Hi DKervick,
firstly a reply to your (in my view) metaphysical position re the sciences and a belief in an ‘external world’. My actual interest is in discussing the nature of perception and its phenomenal world which will follow shortly as I find time.
Although as you say, your non-phenomenal hand is ‘external’ to the empirical experience of wielding it…. So it is ‘beyond’ the experience in that sense, whatever that may actually mean apart from being just the persistence of seeing it there again after blinking. This is what I would call the perdurance of the phenomenal hand, which is of course the hand itself phenomenologically speaking, before one theorises its apparent suprasensory and entirely conceptual ‘objective externality’.
This ‘non-conscious experience’ is a new one on me… how does one experience being non-conscious? I think you are driven to hyperbolic tangles by your attempts to explain your metaphysics.
‘It’s just that …’ is not an argument for your (interactive) dualist philosophical distinction between your actual phenomenal hand and your belief in an, in some un-explicated sense, ‘indirectly presented’ external physical hand. Are you now arguing for a sort of direct realism and retreating from your earlier representationalism?
This notion concerning our making judgments about sense perceptions is very Husserlian of you, and I would agree that it is precisely the investigation of the regularities of our sense perceptions that form the basis of any empirical science. One such regularity is the perdurance of phenomenal things, or objects in the everyday sense. Why this particular perceptual regularity requires a belief in the existence of an ‘external’ world is still yet to be explained, by you or anyone else in the history of philosophy!
An appeal to authority is no proof either, especially when it’s not even true! The belief in an ‘external world’ is a philosophical concern not scientific, and the philosophy remains debated and fractured with no real consensus anywhere for the last several centuries since Descartes and Locke. Unless, that is, DKervick is claiming to have finally proven its existence? Or is it that you hold Moore’s proof as a final ‘proof’? Either way this would still just be your own opinion which is not a proof but merely a belief that ‘it must be so!’
I’d like to just emphasise this error here for anyone reading your repeated and rather grandiose statements concerning the supposed universal belief in the sciences and philosophy in the existence of an ‘external world’ … this is quite simply absolutely untrue! I would have to say that your statements as to this ‘universality’ are a reflection of your own rather scientistic belief structure, a form of faith that is representative of a somewhat over-generalised and naive view of the philosophical basis for the empirical sciences.
And what is your basis for this belief? Apparently it’s peekaboo, for when we close our eyes and open them again, the phenomenal thing or ‘object’ reappears! This regularity in our sense perception has been amusing infants probably since the first human infants were born.
Question: Can you explain why this perdurance means for you that your reappearing phenomenal hand is not your ‘real physical hand’ which is somehow ‘external’ to that mere appearance?
(At the same time I understand this ‘externality’ does not mean you think the mere appearance of the hand is any sort of ‘internal’ sense percept that is individuated in your own experience… although I think this latter is just a cop out on your part and completely undermines your notion of perdurant ‘externality’.)
I must tell you however, that this is a trick question and if you can answer it then you’re probably up for a Nobel Prize (in Literature at least) as you will have solved the eternally dogmatic skeptical debate in favour of the realists.
Yes the phenomenal hand is an existent hand, it exists when I’m asleep on it, I know because it’s numb when I awake! This is not a proof of an ‘external world’, how do I know this? Because there is no way to prove an ‘external world’! And if this notion of ‘externality’ is merely a belief system then as I’ve said all along, it’s a philosophically contentious story you tell about the actual (real) phenomena themselves, a story about an observed regularity in your sense perception. Without this phenomenal world there would be no story to tell at all would there? And without your (real) phenomenal hand there would be no hand to speak of and tell stories about.
And your straw man critique of idealism is an aged red herring:
Agreed … more or less (apart from the last bit about no ‘essential relation’ which is rather vaguely generalised), but I’m still trying to unpack why you think this is an important point, or even what it means apart from that you perhaps appear to equate (erroneously again) phenomenology with some sort of solipsist idealism, an argument that would instead just be the reflected mirror image of your realist beliefs.
Scientific description of my hand would require an x-ray perhaps? Of my actual hand and not a theoretical one, that is. The medical scientist would also presumably be conscious and thus see my hand there… otherwise the procedure could not occur. And the x-ray would show the internal structure of my hand that we could both observe, preferably consciously rather than ‘non-consciously’. But why would this have anything to do with whether the scientist was an idealist or realist in their spare time? More specifically, what would either philosophical belief concerning the metaphysics of perception have to do with doing the actual science in the first place? Apart from absolutely nothing of course.
No it’s not, it really isn’t, and I don’t mean just for certain versions of the Copenhagen interpretation. Physics put aside philosophical notions about perception when it emerged as a separate discipline from natural philosophy during the Enlightenment. As for ‘mere appearances’ that’s for the psychologists to befuddle themselves with, or the other brain sciences that are generally much better at attracting research funding than the lowly ‘social sciences’.
Can you name me just one scientific theory that depends on the notion of a world ‘external’ to sense perception? Does the Large Hadron Collider for example, require this metaphysical belief in order to produce its scatter plots? Or is a metaphysical belief in the actuality of an ‘external world’ simply a creation story to make general sense of, after the fact, how one might understand the sciences ‘philosophically’?
Your earlier deflationary pragmatism remains for me your best logical defence: