Toy model of early mediative techniques and their buddhist prehistory:

[josephzizys]

Nihilist Sensualists. (Lust)
Practiced Jhanas.
Believed death was the end.

Jhanas:

1. Self hypnotic pleasure trance (“little mind” tricking the body)
2. Fading of hypnosis leaves pleasure and joy (body and mind)
3. Fading of pleasure leaves joy (mind)
4. Fading of joy leaves clarity. (niether)

Moral Consequntialists. (Hatred)
Practiced Brahma Viharas?
Believed in Reincarnation.

Brahmas:

1. Love (of what is beautiful)
2. Leads to compassion (for what is ugly)
3. Leads to sympathy (for both)
4. Leads to clarity (niether)

Skeptics. (Delusion)
Used the fourfold negation.
Believed in niether annihilation nor reincarnation
Practiced Formless meditations? (“Unknowing”)

Formlessnesses:

1. Infinite space (body) leads to
2. Infinite consciousness (mind) leads to
3. Infinite nothing (both, theres nothing in the infinite space you are conscious of) leads to
4. Niether perception nor non perception (Leads to clarity??)

Buddha.
Rejected these three views.
Posited dependence as discrediting them.
Taught unconditional human freedom.
Practiced Mindfulness? (“Knowing”)

Original Mindfulness:
Mindful of inconstancy with what is seen, heard, felt and thought, one attends to its impermanence, its lack of control, its imperfection, to its fading, disappearing, to its cessation. Fully understanding this, one is freed from inconstancy by not grasping to it.

or the Scholastic version that becomes prominent in S:

1. mindfullness of the body leads to
2. mindfullness of perceptions (of the body, by the)
3. mindfulness of the mind (being cognizance of the body and its perceptions)
4. mindfulness of truth (being niether the body nor the mind) (leads to clarity?)

My main thought is that the abayakata seems embedded in all the early sequences.

thoughts?

[Raftafarian]

Following your lead, putting together MN119 from Ud 1.10:

It’s when a mendicant—gone to a wilderness, or to the root of a tree, or to an empty hut—sits down cross-legged, sets their body straight, and establishes mindfulness in front of them.

1. What is seen in front of them is metaphorically “the far shore”. It is that which is “the world/not you”.

Just mindful, they breathe in. Mindful, they breathe out. Breathing in heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing in heavily.’ Breathing out heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing out heavily.’ When breathing in lightly they know: ‘I’m breathing in lightly.’ Breathing out lightly they know: ‘I’m breathing out lightly.

2. What is felt and cognized is metaphorically “the near shore”. It is that which is “you”.

They practice like this: ‘I’ll breathe in experiencing the whole body.’ They practice like this: ‘I’ll breathe out experiencing the whole body. (all senses including the mind)

3. What is seen, heard, felt, and cognized is metaphorically both the near and far shore, as well as the divide between them, the river. It is “you in the world".

They practice like this: ‘I’ll breathe in stilling the physical process.’ They practice like this: ‘I’ll breathe out stilling the physical process.’ As they meditate like this—diligent, keen, and resolute—memories and thoughts of the lay life are given up. Their mind becomes stilled internally; it settles, unifies, and becomes immersed in samādhi. That’s how a mendicant develops mindfulness of the body.

4. Just the seen, just the heard, just the felt, just the cognized metaphorically it is the absence of a divide or river so there is no near shore/”you” nor far shore/”the world” either. There is no differentiation made to carve out a “you” or “a world” from raw unparsed sense data. AKA, “there is no you in that”, “the end of the world”, “the end of suffering”.

[Vaddha]

@josephzizys

Nihilist Sensualists. (Lust)
Practiced Jhanas.

In DN 1 and elsewhere in the suttas (like MN 106) the nihilists are associated with the formless attainments, and this makes perfect sense rather than jhana. When people experience jhana they think its God or the Soul etc. But ‘nothingness’ and ‘barely percipient’ sound like annihilationist goals.

Also, ‘sensualists’ and ‘jhāna’ are incompatible. Jhana is basically the opposite of sensuality.

I see similar contradictions in the rest of the post, and don’t see support for this anywhere in the suttas.

[josephzizys]

Thanks @Vaddha and @Raftafarian !! I will elaborate:

DN1 describes an a 2nd group after “anihilattionists” called “extinghismenters?” who are identified as jhana practitioners by:

There are some ascetics and brahmins who speak of extinguishment in the present life. They assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life on five grounds.
Santi, bhikkhave, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti pañcahi vatthūhi.
And what are the five grounds on which they rely?
Te ca bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā kimāgamma kimārabbha diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti pañcahi vatthūhi?

There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view:
Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā evaṁvādī hoti evaṁdiṭṭhi:
‘When this self amuses itself, supplied and provided with the five kinds of sensual stimulation, that’s how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.’
‘yato kho, bho, ayaṁ attā pañcahi kāmaguṇehi samappito samaṅgībhūto paricāreti, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life.
Ittheke sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hoti.
Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?
Because sensual pleasures are impermanent, suffering, and perishable. Their decay and perishing give rise to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress.
Kāmā hi, bho, aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā, tesaṁ vipariṇāmaññathābhāvā uppajjanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā.
Quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, this self enters and remains in the first absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, while placing the mind and keeping it connected. That’s how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.’
Yato kho, bho, ayaṁ attā vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life.
Ittheke sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hoti.
Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?
Because the placing of the mind and the keeping it connected there are coarse.
Yadeva tattha vitakkitaṁ vicāritaṁ, etenetaṁ oḷārikaṁ akkhāyati.
But when the placing of the mind and keeping it connected are stilled, this self enters and remains in the second absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of immersion, with internal clarity and mind at one, without placing the mind and keeping it connected. That’s how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.’
Yato kho, bho, ayaṁ attā vitakkavicārānaṁ vūpasamā ajjhattaṁ sampasādanaṁ cetaso ekodibhāvaṁ avitakkaṁ avicāraṁ samādhijaṁ pītisukhaṁ dutiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life.
Ittheke sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hoti.
Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?
Because the rapture and emotional excitement there are coarse.
Yadeva tattha pītigataṁ cetaso uppilāvitattaṁ, etenetaṁ oḷārikaṁ akkhāyati.
But with the fading away of rapture, this self enters and remains in the third absorption, where it meditates with equanimity, mindful and aware, personally experiencing the bliss of which the noble ones declare, “Equanimous and mindful, one meditates in bliss”. That’s how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.’
Yato kho, bho, ayaṁ attā pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako ca viharati, sato ca sampajāno, sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṁvedeti, yaṁ taṁ ariyā ācikkhanti “upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī”ti, tatiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life.
Ittheke sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hoti.
Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?
Because the mental partaking of that as ‘blissful’ is said to be coarse.
Yadeva tattha sukhamiti cetaso ābhogo, etenetaṁ oḷārikaṁ akkhāyati.
But giving up pleasure and pain, and ending former happiness and sadness, this self enters and remains in the fourth absorption, without pleasure or pain, with pure equanimity and mindfulness. That’s how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.’
Yato kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā pubbeva somanassadomanassānaṁ atthaṅgamā adukkhamasukhaṁ upekkhāsatipārisuddhiṁ catutthaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ patto hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life.
Ittheke sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti.

These are the five grounds on which those ascetics and brahmins assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life.
Imehi kho te, bhikkhave, samaṇabrāhmaṇā diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti pañcahi vatthūhi.
Any ascetics and brahmins who assert the ultimate extinguishment of an existing being in the present life do so on one or other of these five grounds. Outside of this there is none.
Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā sato sattassa paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ paññapenti, sabbe te imeheva pañcahi vatthūhi …
The Realized One understands this …

both these groups believe the same thing: they are materialists, in that they believe you have one life, they all just disagree about the “peak experience” as all divergent meditators must, so i claim this demonstrates that there where nihilist sensualist (in the sense that they recognised the sensual body) who where jhana masters. QED.

As to the formless attainments working better for the skeptics I guess its a structural argument;

A is “all space”
B is “all consciousness”
both the consciousness that all of space is empty of content is the perception of nothingness
niether perception (of space) nor non perception (non?consciousness)

appears to be the abayakata/tetralemma/catuskoti in praxis.

it describes an ascent to a state of which knowledge is nether ascribable to a reality, a consciousness, an absence, or anything whatever.

SO, the “annihilationists” are pretty badly misunderstood i think…

There are some ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists. They assert the annihilation, eradication, and obliteration of an existing being on seven grounds.
Santi, bhikkhave, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ucchedavādā sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti sattahi vatthūhi.
And what are the seven grounds on which they rely?
Te ca bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā kimāgamma kimārabbha ucchedavādā sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti sattahi vatthūhi?

There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view:
Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā evaṁvādī hoti evaṁdiṭṭhi:
‘This self has form, made up of the four primary elements, and produced by mother and father. Since it’s annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’
‘yato kho, bho, ayaṁ attā rūpī cātumahābhūtiko mātāpettikasambhavo kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self becomes rightly annihilated.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā sammā samucchinno hoti.
There is another self that is divine, having form, sensual, consuming solid food.
Atthi kho, bho, añño attā dibbo rūpī kāmāvacaro kabaḷīkārāhārabhakkho.
You don’t know or see that.
Taṁ tvaṁ na jānāsi na passasi.
But I know it and see it.
Tamahaṁ jānāmi passāmi.
Since this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’
So kho, bho, attā yato kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self becomes rightly annihilated.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā sammā samucchinno hoti.
There is another self that is divine, having form, mind-made, complete in all its various parts, not deficient in any faculty.
Atthi kho, bho, añño attā dibbo rūpī manomayo sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahīnindriyo.
You don’t know or see that.
Taṁ tvaṁ na jānāsi na passasi.
But I know it and see it.
Tamahaṁ jānāmi passāmi.
Since this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’
So kho, bho, attā yato kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self becomes rightly annihilated.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā sammā samucchinno hoti.
There is another self which has gone totally beyond perceptions of form. With the ending of perceptions of impingement, not focusing on perceptions of diversity, aware that “space is infinite”, it’s reborn in the dimension of infinite space.
Atthi kho, bho, añño attā sabbaso rūpasaññānaṁ samatikkamā paṭighasaññānaṁ atthaṅgamā nānattasaññānaṁ amanasikārā “ananto ākāso”ti ākāsānañcāyatanūpago.
You don’t know or see that.
Taṁ tvaṁ na jānāsi na passasi.
But I know it and see it.
Tamahaṁ jānāmi passāmi.
Since this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’
So kho, bho, attā yato kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self becomes rightly annihilated.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā sammā samucchinno hoti.
There is another self which has gone totally beyond the dimension of infinite space. Aware that “consciousness is infinite”, it’s reborn in the dimension of infinite consciousness.
Atthi kho, bho, añño attā sabbaso ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ samatikkamma “anantaṁ viññāṇan”ti viññāṇañcāyatanūpago.
You don’t know or see that.
Taṁ tvaṁ na jānāsi na passasi.
But I know it and see it.
Tamahaṁ jānāmi passāmi.
Since this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’
So kho, bho, attā yato kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, so attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self becomes rightly annihilated.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā sammā samucchinno hoti.
There is another self that has gone totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness. Aware that “there is nothing at all”, it’s been reborn in the dimension of nothingness.
Atthi kho, bho, añño attā sabbaso viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ samatikkamma “natthi kiñcī”ti ākiñcaññāyatanūpago.
You don’t know or see that.
Taṁ tvaṁ na jānāsi na passasi.
But I know it and see it.
Tamahaṁ jānāmi passāmi.
Since this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’
So kho, bho, attā yato kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti.

But someone else says to them:
Tamañño evamāha:
‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it.
‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṁ tvaṁ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi;
But that’s not how this self becomes rightly annihilated.
no ca kho, bho, ayaṁ attā ettāvatā sammā samucchinno hoti.
There is another self that has gone totally beyond the dimension of nothingness. Aware that “this is peaceful, this is sublime”, it’s been reborn in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.
Atthi kho, bho, añño attā sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ samatikkamma “santametaṁ paṇītametan”ti nevasaññānāsaññāyatanūpago.
You don’t know or see that.
Taṁ tvaṁ na jānāsi na passasi.
But I know it and see it.
Tamahaṁ jānāmi passāmi.
Since this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’
So kho, bho, attā yato kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṁ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti.
That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti.

These are the seven grounds on which those ascetics and brahmins assert the annihilation, eradication, and obliteration of an existing being.
Imehi kho te, bhikkhave, samaṇabrāhmaṇā ucchedavādā sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti sattahi vatthūhi.
Any ascetics and brahmins who assert the annihilation, eradication, and obliteration of an existing being do so on one or other of these seven grounds. Outside of this there is none.
Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā ucchedavādā sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti, sabbe te imeheva sattahi vatthūhi …
The Realized One understands this …

so again, BOTH “annihilationists” and “extinguishmenters” have the SAME wrong view: that there is a person who is born and dies, but who in a sense can have an “experience” of a “state of mind” like jhana or niether perception nor non perceptoion, (or later “cessation of perception and thingamagig”) that in themselves grant liberative attainment, but:

The chains of desire, the bonds of life’s pleasures
Icchānidānā bhavasātabaddhā,
are hard to escape, for one cannot free another.
Te duppamuñcā na hi aññamokkhā;

and

If a person were granted purity through what is seen, (heard, felt, thought)
Diṭṭhena ce suddhi narassa hoti,
or if by a notion they could give up suffering, (being, not being, both, niether)
Ñāṇena vā so pajahāti dukkhaṁ;
then one with attachments is purified by another: (the practitioner by the practice)
Aññena so sujjhati sopadhīko,
their view betrays them as one who asserts thus.
Diṭṭhī hi naṁ pāva tathā vadānaṁ.

So my argument is that leaving aside the question of whether there is a “self” that is “reborn” in the “jhana realms” or the “sphere of whatnot” or if when your dead your dead, it STILL remains the argument in the sutta that these meditative “ATTAINMENTS” (any or all of them) cannot constitute the “understanding” that is “freed”.

