On the inherent pessimism of parinibbana as mere cessation

[faujidoc1]

Ok, let’s all give it one last try…

Let’s consider Ajahn Brahm’s driverless bus (or a Tesla if one wishes!) and reflect on the following…

What drives the driverless bus? Is that a thing or a process? What is the manner of its origination?

What happens to that which drove the driverless bus when the bus is dismantled into parts and the parts broken down with no remainder? What is the manner of its cessation?

Is what drives the driverless bus the same thing as the parts of the bus? Or is what drives the driverless bus different from the parts of the bus?

Avoiding these extremes, the Realized one teaches by the middle way ‘that which drives the driverless bus’ is an emergent phenomena based on the coming together of the parts of the bus…these parts work together in this manner… When the parts are dismantled without any remainder, that phenomena ceases.

[josephzizys]

1.There is a computer that drives the driverless bus.

2. It is not possible that parts can be broken down with no remainder as this would imply the possibility of making a non-existant (the “nothing”) out of a collection of existants (the parts)

3. No wait, I really can’t be bothered. Today has been exhausting.

[Thito]

@josephzizys

It is not possible that parts can be broken down with no remainder as this would imply the possibility of making a non-existant (the “nothing”) out of a collection of existants (the parts)

Unless it’s a fabrication like a view, which one could say materially speaking is neurons and electrical impulses I guess. Where does electricity go when a device is turned off and no longer pulling it? Where does a fire go when there is no more fuel to burn?

Likewise I would say wrong view pulls (or fuels) energy (or fire) to manifest the latent tendencies, 3 poisons, 5 hindrances, etc.

Getting rid of that wrong view and eventually the 3 poisons is shutting down that corridor where energy flows. Nibbana, the fire blows out.

[faujidoc1]

@josephzizys

There is a computer that drives the driverless bus

Close indeed, but is that it?
Is it the computer drive? Or the CPU? Or the software algorithm that runs on the hardware? Or the electricity that powers it all?
Or is it all these working together that produces the illusion of a driver driving the driverless bus? But with very real consequences.

Anyways, lets let it go for now. Digging deep into these things is undoubtedly exhausting! Too much thinking and pondering tires the body and strains the mind… and when the mind is strained, it is far from Samadhi!

[josephzizys]

Just for the record I think the chariot metaphor, to my knowledge first appearing in SN5.10 is a terrible and misleading one, and good evidence of the corruption and decay of the dhamma when compared to more sophisticated expositions of conditionality in DN and MN.

The problem with it is that it can be easily misinterpreted, as I think many Therevadans do, as saying that there is no such thing as a self, but there are such things as aggregates.

This interpretation completely fails to penetrate conditionality.

The aggregates are just as conditioned, just as unreal, as the self is.

But Vajirā’s poem obscures this fact by asserting the conventionality of ‘existing being’ but leaving the same point unmade about the aggregates.

It’s a bit like your silly driverless bus metaphor: you say that you want to deny the existence of a “computer” because it is made of parts like cpu and memory but you don’t follow thru with your own logic, because the cpu is made of parts too, and those parts are made of parts, it’s made of (made up) parts all the way down! With no discernible beginning!

I would also like to make the point that Vajirā’s repeats the SN specific trope that “only” suffering arises, and that this is flatly contradicted by the Buddha in another sutta where he explains that if only suffering arose then no beings would bother to exist, but I can’t find the reference at the moment, perhaps you could help me?

Anyway, I understand what you are trying to argue, I have read SN, and the Milindapanha for that matter, and it is precisely this incoherent degenerate understanding of conditionality that reifies aggregates and anatta and turns conditionality into a kind of folk-physics that convinced me that SN is by and large a later text than the atthakavagga, parayanavagga and sekkha patipada

[Sunyo]

@josephzizys

in another sutta where he explains that if only suffering arose then no beings would bother to exist, but I can’t find the reference at the moment, perhaps you could help me?

SN22.60. Although by your standard this sutta should be taken with a grain of salt for it is part of the later SN. Though afaik scholars tend to lean towards the assumption that the DN has more of the the later texts, and SN contains some of the earlier.

