I would agree! Perhaps you could labour over the weekend on this?
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Yes, sir! 
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As a leg-up, I note from Ven Analayo’s analysis of the “kāya” in the jhana similes , he distinguishes it from the adverbial sense carried by kāyena. This was from one of his lectures on the MA.
He interprets it adnominally. I wonder if he would entertain the reflexive pronominal sense I suggest, ie "he saturates etc himself with the…"
or the more heretical alternative of the nominal “acquisition of self”.
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Looking at my own experience, for example when doing metta, the mental and physical pleasures are distinct; there is the mental pleasure from metta, and the physical pleasure of relaxation that seems to be an effect of the metta practice.
And besides, how is it possible to let go of the body if one relies on it for pleasure? That just don’t make sense to me.[quote=“frankk, post:197, topic:2589”]
SN 36.31 gives a good idea of how sukha vedana and piti in jhana breaks down in mental or physical type of pleasure.
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If you assume that the pleasure of jhana is physical first, and then read SN 36.31, you can say that “the physical pleasure of jhana is spiritual rapture.”
But if you look at the text:
[…] tactile objects cognizable by the body that are desirable, lovely, agreeable, pleasing, sensually enticing, tantalizing. These are the five cords of sensual pleasure. The rapture that arises in dependence on these five cords of sensual pleasure: this is called carnal rapture.
A simpler reading is just that a pleasure that is “cognizable by the body” is carnal pleasure. When you have descriptions like “full body orgasm”, doesn’t that seem carnal rather than spiritual?
Anyway, let’s not make any assumptions about what type of pleasure the pleasure in jhana is, and just look at the suttas.
[AN 6.63] And what is the cause by which sensuality comes into play? Contact is the cause by which sensuality comes into play. And what is the diversity in sensuality? […] sensuality with regard to tactile sensations […] And what is the cessation of sensuality? From the cessation of contact is the cessation of sensuality […]
What is this contact?
[MN 148] Dependent on the body & tactile sensations there arises consciousness at the body. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition there is feeling.
So, when the meeting of the body, tactile sensations and bodily consciousness ceases (= cessation of contact) this leads to the cessation of sensuality.
If you are feeling a feeling in the body, you have to have contact. If you have contact (with any of the five senses), sensuality - whatever it is - has not ceased.
Please note that this line of reasoning does not depend on the meaning of sensuality at all. So whether you take sensuality to mean the five senses, or the lust/desire for the five senses, or something else, that has only ceased if there is no coming together of the sense base, the sense object and the sense consciousness (not including mind).
There’s also DN 9 and AN 9.31 which says the perception of sensuality has stopped in the first jhana. According to AN 6.63 again, there are six types of perception, where the perception of tactile sensations are one them.
Whatever a perception of sensuality is, the cause for it being gone must be due to a lack of contact:
[AN 6.63] And what is the cessation of perception? From the cessation of contact is the cessation of perception
So to me, it seems like the cause for the things that happen in first jhana is this lack of contact with the five senses.
The things we don’t have contact with, basically don’t exist experientially, as far as I know. And of course, you cannot have any lust or desire for something you cannot feel or perceive.
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The crux of the issue indeed! (Notwithstanding the report on “imameva kāyaṃ” as adverbial or adnominal.)
I’d posit that the Dhātu chapter of the Saṃyutta (SN 14) sheds light on this.
Namely, I suggest that the sequences in SN 14 lend us an opportunity for greater precision here.
First let’s look at how the chapter begins by looking at the culmination of the sequence in the first of two pentads that comprise the first of four subchapters:
[SN 14.4 Vedanā-nānatta]
In dependence on the eye element (cakkhudhātu) there arises eye-contact (cakkhusamphassa);
in dependence on eye-contact there arises feeling born of eye-contact. (cakkhusamphassajā v.)
…
In dependence on the mind element there arises mind-contact;
in dependence on mind-contact there arises feeling born of mind-contact.
Compare this with the culmination of the much longer sequence in the second pentad:
[SN 14.9 Bāhira-phassa-nānatta]
In dependence on the form element (rūpadhātu) there arises perception of form (rūpasaññā);
in dependence on perception of form there arises intention regarding form (rūpasaṅkappa);
in dependence on intention regarding form there arises contact with form (rūpasamphassa);
in dependence on contact with form there arises feeling born of c. w. f. (rūpasamphassaja v.);
in dependence on feeling born of contact with form there arises desire for form; (rūpacchanda)
in dependence on desire for form there arises passion for form; (rūpapariḷāha)
in dependence on passion for form there arises the quest for form; (rūpapariyesana)
in dependence on the quest for form there arises the gain of form (rūpalābha) ….
…
in dependence on the quest for mental phenomena there arises the gain of mental phenomena.
I’ve bolded contact in the two sequences to show how the second sequence appears to be an expansion of the first sequence before and after contact.
