Investigation and analysis whose details would depend upon what was being analyzed. 
I do not understand what you say. I give an example: you might experience an object as green, with a certain shape, as solid, with a certain hardness. We know that this ofcourse also depends on how our senses work, nerves, brain, mind.
But how do you determine how it actually exist? What does it mean…actually exist?
You investigate and analyze the thing in question and if you discover a discrepancy between how it appears and the results of that analysis, then you conclude it is not real. If on the other hand, you can discover no discrepancy after deep analysis and investigation then we say it is real according to our best understanding.
Can you give an example.
Sure.
You are walking through the Sahara parched and looking for water desperately. You see a glare or reflection in the distance and water appears to your mind. You walk closer and closer convinced that your parched throat will soon be satiated. As you draw even closer the mirage evaporates and you discover to your horror that the water you saw was not real. They way it appeared and the way it actually is is not concordant.
Or take the case of the older woman who sees holes in the world wherever she looks. The holes that she sees are not real. By investigating further she discovers the way they appear is not in concordance with what they actually are. Cataracts in her eyes.
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I think it’s important to define nothingness too.
I would map “the highest level of nothingness, without any possibility of anything arising again” to Parinibbana, or after the death of an arahant.
Hi all 
Well, you replied to me first. So it would seem to me considerable if you engaged my argument, rather than drawing us into a tangent about logic, just because of a little mistake, where through quick and careless typing I called it a logical fallacy instead of an illogical fallacy—just semantics with no bearing on my actual argument. Either way, I did acknowledge the distinction as well as my mistake. I also said why I think your syllogism is inaccurate and, despite that, which premise I disagreed with. So I don’t think I neglected your point. I just don’t want to get bogged down in this, like we indeed are now… With respect, I don’t think this is the place for Logic 101, with the assumption that I and/or others don’t appreciate it. So let’s move on from that?
Again I think that’s not a proper rewording of the premise. His argument is that in a particular text the Buddha doesn’t say such things (and not just clearly but not at all). That is an important difference from the Buddha never saying these things—if anything because it (usefully) limits the scope of what we would be discussing. Also, because that is the actual argument. I read Ven Anālayo’s book and I can’t remember him suggesting the premise that the Buddha never says such things (although, again, he probably thinks so, and concludes as much). And even if Ven Anālayo were to suggest this elsewhere, that is still not what I was replying to, not the argument that was introduced by Pyjter.
To quote Ven Anālayo again:
Since Upasīva’s query concerned either annihilation or an eternal condition, it seems that he should be envisaged as operating under the assumption that there is a self. Hence, there may have been an additional need [for the Buddha] to clarify that there is no self in the first place to be extinguished or perpetuated. But that [doesn’t happen because that is] not beyond the reach of language […]. Thus, the reply to Upasīva does not fit the assumption that Nirvana is a mere nothingness […]
So the syllogism I think should be something like:
- Premise 1: When asked by Upasīva about eternalism and annihilationism, the Buddha should clarify that he teaches the remainderless cessation of mere self-less processes (aka what Anālayo calls a “nothingness” that yet isn’t the result of annihilating a self).
- Premise 2: He doesn’t do so.
- Conclusion: Therefore, he didn’t teach that.
I would reject both premises. If accepting the premises, we can logically conclude the Buddha didn’t teach it to Upasīva. However, I think the general conclusion is unwarranted as well—which from the wider context is that he therefore doesn’t teach it at all, to anyone.
To clarify, Ven A. makes an almost identical argument based on MN22, where the Buddha is accused of teaching annihilation of a self. He thinks that in his response the Buddha’s should have clarified that what he teaches is the cessation of self-less suffering. The Buddha doesn’t, is the thinking (although it seems to me he very much does); therefore, he didn’t teach that. Again, even if technically this is logically valid, this is still flawed reasoning; it is still illogical. I could likewise ask why the Buddha didn’t simply respond to the accusation by saying he taught a type of lasting transcendental experience, like Anālayo thinks. The Buddha doesn’t; therefore, he doesn’t teach that, I could argue. But this is an argument from ignorance, going by what is not said.
But let’s put aside MN22 and let’s focus on the Upasiva Sutta first, for we haven’t really gotten much further than my first post. Instead of zoning in on the logic issue, if you can help me realize where my argument is actually wrong or how Ven Anālayo’s is right, I would appreciate that. I am thinking of replying in a more official form to Ven Anālayo and it’s good to get some feedback to remove potential blinders on my side.
