SuttaCentral
In this setting, I always assume that this was the period after Buddha parinibbana.
All sutta with this setting always have monks and nuns to think about Ananda as someone to ask. (Because the Buddha has gone forever)
So that give us the time period. The phrase has existed even before, and important enough that there is explanation to avoid misunderstanding.
Why? What indicates this? Ananda was the Buddha’s attendant therefore most likely was always a source of the Buddha’s teachings.
No, it doesn’t. It’s the briefest version of this sutra, I think. The other Chinese version is elaborate by comparison, going into the twelve links of dependent origination.
What you’ve found is one of a cluster of later Buddhist ideas that have a few instances in the Nikayas and Agamas but are all over the place in later literature. It’s one of the major arguments for there being early and later strata among the EBT canons.
A thing to consider, though, is that “sarva dharma” (sabbe dhamma) is really the innovation that’s rare in EBTs. You can find “the five aggregates are not self” or “the six senses are not self” much more frequently, and those are essentially the same statement. It’s similar to namarupa standing for the five aggregates. It’s a more common term outside of EBTs.
The most interesting thing on this topic to me is that “all things are empty” doesn’t occur in Pali at all that I know of. This fourth mark is found in SA, and it became the main thesis of the Prajnaparamita texts.
Try search and read the suttas where the setting is Ananda at Kosambi and at that monastery.
You will see some hints that the Buddha had passed away.
Thanks @cdpatton ! Yes, my point is that the sabbe sentence is one of the few places in the EBT’s that could be misconstrued as saying “there is no self” which would contradict a lot of places where the Buddha basically says that the people who say “there is no self” are just as enslaved to the concept of self as those who say “there is a self” (and of course those who say “both” and “neither”).
The reason it is interesting to me is because even my absolute hero’s in dhamma like @sujato and K.R Norman say things like this statement occurs “frequently” or is “well known”, but it actually occurs very infrequently, even in later texts like the Abhidhamma, and where it does occur, it often occurs in suttas that themselves betray an anxiety about how legitimate it is, for example in MN35, it is first spoken by Ajivva, and the Jain who he is talking to is so shocked he goes to verify the teaching from the Buddha, however the Buddha is “plunged into the deep woods” and then just repeats what Ajivva says word for word. All this is a bit suspect for a major piece of doctrine that interpreted in a certain way would contradict several major suttas in the canon. The same anxiety occurs in the next sutta with Channa that I give above, the poem is, well, poetic, and states that the idea will lead to dispassion, not that it’s fundamental doctrine, the AN passage is almost bare of context except for the use of dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā which as I said above always means conditionality everywhere else it is used, so we are really left with one short sutta, to Ananda, which is a vacchagotta sutta, that seems to contradict or at least can be interpreted to contradict ALL the othe vacchagotta suttas, many of which are much longer and more detailed and give to my mind sophisticated and deep philosophical reasons for rejecting the view “there is no self” (along with, of course, the views “there is a self” , “both”, “neither”)
That the phrase suddenly appears 30 odd times in the Niddessa, and that it is now trotted out as a “well known” “frequent” commonplace of the early dhamma is therefore quite surprising, or at least it was a surprise to me.
Thanks again for confirming my assessment, I really want to say that you and @sujato have made an enormous difference to my dhamma studies this last year, it has changed my capacity to research in as profound a way as Bhikku Bodhi’s publications did 20 years ago!
Much very sincere Metta to you!
No it doesn’t @prajnadeva , you can’t date suttas by the events that occur in them like that, if that where the case then we would think that a history of World War Two which was written in 2010 was written in 1945 because that’s when the events it described took place.
This is a simple and obvious fallacy that I have pointed out before, so I will point it out this one last time and then ignore any comments from people who make it in future.
Thank you @CurlyCarl !! I missed that one! As for the rest of what your saying… we’ll, I’m not sure I see it.
With DN9 however, what is interesting is that the dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā phrase is used in a context where the Buddha has refused to “hold a view” on the 10 unanswered questions, and then juxtaposed these 10 with his 4 noble truths about suffering, arising, ceasing, and the path. So I would say that this seventh occurrence of the phrase still refers to conditionality, not to the view “there is no self”.
I think the ambiguity of atta could be the cause this problem. Lower case atta does not come with the hard requirement of being eternal. It can sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. Upper case Atta does have to hard requirement of being eternal. If it sometimes does not exist, it does not exist.
@cdpatton , I take it the Chinese texts have the same ambiguity with respect to the two usages of atta?