We have to realize that the word ‘suffering’ is used with various nuances. Sometimes it is opposed to pleasure, such as in this sutta, which talks about people who still have desire, about the worldlings, basically. But in the view of the enlightened suffering includes all feelings, including the pleasant ones. Hence Iti53 says: “Pleasant feeling, bhikkhus, should be seen as suffering.”

Anyway, I feel this topic has derailed again into the discussion about what is right and wrong, rather than how to deal with the idea of cessation when one takes it to be true. And this has been discussed before, so I won’t reply any further myself. But the solution to both, to get right view and to deal with truth, of course we all agree is meditation.

[josephzizys]

@Sunyo

Although by your standard this sutta shouldn’t be considered for it is late.

I think, this is maybe what people think I think. but I am not saying that at all, in fact I think that much of what is important philosophically about Buddhism is recaptured in Mahayana materials that are unquestionably late.

My issue is not that SN is late and therefore “shouldn’t be considered” my issue is that parts of SN alter (what I take to be) the traditional language of the Buddha’s philosophy to make it more open to misinterpretation as essentialist and “substantialist” (that is that the aggregates are “real” and the “self” is “unreal”)

I then think this becomes more pronounced in abbhidhamma materials and the inevitable and necessary reaction to that gives rise to the Mahayana.

So I am happy to “consider” ALL the materials, INCLUDING Mahayana materials, as representing both valid and sometimes invalid developments in Buddhism.

My assessment that SN is (by and large) later than the “core” of DN is merely that, an assessment, based on doctrinal development, which is based on textual evidence. It is not meant to discredit SN in it’s entirety, merely to identify the parts of it that show a divergance from (what I take to be) earlier ways of expressing the dhamma, and highlight how these innovations can lead to misinterpretation.

SO anyway, my argument is NOT that “late suttas should not be considered”.
it is just that “some suttas ARE late, and this explains why their appears to be development in (at least the expression of) the doctrine across the Nikayas.”

I think a lot of people hear excuse themselves form having to deeply engage with Mahayana material because by their standards they shouldn’t be considered because they’re late, this is not my position.

Anyway, thank you for providing the sutta reference, I think it is the one I was thinking of, though I had mis-remembered it as occurring in MN (don’t worry I think parts of MN are late too).

Oh, and one last thing, I have probably used less than careful language in expressing myself here, so for the record I acknowledge that there is late material in DN, as I understand it, it has some of the most ornate and “late” verse forms in the canon, and the mahaparinibanna sutta is widely thought to have been “open” for a long time, perhaps longer than any part of SN was open, it’s just that I take parts of DN (for e.g the sekkha patipada) to represent an earlier strata than the bulk of SN. I also acknowledge that many of the “formula” of SN are undoubtedly very early and probably predate any of the nikayas as settled texts, my contention tho is that SOME of the formulas, like the aggregates, like the phrase “all dhammas are without self”, are late, based on their doctrinal development (the aggregates appearing to me to be a simplification and obfuscation of DO and the “all dhammas” phrase being too open to the "there is no self"interpretation which is a “wrong view” in the earlier material), the relative frequency with which they are found in SN versus the other NIkayas, and that SN has a more “artificial” mode of textual production based on permutations of stock phrases that I find likely to be late when compared to the more narrative based structures in DN and MN.

(oh, and the similarity of the structure of SN to the structure of abbhidahmma matikas is another piece of evidence suggestive of that nikaya being intermediate in age between the narrative nikayas of DN and MN and the (universally agreed to be ) late abbhidhamma texts)

Again, to imply that I am using lateness as a reason to dismiss content is to misrepresent my position, I am identifying arguments that appear to contradict other material in the nikayas, finding that they cluster in SN, and using that as evidence for the relative lateness of SN, however I also absolutely agree that plenty of material in SN does NOT contradict other material and is perfectly legitimate, regardless of it’s lateness or otherwise.

anyway, thanks again for the citation.

Metta.

[Sunyo]

OK, that’s cool. You can have that opinion, obviously. And I respect it. But I think we should be careful when we take doctrine as a measure to decide what is early and late, because then we can be tempted to reject whatever doesn’t align with our views based on our own view. And to challenge our views is a large part of the Buddha’s message. I think we need some real good extra reasons too. For example, if I recall correctly, earlier you rejected the Yamaka Sutta. But are there textual reasons for this? Do other scholars agree? Does the parallel show signs of inauthenticity? Those kind of questions should ideally determine what’s late and early, not our views.

