Latest Scientific Knowledge & Sarvastivadins

Because empty is not a substance but a description of something else, right? An adjective. So if a tree is green and grass is green, grass is not a tree, because ‘green’ is a different type of word than ‘tree’ and ‘grass.’ It’s a mere trick of language to try and cancel an argument by equating the two.

In the same way, dukkha is an adjective, and it negates the proposal that something is sukha, i.e. blissful. Just like ‘suñña’ is an adjective which negates the idea that something is ‘attā’ or ‘sārato’ (having-a-core).

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Is it a trick of language to say the aggregates are not burning chaff? Why is it a trick to say the aggregates are not literal suffering? What’s the difference. Why does one seem such a mean nasty trick while the other seems innocuous :slight_smile: I have some other obligations so will have to go for now, but think it through. I’m interested in what you come up with @Vaddha :pray:

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Burning chaff is a nominal phrase, so it is a noun. It is like “grass” and “tree.” ‘Dukkha’ behaves as an adjective, it is like ‘green.’ When one adjective can apply to two nouns, we can use language in such a way that we equate those two nouns to draw out the common adjective without it being taken as a literal logical equivalence. This is called metaphor. Here is another example that is not about the aggregates:

  1. Cheetahs are fast.
  2. Olympic sprinters are fast.
  3. Bob is an olympic sprinter.
  4. “Bob is a cheetah!!”

In saying sentence #4, it would be understood not as a literal equivalence, but as a metaphor, in that someone may rightly call bob a cheetah because cheetahs are fast and bob is fast.

From Wikipedia:
This quotation expresses a metaphor because the world is not literally a stage, and most humans are not literally actors and actresses playing roles. By asserting that the world is a stage, Shakespeare uses points of comparison between the world and a stage to convey an understanding about the mechanics of the world and the behavior of the people within it.

To then say “bob cannot be fast because you said bob is a cheetah and bob is not a cheetah” would be a mere trick of language, or, misunderstanding metaphor.

We can imagine that someone brings a red cloth into a room and sets it on the table. There are several people in the room. Now, one person hangs up the cloth as a flag outside of the room. Later, someone else takes the flag down and uses the cloth to clean the floor. After, another person puts the red cloth in their pocket as a protective charm. Someone then asks the inhabitants to sort all the cloths in one pile. Then all of the flags. Then all of the cleaning rags. Then all of the red things. Then all of the protective charms. Would you agree that we could call the original object (1) a red thing, (2) a cloth, (3) a cleaning rag, (4) a flag, and (5) a protective charm, in a literal and non-metaphorical way? Could the same thing actually be accurately called by two separate names depending on the scenario? In one case, something is literally a flag. In another case, it is literally a protective charm. If we were to:

  1. Know flags as flags.
  2. Know cloths as cloths.
  3. Know protective charms as protective charms.
  4. Know red things as red things.
  5. Know rags as rags.
    … Would we be contradicting ourself if we know the original object literally as all five? Would it be just as reasonable to start the above thought experiment by instead saying “…someone brings a flag into a room and sets it down” or “someone brings a red thing into a room and sets it down”?

In the case of the aggregates being called burning chaff, there is some common descriptor between “aggregates” and “burning chaff” which is meant to be drawn out and felt via the use of metaphor. Here, we can safely assume that the descriptor is “dukkha,” similar to “fast” being the thread we are supposed to draw out if someone were to compare a sprinter to a cheetah. But from this we do not then conclude that “bob is logically equivalent to anything which is described as fast,” because that is again mistaking the function of metaphor. In the same way, “form” is not “feeling” just because they can be described with the same adjective.

At the same time, if we approach this from a different angle, we can say that “form” can equally be called both “form” and “dukkha,” just as a red cloth can equally be called “red cloth,” “flag,” or “cleaning rag” each in a literal sense. Language, and its words, are functional; this gives us the freedom to avoid turning words into substantial and inflexible things that must always and forever be the same.

We could say that all cloths can be protective charms. But is a protective bracelet then a cloth? What about a protective metal necklace? Or medal? Or tattoo? Or mantra? Is it possible for all X to also be Y but not all Y also be X? Is it possible for all form to be dukkha and all feeling to be dukkha but not all form to be feeling and not all dukkha to be form?

Do you agree that form is not literally a lump of foam, a mirage, a bubble, a dream, a flash of lightning? What is it about those things that allows us to use language in a seemingly illogical way? Is it that there is a quality we can observe in a mirage that we can similarly observe in form? Does the presence of that quality mean that form is equivalent to anything else which we can describe in the same way? Could we describe all form as “thing with mirage-like quality”? Would that mean that all “things with mirage-like quality” must be form, or could there be another “thing with mirage-like quality” that is not form?

