Nibbida versus Aversion

Greetings Kalyanamittas.
I’ve returned to this topic of contemplation numerous times over the years. In particular the very edges of the maximum extent of Nibbida, versus the very subtlest beginnings of aversion. I’m wanting to explore this area, and am curious if anyone has looked at it in detail? :slightly_smiling_face:

Can anyone remember and share which sutta it was where the Buddha, being fed up with the bickering of the monks went off to the forest to be alone.

In this example, how much was Nibbida, was there any Aversion. Was the outcome, of leaving the unpleasant environment, a result of wisdom, or of aversion, ie wanting to distance oneself from the unpleasant? Just wanting to tease out the subtleties here, and all contributions much appreciated :pray::slightly_smiling_face:

If any of our monastic teachers have the time, your input would also be appreciated :sunflower:
@Brahmali @sujato etc…


A great schism once arose among the monks in Kosambī. Some monks charged one of their colleagues with having committed an offence, but he refused to acknowledge the charge and, being himself learned in the Vinaya, argued his case and pleaded that the charge be dismissed. The rules were complicated; on the one hand, the monk had broken a rule and was treated as an offender, but on the other, he should not have been so treated if he could not see that he had done wrong. The monk was eventually excommunicated, and this brought about a great dissension. When the matter was reported to the Buddha, he admonished the partisans of both sides and urged them to give up their differences, but they paid no heed, and even blows were exchanged. The people of Kosambī, becoming angry at the monks’ behaviour, the quarrel grew apace. The Buddha once more counselled concord, relating to the monks the story of King Dīghiti of Kosala, but his efforts at reconciliation were of no avail, one of the monks actually asking him to leave them to settle their differences without his interference. In disgust the Buddha left Kosambī and, journeying through Bālakalonakāragāma and the Pācīnavamsadaya, retired alone to keep retreat in the Pārileyyaka forest. In the meantime the monks of both parties repented, partly owing to the pressure exerted by their lay followers in Kosambī, and, coming to the Buddha at Sāvatthi, they asked his pardon and settled their dispute. (Vin.i.337-57; J.iii.486ff (cp.iii.211ff); DhA.i.44ff; SA.ii.222f; the story of the Buddha going into the forest is given in Ud.iv.5. and in S.iii.94, but the reason given in these texts is that he found Kosambī uncomfortable owing to the vast number of monks, lay people and heretics. But see UdA.248f, and SA.ii.222f). – Buddhist Dictionary of Proper Names sv Kosambi

Here they mention “disgust” but that sounds too harsh to me for an arahant. I’d say it was just the Buddha realizing he was of little use in the situation, since the monks didn’t listen anyway. So he realized he’d be more useful somewhere else, like in retreat, showing the monks how to be at peace.


Thank you Ven @Sunyo :slight_smile: :pray:

I’m wondering if disgust and being utterly repelled/repulsed ( not just disenchanted) is that far edge of Nibbida, and exactly where the line between Nibbida and Aversion is?

To draw out the issue a bit further, I’m guessing that intention, right view and skillful versus unskillful action, has bit bit to do with it. However, I would love to see a cogent case put forward from the words of the Buddha, and to know how we can skillfully use this with our own actions and thoughts.

If the action at Kosambi is compared to another unpleasant (disgusting) situation, when the Buddha stopped to help a sick man on the road, who was covered in excrement and vomit (again I can’t remember the sutta reference). In this circumstance the Buddha stopped and assisted, wiping off the filth.

So there are 2 unpleasant circumstances, in which the Buddha acts in different ways.

  1. Bickering Bhikhus > Buddha tried skillful action it didn’t work, he perceived the situation as really unpleasant and left

  2. Sick man covered in filth > Buddha stopped to help out of compassion, he didn’t perceive the situation as ‘unpleasant’ and remained to help clean the filth.

In the first instance others may have (as they did) engaged in the arguments… Did they not view it unpleasant enough to leave? Did they misperceive what is skillful and what is not skillfull? How was this related to Nibidda v/s Aversion for all the different players?

