In Buddhism, sati (Sanskrit smara or smṛti) has the primary senses “to remember” and to “be mindful”. It is normally considered the case that the sense of mindfulness is probably an innovation of the Buddha. However, a 1993 article by Konrad Klaus, On the Meaning of the Root Smṛ in Vedic Literature questions this, arguing that both senses are attested before the Buddha. This has been cited by Ven Analāyo so I wanted to check it out.
A close reading of the examples Klaus gives shows that they are ambiguous at best, and in fact the sense “memory” is probably better in all cases.
Klaus’s examples
Let’s dispense with the simple cases first. Klaus gives two examples from the Rig Veda. I compare these with the modern translation by Jamison/Brereton:
RV 7.104
- Klaus: Give heed with rapid courses!
- Jamison/Brereton: Keep this in mind!
RV 10.106
- Klaus: you should give heed to the call
- Jamison/Brereton: you will remember our instructions
In both cases Jamison/Brereton prefer the sense “remember, keep in mind”.
Note too that the translators say of 10.106, “There is no question this is the most frustrating hymn in the Rigveda.” So difficult is the text that they leave the middle verses, immediately preceding this line, untranslated. This is no solid ground from which to derive a fundamental meaning.
Maitrāyaṇīsaṁhitā 2.3.3[29, 18].
Klaus himself acknowledges that the sense “forgets” can apply.
Kena 4.4-6
Klaus calls this passage, “Rather difficult”, and says “one will probably agree that ‘to realize, to notice, to become aware of’ as a rendering of upasmarati is worth considering.” This is hardly decisive.
Chāndogya 7.13.1
While acknowledging that other translators agree on the sense “memory” here, Klaus argues that smara here bears the sense “attentiveness”. Klaus only considers the paragraph in question, but it appears as part of a much long chain of things.
In typical Upanishadic style, it is a dialogue that proceeds by question and answer to higher and higher conceptions of Brahma. Nārada starts off by saying that he has studied the Vedas and other literature, but he only knows the meaning of words. He seeks wisdom to overcome sorrow from Sanatkumāra.
The teacher then propounds a series of things, each of which is said to be better than the previous, with explanations as to why that is so.
Here’s a rough summary starting from the beginning of the chapter, i.e. the lowest and least.
- nāma (name = texts)
- vāc (speech, makes known texts)
- manas (thought, holds text and speech, makes plans)
- samkalpa (will, directs thought then speech)
- citta (comprehension?)
- dhyāna (meditation? focus? “The earth seems to be meditating. The space between the earth and heaven seems to be meditating. So also, heaven seems to be meditating. Water seems to be meditating. The mountains seem to be meditating. Gods and human beings also seem to be meditating.”)
- vijñāna (understanding, by means of which one understands Vedas etc.)
- bala (strength, health, vitality, by means of which one can gain understanding)
- anna (food, if you fast you cannot understand things)
- āpas (water, food depends on it)
- tejas (fire, creates rain)
- ākāśa (space, ether, stars are in it, through it one can hear what others are saying, one enjoys and suffers, and are born in it)
- smara (memory? attentiveness?)
The relevant passage is:
If many people get together but their memory (attentiveness) fails, then they cannot hear or think or know anything. But if they remember (are attentive), they can then hear, think, and know. Through memory one knows one’s children and animals.
Good method proceeds from what is clear to what is less clear. And what is clear here is that the final sentence definitely refers to “memory” as the agent of recognition. What of the former part though? Perhaps this employs the dual uses also found in Buddhism?
Klaus argues that “memory is in no way connected with sensory perception”. This is simply untrue. Sensory perception must be learned, and it relies on what it knows from the past to make sense of the present. But this passage should not be interpreted in light of our ideas of how the mind works, but of how these words are used in this text.
Notice that of the three things that “memory” enables, two have already appeared in our text: thought (manas) and understanding (vijñāna). Both are defined in context in terms of scripture, which, if you recall, was the context of the entire passage. “Hearing” was not explicitly mentioned, but obviously includes the “hearing” (i.e. “learning”) of the Vedas that prompted the exchange.
That’s not all. The next item after smara is āśā, “hope, desire” (7.14.1).
Hope inspires a person’s memory, and one uses one’s memory to learn the mantras and perform rituals.
Thus:
- the words connected with smara are associated with textual study
- the second half of the smara discussion clearly means “memory”
- in the passage following, smara also clearly means “memory of texts”.
So the sense of smara as “memory” (of texts) clearly predominates. In the paragraph in question, it seems to refer , not to any gathering, but to a gathering of people intent on studying and reciting the Vedas, and refers to the “true” hearing or more practically, “learning” that occurs when memory is present.
There’s also an argument by negation: if smara is not memory, where is memory? We know it was crucial for the Vedic tradition. Several terms there already denote “awareness” in some way. Why do we need another? Of course, this kind of argument is always weak, but it does seem to me the passage as a whole is richer if we include memory.
I argued long ago, in A History of Mindfulness, that the Buddhist concept of memory evolved from the Brahmanical sense, particularly considering the manner in which “remembered” texts are rehearsed and recited. The Brahmin retires to a secluded spot for quiet, centers his attention on the most high, and brings to mind the sacred texts. They flow forth in an uninterrupted stream, manifesting in a present “flow state” of memory of the words of divinity.
It seems to me that this argument is still cogent. The sense of smara as “uninterrupted stream of awareness” in the present might be pre-figured by the Chāndogya passage, but there it is still tied to textual memory.
Perhaps other passages might illuminate this further, but I find Klaus’ arguments unconvincing.
Pre-Buddhist sati in the suttas
The suttas attribute sati to both the brahmanical (Upanishadic) and śramaṇa (Jain?) traditions.
- Before his awakening, the Buddha studied with Upanishadic teachers, under whom he learned faith, energy, sati, samadhi, and wisdom, which he would later call the five faculties or powers.
- While undergoing his ascetic training, in order to fulfill the practice of non-violence, he always had sati in stepping so as not to harm any insects.
As pointed out by Vaddha (see below), both these can be read as “keeping in mind”. Without more context we can’t really know how those traditions themselves understood sati. Perhaps they should be considered, along with the Chandogya passage, as bridging senses, moving from “memory”, “recollection”, “retention” towards “mindful awarenss in the present”.
In any case it is clear that the Buddha himself generously acknowledged the fact that he drew the idea of sati from his former teachers. It seems that this was a current usage. It is hardly surprising that pre-Buddhist texts don’t have any examples, as they only constitute a fraction of the language at the time.
I was under the impression that the Upanishads were from like… new religious movements… perhaps coming from Brahminism but against the orthodoxy of the time. So you’re saying that orthodox Brahmins of the time would have been following the Upanishads? 
One can also do things on autopilot and without presence.