Let me start of by saying that, from what I can gather of your understanding/presentation, I agree with what you believe is the core of Early Buddhist dhammavinaya, that is:
- The Gradual Training (incl. the jhānas)
- The Middle Way (between eternalism and nihilism, etc. + the dependent nature of views and epistemology)
- Dependent Arising (incl. a path for cessation)
etc.
I actually spent quite some time before my ordination analyzing the Dīgha Nikāya and Dīrgha Āgamas to understand their structure, organization, content, and context as a response to some of your ideas. Then life happened — so maybe sometime in the future I’ll salvage that and share it.
The main thing I noticed and drew out was what @Soren has already pointed out: all of the discourses in the Sīlakkhandhavagga are presented as teachings for non-Buddhists on the basics. This is, of course, the common core of D. But it’s not just that they present the gradual training, etc. to non-Buddhists. It’s that all of the teachings therein are time and again meant to refute foreign doctrine in favor of the better Buddhist one — be it the approach to training, views, meditation, what have you.
BUT: This is not unique just to the Sīlakkhandhavagga. If you compare the collections as a whole, looking at the details of the content and narrative of each discourse, nearly every single sutta in the common core of D contains propaganda and refutation of outside doctrine, supremacy of the Buddhist one, and establishes the significance of Buddhism within its religio-cultural context amidst a sea of samanas and brāhmanas. This is the purpose, the overarching intention and principle, of the common D collection so far as we can tell.
Excuse the poor analogy, but take the flood myth. The flood myth occurs in various cultures around the same region with similar tropes. Say we ignored the fact that the flood myth was embedded in a religious myth, singled out the text on the flood itself, and argued that the core of all early Middle Eastern religions is actually a flood that took place that they interpreted as theologically significant.
While it’s true that the flood motif is a common core established across traditions and that the external details vary, the flood motif cannot be separated from its mythological context, despite what we may perceive as ‘embroidery’ or later flowering context.
In the same way, we cannot isolate the undeclared points, etc. in D from the context that they arise in over and over: refuting or ridiculing (or both) outside doctrines to establish the essential position of Buddhism.
Maybe that example seems faulty and unsatisfactory. Okay. Either way, assuming the context in which these doctrines are grounded:
Are the gradual training and principles of conditionality applied to soteriology fundamentals of Early Buddhism? Yes! And do other more “advanced” materials for practitioners already on the path and cultivating assume one is familiar with them? Of course! That doesn’t mean that the other material post dates the death of the Buddha as you (surprisingly) claim with firm assurance.
Is misinterpreting more ‘advanced’ material because one doesn’t understand the basics problematic? Of course! Does that mean that the material some misunderstand is by default later and scholastic? I think the line of reasoning here is clear.
Note that the early sects of Buddhism also admitted to this. I can’t recall the reference, but IIRC the Sarvāstivādins claimed that the function of the DA is for outsiders (continuing with the function of each of the other collections).
Moreover, as you yourself have said, the material in e.g. DN 1 is extremely dense. You know a more straightforward, less scholastic way of discussing theories of self or annihilation on different grounds? Five basic categories: form, feeling, perception, ideation, consciousness. If we look at other Indic texts, this is also rather familiar to theories of buckets, layers, etc. of the self that begin arising in the Upanisads and so forth. The aggregates are more attested to in the pre-sectarian canon than the various permutations and formulations at DN 1.
I would add, briefly, that it is circular reasoning (in mild disguise) to say that DN 1 is recognized as significant (therefore attesting to its primacy) because the Vinaya says so. This is not an independent source: the Vinaya narrative is literally about justifying the sectarian arrangement of its particular canon. This is like arguing that the three characteristics are clearly the fundamental doctrine of Early Buddhism because the Theravādins say so; it’s self-serving.
Okay, okay. That’s my point; not unfamiliar.
But wait. There’s more. (Lol)
I talked about looking at the context and nature of collections in which material is consistently presented. Let’s explore a bit deeper (and this is an argument I’ve raised to you before):
What is the nature of the SN/SA? What are its characteristics? What guiding principles surround its organization, structure, and content?