It depends on what you’re reading. It is well known among Buddhists today, and it apparently was quite popular during the era of Abhidharma studies as a succinct set of Buddhist axioms.
My understanding is that the presence of an historical event tells us the earliest date that the text could have. A history of World War II can’t have been written before 1939-1945, and it would probably be written sometimes afterward. That’s how that works. Of course, what gets complicated is when you become aware that people have been updating or changing their texts over time. Then, a History of Europe might have originally been written before WWII, but then someone added WWII to the text after it happened to keep it up to date. This is the problem with Buddhist texts. They don’t have “created-at” and “last-revised” time stamps on them, and it would appear they changed over time.
They usually translated it with a first-person pronoun, but occasionally it was translated as “soul.” I think they were trying to make the distinction that way sometimes.
Now I’m curious as to whether the cases @josephzizys is talking about uses the first person pronoun or soul character. I think anatta is supposed to mean not-Atman (uppercase Self), not not-me. Not-me being the personal self (lowercase self). The personal self sometimes exists and sometimes does not exist. Not-Atman cannot sometimes exist. It either always exists or it never existed. Sometimes is simply not an option logically.
Added later: this might explain why you can unproblematically take refuge in your personal self and why the five aggregates are not-Atman.
Can you show us the characters for both? I would like to check this out. Or is it like the characters for vitakka vicara that are used for multiple purposes and you really need a Chinese expert?
The two Chinese words are 我 (I, me) and 神 (spirit, god, soul). 神 is rare as a translation of atta, but it does happen occasionally. 我 is the translation 95% of the time, or something overwhelming like that.
我 is disambiguated from atta mainly by position in a sentence. If it’s the subject, then it’s being used as the normal pronoun (“I said such and such to so and so”); when it’s not the subject of the sentence, then it’s usually used as a concept that can be the subject of speculation like “self.” You do have to pay attention, though, the pronoun can be an object (“me/us”) in a sentence.
神 is most commonly translating words for gods and spirits, not souls (it’s the character for the Japanese kami, e.g.).
Another way nuances come across are in the negatives used. 無 indicates absence or non-possession (“no self” or “doesn’t have self”), while 非 means non-identity (“not self”). Generally speaking 無 translates a- and 非 translates na-. The most common Chinese translation of anatta is 無我 (“doesn’t have/no self”).
“All dhammas are not-self” would mean there is no self. If I said “All things lack blueness” then there are no blue things. If everything is not-self, then there is no self.
When the Buddha was asked if there is a self, he says he would have said there is no self if his interlocutor wasn’t so confused. When questions of exist or does not exist arise, it’s framed in the sense of what happens after death. The eternalists said there is a self which persists (existence applies) whilst the annihilationists said there is a self which is destroyed (non-existence applies). I could be wrong but if I remember correctly the “neither exists nor does not exists” was the view of the Jains.
What is the character for jiva?
added later: Is there a character in any traditional Chinese text for the Brahmanic notion of Atman as eternal unchanging Self?
This succinctly states two misconceptions about the EBT’s and provokes me to address them so thank you @Ceisiwr !
Firstly, the Ānandasutta is probably the shortest, most garbled, and as I have implied above latest of the Vachagotta suttas.
It takes a story, that of the silence of the Buddha in response to Vacchagotta’s questions, and then gives a much shorter, philosophically less clear and less satisfying explanation of that silence than in all the other accounts of the encounter.
MN72 the Aggivacchasutta is the longest account of the Buddhas silence in response to Vachaggota’s questions.
This sutta is framed by two other vachagotta suttas, on either side, the first devoted to repudiating the view that the Buddha claimed omniscience and second a (heavily) modified form of the sekkha patipada applied to vacchagotta himself after he ordained.
these 3 suttas make up the first 3 chapters of the wanderers section of MN, indicating that they where considered important by the redactors of that Nikaya.
IN MN72 vachagotta asks 10 questions:
“Master Gotama, is this your view: ‘The cosmos is eternal. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘sassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti? Variant: evaṁdiṭṭhi → evaṁdiṭṭhī (bj, sya1ed, sya2ed, km, mr)
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘sassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘The cosmos is not eternal. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, ‘asassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘asassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘The world is finite. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘antavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘antavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘The world is infinite. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, ‘anantavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘anantavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘The soul and the body are the same thing. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘The soul and the body are different things. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, ‘aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘A Realized One exists after death. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘A Realized One doesn’t exist after death. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, ‘na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘A Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Then is this your view: ‘A Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?
“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi: ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.
“Master Gotama, when asked these ten questions, you say: ‘That’s not my view.’
“‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, sassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— sassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. Variant: moghamaññan’ti vadesi → moghamaññantīti vadesi (bj); moghamaññanti iti vadesi (?) ‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, asassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— asassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, antavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— antavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, anantavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— anantavā loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi. ‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti— evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi— neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti vadesi.
Seeing what drawback do you avoid all these convictions?”
Kiṁ pana bho gotamo ādīnavaṁ sampassamāno evaṁ imāni sabbaso diṭṭhigatāni anupagato”ti?
“Each of these ten convictions is the thicket of views, the desert of views, the trick of views, the evasiveness of views, the fetter of views. They’re beset with anguish, distress, and fever. They don’t lead to disillusionment, dispassion, cessation, peace, insight, awakening, and extinguishment.
“‘Sassato loko’ti kho, vaccha, diṭṭhigatametaṁ diṭṭhigahanaṁ diṭṭhikantāro diṭṭhivisūkaṁ diṭṭhivipphanditaṁ diṭṭhisaṁyojanaṁ sadukkhaṁ savighātaṁ saupāyāsaṁ sapariḷāhaṁ, na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya saṁvattati. Variant: diṭṭhikantāro → diṭṭhikantāraṁ (bj, pts1ed) ‘Asassato loko’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘antavā loko’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘anantavā loko’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīran’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīran’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’ti kho, vaccha …pe… ‘neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā’ti kho, vaccha, diṭṭhigatametaṁ diṭṭhigahanaṁ diṭṭhikantāro diṭṭhivisūkaṁ diṭṭhivipphanditaṁ diṭṭhisaṁyojanaṁ sadukkhaṁ savighātaṁ saupāyāsaṁ sapariḷāhaṁ, na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya saṁvattati.
Seeing this drawback I avoid all these convictions.”
Imaṁ kho ahaṁ, vaccha, ādīnavaṁ sampassamāno evaṁ imāni sabbaso diṭṭhigatāni anupagato”ti.
“But does Master Gotama have any convictions at all?”
“Atthi pana bhoto gotamassa kiñci diṭṭhigatan”ti?
“The Realized One has done away with convictions.
“Diṭṭhigatanti kho, vaccha, apanītametaṁ tathāgatassa.
So. First, it is clear that the Buddhas says that he rejects holding any of these ten views for THE SAME REASON, not for an eclectic grab bag of specific reasons, different for each one, but because 1. they lead to suffering, and 2. because he has done away with “convictions”.
Second, the (really ridiculous) explanation that the Buddha remained silent when asked if the soul survived the body because there was no soul to begin with simply makes no sense as an explination for why he remains silent on the question of if the soul and the body are different things (if the soul is a fiction and the body is real they clearly are differnet things), or for the questions about the world (unless you think he didn’t think there was a world). Actually this reminds me of another thread where a poster was wondering if the buddha was omniscient and I posted the MN71, the first Vacchagotta sutta where the buddha says he is not, and the poster wrote back and said that the buddha was just saying he wasn’t omniscient WHILE HE WAS ASLEEP 
TLDR the buddhas silence is not just him being rude and unhelpful when people missphrase questions by making assumptions. Guess what, If you ask someone “does the soul survive the body?” and the person holds the view “there is no soul” it’s pretty straight forward for even an unenlightened person to simply say “your question is poorly phrased, there actually is no soul to begin with” in fact the suttas are littered with points where “your question is poorly phrased” is actually used!
Again, this explanation fails for the question of rebirth, in that if “the self is a fiction and therefore doesn’t apply” is the answer then that applies equaly to the fictional selves of unenlightened people as well as the fictional self of the Buddha, but that is not what is meant at all, but also because it is not what is given as the explaination by the Buddha:
“But Master Gotama, when a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, where are they reborn?”
“Evaṁ vimuttacitto pana, bho gotama, bhikkhu kuhiṁ upapajjatī”ti?
“‘They’re reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”
“Upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.
“Well then, are they not reborn?”
“Tena hi, bho gotama, na upapajjatī”ti?
“‘They’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”
“Na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.
“Well then, are they both reborn and not reborn?”
“Tena hi, bho gotama, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī”ti?
“‘They’re both reborn and not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”
“Upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.
“Well then, are they neither reborn nor not reborn?”
“Tena hi, bho gotama, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatī”ti?
“‘They’re neither reborn nor not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”
“Neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.
“Master Gotama, when asked all these questions, you say: ‘It doesn’t apply.’