And then I would ask you: What does the quality of dukkha describe?

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Because The Master then also explains form as impermanent, as anatta. By your logic, form is not literally impermanent, it’s permanent; form is not anatta, it’s atta?

Anyway, intellectualising is only half the way. “They contemplate the phenomena there—included in form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness—as impermanent, as suffering, as diseased, as a boil, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as falling apart, as empty, as not-self.”

I’m not interested in semantic logical parameters and Wittgenstein-ian nitpickings, friend. Form is suffering, literally, metaphorically, comedicly, seriously, whatever. The difference between “substantial” and “insubstantial” categorisation, part of form-clinging, is itself even suffering. :slight_smile:

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No this is an application of the Law of the Excluded Middle and it is very hard to understand what I am saying when you assume this as a law of logic. You are using what is called an affirming-negation.

A non-affirming negation can only be understood without assuming the LEM.

:pray:

I agree. I really have other obligations at moment but look forward to chatting more about this :slight_smile: :pray:

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Instead of talking about “things” like the aggregates and senses, and parsing out whether they are real, unreal, void, or “something” it can help to frame the discussion in terms of the processes of experiences.
Who can deny cognizance of the flavors of experience in the human realm?

Whatever feelings, vedanā, may or may not be, including being void, etc., they are experienced – and are “real” in this sense --as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral experiences.
Are they empty of a permeant essence or identity? Yes.
Are the three characteristics manifested as/in them? Yes.
So: dukkha is experienced.
It’s not logic so much as it’s directly known in/as experiences which can’t be denied.
And denial of experience is experience too.

In this sense, the teachings come close to Phenomenology and perhaps Idealism.
There is no way to directly access whatever “external” reality may or may not be.
These are just processes that are experienced via the six senses, as in SN35.23.
This is the world of experiences that we can practice with and which can finally cease, and in this sense has nothing to do with whatever’s going on in the Andromeda galaxy.

The senses are experiences too. The Buddha says, that’s All.
In this experiential sense they are real, confirmable, and true.
Like: don’t pour piping hot water on your hand.

Within the conditional, existence means experiences via the six sense fields.
All experiences , including the aggregates which are a way of mapping experiences in the human realm, are of course anicca, dukkha, anattā.
All experiences are void and hollow of any persisting, constant, essence.
So experiences are fundamentally dukkha-experiences, including pleasant sensations and happy perceptions, according to the Buddha in hundreds of suttas.

What is not an experience is saññāvedayitanirodha, being the temporary cessation of experience when consciousness is absent. It points to final nibbāna.

N8FP → final irreversible ending of processes/experiences = cessation of dukkha.

Just saying…

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Hmm, due to my faulty memory I cannot recall if anyone has asked you this, but based on the above is it true that you think Nibbana is not experienced? Parinibbana is not experienced either I assume? :pray:

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No worries… I will take my conversation with @Vaddha private then so not to bother anymore. I apologize. :pray:

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Can you point out which part is wrong in this post?

Just in case you think only mental suffering counts as suffering, do remember that the definition of suffering includes: sorrow, lamentation, pain (physical), displeasure and despair.

And the 2nd discourse which says whatever is impermanent, is it satisfactory or unsatisfactory? Unsatisfactory venerable sir. Is what is impermanent, unsatisfactory, subject to change fit to be regarded thus, this is mine, this I am, this is myself? No Venerable sir.

Clinging or not doesn’t change the fact that the aggregates are impermanent and thus the notion of dissatisfactoriness applies, in terms of the 3 kinds of dukkha, it’s dukka due to change and conditionality. But arahants do not suffer mentally due to that, but there’s still this type of suffering due to the aggregates, the remainders.

Yes, I will try to answer but not in this thread as I’ve hijacked if enough as it is. We can chat in PM or in a new/old thread about it. :pray:

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Would you suffer if someone would break a bunch of random sticks in front of you? Is this experience suffering?

I believe the message of the Buddha is that from the perspective of the stilling of all formations, emptiness, dispassion, purity, cessation, directly known by the Buddha, all feeling states respresent a modicum of stress. Because the nature of feeling is touch, sense-contact. And even nice touch represents an element of burden. Where nothing is felt, also that burden of any touch has ceased. This is the bliss of supreme emptiness, which is called Nibbana in Patisambhidamagga and called peace in the sutta’s.

The Stilling of all formations, emptiness, is not a feeling state. It is not a vinnana nor stream of vinnana’s

From MN121 you can see that compared to minds empty nature, any additional formation or base in the mind, any non-emptiness, is perceived as a kind of subtle suffering. Ofcourse this lies very subtle.
But it means…supreme emptiness is by the Buddha (and all yogi’s) known as the ultimate bliss and peace.

They understand: ‘Here there is no stress due to the defilements of sensuality, desire to be reborn, or ignorance. There is only this modicum of stress, namely that associated with the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’ They understand: ‘This field of perception is empty of the perception of the defilements of sensuality, desire to be reborn, and ignorance. There is only this that is not emptiness, namely that associated with the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’ And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what remains they understand that it is present. That’s how emptiness manifests in them—genuine, undistorted, pure, and supreme.

It is always relative. While the complete and supreme emptiness (nibbana is called supreme emptiness) is bliss, a sublime state of supreme peace, imperishable and everlasting according sutta’s, any addition, any non-emptiness, represents still a modicum of stress.

So, this also does not mean that khandha’s are inherently suffering, but the empty mind represents bliss, peace. When this emptiness (sunnata vihara) is still filled (as it were) with feelings and perceptions, that is still experienced as a modicum of stress being present. After death also that is gone and only emptiness remains (which is not nothing).

So, i believe, Buddha teaches this emptiness as the essence of mind, which is stable, constant, not-disintegrating. Whatever formations ceases, one does not see emptiness ceasing.
Emptiness is what is refered to as the stilling of all formations. Practically this is the same.
It is not an absence of all but a presence of emptiness.

I also believe Buddha teaches this as asankhata. Because this emptiness does not have the characteristics to arise, cease and change. Emptiness cannot become something else.

Hossenfelder has said that she is an instrumentalist with respect to the Schrodinger Equation. This is a valid position to take on this issue since no one knows what physical reality it corresponds to and there are no signs of an imminent breakthrough in the foundations of quantum mechanics to resolve the matter: in the meantime the Schrodinger equation is useful even without understanding what it describes.

That said, Hossenfelder is clearly not an instrumentalist when it comes to special relativity! And it would be nonsensical to adopt an instrumentalist stance with respect to special relativity (and I don’t think anyone had done this). For example, GPS satellites must correct for errors using special and general relativity because they are moving at high speed with respect to the surface of the earth and are further up the gravity well.

While it is true that karma and rebirth are multiply ill-defined (in the sense that a number of poorly defined Buddhist and non-Buddhist explanations exist), but they are not so ill-defined that we cannot rule out the possibility of all of them in one go along with all other religious ideas about the afterlife. In the world that we find ourselves in, there is and can be no life after death, sorry. And all “just world” theories are just world fallacies. The world is manifestly not fair.

But I think we have established that almost no one reading this will accept any refutation of karma and rebirth. It’s not a conclusion that folks here consider possible and whenever I say something like this the forum puts me on trial as a heretic. As enthusiastic as they are about the internet, most Sutta Central readers would happily throw all of science under a bus in order to cling to their magical beliefs. So this is not a forum in which to pursue such inquiries.

Whether Sabine Hossenfelder agrees or disagrees I don’t much care. I’m not looking for validation in that way. I know—from my own practice of science—what it tells us about life after death and just worlds.

When one massively oversimplifies a concept, then yes, it is very easy to explain. The problem here is that no pre-modern Buddhist ever described karma this oversimplified way way (you won’t find it in Pāli for example). Having investigated many different Buddhist karma doctrines, I think you have the wrong end of the snake.

Certainly all karma doctrines link actions (karma) with results (vipaka - from the vern √pac “to cook”). But there is always more to it that this! Because vipāka is, in turn, linked to rebirth. In other words the consequence of your actions, where action is equated with conscious intention, is rebirth according to the quality of your intentions.

So the concepts of “action” and “consequence” are not what we expect from the English words “actions have consequences” and the relation between action and consequence in Buddhism always involves supernatural forces and mythical realms (devaloka, niraya).

And yet this too is a massive oversimplification amounting to a grave misunderstanding. “Virtuous behaviour” comes in at least two distinct flavours.

For lay people it takes the form of following moral rules, and this can be seen as a form of virtue ethics. But this is aimed purely at gaining a fortunate rebirth (in which you are exposed to Dharma at an early age and have the opportunity to become a [male] monk).

But in Buddhism, virtuous behaviour has no soteriological value per se. It is instrumental to gaining a fortunate rebirth, but good karma is still karma, good karma still results in rebirth. If you want to end rebirth—the stated aim of all Buddhist religions—then you have to stop making karma all together. This is the cornerstone of your religion, my friend, not some flabby and vague moral rule-following.

For full-time Buddhists, śīla takes on a whole different meaning. In this sense we see ideas like “restraining the senses”, “guarding the gates”, “wise attention”, and so on. This is not morality at all, and certainly not a virtue ethics. Rather this is preparation for the psychological impact of intense sensory deprivation in meditation. The aim being to accustom oneself to low levels of sensory stimulation. Then, when one begins to withdraw attention from the senses one is less likely to encounter the typical mind wandering, fantasies, and hallucinations that sensory deprivation typically produces. It is the submergence of one’s sense of self that eliminates cetanā from decision making and liberates the Buddhist from from making karma and guarantees escape from rebirth.