There is also a quote like that in the MN, but it is about gratifying and ungratifying, not about pleasure and suffering. I’ll try to look it up.

Edit: found SN35.17, SN22.28. I’m quite sure MN has a similar passage but I can’t find it right now.

[Raftafarian]

@Sunyo

But I think we should be careful when we take doctrine as a measure to decide what is early and late, because then we can be tempted to reject whatever doesn’t align with our views based on our own view. And to challenge our views is a large part of the Buddha’s message. I think we need some real good extra reasons too. For example, if I recall correctly, earlier you rejected the Yamaka Sutta. But are there textual reasons for this? Do other scholars agree? Does the parallel show signs of inauthenticity? Those kind of questions should ideally determine what’s late and early, not our views.

This very true. Elements of doctrine can be added or removed, simply saying it only increases is questionable. Once established that certain suttas are earlier or latter, you can determine if latter suttas contradict the doctrines of earlier suttas and represent a change in doctrine.

Certain suttas in the Atthakavagga and the Parayanavagga are believed to be very early because of their meter and mention in canonical commentaries. Academics disagree which is earlier. The Parayanavagga does show brahmanic influence, the Atthakavagga does not. Archeological evidence of the presence of brahmans in the region dated to the Buddha’s time would help the cause of the Parayanavagga, but the Atthakavagga has a leg up on the Parayanavagga since the Atthakavagga does not need that.

If the earliest suttas in the Atthakavagga are earlier, and, for the reason stated above, they probably are, than the Buddha adhered to “no views” and this is a problem for what I call “Big Buddhism” which is full of views and pronouncements that are clearly contrary to the oldest suttas in the Atthakavagga.

Why “Big Buddhism” makes up so much more of the doctrine is self explanatory. It can add and elaborate on views, where “no views” or “Tiny Buddhism” cannot. Simply counting suttas to back up a position does not help. The discrepancy in the number of suttas is expected.

I suspect that “Big Buddhism” took off with the reign of emperor Ashoka who certainly had Brahmans in his realm and pushed Buddhism on them. Apologetics would be required to do that. This would be another reason for the later extensive development of doctrine. State sponsorship can only help with acceptance.

I think those who believe in final nibanna and all the other speculative elements of “Big Buddhism” are at a big disadvantage in a debate on issues of what the historical Buddha actually taught.

[Malunkyaputta]

@1hullofaguy

I can’t help but feel the incredibly dark but logically necessary implication of cessationism is that if one hypothetically assumed that rebirth does not occur after death and thus that there are no negative kammic consequences to committing suicide, then the rational choice for all beings would be to commit suicide–after all, existence is so wrought with dukkha that non-existence is always preferable, no matter the path to get there.

I don’t know if you’re still reading, but I have been wondering about the exact same thing.

And I think there is a possible solution to it.

It would consist of adding a collective rather than just “personal” element to immediate kammic “fruit”.

That way:

a) suicide for anybody would always be wrong, since it resulted in immediate kammic suffering for others

b) Arhat staying alive would always be right, since their exclusively wholesome kamma reduces the immediate kammic suffering of others

c) teaching gets absolute importance to reduce everybody’s immediate kammic suffering, and this would be another reason for people to stay alive.

I would be interested to know if @sujato, @brahmali, @jasudho and other experts think that this could be harmonized with EBT and/or doctrine without resulting in a “crash” somewhere else … Thanks.

[Green]

@Malunkyaputta

b) Arhat staying alive would always be right, since their exclusively wholesome kamma reduces the immediate kammic suffering of others

Just some info (maybe it is helpful in this context);

We can condition body and mind in a way that is conducive to the goal of Nibbana. For example, in stead of mind habitually giving rise to unwholesome views, intentions, speech and actions,
we can condition body and mind in a way that it gives habitually rise to wholesome views, wholesome tendencies, wholesome intentions. But this is not yet the domain of the unconditioned, Nibbana, the domain of the arahants.

Such wholesome or meritorious conditionings give rise to good fruits, in this and after this life (high rebirth, for example) but these wholesome conditionings still do represent an element of volition (bright kamma) that will give rise to a new life in samsara.