I thought as much, but that’s still just falling back on semantics about what “thing” and “existence” and “real” mean to you, which is different from what they mean to most people—including the Buddha, as far as we can tell, because he often affirmatively espoused the existence of things using the verb atthi (like here, specifically in context of the middle teaching). So I think it’s also a misunderstanding of atthitā & natthitā, see a brief explanation here. Anyway, if you don’t want to answer the question, which seems to me to have only two possible answers (yes and no), that is fine.
And to go back a bit (somewhat off topic but anyway):
I think that’s generally a good observation. But moreover, we actually can be sure that there has been editing here, because the manuscripts are inconsistent. None of them actually correctly attributes the quote to the Buddha. The Burmese one sort of does, but does it in a broken way. All others (PTS, Sri Lankan, and Thai) are not broken and attribute the quote to Brahma Baka. So to me it’s quite clear that the editing happened in the Burmese one. Alternatively, the others were edited, or all of them, but either way, because there are differences, there was some editing for sure.
If by the Dharmaguptaka parallel you are referring to DA24, the translation by Patton indeed uses “formless” but the Chinese term is different from the usual symbol for ‘form’ (形 instead of 色), so in that sense it is not clearer than the Pāli.
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I understand that, thanks. Your examples were helpful
I am gonna take some time rest and pauze for a few days.
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Okay, you are right, this has been my mistake. In my original post I should have been more explicit and added something like, “what I am saying here is not a direct engagement of your argument (yet).” So I apologize for that, because I think that from your point of view that is the most natural assumption to make about my initial reply to you.
I agree you did not neglect my point, but you have so far said:
So what it seems to me that you have done is:
- Engaged with my point
- Said my point is a distinction not worth getting caught in up.
- Said that focusing on my point does end up neglecting your actual point.
- Said I have not engaged your argument, but have instead drawn us into a tangent.
- Said I am only focusing on a little mistake of yours; it is just semantics with no bearing
- Said that you don’t want to get bogged down in my point
So yes, I don’t think you totally neglect my point, but the attempts in (2)-(6) above to shift the discussion away from my point would neglect my point. As for point(3), I again have to say that this was my mistake to begin with. What I was saying was not supposed to be a refutation or a counterargument to what you had written, but instead was the beginning of an approach to the issue from a different angle.
I do not have the assumption that others do not appreciate what I am saying. As far whether or not you appreciate it, it does not seem to me like you have, because you say
but to me this is not at all the distinction I am trying to make, and I have never heard of the distinction between a logical and an illogical fallacy? I am making the distinction between a “valid” and a “sound” argument. Anyway, I know that you are intelligent, so maybe when you said “logical fallacy vs illogical fallacy” that was your shorthand way of referring to the distinction between a valid and a sound argument? I can’t tell. You know what they say about assumptions 
. Rather than assuming I should just ask if I have been making any sense with regards to this distinction? Yeshe is the only one in this thread who has seemed to appreciate my post, but I know that he has already studied these things, so I doubt I have been a good spokesperson.
Sunyo, you don’t understand this teaching and training. I understand this teaching and training. What, you understand this teaching and training? You’re practicing wrong. I’m practicing right. I stay on topic, you don’t. You said last what you should have said first. You said first what you should have said last. What you’ve thought so much about has been disproved. Your doctrine is refuted. Go on, save your doctrine! You’re trapped; get yourself out of this—if you can!
Okay, I have always thought that was one of funniest passages in the Canon.
Okay, this is a great point! I may have not represented Anālayo’s position accurately. The argument summary of “his” position that I presented was also my brain filling in the gaps based on arguments elsewhere that I have seen made by others on this issue and others in the Canon.
I will address this but first let me say
So one of the end possibilities I envisioned with this conversation would be something like:
- Formalizing Analyo’s argument (or the more general argument)
- Phrasing your counteraguments also in a more formalized way which shows exactly why (1) above fails
In other words, I am on your side (or at least not against you!) and I think that the counterarguments you have presented are strong. Again, I should have been more explicit that this is the framework under which I should have entered the discussion.
