maybe there are suttas that talk about it the other way round, but then that still doesn’t equate a sense of self to bhava.)
In a certain sense, there is still bhava because consciousness is still established in a particular realm until its cessation (and in this we certainly agree). It is in this way that bhava is not completely ended. However, in another sense, that consciousness— no longer being appropriated, clung to, etc.—cannot be identified with or reckoned in terms of the arahant who has transcended it and dodged the kamma ripening on account of it (by removing all upādāna and thus removing them’self’ from the equation). This all means that there is no way for existence to be renewed (punabbhava), because all ties to existence (bhava) have been severed in the present despite its remnants still hanging around.
I happily agree with the basic ideas here. Bhava is not completely ended for the arahant. But then I don’t understand why earlier you equated bhava to asmīmāna (conceit “I am”) and to “identity” (by your translation & interpretation). Because the arahant has abandoned those. Are there two types of bhava?
Sorry if this is not the most clear
Most i got, but not all of it, sorry.
I know you are looking for the authentic message of the Buddha
Thanks, you got it. To clarify, many, including you, have shared ideas about bhava that pragmatically are very useful on the path, at least at certain points. But here I am interested in finding out what exactly the word bhava meant to the Buddha. I mostly just disagree with people on the textual level. Which is also why I ignored some of the replies that said “it doesn’t matter for my practice”. That’s a personal thing.
I know you’re doing the same. Thanks for a nice exchange.
Well hmm … this is actually exactly how I understand this: There must have been a certain inclination towards human rebirth before he went there. Why then did he not just get reborn again in a heavenly realm? There must have been some inclination as to the direction of the upcoming rebirth, that’s how I see it.
Of course they have inclinations, and of course that’s why they are born there! You don’t have to lose any enthusiasm about that idea. But my point is, that inclination is not bhava. It’s already part of the tanhā and upādāna. If you are inclined towards human existence, then you crave and take up human existence. And then you will get human existence (bhava).
I understand “they long for rebirth among the gods” to mean “their mind inclines into that direction”
Yes, exactly! That longing, or the craving, is the inclination. And what does this result in? In existence (bhava) among the gods. Bhava does not equal the inclination, it’s an outcome of it. Do you see the point?
Perhaps that is not much of a contradiction to you, but I think it can matter, some reasons for which I’ve pointed out earlier. It influences what you think about every time you read the word ‘bhava’ or ‘existence’.
@Eric_ODonnell
Hi Venerable, I’m enjoying reading this discussion and I feel like I understand your arguments. It’s certainly making me think about DO
Thanks for the feedback, Erik, and hope you are well.
What do you make of the following from DN 15 though?:
Aha! I was expecting that reference earlier. Because that is actually the passage I questoned a bit myself initially.
First some general observations about these four types of upādāna (‘taking up’):
Outside of DN15 and the usual “definition” as in SN12.2 they don’t reoccur, nor are they clearly explained anywhere. How for example sīlabbatupādāna (“precepts-and-observances upādāna”) leads to bhava and jati is never explicitly stated.
To me it seems a slightly random list. Surely, there are more things we can take up or “grasp at” than just these four. Like the jhana states for example.
‘Views’ seems to include ‘theories of a self’ already.
The non-returners already abandoned these four types of upādāna, so it seems they are omitted from the list, unless we interpret “theories of a self” to mean a deep inner sense or idea of self, not an intellectual theory/doctrine of the kind one spreads to others.
The word upādāna in some texts on Dependent Arising and related contexts primarily means ‘fuel’. For example SN12.52-54. Or SN44.9 where craving is called the fuel for rebirth, like wind is the fuel for fire that moves from one place to another. Now, to translate diṭṭhupādānaṁ as “fuel at views” of course doesn’t work. So, in the instances where upādāna primarily means fuel, either this list of four upādānas no longer applies, or it should be interpreted differently. Like, ‘the fuel [for rebirth] that comes from views’.
Elsewhere in the suttas, including the context of Dependent Arising, the things that are taken up are the five aggregates, not these four things. That’s why they’re also called upādānakkhandhas, ‘the aggregates [being objects of] taking up’, or more smoothly, ‘the taken up aggregates’. (Which in contexts such as the noble truth on suffering at SN56.11 means taken up at birth, so there upādānakkhandhas is functionally synonymous to khandha.)
So it seems things in one way or another don’t mesh together as smoothly as we’d sometimes like in these kind of analyses. (Not that that’s anything new or unique, lol.)
Now, I don’t think it’s right to assume just from these four types of upādāna alone that bhava must mean something more momentary than what I have suggested. I stick to the assumption that bhava means a state of existence in the sense of a life, since the suttas use the word exclusively in that sense.
Here’s some examples of how this may work:
In the case of precepts and observances (sīlā-vata-upādāna) a good example is the The Dog-Duty Ascetic Sutta (MN57), where the Buddha explains that if the ascetic keeps behaving as a dog, he will be reborn as a dog. He is reborn due to his dog precepts and observances (specifically called sīla and vata in the sutta).
In case of views, (worldly) right and wrong views are both a type of kamma (e.g. 10.176), which leads to rebirth. It likely also includes the view of a self, which I’m sure some suttas also say leads to rebirth.
In case of sensual pleasures, kama-upādāna comes from one of the three types of craving that leads to rebirth of SN56.11. Craving for sensory experiences leads one to take up those things again after death, leading to rebirth in the sensory realm.
In the case of the theory of self, I’m not sure, unless we interpret it as the deeper sense of self, which seems valid, because you only hold such theory if you have that sense of self in the first place. So out of a sense of self there is attachment and taking up of existence after death.
Since the usual object of taking up is the aggregates, I sometimes interpret these four types not just as objects but as sources of taking up: The taking up that comes from sensual desire, views, precepts and observances, and having an idea of a self. While craving is the coarse source of upādāna, these are more refined sources. I’m not sure if this is what the suttas intended but it works grammatically, and it does make some sense. It works better in the contexts where upādāna is fuel too.
That’s a long winded way of saying: Indeed, it is a good question. These four types of upādānas may not be the clearest indication that bhava means existence in the way I explained it. But I also don’t think they negate the idea. They can be interpreted in ways that fit. Also, I’m not sure they are always implied when the Buddha talks about upādāna.
To first answer what I left unaddressed: Bhava is closely linked to inclinations, yes. But that doesn’t tell us much about what the word itself means. Bhava is also closely linked to birth. That doesn’t mean it therefore is identical to birth. The inclinations can be put under tanḥā/upādāna instead. Because if you’re inclined to something and then act out of it, it’s akin to you craving something and then taking it up. That would be a much more natural way to think about it, because just like the inclinations, upādāna is an activity of the mind, whereas bhava is not. A human bhava, for example, as I explained to Ven. Sabbamitta, is not an inclination, nor is it an activity.
And if we’re looking at what the links are, in both SN12.38 and AN3.76 bhava seems more closely linked to punabbhava, both linguistically and in function. In SN12.38 I parallel the factor of bhava essentially with “the establishing of consciousness” at death:
Mendicants, what you intend or plan, and what you have underlying tendencies for [= what you crave and take up, taṇhā & upādāna] become a support for the continuation of consciousness [after death]. When this support exists, consciousness becomes established [in a bhava you’re inclined to]. When consciousness is established and grows, there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future. When there is rebirth (abhinibbatti) into a new state of existence (punabbhava) in the future, future rebirth [jati], old age, and death come to be
To explain very brieflly, the continuation of consciousness doesn’t mean continuation in this life, it means continuation after death. And this happens in another bhava.