In the second instance, I believe other people were passing by the sick man. They viewed it as unpleasant and had aversion and moved on by. The Buddha saw it as a simple condition of the body - (samsaric existence)- did not have aversion, and stopped to assist out of compassion. The Buddha (probably) had Nibbida given how revolting human bodies are, but seeing reality as it is, he didn’t experience aversion to it, and not wanting to get away from this unpleasantness when he could see the potential of skillful action > he stopped to assist out of compassion > skillful action > Sila

This is still relatively straight forward, but in real life I sometimes have difficulty clearly seeing the line.
If one is watching the arising etc of pleasant neutral and unpleasant feeling - that is fine. If action is driven by pleasant or unpleasant feeling, then one needs to be alert for craving or aversion. Wisdom is applied to look at whether actions going towards of away from the stimulus (impingement) are beneficial and skillful or not. Occasionally I’m not certain about avoiding the unpleasant… ie is it the result of strong Nibbida or has it tipped over into aversion. Clear example: 99.9% of TV = Nibbida, so not watching tv is a release from a burden AND a skillfull action. Unclear example: Listening to unbeneficial talk = Nibbida So is the ‘desire/action’ to avoid this, skillful or is it bordering on aversion?

Is it Nibbida when one perceives something as unpleasant/disgusting/repulsive and if one can avoid it - great, if one cannot avoid it then ‘no big deal’? Is it the strength of the desire to avoid the unpleasant that ultimately differentiates Nibbida from Aversion? When it changes from a simple preference (all things being equal) to a compulsion that one has to get away at all costs? Does the Buddha make this clear anywhere?

Is this simmilar to the example of desire for re-birth, where having Nibbida towards being re-born in any realm is a beneficial thing, but having aversion to re-birth is unbeneficial.

:smiley: Really looking forward to a nice teaching :smiley:


It’s in MN 128 and also in the Vinaya at Kd 10. In the Madhyama Agama, it’s MA 72. The Buddha went off on his own, visiting Bhagu, encountering a bull elephant, and then visiting Anuruddha. The Chinese version depicts the Buddha as being pretty irritated, thinking how displeased he was with them while spending time by himself before he was visited by the bull elephant.


My personal understanding of nibidda is that it applies as much to things normally considered pleasant as unpleasant. When you realize something is just a short term gain or a bad habit, you get tired of it. Being tired of it, you turn away from it.

In American English, we have the expression “I’m sick of that; I don’t want anymore.” It could be food; it could be debating with people online. Whatever it is, you’re thoroughly tired of it and don’t want it anymore. That’s the way I think of the meaning of nibidda. It’s being sick of something.


I try to contextualize it linguistically. The Sanskrit nirveda is very rare in pre-Buddhist literature (and could hence be a sramana term). It appears in Satapatha Brahmana in no uncertain terms. Here it says

‘What art thou to me, that givest me nothing?’ him that (master) is likely to hate (dvéṣṭor) to become disgusted with (nirveda).

What helps here is the quasi-synonym dvéṣṭor which comes from dviṣ which is an old Vedic term for being hostile and unfriendly. (A second occurrence in Baudhayana Srautasutra 17.48 is not helpful).

In many suttas we have nibbidā virāga nirodha as a triad (SN 12.16, SN 12.31, SN 12.67, SN 16.12, SN 22.9-11, SN 22.56-58, SN 22.79, SN 22.115-116, SN 35.7-12, SN 35.155, SN 46.20, SN 51.3, SN 55.12, SN 56.7-10, SN 56.31, SN 56.41, AN 2.37, AN 4.185, AN 5.69, AN 10.107, MN 60, MN 63, MN 72, MN 83, MN 85, MN 100, MN 122, DN 9, DN 18, DN 20, DN 29).

This is an exceptionally well-attested connection and I think should be the prime target of nibbidā investigations.

SN 12.23 says that virāga (dis-passion) has nibbidā as a condition, which is interestingly based on seeing things as they are, and on samadhi (similarly in SN 23.1, AN 5.24, AN 5.168, AN 6.30, AN 6.50, AN 7.65, AN 8.81, AN 10.1-5, AN 11.1-5). So here we have also a fairly-well established connection.

So we’d have a psycho-mechanic of: samadhi --> seeing correctly --> nibbida --> viraga --> vimutti --> nibbana.

We have an interesting contrasting in AN 2.6 between assāda which means literally ‘tasty/tasteful’ and nibbidā - which implies distasting.


The buddha is free of rāga dosa and moha.
Therefore there is no possibilty of the buddha getting offended by something. The Kosambiya incident is not an example for nibbidā. I would rather understand that as a way of descipline his pupils. The buddha explained to Kesi how he train his pupils and one of those is to kill them. Then the buddha explained what killing means.