I would also just point out that the opening argument of the sutta is about REJECTING the belief that we are reborn again and again based on the recollections of such by the “eternalists”!

all these “net of views” are rejected in the sutta, in perfect conformity with the atthakavagga (and for that matter the parayanavagga, which I havent qouted from but now will).

Original Mindfulness

“The removal of desire and lust, Hemaka,
“Idha diṭṭhasutamutaviññātesu,
for what is seen, heard, thought, or cognized here; (rebirth, jhanas, niether perception nor…)
Piyarūpesu hemaka;
for anything liked or disliked,
Chandarāgavinodanaṁ,
is extinguishment, the imperishable state.
Nibbānapadamaccutaṁ.

Those who have fully understood this, mindful, (so mindful of this fact)
Etadaññāya ye satā,
are extinguished in this very life. (how do the “parinibanna” crowd explain tis away?)
Diṭṭhadhammābhinibbutā;
Always at peace,
Upasantā ca te sadā,
they’ve crossed over clinging to the world.”
Tiṇṇā loke visattikan”ti.

So the toy model is that DN1 and DN2 are in line with Snp4.2 etc and Snp5.2 etc.

basically i take buddhsim to be precicely an argument about the possibility of being free right now, (not free when I am dead parinibanna crowd!) and that argument hinges on accepting that all phenomena or all subject object relations or all propositions suffer from a key defect, that they are “seen, heard, felt and thought” and that therefore we should turn our minds from such things, and that once our minds really do “understand” “conform to” “become fully conscious of” “know” that they are free from these attachments they really do know and really are freed (from these attachments).

((really the argument is simply surjective - is the person freed thus “really” freed from “life and death” i.e what is “seen, heard, felt, and thought” ??? and the answer is YES! they really are, freed in this very life from attachment to the seen heard thought and felt things including “notions” of birth life death and suffering, live free of attachment to what is and you cannot be “defined” (even while alive!!) by appeal to these things, surjective.))

So buddhism has never been an argument about wether I should beleive in being reborn again and again or beleive that when I die I get to be nothing, its allways been an argument about freeing oneslef from attachments here and now in this very life.

The palpable fact that the canon mostly eminates from a scholastic enterprise congruent with a fullu urbanised and “technological” capacity that would not in itself reflect the ideals of the actual first genration of buddhists who must have been much more magical creatures in the forrests

anyway I have more than lost my train of thought, but basically I think that the earliest material in the canon which I take to be basically the above four documents present a pretty sophisticated and philosophically direct and consistent argument that can begin to be misread if the scholastic material that forms the bulk of the subsequnt collections, M, S, A etc, let alone the even later material, unless pretty scrupulous care is taken to reconcile oneself to what Snp4.2 Snp5.2 DN1 and DN2 actually say before deciding that aggregates are real or there are dhamma-elements, or that “rebirth, properly understood is a prerequisite to enlightenment” or jhanas blah blah blah etc.

I would love in fact to hear of ANY credible evidence whatever to the effect that the four suttas I cite are in any way “late” or “incomplete” or “unreliable” in any substantive way.

Anyway, MN1, which I take to be a very important sutta, also makes the argument from perception to conception

"having percieved X, the unlearned, conceives X, and conceptions should be abandoned. period. note that thier “anatta” and thier “pleasure” are secondary reasons for thier abandonment, just a few of the terrible features of "conciets/conceptions.

I also note that MN1 does not mention the 5 aggregates, which for me indicates earliness

So once again, for these 5 early suttas, I take it to be clearly consistent that any view that relies on a concept drawn from a percept (like a meditative attainment) is a wrong view and a wrong view is a view, and the buddha recommended holding no views regarding what is seen heard felt or thought, ergo no particular percept (meditative attainment) can be a neccesary condtion for holding no view. QED.

[Raftafarian]

@josephzizys

basically i take buddhsim to be precicely an argument about the possibility of being free right now, (not free when I am dead parinibanna crowd!) and that argument hinges on accepting that all phenomena or all subject object relations or all propositions suffer from a key defect, that they are “seen, heard, felt and thought” and that therefore we should turn our minds from such things, and that once our minds really do “understand” “conform to” “become fully conscious of” “know” that they are free from these attachments they really do know and really are freed (from these attachments).

((really the argument is simply surjective - is the person freed thus “really” freed from “life and death” i.e what is “seen, heard, felt, and thought” ??? and the answer is YES! they really are, freed in this very life from attachment to the seen heard thought and felt things including “notions” of birth life death and suffering, live free of attachment to what is and you cannot be “defined” (even while alive!!) by appeal to these things, surjective.))