Now back to the more interesting stuff…
So I guess when I read Anālayo’s text, here is what I see:
I took the phrase “to clarify”, which made assumptions about what the Buddha was like, and mapped this onto premise 1:
I am, of course, somewhat stretching Analayo’s original statement, but it looks to me like a fair stretch? One that he would agree with? Do you disagree? If Analayo personally did not agree with the above, then do you think it is worth looking at that premise more closely? Because I have seen similar premisese used elsewhere in other writings.
I think the argument Analayo is interested in is more powerful than just, “the Buddha does not say exactly this in this passage.” There are other background assumptions being made by Analayo, namely about the nature of the Buddha as a teacher. Like, obviously:
If a person never explicitly said X in this instance in exactly the way we would have wanted them to, it means they don’t believe X!
is a bad argument. Why not engage with the strongest version possible of Analyo’s argument?
I think this is a clearly bad argument alone. The crucial difference between the strong and the weak argument is that the strong argument introduces assumptiosn about the qualities of the Buddha as a teacher. So, I do not think that the syllogism should be like that, because where would be the fun in that? 
Let us not try do the “Weak Man Fallacy.” The Weak Man Fallacy “chooses the opposition’s weakest (or one of its weakest) arguments or proponents for attack.”
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Hi Bhante 
It’s a straw man fallacy, and by that I don’t mean deliberate misrepresentation, Ven Analāyo’s argument doesn’t have the structure of an argument from ignorance.
In our case, argument from ignorance would be if Analāyo claims that your “proposition is false because it has not yet been proven true" (Wikipedia). Which isn’t the case.
First, he presents an argument that if Upasīvas assumption about self is wrong, there would be a need for an explanation of this false premise, but there is none. Analāyo doesn’t say: therefore, cessationists are wrong. Instead, he simply points out that communication of cessation doesn’t constitute a language problem. We see plenty of such examples in suttas. In the next step, he relies on what actually Buddha said and presents a better explanation why The Teacher speaks about the limits of language. It’s challenging to talk about transcendence.
Transcendence is another name for something beyond empirical reality, logic, and by the same token beyond language. So, maybe he is saying that here and other suttas?
As I posted before, I don’t think Ven Analāyo disagrees with you here and your later remarks. But simply interprets them differently.
Ven Analāyo does consider and discusses other views; for instance, he mentions an explicit Ven @Brahmali paper about Nibbana, so he also knows your stance on this subject. He simply has a different opinion, And just because of it, to suggest that his explanation isn’t informed or careful, is not fair. He uses a cumulative argument to deliver his point, and here we discuss only a fragment of his analysis. Your criticism looks like ad hominem.
If my memory serves me well, the first time I read “Nibbana is psychologically positive, but ontologically negative,” it was in Ven Bodhi essay about Nibbana. For him and Ven Analāyo, being ontologically negative doesn’t mean mere nothingness. In addition, you don’t get psychology without ontology.
Ven Analāyo painstakingly presents the metaphor of the island, warns against the reification of Nibbana, and shows that It isn’t a being or a thing. So I don’t understand who is postulating that Nibbana is “a physical place”? Is this another straw man?
I know! Och, these limits of language! 
In that case, can I say that then the sage is beyond language, logic, like the ocean? Again, expression of cessation in language isn’t problematic.
For Analāyo the natural interpretation is that Nibbana isn’t a thing nor mere nothing. It’s a “middle path position.”
5.1vns102In the same way for the rightly released,
5.2who have crossed the flood of sensual bonds,
5.3and attained unshakable happiness,
5.4where they have gone cannot be found.”
This verse, which has a range of parallels conveying similarly positive connotations, complements the presentation in the previous verse regarding the cessation of the aggregates. When read in conjunction with the present verse, it seems that there is more to it than just the extinction of the five aggregates.
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Nibbana is the end of existence. Existence continues because consciousness associated with intentional actions continues. Consciousness arises in dependence on the six types of sense stimuli. So, when existence ends, consciousness too ends.
Therefore, to say that there is something after the passing away of an arahant is to admit that consciousness in some form exists/continues after death. The Buddha is very clear that consciousness ceases just like a fire extinguishes due to lack of fuel.
With Metta
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I wouldn’t call it semantics since substantial existence is the 1st fetter to be given up. Once you give that up, you can’t think in terms of truly existing or true non-existence (atthitā & natthitā). So when someone says that nibbāna is pure cessation, they are going to an extreme. Of course we can say things exist or not in a general sense. The dhammas arise and cease in a general sense, but because of the emptiness of substance we can’t say that they truly are or are not.