Well, they’re definitely dead when the Realized One doesn’t think they’re worth advising or instructing, and neither do their sensible spiritual companions (AN 4.111).

Kosambiya incident is one of those times the buddha decided his pupils at kosambi are not
worth advising or instructing.

About seclusion:
The buddha always appreciated the seclusion as well as the silence and this was well known as we can see in DN9. People respected that quality even when they see the buddha’s pupils. Read MN 76 Sandaka asks the people to be silent when Ānanda thero isi approaching.

The buddha preferred silent and secluded places. He state that clearly in AN 8.86.

Take a mendicant who I see in the wilderness receiving robes, alms-food, lodgings, and medicines and supplies for the sick. Fending off possessions, honor, and popularity they don’t neglect retreat, and they don’t neglect remote lodgings in the wilderness and the forest. So I’m pleased that that mendicant is living in the wilderness.

Nāgita, when I’m walking along a road and I don’t see anyone ahead or behind I feel relaxed, even if I need to urinate or defecate.

Thereofore choosing Ven. Bhagu, Kimbila and Anuruddha was an obvious over Kosambiya bhikkhūs since the Buddha got a chance to teach them about meditation and make them attain Nibbāna (solving indriyasamatā problem) MN128.

To understand nibbidā Kosambiya incident is not an option. Most people try to explain the buddha was offended or irritated by the behavior of Kosambiya bhikkhūs, however as the Buddha is free of kilesās it is not possible the Buddha ever feel anger. Furthermore, DN 16 says the Buddha asked the sanga to give prime panishmant to ven. Channa.

After my passing, give the prime punishment to the mendicant
Channa.”Channassa, ānanda, bhikkhuno mamaccayena brahmadaṇḍo dātabbo”ti.

And as we know because of that punishment he attained Nibbāna. Therefore, we should simply understand this as a way of teaching.

This is unpleasant to us, not to an arahant, so as not to the Buddha.

Take a mendicant who sees a sight with their eyes. If it’s pleasant they don’t hold on to it, and if it’s unpleasant they don’t dislike it. They live with mindfulness of the body established and a limitless heart.
Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā piyarūpe rūpe nādhimuccati, appiyarūpe rūpe na byāpajjati, upaṭṭhitakāyassati ca viharati appamāṇacetaso (SN35.247).

Eventhough the sense they get is the same as us, which may be odourful, disturbing, etc, but they have the ability to control how they feel about it.

what are the psychic powers that are free of defilements and attachments, and are said to be noble?Katamā pana, bhante, iddhi anāsavā anupadhikā, ‘ariyā’ti vuccati?

It’s when, if a mendicant wishes: ‘May I meditate perceiving the unrepulsive in the repulsive,’ that’s what they do.
Idha, bhante, bhikkhu sace ākaṅkhati: ‘paṭikūle appaṭikūlasaññī vihareyyan’ti, appaṭikūlasaññī tattha viharati.
If they wish: ‘May I meditate perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive,’ that’s what they do.
Sace ākaṅkhati: ‘appaṭikūle paṭikūlasaññī vihareyyan’ti,paṭikūlasaññī tattha viharati.
If they wish: ‘May I meditate perceiving the unrepulsive in the repulsive and the unrepulsive,’ that’s what they do.
Sace ākaṅkhati: ‘paṭikūle ca appaṭikūle ca appaṭikūlasaññī vihareyyan’ti, appaṭikūlasaññī tattha viharati.
If they wish: ‘May I meditate perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive and the repulsive,’ that’s what they do.
Sace ākaṅkhati: ‘paṭikūle ca appaṭikūle ca paṭikūlasaññī vihareyyan’ti, paṭikūlasaññī tattha viharati.
If they wish: ‘May I meditate staying equanimous, mindful and aware, rejecting both the repulsive and the unrepulsive,’ that’s what they do.
Sace ākaṅkhati: ‘paṭikūlañca appaṭikūlañca tadubhayaṃ abhinivajjetvā upekkhako vihareyyaṃ sato sampajāno’ti, upekkhako tattha viharati sato sampajāno.
These are the psychic powers that are free of defilements and attachments, and are said to be noble.
Ayaṃ, bhante, iddhi anāsavā anupadhikā ‘ariyā’ti vuccati (DN28).


Thanks @Gabriel for bringing this sequence to the conversation, as I was going to do myself., and for your exhaustive research and list of suttas! Wonderful.