So buddhism has never been an argument about wether I should beleive in being reborn again and again or beleive that when I die I get to be nothing, its allways been an argument about freeing oneslef from attachments here and now in this very life.

You must be a genius. Your opinions coincide exactly with my own. All kidding aside, I think we have, more or less, reached the same conclusions. Now go to a wilderness, or to the root of a tree, or to an empty hut—sit down cross-legged, …

[cdpatton]

@josephzizys

I would love in fact to hear of ANY credible evidence whatever to the effect that the four suttas I cite are in any way “late” or “incomplete” or “unreliable” in any substantive way.

DN 2 is greatly expanded with the addition of material from DN 3 when its compared to its parallels. Whether or not the original version was early or late aside, the Pali version has been redacted to add that material. Does that qualify as “any credible evidence”?

[Raftafarian]

@josephzizys

So the toy model is that DN1 and DN2 are in line with Snp4.2 etc and Snp5.2 etc.

As I said before, I think you and I agree on more or less everything that is truly substantive. That said, the relationship between Snp 4.2 and Snp 5.2 may be a point on which we differ.

In Snp 4.2, we must completely “understand” sanna in order to be freed from longing for this life or another. In Snp 5.2, consciousness must cease to be free. This seems to be more in line with Parinibbana. At least that is how I read it.

Snp 4.11 appears to be a counter to Snp 5.2. It seems to argue that the reason for thinking cessation of consciousness is freedom is dependent on a view or views regarding the undeclared.

I suspect that Snp 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 came first. They are the raft. They are complete and coherent in themselves. Snp 5.2 appears to have been a misunderstanding of Snp 4.2 corrected in Snp 4.11.

If you do not think Snp 4.2 and Snp 5.2 are at odds with each other, I would like to hear why.

PS. My prior post was meant to be humorous, but on rereading it, it seems snooty. It was not meant to be.

[josephzizys]

@Raftafarian

All kidding aside, I think we have, more or less, reached the same conclusions.

lol! I was thinking just the same

[josephzizys]

yes! it certainly does the DA27 seems much simpler and does not exactly align does it?
but this just gives me evidence that the teaching itself is very old! otherwise why do we seem to have a more archaic and less elaborate list of the 6 teachers and a much more elaborate one in the Pali?

I prefer the chinese:

NO GOOD AND BAD ACTS:

Pūraṇa Kāśyapa
C: “That Pūraṇa Kāśyapa replied to me: If you cut and sliced sentient beings on the side of the Gaṅgā River, that wouldn’t bring any bad rewards. If you gave charity to a large congregation on the side of a river, profiting people, there wouldn’t be a rewards for merit, either.’”

NO GOOD AND BAD PEOPLE:

Maskarin Gośālīputra
C: “He replied to me, ‘Great king: There are no ascetics or priests in the world who practice truly. None of them are self-realized and disseminate it to other people in the present life or an afterlife. Their words are all false.’

DEATH IS THE END:

Ajita Keśakambala
C: “He replied to me, ‘A person acquires the four elements and takes them to the end of his life. The earth element returns to earth; the water element returns to water; the fire element returns to fire; and the air element returns to air. People are all destroyed, and their faculties return to space. When a person dies, their body is placed on a palanquin and they are taken to a charnel ground. There, they are cremated until their bones are the color of pigeons, or they turn into ashes. Whether foolish or wise, people are all destroyed when their lives end. It’s the rule of annihilation.’

LIFE IS PREDETERMINED:

Kakuda Katyāyana
C: “He answered me, ‘Great king, there’s no strength and no effort. People have no power and no means. There’s no cause and no condition for the attachment of sentient beings to defilement, and there’s no cause and no condition for the purification of sentient beings. Every kind of sentient being that has a life has no power, and they can’t act freely. Without any enemies, they are certain to exist in numbers. They experience pain and pleasure in these six births.’

KNOWLEDGE IS IMPOSSIBLE:

Saṃjayin Vairaṭīputra
C: “He answered me, ‘Great king, “Is there a reward for ascetics in the present?” Questioned thus, I would answer this subject in this way: “This is something real, this is something different, or this is something neither different nor not different.” Great king: “Is there no reward for ascetics in the present?” Questioned thus, I would answer this subject in this way: “This is something real, this is something different, or this is something neither different nor not different.” Great king: “Is there both a reward and no reward for ascetics in the present?” Questioned thus, I would answer this subject in this way: “This is something real, this is something different, and this is something neither different nor not different.” Great king: “Is there neither a reward nor no reward for ascetics in the present?” Questioned thus, I would answer this subject in this way: “This is something real, this is something different, or this is something neither different nor not different.”’

OMNISCIENCE:

Nirgrantha Jñātiputra
C: “He answered me, ‘Great king, I am an all-knowing and all-seeing person. My knowledge is complete without exception. Whether walking, standing, sitting, or lying down, my awakening is without exception, and my knowledge is always right in front of me.’

In the Pali there is a change in the order of the skeptic example and the jain, and a alteration of the jain position, in the chinese it’s a pretty clear list of the things rejected by buddhism, with the jain false omniscience contrasting with the false skepticism of the preceding example.

[Sasha_A]

@josephzizys

So my argument is that leaving aside the question of whether there is a “self” that is “reborn” in the “jhana realms” or the “sphere of whatnot” or if when your dead your dead, it STILL remains the argument in the sutta that these meditative “ATTAINMENTS” (any or all of them) cannot constitute the “understanding” that is “freed”.

This kind of meditative attainments does not even indicate that the person has given up the lower fetters - they can be achieved even by an ordinary person:

AN4.171
“Sāriputta, take a person who hasn’t given up the lower fetters. In the present life they enter and abide in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. They enjoy it and like it and find it satisfying. If they abide in that, are committed to it, and meditate on it often without losing it, when they die they’re reborn in the company of the gods of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. When they pass away from there, they’re a returner, who comes back to this state of existence.

[cdpatton]

There’s a couple other versions of the heretical views in Chinese. It’s a great example of how old material can be very close and also in disarray. The views are fairly close in the different versions, yet ascribed to different heretics. I agree that that section of the sutra is pretty old. It may be the real core of it, with the story about Ajatasatru built around it.

[Vaddha]

@cdpatton

I agree that that section of the sutra is pretty old. It may be the real core of it, with the story about Ajatasatru built around it.

It definitely rings of something old and embedded in a diverse cultural context. And this relates to discussions of chronology and canonization claims.

As @josephzizys has said before, they opine that the sīlakkhandhavagga of the long collection was the most prized, esteemed, and earliest. And therefore subject to padding and elaboration.

But if this were so, why is the very “core” itself so disagreed upon by the various sources? None of them correspond in how they treat the outside teachers and views, whether it be DN DA or EA, etc. The doctrines are muddled, characters scrambled, and the narrative inherently contains high-profile names to elevate the Buddhist side that other groups also claimed. (For example, King Ajātasattu was claimed by various Upanisads and Jains iirc — likely post-mortem).

If it were extremely essential, esteemed and old, this part would be much more concrete than we find. There should be an actual ‘core’ of textual doctrine intact that is not just a loose narrative theme with varying views, characters and so forth.

Compare this to e.g. the dhammacakka sutta (traditional first sermon). There, we do actually see exactly this idea of a common core being expanded onto play out. Some versions record the first sermon as just the middle way between two extremes. Others include the four noble truths in three turnings. Others add on the analysis of the noble truths in. Then there is the added detail about various deities celebrating the sutta in some, not others; and there is the varying elaborations of Añña Kondañña understanding and becoming a stream-enterer. But there is actual agreed upon core material that is shared and which has been compiled with some variation and occasionally expanded on.

I’m using this as an example. And some may think “of course the traditional Buddhist monastic defends the tradition’s idea of the first sermon rather than the flashy idea that the whole SN is a later scholastic invention.” I’m not saying that the Dhammacakka Sutta is necessarily the first sermon or even recording authentic events; those arguments are irrelevant to the basic pattern which shows us what actual core material being expanded on looks like.

I think DN2 and parallels may very well be an early discourse, and I think it does contain a lot of the very essentials of Early Buddhism — better than starting with the aggregates and 18 elements. But upon analysis, it fits all the criteria of the long collection as an organized “genre”:

• narrative themes essential to the core of the discourse, rather than sheer doctrine
• narratives involving high-profile people to provide esteem, again as essential, inseparable components in the discourse
• refutations of outside views or defence of the very basic buddhist views/training, often with somewhat disorganized and/or inconsistent understandings of outside persons and views

The evidence, again and again, simply shows us that isolating the D, claiming it to be early, and pitting other discourses against its own characteristics to find differences and conclude they are later, is simply not an effective strategy for making chronological claims.

I think the D contains early material, as do the other collections. Clearly a body of material was simply distributed to various collections over time after a certain point, and trying to nitpick dates of doctrine within it always seems to hit a wall after sifting through clear additions and minor details.

[cdpatton]

Well, my experience over the past several years of looking at parallels is that it’s complicated.

So, for example, we have this set of heretical views, which were ascribed inconsistently to a set characters. Were these two lists - a list of heretical views and a list of heretics - originally associated with each other? Myself, I doubt it. Otherwise, as you rightly point out, one would think there wouldn’t be so much confusion about who’s views was which. But all the traditions are in good agreement on the content of the heresies and on the names of the heretics. So, perhaps they were two things that were at some point combined.