I don’t see how this equation of bhava to the inclinations is “well attested”. They are better seen as equivalent to upādāna. That also fits the idea that the arahant has no more upādāna (or inclinations) but still has bhava. Because they were reborn in a bhava. If bhava were inclinations, the arahant would have no bhava.
Bhava is not the inclination. Bhava, as in the ordinary chain of factors, should be placed right before birth, not all the way at the beginning. In fact, here punabbhava is functionally equivalent to bhava. I think that’s why Sujato effectively translates it as “new state of existence” here.
AN3.76 conveys the same idea, that rebirth happens because consciousness gets established in one of the three realms of bhava. (Which is why a human arahant still has consciousness: because their consciousness was established in the human world at birth.) The sutta shows first that bhava is the result of kamma, as I’ve been repeating, not kamma itself:
If there were no deeds (kamma) to result in the formless realm, would continued existence (bhava) in the formless realm still come about?”
This conveys a certain causality, not an equation of bhava to kamma. And the kamma-result is most naturally read as being rebirth, not results of kamma in this life. After all, rebirth is the most important outcome of kamma throughout the suttas and is the main theme of Dependent Arising. That means the result of kamma, which is the bhava, refers to rebirth too. So kamma results in existence in a certain realm, that’s the idea here. Or we could say that inclinations to a certain realm lead to bhava in that realm. So also here bhava and inclinations are not the same.
The simile that follows next conveys the same ideas:
“So, Ānanda, deeds are the field, consciousness is the seed, and craving is the moisture [for the] consciousness of sentient beings—shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving—[to be] established in a lower realm [i.e. a bhava]. That’s how there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future.
The realm is one of the three realms of bhava (here the lower, the kāmadhatū). Like a field, seed, and water are conditions for a plant [= life] to grow, kamma, consciousness, and craving are conditions for the next bhava [= life]. (I think you’ll remember how I explained the seed simile before, and how intrinsically connected it is to “established”, which I translate as “planted”.) I explained in a previous post here that you can’t establish consciousness in another realm while you are alive. And, indeed this passage is about rebirth, because it sums the process up as, “that’s how there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future.” This is the exact same idea as SN12.38.
AN3.77 is a bit more awkward, because it talks about the establishing of kamma, which is unique to this sutta, unlike the establishing of consciousness, which happens quite a lot. To me it basically refer to kamma ripening. When kamma “establishes”, it is the working out of kamma and volition wherever there is rebirth.
As to what these suttas as a whole are about, let’s put aside kittāvatā for a moment. Interesting is the end of the sutta: evaṁ kho, ānanda, bhavo hoti. Which seems to be the complement to Ananda’s initial question, (although the more common and natural complement to kittāvata is ettāvatā, as in SN12.15, SN22.113-114, SN22.126ff, MN79, MN109, and others.) But the line itself is more naturally read as “thus bhava occurs”, which does imply a causality. Just like the line before: […] evaṁ āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti. Evaṁ kho, ānanda, bhavo hotī”ti, “That’s how there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future. That’s how continued existence comes to be/happens.” Not sure, this could benefit from more analysis of kittāvatā, but I’ll say in a moment why hanging everything on that word may not be necessary, anyway.
But first, the Chinese parallel of AN3.76 (there is no parallel of AN3.77 apparently) at EA2.42 may shed light, since it is a bit different. I don’t read Chinese, but with the dictionary engine I can tell that it starts with the threefold realm as an answer to the initial question, and only then continues with an explanation of how these three types of existence come about. Perhaps the initial answer of the three realms was dropped from the Pali. It would make sense contenxtually, and would be more in line with the standard definitions of bhava in DN15 and SN12.2. Regardless, combining the disagreement of the parallels with the fact that AN3.76-77 are about the only sutta you’ve referred to for a direct “definition” or use of bhava as inclinations, makes the conclusions quite shaky. I suggest we look at how bhava is used elsewhere and then interpret this apparently questionable suttas in light of that, not the other way round.
To me only the initial question (“to what extent (kittāvata) is there bhava?”) is a bit obscure, but it doesn’t change the way I think about the general concepts. So, as to kittāvata:
If these suttas [AN3.76-77] do indeed set a limit on bhava, then that limit would have to encompass the entire content of the these suttas. It is artificial to understand only part of the suttas to be included within this limit.
I admit I (also) don’t know how kittāvatā exactly relates to the whole sutta. At least I think we’ve concluded Ananda is not asking for a straight definition of the word bhava. But what you say here seems overly demanding on the texts to me. It wouldn’t be the first time that the Buddha answers a question with a counter question, or that he doesn’t give the most expected or straightforward answer.
In SN12.15 we even have the same kind of question, “to what extent (kittāvatā) is there right view?” But the answer starts with what wrong view is. So in this case only part of the answer IS to be included within the “limit”. Of course it’s a bit different, because the wrong view sort of limits the right view; but still, the answer isn’t as straightforward and well-defined as it could be. So why should it be in AN3.76?
I also wouldn’t totally rule out that the question still somehow (also) inquires about how bhava comes about, not just about the extent of it. Compare with SN22.1 for example (Ven. Bodhi’s translation):
How (kittāvatā), householder, is one afflicted in body and afflicted in mind? Here, householder, the uninstructed worldling, […], regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He lives obsessed by the notions: ‘I am form, form is mine.’ As he lives obsessed by these notions, that form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair. [Same for other aggregates.] It is in such a way (evaṃ), householder, that one is afflicted in body and afflicted in mind.
(SN35.132 and AN3.53ff (at least) have a similar structure with kittāvatā … evaṃ.)
See here first that the question of kittāvatā, if it were to mean ‘to what extent’, isn’t answered directly. Because the Buddha doesn’t just explain what the afflictions are, but also how they come about. The same can very well we true in AN3.76. The question is about bhava, but the answer includes also how it comes about.
Also, see that my earlier suggestion of kittāvatā as ‘how’ wasn’t novel. Bodhi uses it here to, and so does Ven. Sujato. Throughout Ven Bodhi’s and Sujato’s translations I’ve found quite a variety of renditions of kittāvatā, so who knows what exactly it means. Perhaps I was too easily swayed by Ven. Sujato and my earlier idea of ‘how’ wasn’t totally without merit, even though that is not what kittāvatā literally means. Either way, this single word, or single sutta even, doesn’t change how I think about the functioning bhava.
I’m not so convinced about the idea of SN12.2 being commentarial. Some of the definitions there, like that of birth and death, are super detailed and smell very authentic, since they reoccur in quite a few suttas. The Chinese parallel also defines bhava the same: as the three realms. Also in DN15 we don’t get a further explanation of bhava, just the three realms again, unlike some of the other terms, which are very well explained. Regardless, I agree with your point that definitions can be further specified elsewhere, but that can be the case even if SN12.2 was authentic. I feel questioning that wasn’t necessary to make the point. Anyway, I don’t think that a further definition is what’s happening in AN3.76, as I explained.