“‘Evaṁ vimuttacitto pana, bho gotama, bhikkhu kuhiṁ upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi. ‘Tena hi, bho gotama, na upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi. ‘Tena hi, bho gotama, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi. ‘Tena hi, bho gotama, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi.
I fail to understand this point, Master Gotama; I’ve fallen into confusion.
Etthāhaṁ, bho gotama, aññāṇamāpādiṁ, ettha sammohamāpādiṁ.
And I’ve now lost even the degree of clarity I had from previous discussions with Master Gotama.”
Yāpi me esā bhoto gotamassa purimena kathāsallāpena ahu pasādamattā sāpi me etarahi antarahitā”ti.
“No wonder you don’t understand, Vaccha, no wonder you’re confused.
“Alañhi te, vaccha, aññāṇāya, alaṁ sammohāya.
For this principle is deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, sublime, beyond the scope of logic, subtle, comprehensible to the astute.
Gambhīro hāyaṁ, vaccha, dhammo duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo.
It’s hard for you to understand, since you have a different view, creed, preference, practice, and tradition.
So tayā dujjāno aññadiṭṭhikena aññakhantikena aññarucikena aññatrayogena aññatrācariyakena.
Well then, Vaccha, I’ll ask you about this in return, and you can answer as you like.
Tena hi, vaccha, taññevettha paṭipucchissāmi; yathā te khameyya tathā naṁ byākareyyāsi.
What do you think, Vaccha?
Taṁ kiṁ maññasi, vaccha,
Suppose a fire was burning in front of you. Would you know:
sace te purato aggi jaleyya, jāneyyāsi tvaṁ:
‘This fire is burning in front of me’?”
‘ayaṁ me purato aggi jalatī’”ti?
“Yes, I would, Master Gotama.”
“Sace me, bho gotama, purato aggi jaleyya, jāneyyāhaṁ: ‘ayaṁ me purato aggi jalatī’”ti.
“But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you:
“Sace pana taṁ, vaccha, evaṁ puccheyya: ‘
This fire burning in front of you: what does it depend on to burn?’ How would you answer?”
‘yo te ayaṁ purato aggi jalati ayaṁ aggi kiṁ paṭicca jalatī’ti, evaṁ puṭṭho tvaṁ, vaccha, kinti byākareyyāsī”ti?
“Sace maṁ, bho gotama, evaṁ puccheyya:
“I would answer like this:
‘yo te ayaṁ purato aggi jalati ayaṁ aggi kiṁ paṭicca jalatī’ti, evaṁ puṭṭho ahaṁ, bho gotama, evaṁ byākareyyaṁ:
‘This fire burning in front of me burns in dependence on grass and logs as fuel.’”
‘yo me ayaṁ purato aggi jalati ayaṁ aggi tiṇakaṭṭhupādānaṁ paṭicca jalatī’”ti.
“Suppose that fire burning in front of you was extinguished. Would you know:
“Sace te, vaccha, purato so aggi nibbāyeyya, jāneyyāsi tvaṁ:
‘This fire in front of me is extinguished’?”
‘ayaṁ me purato aggi nibbuto’”ti?
“Yes, I would, Master Gotama.”
“Sace me, bho gotama, purato so aggi nibbāyeyya, jāneyyāhaṁ: ‘ayaṁ me purato aggi nibbuto’”ti.
“But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you:
“Sace pana taṁ, vaccha, evaṁ puccheyya:
‘This fire in front of you that is extinguished: in what direction did it go—
‘yo te ayaṁ purato aggi nibbuto so aggi ito katamaṁ disaṁ gato—
east, south, west, or north?’ How would you answer?”
puratthimaṁ vā dakkhiṇaṁ vā pacchimaṁ vā uttaraṁ vā’ti, evaṁ puṭṭho tvaṁ, vaccha, kinti byākareyyāsī”ti?
“It doesn’t apply, Master Gotama. The fire depended on grass and logs as fuel. When that runs out, and no more fuel is added, the fire is reckoned to have become extinguished due to lack of fuel.”
“Na upeti, bho gotama, yañhi so, bho gotama, aggi tiṇakaṭṭhupādānaṁ paṭicca ajali tassa ca pariyādānā aññassa ca anupahārā anāhāro nibbutotveva saṅkhyaṁ gacchatī”ti. Variant: ajali → jalati (sya-all, km, mr)
“In the same way, Vaccha, any form by which a Realized One might be described has been cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future.