Relatively short, concise, yet practical contemplative analyses and instructions. When we start comparing much of the material in the various sects’ canons, we see that there is an underground rail-road between S and M: longer discourses that are copied and or moved and often expanded upon (but not always!) are moved from S into M.
Then, we look at D again. Comparing the nature of this collection with the Sanskrit and Chinese, something interesting arises: there was a clear “underground rail-road” again, this time between M and D, with different schools sometimes moving different discourses along this highway.
So it looks like we have a basic principle of length influencing the collections that we can see independently and consistently in S, M, D in all parallels available. This is, admittedly, unsurprising. Longer discourses tend to go to D. Middle-length to M. Less elaborate to S. And we see a kind of road from S to M to D.
Why isn’t the lengthy, elaborate, detailed gradual training present all over S? Maybe because of its length! It simply does not fit with the discourses of S, and so it is simply unreasonable to demand it to as evidence for its authenticity — like taking someone captive and forcing them to reveal information they don’t have lest they be deemed a liar.
Let’s talk about what the early schools themselves have to say, as you did before, again. They claim that the collections are organized around length and around overarching function/principle. No surprise, we find this to clearly be the case for the common core of D in both regards independently of the school who claimed it, and likewise this principle holds true from the negative perspective: we don’t see what we expect not to.
Then let’s think about the independent evidence of various scholars (Yin Shun, Mun Keat, Sujato, etc.) on the early structure of the pre-sectarian canon before the four-fold Āgama distribution. Because let’s keep in mind that the actual discourses never mention the four āgamas/nikāyas, nor do they hint at any evidence they know of their existence. What they do hint at is memorized discourses according to ‘angas,’ just as the earlier Jain canon distributes material and in line with the Vedic angas we see the suttas reference.
There we see that the categories especially of sutta, geyya, and veyyākarana stand out — not only as meta-references in the early texts, but also as somewhat recognizable and logical categories that we can observe for ourselves within the S collection and then outward in the M and E/A. So there is actual independent indication—that holds up across canons, was attested to by ancient Buddhist scholars, and holds to modern scrutiny—leading us to believe that material originating in something closer to S is old, and moved out to other collections based on the above mentioned principles of length, theme, function, etc. This was subsequently influenced more over time as the reciter tradition evolved to even out even more the collections and so forth, though we still have traces of common movements that are likely older.
We can also think about what this independent evidence relating to the three angas identifies as the core of Early Buddhism:
- Conditionality / Dependent Arising
- The Middle Way (both incl. abyākata)
- Removing 5 hindrances (incl. jhāna)
etc.
What you call the ‘samudayanirodhamagga’ and identify as essential is of course, as you mentioned, the format of the four noble truths and forms the core layout of much of the pre-S organization. Moreover, this is assumed and referenced in D without sufficient explanation: in the paññā section it references these four without definition or explanation. Of course, for establishing a basic outline and presenting the essentials of Buddhist training to outsiders, this makes sense. But as the reference for Buddhists, less so
So there is no disagreement with what you identify as essential based on the lengthy collection. I’ll repeat that misinterpretation by later interpreters does not mean the collection is more suspicious; in fact, we would only assume and that the texts meant for the actual disciples of the Buddha were more subtle and easier to misunderstand than the ones meant to present to people completely unfamiliar with Buddhism.
We simply cannot look at one particular, contextual assortment of selected texts and then interrogate other texts why they do not fit in to those same particulars. It’s rather arbitrary, to be honest, to look at one set of teachings for a particular group and say it’s first, and that therefore other teachings (which do not present different core messages) are later. You do it with D; others do it with S; some with E/A; some maybe with M. If we start by assuming some ground, we can claim the whole world; if we start without, we see that the reality is much more complicated.
There’s a lot to go into and say here, and this was just what came to mind on a whim for now. There are various good, valid points and others not so solid. I’d close by repeating that I think there’s a lot of value in approaching Buddhadhamma from the perspective you have gained based on careful reading of the gradual training and undeclared points. I just don’t agree with some of the assumptions here.
Mettā