I feel the difference is in the approach. Do we decide the meaning of bhava based on indirect connections? Or do we base it on how the word itself is actually used? I prefer the simple principle: to determine the meaning of words in difficult contexts, consider the simpler ones first. Your idea doesn’t fit any of the context I’ve given. So I’ll also bring up again something you haven’t responded to: how does bhava being inclinations work with such suttas I mentioned, like a stream winner not taking an eighth bhava? It seems to me that the word bhava is used here in the same sense as in Dependent Arising, though more colloquially. It’s very natural to assume, because the context is the same, namely rebirth. Same with all the other references I’ve given.
@Erik_ODonnel:
Under ignorance. It’s the sense of self that sets of the whole chain. If you have no sense of self, there are no karmic activities, there is no upādāna, etc. But until you die you still have bhava. Which is of course exactly how bhava is used in ordinary context again and again.
Sorry that I keep making this final point, but people keep ignoring it and coming up with very obscure references for their ideas, many of which don’t even use the word bhava, like these references to the sense of self.
And of course, this sense of self idea is fitting the translation “becoming”, which is just not a good translation.
Bye now, everybody. Don’t be surprised if I don’t respond for a while, haha. Have to give my poor keyboard a rest.
Thank you for replying. I’ll just let it settle down little more.
I am honestly impressed by the length of your posts in general, and this one in particular. I rarely manage to read them all, but writing so many of them … unthinkable!
Wishing a good and well deserved rest to your keyboard—and you!
@brahmali, sorry, reading back I realize this wasn’t the clearest. What I tried to say is, in the SN12.38 quote (below) ‘birth’ is found at the end. Now bhava > birth is the default link. So what is equivalent bhava is found just before birth (around where punabbhava is), not all the way at the beginning (where the inclinations are). At the beginning we instead find the defilements, equivalent to taṇhā and upādana.
Mendicants, what you intend or plan, and what you have underlying tendencies for become a support for the continuation of consciousness. [here is craving and upādāna]. When this support exists, consciousness becomes established. When consciousness is established and grows, there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future [here is bhava, more or less]. When there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future, future rebirth [jati], old age, and death come to be. (SN12.38)
I am honestly impressed by the length of your posts in general, and this one in particular. I rarely manage to read them all, but writing so many of them … unthinkable!
Thanks, but now I don’t know if it’s a good thing or a bad thing, if even you can’t read them all. Anyway, bless my parents for forcing me to do a blind typing course in the days of MS DOS. In fact, it worked a bit too well. I sometimes type faster than I think, haha. (Not in this thread of course )
Oh well I don’t know what image you have of me. It’s probably just me, getting slow and tired these days. Often there are many interesting things to read, but I can’t keep up. Old age doing it’s thing, I guess …
My interpretation of bhava is that it means “existence,” and is similar to a fire that is kept in existence with the fuel (upādāna) that it is fed. A fire, in order for it to be maintained in existence with fuel, must continue to manifest various “births” and “deaths” of different types of fires: stick-fires, log-fires, grass-fires, etc. (using the Buddha’s analysis of separate manifestations of fire). I fail to understand how this is a “20th alternative” “more complicated than the other[s]” if it is literally the definition of the word using the exact same metaphor for understanding that the Buddha used time and again, and even in this exact context (with the word upādāna). I also said that, for the Buddha, ‘existence’ must be seen in a particular light—saṁsāra—and that bhava should primarily be understood as one existence per life that is present and continues (or is renewed) so long as the conditions underlying it are not removed. How any of this differs from the Buddha’s message and forms radical new views on paṭiccasamuppāda, rebirth, existence, conditionality, or nibbāna is unclear to me.
In fact, I would argue that my understanding is more simple than yours. My understanding is that bhava means exactly, well, what the word itself means: (an) existence, which can be renewed (punabbhava). To limit a word to “the continuation of existence between births” is much less simple, and much more technical. It is also less consistent with the recurring metaphors for fire and fuel used by the Buddha. Moreover, in MN 38, bhava is specifically listed in the ways that paṭiccasamuppāda occurs ‘in this life.’ In SN 12.33, bhava is listed as a “present phenomenon” that one then infers into the past and future. Now, if we reduce bhava to existence after death, it is impossible for this to be a present phenomenon that is inferred into the past and future. If, however, it means ‘existence’ which comes from the past existences and will be renewed in future existences without any break, then this is consistent, simple, and coherent with the above references.
Yes, this was my point: sakkāya references existence, it comes up in contexts conditioned by upādāna several times, it is directly related to the upādāna in regards to the khandhas, and it is defined as ‘dukkha’ and its cessation the ‘cessation of dukkha’ (SN 22.78, for example). If dukkha is largely about saṁsāric existence in Buddhism (as I believe we agree), then I just listed several ways in which sakkāya and bhava have astonishing correspondences. You are correct though that no sutta says that these are identical or necessarily related—I am simply offering it as a possibility and something that may help us understand the context a bit more.
This also relates to your later comments on upādāna: sakkāya is, again, defined in relation to the five aggregates—something which you hypothesized may be more essential to bhava than the four bases for upādāna in SN 12.2 or DN 15. I agree with you that these are best interpreted as bases, i.e. grounds and sources, for upādāna rather than as that which is clung to/taken up/used as fuel. And I do not think those upādāna are incompatible in any way with how bhava is used in the other suttas. That said, either way sakkāyais directly related to the aggregates and upādāna, and thus it would, in some ways, be closer to your current understanding of bhava than SN 12.2 itself.
This must have been unclear—I apologize. I did not mean to imply that bhava and asmīmāna are identical. What I was saying is that they relate in certain ways. This brings us back to one of my main points in (one of?) my original posts here. You seem to make hard and fast distinctions between certain psychological and cognitive aspects of paṭiccasamuppāda and “[meta]physical” ones such as rebirth. What I am saying is that these are not as distinct as you appear—to me—to be making them out to be. This does not mean paṭiccasamuppāda is momentary (in fact, I don’t think momentariness is consistent with how the Buddha defined conditionality in this context).
What it does mean is that just like the Vedic predecessors which created cognitive models that related to rebirth, reality, existence, and soteriology—cognition and metaphysics (or ontology maybe? I’m not a philosophy expert) are inherently related and intertwined in Indian philosophy of this period, and Buddhism is no exception. Just take a look at the noble truths: craving—a cognitive process—leads to physical rebirth. Western scientists might hear that statement and be confused: “How is there any connection from point A to point B?? Craving is just a cognitive phenomenon, what does it have to do with embryology??” This connection is essential to Buddhism though as you are very much aware of already.
So, as to the connection between sakkāya—which is more cognitive—and bhava—which is more ontological—is that they are shedding light on two aspects of the same thing to me. We have the experience of “I exist,” “I am here,” “I inhabit the world,” “I am the one experiencing the external world.” But, in reality, I am just the subjective experience of the world that continues life after life due to a stream of craving and kamma which propel consciousness in a flowing stream. If we take a look at SN 12.15 or SN 22.90, these ideas of existence are described as relating to the self and taking up ideas of the self—and in fact, it uses the same terminology that you highlighted as referring to taṇhā and upādāna with Ajahn Brahmali in this same reply. And then what—the solution is paṭiccasamuppāda which leads to right view and stream entry. By breaking through the sense of self via paṭiccasamuppāda, one breaks through notions of personal existence and annihilation. Here again I see another connection, and I already quoted several suttas which talk about two views of bhava and vibhava and how they are born of upādāna and cease with the cessation of upādāna—consistent with SN 12.15, SN 22.90, and further the connection between sakkāya and bhava. Again, that doesn’t mean they are identical, but I am proposing that they are much more related.