“Evameva kho, vaccha, yena rūpena tathāgataṁ paññāpayamāno paññāpeyya taṁ rūpaṁ tathāgatassa pahīnaṁ ucchinnamūlaṁ tālāvatthukataṁ anabhāvaṅkataṁ āyatiṁ anuppādadhammaṁ.
A Realized One is freed from reckoning in terms of form. They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom,
Rūpasaṅkhayavimutto kho, vaccha, tathāgato gambhīro appameyyo duppariyogāḷho— like the ocean. seyyathāpi mahāsamuddo.
‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn nor not reborn’—none of these apply.
Upapajjatīti na upeti, na upapajjatīti na upeti, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti na upeti, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti na upeti.
Note that the argument is not that “there never really was a fire”.
Rather the argument is that “exists” and “doesn’t exist” for the fire DEPENDS on “exists” or "doesn’t exist for the fuel.
its the very CONCEPTS of “exists” and “doesn’t exist” (and “both” and “niether”) that the buddha relativises here, they all equally fall under the sway of dependence.
Also note that this sutta gives the source of vaccha’s confusion; he dosn’t understand because “this principle is deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, sublime, beyond the scope of logic, subtle, comprehensible to the astute” i.e “dependant origination”, not “Anatta”.
This is the whole entire point of early buddhism as far as I can tell, to replace the extreem views of “exists” and “does not exist” with the more dynamic understanding of the contingency of existance and non-existance. the capital A Anatta crowd make conditionality something that happens inside an “Objective Reality” whereas te buddhas point was that reality is something that happens inside conditionality.
SO TO MAKE A LONG STORY SHORT:
Not true. the Buddha refuses to say this becasue it would contracdict conditonality and he answers the question by explaining conditionality.
Not ture. there are plenty of examples where questions of existance or non existance are framed in other ways and the Buddha always answers that they have done away with such conceptions in favour of conditionality.
Metta.
Just for reference, because Vachagotta is a good gateway into Buddhist Philosophy in the EBT’s:
Vachagotta appears in:
MN71
MN72 (this is one of the most philosophically important suttas in the canon)
MN73
SN33 (this one is a classic “mechanical reproduction of permutations” samyutta)
SN44.7
SN44.8
SN44.9
SN44.10
SN44.11
AN3.57
AN3.63
Thag1.112
For your reading pleasure, Vachagotta in the EBT’s!!
Metta
The world, as in most people, aren’t caught between thinking if dhammas exist or not ontologically. That’s a much later concern, born of scholastic debates. They are, back then as today, caught between thinking (shackled) about if they will exist or won’t exist when dead. This is the bulk of the speculative wrangling that the other ascetics got caught up in. Then the Buddha came along and pointed out that they were literally arguing over nothing. Instead of a self that exists now and forever, or one that is one day destroyed, there are only dhammas. Natural phenomenon and events arising and ceasing according to conditions. I’ll have to address the rest of your points when I get time, but in all honesty I think the kind of philosophical road you are going down misses the point of the Dhamma entirely.
I literally quote extensively from a sutta that explores the ontological status of fire in a deep and interesting way that is clearly incompatible with the explanation that the fire is “literally nothing”. Are you saying that you think MN72 is a late “scholastic” sutta?
And honestly @Ceisiwr if you are just going to repeat the torturous, late and scholastic debating points of the Therevadan orthodoxy at me like “the body in jhana means the body in the mind” and “the denial of omniscience is only the denial of omniscience whilst asleep” and “the silence of the Buddha was because the soul didn’t exist before death either” and so on and so forth rather than engage in the actual philosophical issues I raise then feel free not to bother.
My philosophical interest in Buddhism is simply the interest in whether or not it is possible to make Buddhism make sense.
If a nonsensical religion is good enough for you then that’s fine, I hope your worries about existing or not existing after you die have been assuaged.
My worries are not about whether or not I exist after death, rather they are worries about whether or not any sense can be made of the world that gives peace of mind.
If you think that misses the point entirely then by all means pass by me in noble silence.
Good luck with your journey.
They used a few different words given context that mean “life” or “to be alive” like 壽, 命, 存, 活.
壽 and 命, which are sometimes combined into one word, refer to the span of a person’s life and life in general. If they’re personalized with 者, then 壽者 or 命者 mean the liver of a life (as in, “the singer of a song”).
存 and 活 were used to mean to be alive in the present or continue to survive.
I can’t think of any other that 神 in the Agamas, but it comes up so infrequently that it’s just the impression I have. There are other translations in the Chinese language (it’s a vast corpus, after all). See the search results at Muller’s Digital Dictionary of Buddhism for entries that mention atman.
some may find this of interest:
