I see Venerable Nāgārjuna’s exegesis as valid. The Buddha’s contemporaries, mostly, were substance metaphysicians (Jains still are to this day). The atta they preached was a substance. One among many substances (earth, aether etc). Theirs was a world of real things and their modalities. The very basis for their views, Eternalism or Annihilationism, is that there is something real. The suttas are quite clear on this. For the Eternalists a real substance exists and always exist. For the Annihilationists a real substance is destroyed. They argued that something has independent existence, and so is therefore real. That is how you make something real. You assign it independent existence, an essence, a substratum. Even today when people want to say something is real they say its a substance which exists independently (such as matter). What the Buddha said in turn was that everything we experience is dependent, not independent. As such, he undermined the metaphysics of his contemporaries. The atta can’t exist forever or be destroyed, because an atta-substance can’t be established to begin with. He also went deeper. The cause for these views is in grasping, which occurs due to the taints which “pour into” our experiences. The taint of ignorance, the taint of sensual pleasure (something is pleasing) and the taint of Being (something truly exists). There is a reason why the very first fetter given up is Sakkāyadiṭṭhi, literally “truly existing being view”. What is true of the atta is true for all other substances, such as matter or truly existing aggregates (the view of all the various Abhidharmas that we know of). Ultimately then the highest truth is that of nibbāna. Of no arising, no ceasing, no coming, no going, no stars, no moon.
It certainly seems true that as Buddhist philosophical ideas developed there was an increasing emphasis on a systematic metaphysics and ontology.
The Buddha himself, as represented in the suttas, did not seem overly interested in these ideas, rather he presented a plan for liberation.
Those of us today who are philosophically inclined struggle with our mind’s desire to speculate on the nature of ultimate reality, and the different mode of teaching the Buddha used.
Yes, and the Buddhas teachings were warnings against that. Something Venerable Nagarjuna was also arguing against. Like when people say the aggregates are “real”.
The five aggregates subject to clinging are really the source of dukkha. For real!
When the Buddha set out on his journey he thought that there was a self who suffered. That he suffered. Then, when he awakened, he realised that there wasn’t anyone who suffered all along. It’s was a delusion. What is true of the atta substance is true of all other substances too. When one awakens then they realise there never was dukkha to begin with. There never was a journey. There never was samsara, ultimately. The aggregates, sense spheres and elements are just as conventional as “I am”.
Can you provide a Pali sutta reference for your idea that there is no dukkha nor samsara?
Again, this seems a later philosophical idea.
This thread is very helpful on this subject:
This quoted footnote by Ven Bodhi (for MN 22) is very helpful:
“The import of this statement is deeper than appears on the surface. In the context of the false accusations of §37, the Buddha is stating that he teaches that a living being is not a self but a mere conglomeration of factors, material and mental events, linked together in a process that is inherently dukkha, and that Nibbāna the cessation of suffering, is not the annihilation of a being but the termination of that same unsatisfactory process. This statement should
be read in conjunction with SN 12:15/ii.17, where the Buddha says that one with right view, who has discarded all doctrines of a self, sees that whatever arises is only dukkha arising, and whatever ceases is only dukkha ceasing.”
Nibbana is said to be the highest truth
See how the world with its gods imagines not-self to be self; habituated to name and form, imagining this is truth.
For whatever you imagine it is, it turns out to be something else. And that is what is false in it, for the ephemeral is deceptive by nature.
Extinguishment has an undeceptive nature, the noble ones know it as truth. Having comprehended the truth, they are hungerless, extinguished.”
Snp 3.12
And what is that highest truth?
“There is, mendicants, that dimension where there is no earth, no water, no fire, no wind; no dimension of infinite space, no dimension of infinite consciousness, no dimension of nothingness, no dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; no this world, no other world, no moon or sun. There, mendicants, I say there is no coming or going or remaining or passing away or reappearing. It is not established, does not proceed, and has no support. Just this is the end of suffering.” Ud 8.1
The characteristics of the conditioned are arising, ceasing, persisting and change. The characteristics of nibbana are no arising, no ceasing, no persisting, no change. If the highest truth is emptiness of arising, ceasing, change, causality, self, objects etc then where is dukkha?
When you see arising, ceasing, persisting, change then you see no arising, no ceasing, no persisting, no change. When you see dependent origination then you see nibbana too.
I don’t follow. I think you need to explain what you mean by real and unreal. What I mean by real is that we experience them. That’s as real as things get. I suppose I do not mean real in a “substance metaphysics” kind of way. I certainly do not mean “real” in the sense of permanent.
Although I do think parinibbāna is the cessation of the aggregates, not just to stop thinking about them as real, we may not be so far apart on the rest.
Yes, for sure.
This kind of confusion occurs when highly abstract metaphysics gets blended with dhamma.
Real would be substantial existence. Dravyasat. Independent existence. The kind of thing Kaṇāda taught, Aristotle taught, or Jains still teach, or Vedanta or Christians with their Triune God and souls, or we scientists when we assume matter and an external world to do science. When people say trees are real, they mean its because they have their own identity and exist independently. Essentialism basically. There is something really there in sense experience. I too think there is a cessation of the aggregates, but conventionally. I’m much influenced by Tsongkhapa in my views, where we can’t deny sense experience its just merely dreamlike, rather than Gorampa who, for him, even sense experience is denied. From one perspective there are aggregates, sense-spheres, gods and dependent origination. From another perspective there is none of those things. Just like how EBT folk and Theravādins and the other early schools said that conventionally we can talk of a Buddha doing this and that, but ultimately we cannot, so to with the aggregates etc.