To summarize this and reiterate my ideas: Due to the taking up (or assuming) of various aspects of experience, we have the sense of existing personally—rather than the simple unfolding of a process. Taṇhā is the glue that holds this all together, which is itself underlied by avijjā. So long as that glue is there, this cognitive existence is going to manifest ontologically and metaphysically in literal existence. And all forms of existence must manifest themselves in the forms of birth (jāti) and death (jarāmaraṇa) due to their impermanent nature. You yourself said that we can see bhava for ourselves because we know we exist. But this is actually inconsistent with the idea that bhava refers to existing after death: knowing I exist has nothing to do with knowing that my consciousness will exist between death and a rebirth.
However, knowing I exist now in dependence on upādāna and taṇhā, and that this experience of existence—which must (and has) manifested itself in the form of birth and death—has no reason why it should stop considering upādāna is still there does help me understand how rebirth will simply be the renewal of this same experience of existence (i.e. punabbhava). Also, note how sakkāya fits in here: I know that my personal existence, or my experience of an ‘existent group’ (of aggregates), will cease once I no longer take up these aspects of experience due to craving and ignorance. Once I see that, I know bhava will cease: all that is left are the remains of bhava that are left over from the previous establishment of consciousness in this life. The fire has gone out, but the coals are still hot and haven’t completely cooled down yet (nibbāna) until the remains break apart.
In order to realize this insight about “I” and my existence, one must experience the reality of the aggregates as impersonal processes of experience that are impermanent or suffering; one must experience the reality of their cessation (nirodha)—including consciousness—and from that point onwards (just as SN 22.90, SN 12.15, SN 22.83, etc. say), one is a sotāpanna. One also understands bhava because the nature of metaphysical existence is cognitive existence: they are one and the same (just how cognitive craving that holds together the upādāna in one life is behind metaphysical continuation of consciousness and the formation of a new body, etc.). Again, none of this is a radical new interpretation.
Sorry for the long post again. This is a good conversation. To be honest, I was a bit reluctant just because I feel like there are so many opinions on this (as you already mentioned) and I really feel how difficult it is to have a good, nuanced discussion of it all on an internet forum. It would be much better with a real-life interaction. Also, there are a lot of assumptions to be made. For instance, I assumed that you understood upādāna as defined in SN 12.2 and DN 15; I didn’t know the nuance behind this, and this I didn’t bring it up.
No rush! But I do hope we can continue building our mutual understanding of the terms with one another’s help. Again, you’ve shed light on important issues!
Sorry, this is an edit/addition to the above (slow mode!!). I felt that the connection between the existential and the cognitive/phenomenological might have been unclear.
What I mean is that by understanding my current existence and my predicament in terms of certain cognitive processes (like ignorance, volition, craving, and upādāna), I can understand the very nature of all existence on an ontological scale; by understanding how my current bhava relates to upādāna, etc. I can understand how allbhava continues on the same basis. The noble truths make this connection, and paṭiccasamuppāda expands it. In the Vedic cosmogonies, reality is a cognitive experience that creates itself existentially and manifests itself in birth and death in order to experience itself and various emotions; this is then repeated in humans, whose essence/ātman is equated with that same force of Reality in more contemplative texts. For the Buddha, there is no ātman behind this existential-cognitive reality we live in, and yet existence is still driven by our drive to cognize and experience things and our attachment to ourselves (attā). Saṁsāric existence is built up by cognitive transformations that are true timelessly no matter when or where (SN 12.20) and which actualize themselves in physical phenomenon (which we also experience purely cognitively anyway—it’s all cognitive).
I also want to quickly respond to AN 4.131:
If ‘existence’ (bhava) is still prone to manifest and continue because one has not uprooted its condition (upādāna—which by the way for an anāgāmi of this level would just be a subtle trace of conceit/self—sakkāya), then it will have to manifest somehow. However, if one has uprooted the condition for a complete rebirth, then there’s a bit of a predicament. Bhava will be forced to continue to some degree, but not in a full birth, leaving you with ‘extinguishment in-between’/antarābhava. This is just the only possible way that the situation can turn out; it doesn’t define what bhava itself means. Bhava itself, I argue, refers to all existence generally which is ever-present until nibbāna (bhavanirodho). So I don’t agree with using this sutta to form any definition or conclusion as to the meaning of the term.
Ven. @Sunyo I agree with your interpretation of bhava as existence, which seems more consistent with the suttas. However, I’m kinda confused about what was said concerning taking up and not-self. Maybe my question will deviate a bit too much from the topic, so sorry in advance
Concerning the four types of clinging in SN 12:2, I think Bhikkhu Analayo had elucidated some important points to me in “Superiority Conceit in Buddhist Tradition”:
“According to early Buddhist thought, the belief in some sort of a permanent entity will be left behind with stream entry, the first level of awakening. However, clinging to the five aggregates as “me” or “mine” will be overcome for good only with the attainment of the highest level of awakening. Once one has become an arahant, only the bare aggregates are left, and all clinging has been completely eradicated (Anālayo 2010a: 13–15).
In later tradition, this perspective on the gradual removal of types of clinging during successive stages of awakening has not always remained fully clear. A problem appears to have arisen due to a literal reading of the wording used in a Pāli discourse for describing four types of clinging (translated by Ñāṇamoli 1995/2005: 161). The Pāli version introduces one of these as involving clinging to a doctrine of self (attavādupādāna), whereas the parallel versions just speak of clinging to a self (Anālayo 2010a: 10–13 and 2011: 102–3).
Whereas clinging to a doctrine of self will be overcome already with stream entry, clinging to the subtle notion of a self will be left behind only with full awakening. If the fourth type of clinging concerns a “doctrine of a self,” a problem arises in relation to the remaining three types of clinging: clinging to views, clinging to rules and observances, and clinging to sensual desires. The first two will be left behind with stream entry, whereas the third will be eradicated with the attainment of nonreturn, the third stage of awakening. The net result is that all types of clinging have already been abandoned with the third level of awakening and no form of clinging remains to be abandoned during the progress from nonreturn to becoming an arahant.
Buddhaghosa attempts to solve this problem by broadening his definition of the term kāma, used to refer to “sensual desire.” The argument is that greed for fine-material and immaterial experiences should also be included under this heading (translated by Ñāṇamoli 1991: 711). Since such types of greed, related to the experience of the four absorptions and the four immaterial attainments, are left behind only with full awakening, in this way the gap can be closed by identifying a type of clinging to be eradicated during progress from nonreturn to full awakening. Yet, the standard definition of the first level of absorption in the discourses begins with an explicit reference to seclusion from all sensual desires as a precondition for its actual attainment. This precludes considering an absorption experience to be a possible object of sensual desire.”
If Ven. Analayo is right, and the correct interpretation is clinging to a self instead of clinging to a doctrine of the self, this implies that taking up actually includes conceit. Therefore, awakening would be achieved by getting rid of ignorance, which means that one sees their experience as dukkha (1° noble truth). As a consequence, they get rid of craving for the aggregates, which makes them not take them up as themselves, i.e. awakening is achieved. This way of seeing things seemed intuitive to me and resembles dependent liberation: you get nibbida (by seeing things as dukkha) > viraga (you get rid of that craving for things) > vimutti (conceit is overcome).
Previously, you said we stop craving when we see things as not-self, but I thought it was the other way around.
Perhaps Venerable Sunio means that “existence” is a river of processes that, due to ignorance, we consider constant. Surely he can’t mean that the “worlds of existence” don’t have constant action in them. Perhaps it is possible to reconcile the concepts of becoming with what the Venerable One says about Bhava.
Yup, I agree. Because bhava continues after birth as well. Or we can say that birth is just a particular event within the next bhava, which starts after death. And also, we already have a bhava right now because of craving in the past. You’re not the first to misinterpret this, so I suppose I didn’t make myself clear enough. Hopefully it is clear now, though.
Dependent Arising is not so much about the inividual factors as it is about the links. And still I don’t think the link “taking up > bhava” intends to tell us about something that happens in this life. It tells us that taking up in the past life lead to this bhava, and that taking up in this life will lead to a next bhava.
By that logic birth and death can happen at any point in life as well, which is not the case.
Birth having ended means the Buddha won’t get reborn. But he still exists in this life, still has this bhava as a result of craving in his past life. Birth having ended doesn’t mean bhava has ended; it just means there will be no future bhava after death.
Not bound up with birth (jāti) in this very unique case of the highest of non-returners. But it is with everybody else.
Also, the sutta does show that bhava is still bound up with what happens after death, with continued existence. Venerable Bodhi notes, “certain non-returners, following their death in human form, enter an intermediate state and attain final nibbāna in that state itself, thereby circumventing the need to take another rebirth.” This intermediate state is the bhava they are still said to be “fettered” to. As I said, it is a curious sutta, but it helps show what bhava means. There is not really any other way to interpret bhava here.
Hey,
I don’t see “occurs in this life” anywhere. Are you referring to “visible in this life”? If so, that’s something different. It doesn’t “specifically” include bhava either. It just refers to the Dhamma. It means you can understand the Dhamma in this life, not having to wait till after death, like you generally have to do in faith based religions. You can understand that there is rebirth before you die, for example.
The line is “teaching that’s visible in this very life, immediately effective, inviting to come and see, relevant, so that sensible people can know it for themselves” (dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattaṃ veditabbo). The adjectives here all describe the Dhamma, the Teaching, not individial factors of Dependent Arising. Otherwise birth and death would be “immediately effective” and “inviting to come and see”.
Or am I having the wrong passage here?
It is not called a “present phenomenon” there, as far as I can tell. Instead it is a phenomenon that is seen and understood, which is something else of course.
And all factors are treated the same. But is death a present phenomenon? Not unless you’re dying right now! (Which I hope not.)
The inferences about past and future are explained as (paraphrased) “others in the past/future will have the same realization”, which is not at all how you explain it. It means that stream winners know that other stream winners have had or will have the same insights as them. It has nothing to do with bhava (or whatever factor) being inferred from this life to the next.
I’m not sure I feel like replying any further. Because it’s not just that I belief you misunderstand the suttas, I am of the opinion that you’re misrepresenting them too. And then the discussion gets quickly very boring with things like, “no that’s not what it says”, as you can already tell from my reply so far. No offense.
I did read the rest of your post, and I’ll just say I am quite surprised that you think your interpretation is more simple. To me it really seems like you’re struggling to bridge a certain gap between two ideas about bhava, even though you insist they’re one and the same. As a result it’s also a bit complicated—or at best clumsy—how you interpret an arahant having bhava but at the same time no “sense of existing personally”, which you also put under bhava.
We do have agree, though, about consciousness establishing at the start of life, about how to interpret the four types of upādāna, and to some extent about bhava as well. I don’t think the “experience of existing” is part of it, though.
Finally! A saved soul, haha. Thanks Mike, for letting me know.
As I explained to @Erika_ODonnell before, I also thought the upādāna of “doctrine of self” would be better interpreted as “sense of self” because otherwise the non-returner would not be included in the list of four upādānas. I didn’t know about the parallels, so that is a nice confirmation from Analayo. (Do you know if and where I could download the book for free?) I also agree that, although the sense of self is mainly referred to by the factor of ignorance, upādāna implies a sense of self too. Because ignorance always lies underneath it. I further think the four types of upādāna may be interpreted, for example, as “taking up due to a sense of self”, not (only) as “taking up of a sense of self”. As I said, throughout the suttas the usual objects of taking up (upādāna) are the aggregates, not these four things. But because the suttas never explain these things in any detail and the grammar allows both, it’s hard to be sure.
Your question is not too far off topic. Because some people here included the sense of self in bhava, which considering the sequence of factors in DA would mean it arises after craving arises and only disappears after craving disappears. If I understand you correctly, you don’t include the sense of self in bhava, but still think the process happens in roughly the same fashion—that one has to understand suffering and let go of craving before one lets go of the sense of self.
But I don’t see it that way. Anatta and dukkha are intrinsically connected. They’re almost like two sides of the same coin (with the third side being impermanence). That’s why in the first noble truth the Buddha can “get away” with only mentioning suffering, even though the noble ones, who have insight into this truth, also understand anatta. It’s because anatta is implied in dukkha. The suttas show this too: The aggregates are without a self (anatta), says the Anattalakkhana Sutta, and because they are without a self, they lead to “affliction”, i.e. suffering. (SN22.59) Therefore, “what is suffering is without a self.” (SN22.15)
You also suggested that seeing dukkha leads to nibbida (disillusionment). This is true, but seeing anatta also leads to nibbida. When you see that the aggregates are not yours but only impersonal burdens that “you” carry around, you will want to get rid of them, and you’ll lose desire for them. It’s like you finally realize you are carrying a backpack filled with rocks, which you thought were part of your body. This idea also pops up in many suttas. The Anattalakkhana Sutta itself says that when you see things as without a self, you get disillusioned with them. Others say for example:
To you [the aggregates] will appear void, empty, and without a core. Because what core can there be in in [them]? As a learned noble disciple, when you see this, you get disillusioned with form, feeling, perception, will, and consciousness. (SN22.95)
Everything is without a self.
When you see that with understanding,
you get disillusioned with suffering.
That is the way to purification. (Dhp229)
Parts of the stream winner’s insights can be put like this, if you’d have to put it in words: They see that parinibbana entails the cessation of existence (bhava), the cessation of the aggregates. They then realize that the aggregates are suffering, in light of knowing the peace of their cessation. And because they see that at parinibbāna there will be nothing left over, they understand that there is no self inside or outside the aggregates either. So they understand anatta and dukkha in conjunction by understanding cessation.
Although they have these very deep insights, the mind tends to fall back into old habits, which is why they’re not yet enlightened. But they will start living more and more in accordance with these insight, losing more and more their sense of self, accepting the reality of suffering more and more. Finally, at enlightenment, the last vestige of self, that of conceit, is fully abandoned.
