SuttaCentral
No! friend, i think you are going by a certain english translation. For me (although I have no formal education in pali) the simile is simply used for conveying whether something has a patiṭṭhā or not.
Additionally, for me the idea of impediment is expressed by ‘akusala dhamma’ or kilesa.
I think i will take my leave from this particular thread. I don’t think i have the skill to further this conversation.
Here’s another passage from the Udana that I saved before, it’s similar to the one you posted above
“The world is caught up in delusion,
but is looked on as making sense.
The fool caught up in attachment
is surrounded by darkness.
It seems as if eternal,
but for one who sees, there is nothing.”
https://suttacentral.net/ud7.10/en/sujato
I don’t know whether this is relevant or helpful, but it occurred to me. This photo is from Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s book “The Mind Like Fire Unbound.” He says that the Buddha simply used the fire imagery common at that time, in which the fire was assumed to still exist after extinction. He also says that what extinguishes is craving. If there is literally nothing after nibbana, it would be annihilationism. The reason ‘consciousness without surface’ (as a consciousness separate from 6 sense consciousness) is not eternalism is, ‘consciousness without surface’ is not the kind of ‘existence’ which beings in samsara can cognize. I gather this is why the Buddha said that arahants after nibbana cannot be said to exist, not-exist, both or neither.
Yet, the agama version of MN 49 discussed in Bhikkhu Analayo’s paper also seems worth considering.
If we translate the last sentence of UD 8.2 as “The one who knows and sees has nothing” then it might mean “He knows and sees that there is nothing to attach to or objectify.” This makes sense because nibbana is what happens when we drop all cravings and objectifications.
Consciousness is able to know the presence and absence of impediments.
Things are known to be present when the presence of their impediments are known to consciousness.
The uninclined is a state where consciousness knows that all impediments are absent and does not create an impediment out of this knowing (i.e. consciousness doesn’t fabricate a thing out of this knowing; in other words, consciousness doesn’t objectify knowing).
Notions such as there are no impediments, there are no things, there is well being, this is self, this is not-self, this is present etc. are examples of the objectification of knowing. These do not occur.
Put another way, knowing occurs; but not nothing (i.e. no thing) is known as anything or in relation to anything. Knowing simply occurs. This knowing is what we might refer to as the uninclined.
I agree. However, the above statement can not be concluded from your essay at the beginning of this thread.
This is the main point of your essay and is also the weakest point. As I pointed out, it leads to the conclusion that the uninclined can not be known. You tried to keep the assertation that the uninclined can be known but it leads only to contradictions as below:
What kind of “state” you are trying to say here? Is this “state” yourself? Is this “state” belongs to you? Is this a state of consciousness? Is this a state of the mind? Is this a state of the world? What does this “state” has anything to do with you, with anyone else?
Sorry but this statement does not make any sense. All of these contradictions spring up because you started with a very controversial statement in your essay:
You can not proclaim such statement and also proclaim a contradiction that ‘“the uninclined” without impediment can be known.’ These two statements are exclusive of each other.
In the essay, you have declared too that:
Again, controversial claim which leads to controversial conclusion like “we can not confirm it does not exist”. What is “it” that you mentioned here? Did you mean “we can not confirm the absence of the impediment does not exist”? The Buddha proclaimed the 3rd Noble Truth saying “the absence of suffering does exist”, why do you have to try to claim something else which is much weaker?
This is direct contradiction to the 3rd Noble Truth. When the Buddha said “suffering is ceased”, according to your essay, it it incorrect to conclude that suffering no longer exists? And we can only correctly conclude that suffering is no longer an impediment?
And the conclusion:
Oh oh…???
I can’t imagine that the Buddha had taught this way, such statement erases all of his compassion and effort to teach us in so many years.
There are some members here that are attracted to your ideas, I just want to voice out that your ideas are very very controversial.
I think you should change it into a Discussion instead of an Essay. I don’t think this is Dhamma and I don’t think it’s worthy of Essay category. Even a learned monk like Ven. @Sunyo couldn’t persuade you so I will not push my luck here further.
This will mark my last contribution to this thread.
You’ve misunderstood several points that I have made. I will try to clarify.
Yes it can. To reiterate:
Things can only be known to exist because their impediments are known to consciousness. It therefore follows that consciousness can also know the absence of impediments.
Notice that things are distinct from their impediments. I make no claim in the essay about consciousness being unable to know the absence of impediments; only the absence of things.
I’ve laid out premises that are straight forward. These premises lead directly to the conclusion that things are known to be present via their impediments.
I believe your confusion arises from the view that the uninclined is a thing. It is not.
The uninclined is just a label for a state of consciousness beyond the scope of existence.
Sorry but this statement does not make any sense. All of these contradictions spring up because you started with a very controversial statement in your essay:
In every case, the only reason that we know something is present is because that thing impedes us in some way.
You can not proclaim such statement and also proclaim a contradiction that ‘“the uninclined” without impediment can be known.’ These two statements are exclusive of each other.
I have rephrased it is known to knowing occurs, in my original reply to you. You will have to forgive my original slip of the keyboard. I had to rewrite this a couple of times.
Part of the problem is that a state to which existence does not apply is difficult to described by any is-ness.
The uninclined is not a thing. Thus, the inability to know things when impediments are absent has no bearing on the knowing that occurs in the state of the uninclined.
As mentioned above, the conclusion about things and impediments derives directly from some straight forward premises. For it to be controversial, you would have to show that at least one of the premises I’ve laid out is controversial. I don’t believe this can be done, but I’m open to your thoughts.
I used the word it to refer to the something, mentioned earlier in the sentence. It does not refer to impediment.