Luke, you’re going to find that many of the truths we cling to depend greatly on our own point of view.
- Ācariya Obi-Wan Kenobi
I mean, if dukkha wasn’t real, would the Buddha spend decades of his life teaching about a way to end it? Really?
If dukkha was real, how could it end? How could something which has existence be brought to cease? These are the kind of debates the Buddha’s contemporaries entangled themselves in, because they thought things were real to begin with. Some argued they cant cease, because they have independent existence. Others taught that they can still be made to cease despite them having independent existence (substances don’t rely on anything else for their existence). Others still like the Jains taught that these real existents can both exist and not exist at the same time (think of the unanswerable questions here). Instead the Buddha taught the middle way. We have experiences, there is dukkha, but conventionally. Ultimately, with wisdom, they can’t be established at all. Conventionally we say “You and I” but from a higher point of view, those words don’t apply. Conventionally we say the Buddha did this and that, but from a higher point of view he can’t be pinned down. What is true of the Buddha is true of all things.
Yes, for sure.
This kind of confusion occurs when highly abstract metaphysics gets blended with dhamma.
Highly abstract metaphysics, and the tendency behind it all, is what the Buddha was countering. All of his contemporaries (bar the sceptics) were steeped in it. To understand the Dhamma, you have to understand who and what it was he was arguing against.
The cessation of dukkha, the cessation of the aggregates, can be said to be the point of Buddhist practice.
This is what the word ‘nibbāna’ implies.
I’m surprised this is up for debate in this forum.
The teachings are also a raft towards the abandoning of all views, opinions and theories. That would include taking anything as being real or not real. In order to get to nibbāna we use the raft of Dhamma. Of aggregates, sense-spheres, meditation and Saṃsāra. When we get there, we give all of that up. We even give up the view of dependent origination. We give up understanding and nibbāna itself. Of course after we can still talk of those things, just like we can talk about “me and you”. We can talk about those things, conventionally. You mentioned highly abstract metaphysics. Well, for me, the path leads to giving up those very notions. Of there being any ultimate truth at all.
Strangely, neither of them translate 般涅槃 as parinirvāṇa. I would think it matters in a sutra discussing remainder and no remainder after cessation. 
I think @sunyo’s basic point is borne out by SA 249, for what it’s worth. There’s nothing like “any longer” in the Chinese parallel, and Ananda asks whether “there’s a remainder” (有餘) or “there isn’t a remainder” (無有餘) after cessation. Which could be translated more freely as “there’s something else” or “there isn’t something else.”
Honestly, I think the meaning of words like virāga (lack of desire or fading away?) and papañca (proliferation or falsity?) are more at issue when I compare SA 249 to AN 1.173-4, but this would probably stems from differing textual traditions. They understand words a bit differently and use variable formulae. The way passages are expanded makes them less ambiguous.
In SA 249, Ananda’s asking about something remaining after a liberated person dies, given the referrence to parinirvāṇa (not just nirvāṇa) at the conclusion. AN 1.173-174 sound like a question about whether something exists besides the six sense fields.
In SA 249, Ananda’s asking about something remaining after a liberated person dies, given the referrence to parinirvāṇa (not just nirvāṇa ) at the conclusion. AN 1.173-174 sound like a question about whether something exists besides the six sense fields.
@cdpatton Thanks for adding this important clarification of the Chinese 般涅槃 in SA 249 as referring to parinirvāṇa rather than nirvāṇa as found in the two translations that I posted.
yes, exactly, suffering cannot be real in any independant self-existent sense, it cannot be a mere figment of the imagination, it cannot be both, i.e a combination of a delusion and a “reality” and it cannot be niether of these things, i.e uncaused, or random “arisen by chance or caprice”.
no. the argument from abyaktaka applies to the aggregates too.
take perception:
perception cannot be it’s own cause
it cannot be the caused by another
it cannot be both
niether.
etc.
the argument is always the same.
I think we just disagree here, and I have expressed elsewhere my views about those passages.
no. they are the same question.
the question is about any entity having the property of temporal or spatial extension while simultaneously being the cause or condition for other entities, all of which can appear remain and disappear.
you are refusing to acknowledge the “or cosmos” parts of the standard list and barely acknowleging the existence of questions we have from the ebts where they are applied to at least 20 or more entities other than a “self” and multiple examples regarding space and time that do not even rely on the presense of “entities” per se.
the argument is deeper than one about “selves” and merely includes it as a (divinely) practical case.
I think it is you who are playing with words @Sunyo , it is you who have a “something” that you claim you can tell me “nothing” about but that you are allowed to call “it” whatever you like.
I have asked for no such entity.
you seem to consistently confuse me with someone who holds the view that there is some type of continued existence, but I do not hold that view.
I am asserting that you hold the view “nothing exists after” and that this is a wrong view. that is all.
you are mistaken. if you would just read my survey of the bulk of instances of discussion in the nikayas about the topic you would see that there is much more to it.
I will bow out of this thread now and see if I can gather my thoughts elsewhere.
Always a genuine pleasure to argue the point with you @Sunyo