Hello,
I mean ‘existence’ in the sense of a life, not in the sense of a stable never-changing existence. A bhava is what starts after death and ends with death. Of course what happens in between the two is a constant flux, I agree. But not every single word has to convey all of ultimate reality. Here bhava is quite a colloquial word, meaning essentially ‘a life’. It is not supposed to be an antonym to flux.
I also don’t mean a river. Bhava is (often) a countable noun, meaning you can have one, two, three bhavas, and so forth.
Try not to focus on the translatoin ‘existence’ either. The problem with the word bhava is that it is very clear what it means (to me anyway), but no single English term conveys it perfectly. ‘Existence’ for example is also not really a countable noun, and ‘a life’ is awkward in phrases such as “the cessation of life”, which sounds like the result of a nuclear war! So, as you may notice in my opening post, I avoided saying what the right translation is (because there is no such thing), but mainly showed what bhava is not—namely, “becoming” in the sense of an identity and such.
If by “becoming” some mean a new life, then that’s fine with me, but that’s not a use of the word in English. In ordinary English ‘becoming’ is the process by which something comes into existence. But bhava is the outcome of this process, namely a next life.
Thanks everybody, for the thoughts and nice discussion. :smiling_face_with_three_hearts:
Lol, seems like I ran out of smiles in my last post, or something. Intended to finish with this one:
Anyway,
I thought my initial list of example uses of bhava should have been convincing enough. Since apparently it wasn’t, here are some other contexts that use the word. Because as I said a couple times before in this thread, we should honor the principle that to determine the meaning of a word, we should use contexts that (1) actually use the word, and (2) are quite clear and not as open to various interpretations.
For the examples I chose contexts where bhava is used outside of the compound punabbhava. Because the latter is quite universally agreed to refer to rebirth, and many, many contexts show that this is indeed the case. Moreover, those who think it doesn’t mean rebirth generally also don’t take ‘birth’ to mean, well… birth! And ‘death’ to mean death, and such things. So to me they are unlikely to get convinced by a reasoned approach, anyway.
(I used Venerable Sujato’s translations, but because the ideas of rebirth and bhava blend together in his translations (as they should), here and there I changed them for clarity, removing some of the “bias”, so it’s more neutral for those who doubt these translations. For example, sometimes he translates bhava as ‘rebirth’, and I changed it to ‘existence’. In these cases I added a ~ before the sutta reference.)
First, some of you suggested, akin to the commentaries, that bhava is kamma or inclinations, or a sense of self. These are all defilements, unskillful things that the mind does. But bhava is something more objective. It is something that we get attached to and try to obtain.
If because of delusion you don’t reach consummation,
you’ll do evil deeds in life (bhava) after life (bhava). (Thag16.4)
Can you do evil deeds “in inclination after inclination”, or “in a sense of self after sense of self”? (The compound is bhavābhavesu, which is a locative.)
When the conduit to existence (bhava) is ended,
and the truth is seen as it is,
there is no fear of death;
it’s like laying down a burden. (~ Thag16.4)
The exact meaning of ‘conduit’ (netti) is somewhat unclear, but it has been rendered ‘attachment to’ as well. Is the idea that we are attached to kamma, or is the idea that we are attached to life? It seems to be the latter, because it talks about not fearing death.
They have nothing born of entanglement at all,
that would shackle them to a new life. (bhava)
Such a mendicant sheds this world and the next,
as a snake its old worn-out skin. (Snp1.1)
Now, the suttas don’t tend to talk about craving for defilements or getting attached to defilements. Because those cravings and attachments are themselves the defilements. They usually talk about craving for objective things, like the five aggregates, or sensual pleasures. Or existence/life (bhava).
So do we get shacked to inclinations? That is not how the suttas usually phrase things.
The wise do not go on into life (bhava) after life (bhava). (Snp4.11)
Do we “go to (saṃeti) inclinations”? Do we “go to a sense of self”? Or do we go to a next life?
Though struck by contacts,
a mendicant would not lament at all.
They wouldn’t pray for another life (bhava),
nor tremble in the face of dangers. (Snp4.14)
Do we “pray for inclinations”? Do we “pray for a sense of self”?
“Bound by craving, minds full of desire
for rebirth in this or that state (bhavābhave),
yoked by Māra’s yoke, these people
find no sanctuary from the yoke.
Sentient beings continue to transmigrate,
with ongoing birth and death. (Iti58)
Here we have ‘minds full of desire regarding life here or there’ (rattacittā bhavābhave). Do we desire for kammas here or there, or a sense of self here or there? Or is the idea more direct? See also how directly this is linked to rebirth. It is because of desire for existence after death that beings continue in saṃsāra (rendered here as ‘transmigrate’).
Bhava is always closely connected to rebirth. So close, in fact, that it is effectively synonymous to it.
So, second, here are some more quotes that show how closely bhava relates to birth (jati) and transmigration (saṃsāra):
Living at ease, I shall apply myself
to giving up rebirth (jāti) and death.
What’s the point in hope, in a new life (bhava),
in this useless, hollow body?
Grant me permission, I shall go forth
to make an end of craving for a new life (bhavataṇhā). (Thig16.1)
It seems to me ‘this useless, hollow body’ refers to another body in a next life. But of course there are clearer references, such as “birth and death”.
Mired in all sorts of ignorance, beings in love with being [i.e. with existence] are not released from continued existence (bhava). Whatever states of continued existence (bhavas) there are—everywhere, all over—all are impermanent, suffering, and perishable. In this way one seeing with right wisdom in accord with truth, gives up craving for continued existence (bhava-taṇhā), while not look forward to ending existence. (Ud3.10)
This talks about all the various different realms where you can take rebirth.
Those with no craving at all in the world
to any form of existence (bhava) in this life or the next (Snp3.5, Snp4.5)
[…]
“In this life or the next” refers to rebirth.
Here we have bhāva (long ‘ā’) instead of bhava, so perhaps it’s a slightly different word (or perhaps the lengthening is for metrical reasons?) but at least it gives a good example of punabbhava:
“Those who journey again and again,
transmigrating through birth and death;,
they go from this state to another (itthabhāvaññathābhāvaṁ)
destined only for ignorance.
For ignorance is the great delusion
because of which we have long transmigrated.
Those beings who have arrived at knowledge
do not proceed to a future life (punabbhava).” (Snp3.12)
Next:
I see the world’s population floundering,
given to craving for future lives (taṇhagataṁ bhavesu).
Base men wail in the jaws of death,
not rid of craving for life (bhava) after life (bhava). (Snp4.2)
Here we don’t have the ordinary compound bhavataṇhā but tanḥagataṃ bhavesu, where bhava is interestingly in the plural, “future liveS”. As I said before, following Venerable Sujato’s argument in the post I referred to at the start, bhava is (usually?) a countable noun. You can have one, two, three, etc. lives. If ‘existence’ were one constant stream or something that we are now in this life, there is no reason to render it in the plural.
See also the direct connectoin with death. You die because you crave for future lives and get reborn. (The line “life after life” should not be translated ‘existence and non-existence’, as I’ve seen somewhere.)
One here who has no wish for either end—
for any form of existence in this life or the next— (Snp4.5)
A bit obscure, but in some suttas “either end” is used to refer to rebirth as well. Either way, ‘in this life or the next’ (idha vā huraṁ vā) is also a reference to rebirth.
Rebirth (upapatti) in a new life (bhava) […] (Snp4.9)
See also MN127 at 3.147 which uses the same compound. There this rebirth in a new life is specifically said to happen after death.
don’t plant consciousness in a new life (bhava). (Snp5.5)
This is the establishing and continuation of consciousness in a next life that I mentioned before.
One detached from sensual pleasures but still attached to rebirth (bhava) is a non-returner, who comes not back to this state of existence (itthatta). (Iti96)
Bhava is connected with rebirth so directly that Ven. Sujato even translates it as ‘rebirth’ here, like he does elsewhere sometimes. The next conveys the same idea about the non-returner:
“Attached to both sensual pleasures
and existence (bhava);
sentient beings continue to transmigrate,
with ongoing birth and death.
Those who’ve given up sensual pleasures
without attaining the end of defilements,
and are still attached to existence (bhava),
are said to be non-returners.
Those who have cut off doubt,
and ended conceit and future lives (punabbhava),
they’re the ones in this world who’ve truly crossed over,
having reached the ending of defilements.” (~ Iti95)
I think that speaks for itself.
Notice in the last passage also the close relation between punabbhava and bhava. So, thirdly, and perhaps most tellingly, here are some examples of the equivalence of bhava and punabbhava.
The first also shows their relation to upādāna:
“Grasping (upādāna) is the cause of continued existence (bhava);
one who is born falls into suffering.
Death comes to those who are born—
this is the origination of suffering.
That’s why with the end of grasping (upādāna),
the astute, understanding rightly,
having directly known the end of rebirth,
do not proceed to a future life (punabbhava).” (~ Snp3.12)
The links essentially say upādāna > bhava, no upādāna > no punabbhava. So bhava and punabbhava are functionally equivalent.
Another undeniable—I would say—link between bhava and punabbhava:
“These folk are caught up in conceit,
tied by conceit, delighting in existence (bhava).
Not completely understanding conceit,
they return in future lives (punabbhava).” (Iti8)
Another:
They completely understand what has come to be [or ‘what was born’, bhūta],
rid of craving for rebirth in this or that state (bhavabhave),
with the disappearance of what has come to be [i.e. with parinibbāna],
a mendicant does not come back to future lives (punabbhava).” (Iti49)
And another:
My defilements have been burnt away by practicing absorption—
rebirth into all states of existence (bhavas) is eradicated,
transmigration through births (jāti) is finished,
now there are no more future lives (punabbhava). (Thag1.67)
So, to conclude, bhava in Dependent Arising is equivalent to the punabbhava of the second noble truth. And why would it not be? After all, DA is essentially a longer version of that very same noble truth. (AN3.61) They both talk about how suffering arises, which is through rebirth.
The reason DA doesn’t use punabbhava but just bhava is that DA presents a more general principle. You can look at the chain in multiple ways, placing the factors in different lives. If you place craving and taking up in the past life, the chain becomes about the current bhava which was a result of that past craving. But the noble truth is phrased only in terms of future bhava (i.e. punabbhava).
That’s the basic difference, nothing much more. It is not that in DA bhava means kamma, or inclinations, or a sense of self, while in the noble truth it means a life (in punabbhava, which means ‘another life’). It means the same thing in both.
Now, if you’re super astute, you may have noticed all those references came from the Kuddhaka Nikāya alone! (That’s why it was mainly verse.) I got tired of searching further, but you can imagine what happened if I did a more thorough search through the other nikāyas as well.
Please know that I also didn’t keep any references back, instances where bhava clearly means something else, like a sense of self or whatever. I would have shared those too. But such references just don’t exists, people. Because that’s simply not what bhava means.
Prior to the Buddha’s awakening, he acted with craving. However that craving did not result in him being reborn because he gained awakening within that lifetime. Therefore, craving in one life does not necessarily lead to being born in another life.
As such, an interpretation of dependent origination that says craving in a past life leads to birth in a future life regardless of the intervening moments is flawed.
It makes more sense to say that craving at the moment of death, conditioned by previous kamma, leads to being born in another life. This is what allowed the Buddha an escape. He could cut off craving in the present life so that at the moment of death, the craving necessary for rebirth would not arise. With the ceasing of craving, ceased the tendency towards becoming. With the ceasing of the tendency towards becoming ceases any possibility rebirth.
As can be seen, we again come back to the moment.
It depends on how you define birth really. If you tie birth to the formation of a body, then you have an issue if someone is born in a formless realm.
There is scope here to have a more general and encompassing view of birth.
One can be born multiple times within a life just as easily as one can be born from life to life. In general, one could say that:
Birth is the beginning of a set of seemingly constant formations
Aging is the decay of these formations
Illness is functional impairment of these formations
Death is the breaking apart of these formations
With respect to birth from life to life in a realm of form, the body could be seen as the major ‘constant’ formation.
With respect to birth moment to moment, a mental formation could be seen as the major ‘constant’ formation. For example, you could be born into a dream as you are sleeping.
In general, it is possible to be born into whatever sense of self that arises based on craving in a given moment. That self then naturally experiences aging, illness and death after which one is born into a new sense of self.
I could have phrased my initial statement better. To clarify, I was not saying that it isn’t bound up with birth for everyone else; just that it need not be limited to this.
The relationship between becoming, being and non-being
We can think of beingand non-being, as states where inconstance is abstracted away to maintain a general sense of continuity. Being is a state caused by craving for the positive (i.e. I crave to have legs) while non-being is caused by craving for the negative (i.e. I crave to not be disabled).
We can think of becoming as the transition from one state of being or non-being to another state of being or non-being.
Since becoming always leads to being or non-being, one can think of becoming as interchangeable with being / non-being.
How this is so can be illustrated by the following analogy:
Suppose that an archer lets loose an arrow aimed at a person. If the person avoids the arrow he doesn’t die. If the person gets hit in a vital area he dies. Death is the state while the arrow is the means by which that state is achieved. Nonetheless, one may use the words arrow and death interchangeably, in this context. This is why a person who has a close encounter with the arrow (e.g. is nicked by it) can be said to have had a close encounter with death and vice versa.
Similarly, although being/non-being are states and becoming is the means by which these states are achieved, these can be used interchangeably. In fact, it is more useful to focus on the means rather than the state:
It is by observing the arrow that one can avoid it and therefore avoid the state of death; similarly,
It is by observing the process of becoming that one can bring it to cessation and therefore avoid a subsequent state of being.
A noble disciple understands bhava, its origin, its cessation, and the practice that leads to its cessation. This is their knowledge of the present phenomenon.
SN 12.33
I’m not a Pāli scholar (yet! ). I’m simply quoting a trusted translator. To say that this is me misrepresenting the suttas is … a stretch. If the translation is unclear in comparison to the Pāli, or if I have misunderstood it, then it’s simply an accidental oversight. I think its fair to say that what is meant here, looking closer, is that the sotāpanna sees bhava in the present, just as they see jarāmarana. This doesn’t mean death is occurring, no, but they understand it in the present (with wisdom).