Then Venerable Ānanda went up to Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, Ānanda sat down to one side, and said to Mahākoṭṭhita:
“Reverend, when these six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, does anything else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Does nothing else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Do both something else and nothing else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Do neither something else nor nothing else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Reverend, when asked these questions, you say ‘don’t put it like that’. … How then should we see the meaning of this statement?”
“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, something else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘both something else and nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘neither something else nor nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. The scope of proliferation extends as far as the scope of the six fields of contact. The scope of the six fields of contact extends as far as the scope of proliferation. When the six fields of contact fade away and cease with nothing left over, proliferation stops and is stilled.”
AN 4.174
This is the view of substantial aggregates and identifies the person with the aggregates. What ceases is a self - selfish thoughts, self cherishing attitudes, views of self vs other, view of the self as the aggregates, views of the self in the aggregates, views of self outside or distinct from the aggregates, ignorance imposing a view of a personal self, continued individual existence - all this mass of suffering ceases. The aggregates are not the self. The aggregates never were the self. The view of substantial aggregates as a personal individual must be put down and this burden let go of.
This is what I mean when I say Nibbana is the end of existence.
With Metta
That may be so, but the aggregates are not the self. The body and mind are not the self. The self is not in the body and mind nor is it distinct from them. The extinguishment of continued individual existence is not the same thing as the extinguishment of the continued existence of the aggregates; which are again not the self. Mistaking the extinguishment of continued individual existence for the extinguishment of the continued existence of the aggregates is to view the aggregates as the self. To bring it back to the topic; that is a part of the point I believe Bhikkhu Bodhi may be making.
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I do not understand. Can you please explain.
Here again I do not get it. What is the difference between existence and the aggregates.
With Metta
You cannot find a self in the body no matter how hard you look. You cannot find a self in the mind now matter how hard you look. You cannot find a self in the body + mind no matter how hard you look. You cannot find a self somewhere separate or distinct from the body + mind no matter how hard you look. The body + mind is not a self nor does it contain a self.
Individual existence is dependent upon the ignorance believing one can find a self in the body; in the mind; in the body+mind; somewhere somehow separate from the body+mind; as the body; as the mind; as the body+mind; as something other than the body+mind. When this ignorance is extinguished so is individual existence. Individual existence is dependent upon this ignorance.
Believing that individual existence is somehow tied up or equal to the existence of the aggregates is grasping at the aggregates as the individual. It is the view of the self as somehow found or embodied by the aggregates. This is a burden that should be given up. Without giving up this burden and letting go of identification with or possession of the aggregates it is not possible to cease individual existence.
So when ignorance is replaced by wisdom or when ignorance totally fades away, there is no existence or anything that can be viewed as self either in the aggregates or in the mind. Correct me if I am wrong.
Then what do you think is left after Nibbana? Is it (if any) not related to consciousness?
With Metta
Have you found the mind? How does it look like?
I believe EBT make clear that such a thing as individual existence is a very strong impression that arises because the senses, body and mind together process sense-info locally. The senses are local, the brain is, the nerves are. And like a huge antenna they pick up signals, process it. And all this comes with a strong impression that the nature of the mind itself is also local. It makes us feel we are individual, limited to a certain place and time. We do not see and know mind without limits (AN10.81)
It makes us feel we are here, and reality is there. It makes us feel this seperation is real.
This is like forming a whirlpool in water. Khandha’s form a kind of mental whirlpool that blind us from seeing we are never really seperated from the oneness of the mind and reality. A whirlpool has not really boundaries. They do not form a reality that is ever separated from a much larger reality of water.
But still, the whirlpool is trapped in her own movement, blinded by it, and only when it cools down, calms, it can notice the truth that it never really existed as some seperated individual reality.
All beings experience themself as whirlpools because this is merely the effect of sense-info being locally processed. It comes with a coming and going of vinnana’s. All being are completely obsessed with this coming and going. And that cause the impression of living an individual existence. That is why vinnana is called a magician.
In the end this is also our belief in self. There is no real difference between believing to exist as individual in some fixed way, and a belief in self. It is because we are so sure about our individual existence, that we also are so protective and have become full of anger, greed, delusion, violence to protect this individual existence. But what do we protect? The Buddha saw…mere suffering. We do not really protect ourselves.
Seeing all things as they really are, one does not denie individual existence but knows how it arises and ceases any moment. And one does also not denie the oneness.
Nice 
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