@Viveka, as these sequences always show things in the order they occur, it’s useful to note that nibbida comes in to play at quite a deep level of practice, and is quite profound, based on the knowledge of how things are, which is gained from samadhi. This means it’s based on clarity of mind, and is a wisdom faculty, it’s not a mind tortured by repulsion or unpleasant feeling, which would certainly be more akin to aversion. Aversion is the sort of thing we feel towards worldy things and so is also mixed up in all those wordly states of mind, disgust, anger, resistance etc. But in these sequences, when nibbida appears, the mind has already been prepared through a series of blissful states, which ripens in wisdom. As in the Cetana Karaniya Sutta, where a meditator does not have to ‘make a wish’ to progress, it is a natural sequence:

…‘May I feel bliss!’
‘sukhaṃ vediyāmī’ti.
It’s only natural to feel bliss when your body is tranquil.
Dhammatā esā, bhikkhave, yaṃ passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vediyati.

When you feel bliss you need not make a wish:
Sukhino, bhikkhave, na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ:
‘May my mind be immersed in samādhi!’
‘cittaṃ me samādhiyatū’ti.
It’s only natural for the mind to become immersed in samādhi when you feel bliss.
Dhammatā esā, bhikkhave, yaṃ sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati.

When your mind is immersed in samādhi you need not make a wish:
Samāhitassa, bhikkhave, na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ:
‘May I truly know and see!’
‘yathābhūtaṃ jānāmi passāmī’ti.
It’s only natural to truly know and see when your mind is immersed in samādhi.
Dhammatā esā, bhikkhave, yaṃ samāhito yathābhūtaṃ jānāti passati.

When you truly know and see you need not make a wish:
Yathābhūtaṃ, bhikkhave, jānato passato na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ:
‘May I grow disillusioned!’
It’s only natural to grow disillusioned when you truly know and see.
Dhammatā esā, bhikkhave, yaṃ yathābhūtaṃ jānaṃ passaṃ nibbindati.

When you’re disillusioned you need not make a wish:
Nibbinnassa, bhikkhave, na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ:
‘May I become dispassionate!’

These type of sequences make me think we shouldn’t force nibbida to arise, it appears naturally at the right time due to causes and conditions. It is a process filled with wisdom and
beautiful logical causality; not something that is arrived at through will power.

And so, mendicants, the knowledge and vision of freedom is the purpose and benefit of dispassion. Dispassion is the purpose and benefit of disillusionment (nibbida). Disillusionment is the purpose and benefit of truly knowing and seeing. Truly knowing and seeing is the purpose and benefit of immersion. Immersion is the purpose and benefit of bliss. Bliss is the purpose and benefit of tranquility. Tranquility is the purpose and benefit of rapture. Rapture is the purpose and benefit of joy. Joy is the purpose and benefit of not having regrets. Not having regrets is the purpose and benefit of skillful ethics.

Some people seem to think that putting practices of repulsion (often calling these ‘nibbida’) at the centre of their practice will make for a quicker journey towards enlightenment but I often see these types (there is a type!) are coming from a place of anger and harshness, self harming tendencies, and an almost fetishised asceticism.

In the Fire Discourse we have quite a lot of nibbida for sensory experience. But again, this is something directed toward the high end of the path, note the use of the phrase “learned noble disciple/sutavā ariyasāvako”, this is not an ordinary person, but someone who has already reached a high level of insight. This isn’t to say we can’t aspire to such understanding and practices, but rather that we shouldn’t make these things prematurely relevant to ourselves! (me included obviously!)

Burning with the fires of greed, hate, and delusion. Burning with rebirth, old age, and death, with sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress, I say.
‘Rāgagginā, dosagginā, mohagginā ādittaṃ, jātiyā jarāya maraṇena sokehi paridevehi dukkhehi domanassehi upāyāsehi ādittan’ti vadāmi.

Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact. And they grow disillusioned with the painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by eye contact.
Evaṃ passaṃ, bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako cakkhusmimpi nibbindati, rūpesupi nibbindati, cakkhuviññāṇepi nibbindati, cakkhusamphassepi nibbindati, yampidaṃ cakkhusamphassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā tasmimpi nibbindati … pe …

And while this discourse was being spoken, the minds of the thousand mendicants were freed from defilements by not grasping.
Imasmiñca pana veyyākaraṇasmiṃ bhaññamāne tassa bhikkhusahassassa anupādāya āsavehi cittāni vimucciṃsūti.