We might ask, though, how does that explain the confusion? Surely the two lists were combined for the first time by one author in one text. Then it was propagated into many other texts. Wouldn’t it have been fairly stable instead of confusing one heretic for another?

Well, yes, if it was considered important which heretic believed which heresy. But perhaps it wasn’t so important who believed what. Perhaps it was a first a matter of those other teachers who believed those other things, which was later expressed more specifically with names and particular opinions. If the heretics originally were a group of people who believed heresies without much individuality, assigning specific heresies to them later may have been arbitrary. Unimportant details tend to change from one telling to the next of a story. So, each tradition found itself with a version that was a little different from the others.

This type of redaction of indistinct or summary passages to more verbose and specifically defined ones is a feature of Buddhist textual history. It takes several forms. Sometimes, a single verb or adjective is made more specific (or more general) by adding synonyms to it. Sometimes, a list appears to have originally gone undefined because the parallels all agree on the items but not their interpretations. Sometimes, smaller lists appear to grow in size over time. Which becomes apparent when comparing parallels because they agree closely on the original smaller list but not on the new items that were added to it.

Another issue which has less to do with the text and more to do with us, the modern readers, is that we tend to dismiss stories and myth and fixate on abstract ideas. This is basically the opposite of the ancient human preference for story over ideas. People understood the world through story, through consequences of events that draw out cause and effect, and they saw the world around them through the metaphors and symbols of their stories. It was not until writing and philosophy came to India that the ways of abstract thinking took firm root.

And then, yes, abstract teachings and Platonic ideas became common place. Abhidharma was the primary study material for quite some time, which then gave way to the even more idealized and abstract texts written by Mahayanists. Buddhism passed through the whole spectrum of human thought, but I doubt that the original form that Buddhism took was like Greek philosophy.

But I notice the modern people want it to be. They really do. It reminds me of how people in the West really like the Daodejing, but they are mystified and dismissive of actual Daoism, which is full of gods and quasi-deities, not to mention stuff like ancestor worship and such. Westerners would like to slough off all of that other stuff and just gaze on ideas lifted out of context and culture. There’s nothing wrong with that, per se, but ancient religions weren’t like that. It’s like we want an ancient religion to validate our modern ways of thinking, so we project our modern thinking into them.

[Ceisiwr]

@cdpatton

But I notice the modern people want it to be. They really do. It reminds me of how people in the West really like the Daodejing, but they are mystified and dismissive of actual Daoism, which is full of gods and quasi-deities, not to mention stuff like ancestor worship and such. Westerners would like to slough off all of that other stuff and just gaze on ideas lifted out of context and culture. There’s nothing wrong with that, per se, but ancient religions weren’t like that. It’s like we want an ancient religion to validate our modern ways of thinking, so we project our modern thinking into them.

I quite agree with you here.

[josephzizys]

@cdpatton

But I notice the modern people want it to be. They really do. It reminds me of how people in the West really like the Daodejing, but they are mystified and dismissive of actual Daoism, which is full of gods and quasi-deities, not to mention stuff like ancestor worship and such. Westerners would like to slough off all of that other stuff and just gaze on ideas lifted out of context and culture. There’s nothing wrong with that, per se, but ancient religions weren’t like that. It’s like we want an ancient religion to validate our modern ways of thinking, so we project our modern thinking into them.

Umm… “actual daoism” by which i assume you mean religious daoism emerges hundreds of years later than the philosophical daoism of the Daodejing and the Chuangzi , bot texts where definitly part of literary chinese civilisation in a very philosophically sophisticated way centuries before there is any evidence of them being used as religious texts.

Secondly, “people in the west” aside, it is absolutley credible and reasonable to think that philosophical discourse was every bit as sophisticated in india as in greece as in china in the axial age.

Many great scholars, like the japanese Nakamura, have devoted thier lives to tracing the resonances between these traditions. But you probably think hes corrupted be "western influences "?

As to “sloughing off the other stuff” i have no idea what you mean, I sumply want to understand what was the argument presented.

That doesnt mean i want to ignore other facets, just that i am interested in this facet right now.

Anyway,

[Sasha_A]

@cdpatton

It was not until writing and philosophy came to India that the ways of abstract thinking took firm root.

It seems to me that many people, even well-educated ones, still confuse abstract reasoning with philosophy, not realising that philosophy is about the meaning of the concepts used, both in themselves and in their interrelationship. The presence or absence of a developed philosophy is not determined by the presence of abstract reasoning, but by the presence of a developed coherent and consistent system of views, because without a developed philosophy as a basis, any views are just a set of incoherent pseudo-intellectual or dogmatic statements. To recognise developed philosophy, one must first understand what philosophy is in general, and secondly be able to analyse the views down to the meaning of the basic concepts of the language used to describe them.