I also don’t find it very compassionate to tell someone (paraphrasing) “you misunderstand this sutta and misrepresent it, but it bores me to tell you where you’re mistaken, so I’m not replying any further.” I understand you have limited time and that the internet is a strange place sometimes, but that’s a matter of time. Being too ‘bored’ to help someone who, according to you, is misrepresenting the Buddha and who is authentically trying to understand is a bit much. I’m not trying to offend or attack you, and I’m grateful for the clarifications—I do think I misread the ‘inferring’ reference there to a degree—but this is how I feel in response to that.
And speaking of, this is also a misunderstanding on your part. We’re all liable to misread or misinterpret something. MN 38 does say this, and then the Buddha explains what he means by that:
For when I said that this teaching is visible in this very life, immediately effective, inviting inspection, relevant, so that sensible people can know it for themselves, this is what I was referring to.
…
Being so full of favoring and opposing, when they experience any kind of feeling—pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—they approve, welcome, and keep clinging to it. This gives rise to relishing. Relishing feelings is grasping. Their grasping is a condition for continued existence.
MN 38
The whole section is precisely a description of the links of Dependent Arising. And it’s also a very down-to-earth one at that for things that anyone can generally get a hold of to start gaining insight into, like a child growing up and being attached to things. It would be odd for the Buddha to give a description like this specifically on how the factors are visible, occur in this life, etc. etc. and include these last links if they simply were not. Notice that the sankhara and viññāna links are missing as well—it starts directly with our own coming into existence or what we cognize directly (a mother giving birth, etc.)
You may think this is a textual corruption or that the same principles don’t apply to the bhava link, but the reference I made is there and it is to DA—not a misrepresentation.
This is incorrect. I did not insist they were the same, and I actually corrected you on this already in my post in saying that I did not mean that. I said it when talking about sakkāya too, saying that there were correspondences and that I was calling attention to their similarities for potential better understanding of the terms and because they have astonishing correspondences.
My interpretation is that bhava means ‘existence.’
You don’t think that we experience our existence, and that this is essential to understanding the Dhamma which, in terms of DA, is called ‘inviting to come and see,’ ‘immediately effective,’ true at all times whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas or not, etc.? I think all existence is experience, and to claim otherwise makes no sense. This is why we crave for bhava: we want to experience something. If someone says “I love life!”, what the word ‘life’ is referring to is simply to their experience of existing and of cognizing things generally. All I’m saying is that non-arahants appropriate and take this experience of existence personally and conceive “I exist” rather than understand “conditioned experience exists”—and I think this is part of how we understand bhava in relation to upādāna which could be quite accurately translated or explained as ‘appropriation.’ That’s just a more formal word for ‘taking up.’
Our mental appropriation of existence due to craving leads to physical appropriation of the aggregates at death in the form of rebirth—they correspond one to one. Once again, I do not think these are radical ideas at all, not for the Buddha or for the similar philosophical/religious systems of his time. Our cognitive tendencies and habits manifest ontologically, and I think DA is precisely a representation of that process/regularity of Dhamma.
And to clarify again: I think punabbhava is an important aspect of bhava that is often overlooked and I think you make good points in connecting it to ‘ponobhavika’ from the 2nd noble truth. I just think the word is, in a sense, more broad/simple as all bhava—past, present, or future. I would also point you to the several (groups) of suttas where the Buddha / his disciples point out that the Tathāgata or arahant cannot be found even in the present life because they are not any of the aggregates nor are they outside the aggregates. This is much harder to understand and a profound aspect of Dhamma—rebirth isn’t the only profound thing. So if you think my explanation is awkward and clumsy, I was trying my best to put into more everyday words what those suttas themselves say: that with the cessation of upādāna, all references to the existence of the arahant will turn out to be empty when examined further (and yet the aggregates are still established in a bhava).
I hope this can continue to be a friendly discussion, and I hope my comments have not offended or turned you off from conversing. I just expected you to reverberate the sane sentiment I shared with you: that we operate under the assumption that the person really wants to understand the Buddha’s message and realize the Dhamma.
And to respond to this:
I agree that bhava does not mean a ‘sense of self’ and that it simply means ‘existence’/sometimes ‘life’ etc. But this is a perfect example of what I mean:
People don’t want a sense of self, they want to exist, no? But why do they want to exist? What do they really want? What they really want is for themSELVES to cognize and experience life. Who cares if your next door neighbour gets to exist, we don’t get the personal satisfaction from that (rhetorically; we should all care about our neighbours). What we really want is not just ‘a life’ but the personal experience of life that we appropriate in order to derive … pleasure ! The only reason we want to live is craving for pleasure (tanhāpaccayā vedanā), and so we appropriate (upādāna) things (khandhas) in order to experience existence (bhava) which, due to the nature of samsāra, means repeated birth and death (jātipaccayā jarāmarana). This is how the sense of self is inherent in bhava—appropriated experience = our experience of “life” and what we crave. And again: this manifests ontologically (even though it’s all just subjective experience / cognition as the suttas themselves remind us time and again with discussions of epistemology or loka, etc.).
In order for one to be established in appropriated experience though, make it yours, crave for it, etc., you must plant the seed of the self within it. If the sense of self is removed and cut off, that experience is no longer ‘mine’ and it just *is—there’s nothing to crave for (because there’s no ignorance to make the craving seem remotely worth it, dukkha is seen, etc.). The remains of a previously established bhava may be there, but it is also special and not the same for the arahant in another sense (as pointed out already in the sutta that discusses this). So the question of the nature of an arahant’s bhava is not really relevant to the Buddha’s teaching IMO. DA is what the average being has gone through and is going through over and over; it’s not made to explain the intricacies of how a living arahant functions in comparison to non-awakened people.
Point being: this is what I mean by sakkāya and bhava being very closely related and informative of one another. We crave for bhava, i.e. for ourselves to experience existence, and we appropriate things to experience this (all of which is the case of sakkāya). Bhava emphasizes the samsāric and ontological aspect of this more, but it is the manifestation of the same cognitive conditions IMO. I hope this wasn’t too repetitive, it just seems like certain key points haven’t gotten across (though understandably, and I apologize for any lack of clarity!)
), relying on the five khandas.
)
that sutta talks about a change bhava in this life, so we didn’t have to argue over that idea. But I myself actually think it is more naturally read with bhava in the normal sense of the word: A human arahant still has a human bhava. But this bhava is better than the pinnacle of bhava, not because it is actually higher or somehow unique, but because the one who “has” it is enlightened, while the devas of neither-perception-nor-non-perception are not. Of course, that is exactly the point of the pun: that enlightenment is more valuable than even the highest type of existence. The point is not to define a unique kind of bhava for the arahant; it is to say that being an arahant is better than existence in the highest heaven.
But here I am interested in finding out what exactly the word bhava meant to the Buddha. I mostly just disagree with people on the textual level. Which is also why I ignored some of the replies that said “it doesn’t matter for my practice”. That’s a personal thing.
You don’t have to lose any enthusiasm about that idea. 
Don’t be surprised if I don’t respond for a while, haha. Have to give my poor keyboard a rest. 
(Not in this thread of course 
)
In ordinary English ‘becoming’ is the process by which something comes into existence. But bhava is the outcome of this process, namely a next life.
(That’s why it was mainly verse.) I got tired of searching further, but you can imagine what happened if I did a more thorough search through the other nikāyas as well.