Meaning that she won’t agree with you? LOL.

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While I’m only posting this as a thought experiment, we know that brain can alter time perception significantly. How significantly? At the risk of sounding like a junkie, perhaps some weird chemicals like DMT can take part of it (since there needs to be a physical dimension to what I’m about to suggest):

On the moment of almost-death, craving for continued life can perhaps create an embedded dream-reality, in which time could pass so slowly like Zeno’s arrow, while for us outside observers, the brain is cooled off, for the immediate observer, there’s still an ocean of eternity.

I mean, weirder things happen in life. We’re walking hydrogen and oxygen bonds that talk and do taxes.

I think trying to define if it can happen or not is not fruitful, and isn’t even part of Buddha’s teachings as well. The important thing is Even if there’s rebirth in any fantastic state possible, it’s just suffering on a different form.

Which precisely ties to the sīla as you explained. My mistake to use an English equivalent, when indeed virtue has connonations different than guarding sense doors.

More sober way to read rebirth as in birth of object-experiences, but that’s another discussion.

I would say Buddha was a pragmatic in a time when rebirth was considered a given. Instead of saying “Rebirth isn’t real!” or otherwise, perhaps the skillful way is to express “(The idea of) Rebirth is suffering”.

Again, poetic expressions of antiquity isn’t my source to ontologic facts, but pass that veil of language, we find the sense-restraint meditation and achieving peace that isn’t much reliant on external factors.

To clarify, you are suggesting there is no example in the EBT of a kamma-vipaka manifesting in the same life, only the next (or subsequent one)?

Using pejorative terms isnt an argument. Just as using “primordial” with soup (to differentiate it from “Chicken” I guess) isnt actually an articulate explanation for how consciousness arose in this planet. Do you consider gravity or magnetism as “supernatural forces”? Do you know all realms that exist in this universe and all the meta-verses that exist?

I have heard these sorts of comments called the “Jigsaw fallacy”…the confident pronouncements of someone who thinks they have all the pieces so they know the entire picture…until someone points out the missing pieces! :slight_smile:

…Ahem, no, not in my case. I consider sila to be part of the practice and the practice to be the path to awakening. I don’t observe the precepts I observe in order to get to the Brahma realms. I heard something recently about the Buddha suggesting if you die in the 7th absorptive state you can be reborn in the formless realms for 60,000 aeons and then, having extinguished your merit, you often end up in the lower realms. Doesnt sound like something to aim for to me :slight_smile:

…again, completely wrong in my view…

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Thanks.
The short answer is that I don’t see nibbāna as a “thing” that is experienced but more as the “mental” peace and equanimity that are experienced with the elimination of the defilements. This is while an arahant is alive and the aggregates and senses also remain as experiences of dukkha.
After the final death without rebirth there’s no experience and no dukkha.

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Hi,

It’s not about the sticks, but about the dukkha of the senses that perceive the sticks.
As in SN35.28:
" “Mendicants, all is burning. And what is the all that is burning?

The eye is burning. Sights are burning. Eye consciousness is burning. Eye contact is burning. The painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by eye contact is also burning. Burning with what? Burning with the fires of greed, hate, and delusion. Burning with rebirth, old age, and death, with sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress.

The ear … nose … tongue … body …

The mind is burning. Thoughts are burning. Mind consciousness is burning. Mind contact is burning. The painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by mind contact is also burning. Burning with what? Burning with the fires of greed, hate, and delusion. Burning with rebirth, old age, and death, with sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress, I say."

And SN22.59:

" What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, sir.”

“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”

“Suffering, sir.”

“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”

“No, sir.”

“Is feeling permanent or impermanent?” …

“Is perception permanent or impermanent?” …

“Are choices permanent or impermanent?” …

“Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, sir.”

“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”

“Suffering, sir.”

Clearly, the arahant does not identify with anything. But the mere presence and activities of the senses and aggregates remain until they utterly cease without remainder after the final death.

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You’ve said that every experience is dukkha. You seeing a bunch of random sticks getting broken is also an experience. So, is this experience of seeing sticks getting broken also dukkha?

From the standpoint that

is experienced through the senses, yes. Because the presence of the senses (and aggregates) are dukkha, as in the suttas cited in my last post.

As we know, dukkha doesn’t just mean intense suffering. Watching sticks being broken doesn’t feel like suffering. But because it’s a conditional experience, it is a form of dukkha, as are all conditional experiences.

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