A chariot, assuming its a real chariot, really is designated ‘chariot’.
A chariot, even a fictional one, is still, correctly, designated as ‘chariot’
A real, OR an imaginary or fictional chariot, if it is made of parts is still corectly refered to as ‘chariot’
A real or imagined chariot that is not made of parts, say machined from a single block of wood, so frictionless that the horses drag it along like its on ice would still be CORRECTLY called a (ice?) ‘Chariot’.
So it is ENOURMOUSLY UNCLEAR what people actually think they are pointing out when thet point out that the word ’ chariot’ means chariot.
Person, self, actor, agent, all these things can be real or fictional even in the everyday sense, all these things can have parts, I, the person joseph, have 2 arms, so what? How does my having 2 arms or a chariot having 4 wheels say ANYTHING AT ALL about the question of wether we are talking about a real or a fictiinal chariot? Or a real or imaginary joseph?
On this argument, EVERYTHING is a meaningless designation of mere convention: chariots, persons, dolphins, numbers, truth values, fact/falsity distinctions, nibanna, the aggregates, you, me ANYTHING is “mere designatiion”.
This vacuous argument, which appears in one poem in SN and the Milindapatha, that is that chariots arent real because they are made of parts and by analogy we should understand that people aren’t real because they are made with parts is not a valid argument by explosion QED.
It therefore can’t be the original valid argumnet of buddhism. QED.
it must be possible to think about what the buddha taught in such a way as to be led towards peace of mind and certainty rght now.
The buddha said that it was incorrect to hold the view:
The fire is real
The fir is not real
The fire has both real and unreal parts
The fire has niether real nor unreal parts
But correct to assert
The (real) fire really burns
Dependent on there really being fuel to burn.
With the exhaustion of fuel the fire is exhausted.
When its exhausted the fire isnt north south east or west.
If anything composed of parts is definitionally fictional and therefore false, everything is false and language is impossibility, without holding such a view it is possible to point out its flaw.
Thankfully I think it is only by late misinterpretation that the “fictionalist” argument gets in to buddhism and in the main the texts are scrupulous to avoid making such universalist and logical explosion prone ideas.