Philosophy (love of wisdom in ancient Greek) is a systematic study of general and fundamental questions concerning topics like existence, reason, knowledge, value, mind, and language. It is a rational and critical inquiry that reflects on its own methods and assumptions.

[Vaddha]

@josephzizys

Umm… “actual daoism” by which i assume you mean religious daoism emerges hundreds of years later than the philosophical daoism of the Daodejing and the Chuangzi

Yeah, this idea, which was popular, has been pretty heavily criticized by modern scholars of Daoism and Daoist texts. If you’re interested you’ll be able to find lots of articles and information. But texts like the Zhuangzi and Laozi already make references and allusions to various Daoist biospiritual practices and so forth. It’s not so simple as ‘philosophical’ and ‘religious’ Daoism, but of course there was evolution and adaptation.

Metta

[josephzizys]

Yes i was a little hyperbolic in my statement, i merely meant that daoist texts like the Zhuangzi where accepted as “philospiritual?” Texts by confusions and legalists and all the other “philosospiritual” groups in china, that is they where never exclusivly religious texts.

Similarly with DN1 and DN2, they are obviously texts from a spiritual tradition but, like the upanishads, they engagae in what is obviously philosophical debate, moral nihilism and skepticism, both explicitly discussed in the buddhas day, are still discussed today, and if one wants to have that discussion outsidenof any particular religious tradition it is called “philosophy”.

The idea that discussing ideas on thier merits, common sense, coherence etc, without reliance on any particular tradition is somehow just a cultural or ethnic fashion charecteristic of “the west” is racist, both against the europeans who it is often directed against, but also to the arab, chinese, japanese, sub-continental, etc etc philosophers who it completely ignores.

[josephzizys]

@Vaddha

Compare this to e.g. the dhammacakka sutta (traditional first sermon). There, we do actually see exactly this idea of a common core being expanded onto play out. Some versions record the first sermon as just the middle way between two extremes. Others include the four noble truths in three turnings. Others add on the analysis of the noble truths in. Then there is the added detail about various deities celebrating the sutta in some, not others; and there is the varying elaborations of Añña Kondañña understanding and becoming a stream-enterer. But there is actual agreed upon core material that is shared and which has been compiled with some variation and occasionally expanded on.

I wonder if you could elaborate on what exactly is the “agreed upon core material that is shared” in this case?

With DN2 for example we have, i think, 4 argumnets that are the same and 2 that are different (the substance theory and the jain one)
So our “agreed upon core material” is actually a fair chunck of substantive philosophy, what parts of the dhammachakra remain ?

[Vaddha]

@josephzizys

I wonder if you could elaborate on what exactly is the “agreed upon core material that is shared” in this case?

I should say that the dhammacakka sutta is not the best of examples, because the first sermon is in such a spotlight that the way the details are compiled varies. But, the common core is the teaching of the middle way of the 8fold path between self-mortification and self-indulgence and the four noble truths + three permutations, as well as the narrative arc that these make up the initial teaching of the Buddha to his first five disciples.

These components are found consistently, even if what is considered the ‘first sermon’ constitutes just the first part of the middle way or if it includes the middle way and the four truths. Some parallels have the former, but this core is clear in all parallels as to what its content is. Same for the four truths and three permutations: the actual content is the same across schools, despite differences in arrangement or minor narrative details like when and what Añña Kondañña first understood (which is disagreed upon), or the various deities that exalt the teaching in ascending order.

@josephzizys

With DN2 for example we have, i think, 4 argumnets that are the same and 2 that are different (the substance theory and the jain one)

When comparing not just DN2 and DA27, but also the EA parallel at EA 43.7, I don’t think any match at all. There are some clear similarities, but they all seem different. Purāna Kassapa may be the same, but the EA view reads like he is holding a view of no rebirth as well, as it says there are no arhats. I did a brief comparison. I’d be interested to see a more detailed analysis of the characters and the specific views of each parallel.

I don’t think DN 2 is particularly ‘inauthentic’ or exceptional, just that it proves generally no less reliable or fallible than the other established EBT material on average. But of the other EBT material, there is stuff that seems more solid than, e.g. DN 2. And therefore attributing it and the other similar discourses special chronological importance doesn’t make a lot of sense to me.

You can also look at just the characters. DN 2 assumes that a famous, wealthy aristocrat would be informed of the Buddha who already had a large community and good reputation across territories. The dhammacakka sutta presents him as a lone forest ascetic teaching a huddle of other ascetics his realization. Of course, there are narrative reasons for each of these cases that one cannot assume at sheer face value, but there is a certain degree of actual plausibility about which would make sense to necessitate a later date than the other. What I mean is that the Buddha being an ascetic in the woods teaching a small group about a meditative path could be a later portrayal, but it could also be an accurate early depiction as it claims. The portrayal in DN 2 does not claim to be of him early on, nor could it be.

Mettā—