So, Dhamma teaches that demerit as well as merit is a bond. But merit as bond is much better then demerit as bond. So first of all we can focus on replacing conditionings that lead to misery, with conditions that lead to good fruits. This is in Dhamma called: the development of the mundane noble Path (MN117, not supramundane Path yet).

Expressed here:

Rush to do good,
shield your mind from evil;
for when you’re slow to do good,
your thoughts delight in wickedness.(Dhp116)

If you do something good,
do it again and again,
set your heart on it,
for piling up goodness is joyful (Dhp118)

Think not lightly of evil,
that it won’t come back to you.
The pot is filled with water
falling drop by drop;
the fool is filled with wickedness
piled up bit by bit. (Dhp121)

Think not lightly of goodness,
that it won’t come back to you.
The pot is filled with water
falling drop by drop;
the sage is filled with goodness
piled up bit by bit. (Dhp122)

So, first of all we develop the mundane noble path to more or less replace the demeritorious views, intentions, speech, actions, the evil, that we have collected in many lifes and that only represent a downward path if we follow that. A path to misery. Replace this with good as it were. This will lead to relative happiness here and now and after death. Merit represents an upward Path.

At a certain moment we will also see and understand that mere changing our personal conditionings from demeritorious to meritorious is also not really a safe Path. It is meritorious but it does not free from samsara. Another aspect of the teachings is: purify mind. This means, make an and to all passions and kamma making.

I believe this develops naturally because there comes a time that one sees that all that programmed thinking, speaking and acting, even if this might be called goodhearted, meritorious, is often also not really wise too. One starts to see it is not really pure too. It also contains an element of passion.
One needs an element of freedom and dispassion to act really wisely.

Both meritorious and demeritorious are rooted in avijja. Both contain an element of passion.

This pure level is expressed in these verses, for example:

One whose mind is uncorrupted,
whose heart is undamaged,
who’s given up right and wrong,
alert, has nothing to fear. (Sujato, dph39)

For the one with mind free of lust, for the one with mind unperplexed,
for the one who has abandoned making merit and demerit, for the watchful, there is no fear.
(anandajoti, dhp39)

But one living a spiritual life,
who has banished both merit and evil,
who wanders having appraised the world,
is said to be a mendicant. (Dhp267)

In short: It is not that bright kamma can make an end to suffering. Purity is not the domain of kamma, kamma is not the domain of purity. Arahant and Buddha’s are beyond kamma, meaning dispassionate.

[Malunkyaputta]

I have now pondered this further, and I think I have come to a breaktrough in this, a solution that does not require collective Karma.

The topic in question is:

Does, as the OP suggests, not believing in rebirth lead to committing suicide as the quickest way to Parinibbana within the Buddha’s system?

I believe that I can now convincingly answer: No.

In explaining this, a look at the 2nd noble truth is necessary.

Craving is said to be the reason for Dukkha. How so? Craving is wrong view. Wrong view produces Kamma. Kamma leads to immediate suffering in this life and to rebirth. Rebirth leads to new suffering.

Note that the so called “immediate Kamma” may get to you in this life and lead to increased suffering in this life.

With the omission of rebirth, the 2nd noble truth necessarily changes:

Craving can now no longer be seen as the reason for Dhukka, because nobody has a responsibility for being born. However: Craving is still wrong view. Wrong view still produces Kamma. Immediate Kamma may still lead to immediate suffering in this life.

Now, we focus on suicide.

It has been argued that, since Kamma is individual, the act of suicide can have no more consequences on one’s suffering and is therefore the quickest way to lead to Parinibbana, the cessation of the 5 aggregates.

I am now arguing that this is not true.

Why? Because of the possibility of immediate Kamma getting to you between the act of attempted suicide and the ceasing of your aggregates.

Examples for this (I am sorry) are an extremely slow death in agonizing pain, as well as a botched attempt at suicide with the effect of prolongued, agonizing suffering, as in a lasting disability.

Therefore, even if you give up rebirth, the eightfold path is still the way to the utmost reduction of suffering possible. And, if you still want to call it that, you may still reach Nibbana in the sense of abandoning wrong view and ending your personal greed, hatred and illusion.

Criticism please.