This last stanza, to me, shows the wisdom aspect of “not grasping” (anupādāya). An image I often bring to mind when I think about nibbida is a hand letting go, a turning away, a releasing, or dropping of something because it is seen for what it is and not wanted. In this sense, the translation of nibbida as disillusion or disenchantment seems appropriate. It is based on wisdom not feeling, which is too much a part of disgust or reulsion, although some teachers really emphasise this aspect, maybe overly so perhaps due to translations that encourage this view… Then, after the ungrasping of nibbida follows the dispassion (viraga) which is the hand not wanting to pick it up again!


Many thanks @cdpatton I really enjoyed reading MA72, it was very useful :slight_smile:

Thank you for the great list of references :slight_smile: Nibbida, leads to Viraga, which leads to Nirodha… the causality sequence in dependent cessation :slight_smile: But for me, it doesn’t tease out how to best identify Nibbida versus Aversion.

SO the position would be No Craving = No Aversion. Seeing things as they are (no delusion) means there can no longer be either craving or aversion and hence no ill will.
Therefore> once raga, dosa and moha are eliminated, there is no more aversion - but Nibbida remains while one remains in samsara, because of seeing things as they truly are :slight_smile:

So in this case one is differentiating Nibbida from Aversion by seeing what defilements are there or not :slight_smile:

I appreciate the idea that the Buddha left the ‘bickering Bhikhus’ as a method of teaching. But by leaving them, they may, or may not have learned anything as a result of those actions. Nothing further could be achieved by remaining and watching stupidity perpetuate itself (nibbida inducing situation)… so why remain in such an unpleasant and unskillful environment? No beneficial results for anyone by staying. ?? :upside_down_face: :slightly_smiling_face:

Thank you everyone for your contributions in helping explore this topic. :smiley: :pray:


This is really beautiful :slight_smile: Thank you :pray:
It is going into my list of favorite suttas :slight_smile:

So this perspective is similar to the one that Ven Amatabhani was making, if I am understanding you correctly :slight_smile:

:slightly_smiling_face: :sunflower: :revolving_hearts:


Maybe like this: If I translate both nibbida and aversion into a vector, a movement, then both mean ‘away from an object’. In that respect they are similar. They would be different, however, in their level of crudeness.

Normal ‘aversion’ shoots in so many directions at the same time, it’s aggressive, destructive, self-harming - a very non-precise movement of ‘away-from’. As Bh. @Akaliko pointed out, the ‘away-from’ of nibbida is much more refined, connected with panna, based on samadhi, etc. It’s a liberation-oriented, ‘surgical’ away-from which doesn’t target normal objects of life but rather existential principles like the khandhas.

How the Buddha acted in certain situations, and why, is I think a different matter. I don’t trust these exceptional narratives anyway to represent ‘real’ events, so who knows how many filters it went through to get to us. But we can also look at recent supposed arahants like in the Thai forest tradition - they were known to include rough and rude behavior in their bouquet of interactions. Also Mahakassapa in the suttas, etc. So I would distinguish these personality traits and displayed behavior from the mental soteriological mechanics.


An image from the suttas that always comes to mind when I think of nibbidā is from AN 7.49:

When a bhikkhu often dwells with a mind accustomed to the perception of unattractiveness, his mind shrinks away from sexual intercourse, turns back from it, rolls away from it, and is not drawn toward it, and either equanimity or revulsion [pāṭikulyatā] becomes settled in him. Just as a cock’s feather or a strip of sinew, thrown into a fire, shrinks away from it, turns back from it, rolls away from it, and is not drawn toward it, so it is in regard to sexual intercourse when a bhikkhu often dwells with a mind accustomed to the perception of unattractiveness.

Pāṭikulyatā here seems to be a synonym for nibbidā, and although it can mean revulsion, it can also mean “reluctance”. When I think of some of the unwholesome activities I used to engage in during my pre-Dhamma days, I don’t feel aversion toward them, but I do feel a reluctance and a desire to steer clear.


But on which grounds do you equate nibbida and paṭikulyatā, where are they treated as synonyms? I understand that you make this connection in your mind as they both mean an ‘away-from’, but the connection with nibbida as an important doctrinal term should be based on some suttas, no?

Otherwise what keeps me from equating pamojja, piti, sukkha, ananda - because they all express some kind of positive ‘pleasant state’?


I am not sure that they can compared. Perhaps like this; if aversion and greed are two vectors with opposite directions, Nibbida is out of the paper or out of the plane of aversion and greed.


I’ve often seen Buddhists (Eastern and Western, others and myself!) rationalize continued involvement in bad situations under the excuse of “cultivating upekkhā” or “practicing patience” or (worst of all) “exercising compassion.”

So I just wanted to point out that the Buddha often praised good relationships and conducive environments and never spoke in praise of cultivating friendship with fools nor sticking around in environments unsuitable for striving. Bodhisattvas take note: There’s nothing “noble” about self-sacrifice!!

MN2 outlines the difference—what afflictions are to be endured and which afflictions are to be avoided:

What taints, bhikkhus, should be abandoned by enduring? Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, bears cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, wind, the sun, and creeping things; he endures ill-spoken, unwelcome words and arisen bodily feelings that are painful, racking, sharp, piercing, disagreeable, distressing, and menacing to life. While taints, vexation, and fever might arise in one who does not endure such things, there are no taints, vexation, or fever in one who endures them. These are called the taints that should be abandoned by enduring.
What taints, bhikkhus, should be abandoned by avoiding? Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, avoids a wild elephant, a wild horse, a wild bull, a wild dog, a snake, a stump, a bramble patch, a chasm, a cliff, a cesspit, a sewer. Reflecting wisely, he avoids sitting on unsuitable seats, wandering to unsuitable resorts, and associating with bad friends, since if he were to do so wise companions in the holy life might suspect him of evil conduct. While taints, vexation, and fever might arise in one who does not avoid these things, there are no taints, vexation, and fever in one who avoids them. These are called the taints that should be abandoned by avoiding.

So this gives us our measuring stick between patience and avoidance, nibbida versus aversion: are we avoiding this situation because it’s painful or because it’s connected with the unwholesome?

Interestingly, both physical repulsion and moral disgust use the same part of the brain. So, the training here isn’t so much to kill off our capacity for disgust, but is rather to (re)train it to be automatically avoidant of what is unwholesome and unbenefitial. In short, to be wise.

In this way, disgust becomes our ally on the path instead of our hindrance. Aversion becomes nibbida as wisdom flowers.

I hope that helps to clarify somewhat. :slightly_smiling_face:


Thankyou Ven Khemarato :slight_smile:

I’ve come to a similar understanding (mostly :rofl:)

It really helped sort it out by looking at the presence or absence of hindrances and in combination with intention.

I also think that the definitions I had for Nibbida and Aversion were out of alignment with what appears to be the common view. I was adding a few different things into the mix - Now it is clearer. Aversion = the negative form of craving (the craving to not have) - Ill will and delusion are present
Nibbida = distaste (etc) for the unwholesome, including weariness for the conditioned - neither ill will nor delusion are present.

Now I’m experiencing nibbida for too much thinking :rofl: :exploding_head: :joy: :smile: :slight_smile:

Thank you everybody for your generosity in contributing and sharing
:pray: :pray: :pray:


Oh, I wasn’t trying to do anything quite so linguistically ambitious as you might assume. :slightly_smiling_face: That’s why I said “seems to be”. Also, to my mind, synonyms don’t necessarily equate; they often just partially overlap in meaning.

My intention was only to point out a word that could indicate the possibility of repulsion without aversion.

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If it makes you feel any better, the Chinese translators generally agreed that nibbida means something ranging from being tired, apathetic, sated, or even disgusted (in the context of things like overeating). That’s what informs my reading of the term.


Aversion doesn’t bear recalling and therefore interrupts mindfulness.

DN33:3.3.29: Furthermore, a mendicant is mindful. They have utmost mindfulness and alertness, and can remember and recall what was said and done long ago.

When my grandkids fight and “hate each other,” I sit them down and ask them to recall and restate what the other said. Works every time. Peace happens. Or maybe it’s just too painful to be around Grandpa.


Thank you @Akaliko and @Gabriel : sadhu x3 ! :pray:
Nibbida is clearly different from aversion in your wonderful explanations coming from suttas. Seeing /“feeling”/ being mindful of the danger of some behaviors make us disillusioned. Being influenced by samadhi, it seems non-conceptual in nature.

In my experience , the danger is when samadhi and the “seeing clearly” wear off as the mind is more prone to judge and make a mental stance (ie. sankhara) on the objects of disillusionment.
At this moment we are back into aversion and the conditioned cycle, even more so when we think this aversion is nibbida.