I can see how the sentence is potentially ambiguous. Thank you for raising the point. I’ve edited my original post to the following:
Thus, while the presence of an impediment lets you confirm that something exists, the absence of the impediment does not let you confirm that something does not exist.
The primary point of the article is to show that cessation refers to the cessation of impediments rather than cessation of existence. Suffering is defined as an impediment. Thus, it can cease. The third noble truth is not contradicted. It is assumed to be true, and used to understand that suffering is an impediment.
I’m not sure about anything I say erasing the Buddha’s compassion. However, as mentioned above, I’ve changed that particular sentence.
I’m still thinking through how best to describe the uninclined. Words such as is / is not, * present / absent* etc. (if used to describe that which sits behind activity or lack thereof) pertain to existence and thus can’t be used. For the moment, the best I can do is describe what happens as knowing occurs. I’m still thinking through the implications of using such wording.
The EBTs you mentioned here (for your analysis/argument) were in fact not established at once in complete structure (form) and content at the first Buddhist council.
EBTs (such as the principal four Nikayas/Agamas) were gradually developed and expanded from SN/SA (according to Ven. YinShun).
Thanks for reading the article 
. Yes, I have heard this line of reasoning, and it may have some validity. I prefer to not assume this is the case right off the bat though.
There have been times where core Buddhist teachings have been dismissed as ‘late’ by well known scholars. For example, the four noble truths are considered to be a ‘later development’ on Wikipedia; see below:
Based on Wikipedia, awakening is just the attainment of jhana.
Having analysed the arguments of the authors, I found them lacking. The second post found at this link is an analysis I did on Dhamma Wheel showing that the four noble truths could not be dismissed as ‘late’.
This is just to say that attributing the variability in suttas to their ‘earliness’ or ‘lateness’ and then dismissing the ‘late’ ones should, in my opinion, be used as a last resort. As seen above, it is possible to destroy the heart of the teaching in by excluding or distorting a sutta using faulty logic; thus my attempt at resolving the variability using my present approach.
What is your present approach?
As stated above, EBTs were not established at once in complete structure and content at the first Buddhist council.
To find a way of contextualising the suttas such that their most straightforward interpretations, within that context, don’t contradict each other. If suttas agree with one another, there is less of a need to distinguish between them as ‘early’ or ‘late’, and less of a temptation to dismiss or change them.
You may need to study both Pali and Chinese EBTs comparatively, not just Pali, for seeking an understanding of early Buddhist teachings.
Thank you for the suggestion.
The following book by Choong Mun-keat may be useful on the issue/question regarding dukkha, nirodha, the cessation of the five aggregates:
The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sūtrāṅga portion of the Pāli Saṃyutta-Nikāya and the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama (Series: Beitrage zur Indologie Band 32; Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2000).
The particular collection of the Pali SN and the Chinese SA is mainly about knowing and seeing the four noble truths, the notion of anicca, dukkha, suñña (empty), anatta, and the middle way, which all are the core teachings of Early Buddhism.
For PDF, see below site:
I enjoy reading your analysis. Very good. The emphasis of understanding is on conditionality, that everything disappears as soon as its supporting disappears. Thank you for your writing.
Dear All,
Please note that this thread was moved to the Discussion category, because it is more appropriate for broader debates which involve EBTs.
Instead, the Essay category is most appropriate for:
Please find here the complete description.
With Metta,
Ric
Why not just acknowledge that Buddhism like every other major religion on earth evolved. Modern Buddhism is not the Buddhism of the the earliest texts and neither was the Buddhism of the DN, SN, AN, and MN.
If you read the Atthakavagga, liberation is the cessation of sanna, the end of being in the world. This is not the end of the five aggregates. Rather than twist and mutilate texts, leave them as they are and understand what each layer was getting at why they changed over time? If you continue to go down your path, you will never understand what Buddhism was. You will only convince yourself it was something it never was.
Yes, sometimes I feel the term EBT is too much in this forum. Instead of understanding the contexts of the paths of liberation that are interrelated to one another, what often emerges is a simple judgment that this text is earlier, this text is later; but it is obvious that there is no penetration of the Dhamma.
Sādhu Sādhu Sādhu! 
This is the best article I’ve ever read here on this forum and many other forums! 
I will bump up this thread every now and then, by trying to add things to this topic/discussion, so all can get a chance to read this amazing article of yours. 
It is clinging to the aggregates that is severed and the aggregates, particularly thought and feeling, serve as the basis to make sense of experience.
When one is born, one is using their sense and aggregate faculties in overdrive. One is born with no insight into the 5 aggregates or even an understanding of such. Because of this, one is due to come into contact with some stress or a problem at some point which then urges one to question what is going on which then may lead one to examine the process of thought, or better, comes into contact with the ideas of the 5 aggregates which provides a structure to understand ones mind better. Learning to let go of the habit of endless thought can be hard, because thought also serves a function, and so it is learning to let go of that which is marked by further giving rise to pain, stress, dissatisfaction and suffering. That usually always boils down to the mind that is habitually holding onto things without realising it, and thus once the individual gets the hang of letting go and holding on - freedom arises. Thought serves utility but can also be unhelpful at times.
With ignorance as our natural condition, it is to be expected that one will encounter difficulties - especially from becoming entangled in thought.
Yet, the problems this causes leads to the illumination of the myriad poisons and hindrances which in turn leads to the growth of wisdom, concentration and ethical conduct. The one that ‘knows’ arises right in the middle of the myriad senses, aggregates and elemental factors that has led up to ones arising. One is in the very centre of the X that marks the spot!
The aggregates in themselves are neutral.