Now here is where I beg the question: what is the difference between the two terms “feeling born of body-contact” (kāyasamphassajā vedanā) and “feeling born of contact with tactility” (phoṭṭhabbasamphassaja vedanā)?
Holding the question I’d point to a couple more interesting selections coming now from the second subchapter:
[SN 14.12 Sa-nidāna]
Bhikkhus, sensual thought (vitakka) arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of ill will arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of harming arises with a source, not without a source.
And how is this so?
In dependence on the sensuality element (kāmadhātu) there arises sensual perception;
in dependence on sensual perception (kāmasaññā) there arises sensual intention;
in dependence on sensual intention (kāmasaṅkappa) there arises sensual desire;
in dependence on sensual desire (kāmachanda) there arises sensual passion;
in dependence on sensual passion (kāmapariḷāha) there arises a sensual quest.
Engaged in a sensual quest, the uninstructed worldling conducts himself wrongly in three ways—with body, speech, and mind.
…
Bhikkhus, thought of renunciation arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of non-ill will arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of harmlessness arises with a source, not without a source.
And how is this so?
In dependence on the renunciation element there arises perception of renunciation;
in dependence on perception of renunciation there arises intention of renunciation;
in dependence on intention of renunciation there arises desire for renunciation;
in dependence on desire for renunciation there arises passion for renunciation;
in dependence on passion for renunciation there arises a quest for renunciation.
Engaged in a quest for renunciation, the instructed noble disciple conducts himself rightly in three ways—with body, speech, and mind.
…
Now, the translation of pariḷāha here as “passion” obfuscates the potential connection between the sequence there and the sequence in the oft-overlooked Bhikkhunupassaya Sutta where the same word is rendered as “fever”.
[SN 47.10]
Here, Ānanda, a bhikkhu dwells contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful, having removed covetousness and displeasure in regard to the world. While he is contemplating the body in the body, there arises in him, based on the body,
either a fever in the body (kāyasmiṃ pariḷāho)
or sluggishness of mind,
or the mind is distracted outwardly.
That bhikkhu should then direct his mind towards some inspiring sign.
When he directs his mind towards some inspiring sign, gladness is born.
When he is gladdened, rapture is born.
When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil.
One tranquil in body experiences happiness.
The mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated.
Moving on:
[SN 14.13]
Bhikkhus, in dependence on [this mighty] element [of ignorance (avijjādhātu)] there arises a perception, there arises a view (diṭṭhi), there arises a thought.
…
In dep. on an inferior/middling/superior (hīnaṃ/majjhimaṃ/paṇītaṃ) element there arises
inferior/middling/superior perception,
inferior/middling/superior view,
inferior/middling/superior thought,
inferior/middling/superior volition (cetanā),
inferior/middling/superior longing (patthanā),
inferior/middling/superior wish (paṇidhi),
inferior/middling/superior person (puggala),
inferior/middling/superior speech (vācā).
He explains, teaches, proclaims, establishes, discloses, analyses, and elucidates the inferior/middling/superior. His rebirth, I say, is inferior/middling/superior.
Here we see a classification scheme for the elements that’s quite distinct and has a bearing on the rebirth destinations of individuals. I mention it to say that the suttas overall appear to slice up the elements in a variety of ways. Given that the elements are placed at the fore of the causal sequences, I again beg the question:
Does this and the surrounding five admittedly stock doctrinal assertions really cover the elements in exhaustive manner?
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in partial answer to Erik and Sylvester, Dhatu Samyutta was what i had in mind also of the most promising suttas to help untangle whether piti, sukha, pamojja, upekkha, adukkham-asukum-vedana are mental, physical, or both.
one of the suttas in indriya samyutta is particularly helpful in clearly identifying that vedana has both physical and mental aspects.
Sylvester, that sutta you can see why i translate somanassa as I do, is not to try to capture a perfect idiomatic sense, but to clearly distinguish whether piti, sukha, etc, are mental or physical.
to everyone who directly asked me a question, i may be slow, very slow, to respond. i’ve already spent way too much time on dhamma discussion, going beyond my daily quota, and need to force myself to scale back.
edit: (addition, comment to Sylvester) i know 3rd jhana doesn’t say somanassa. but the fact that somanassa is used in the samisa sukha sets up the dichotomy there, meaning “sukha” in samisa and nira-misa take on the sukha-indriyam (physical pleasure definition) of SN 48.36.
If we take sukha in 3rd jhana definition to be “sukha vedana”, sukha vedana contains both sukhindriyam and somanass-indriyam, and then the Buddha specified “sukhan ca kayena patisamvedeti” to emphasize that he’s talking about sukha-indriyam (phsyical pleasure) that is still part of 3rd jhana.
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yes! you can distinguish the mental and physical source. and in the gradual training you have four jhanas to phase out involvement with the physical body.
if you start relying on the hedonistic pleasure of bodily sensations to sustain sukha and piti, then it changes into a 5 cord of sense pleasure fueled meditation, and becomes wrong jhana, wrong concentration.
but if you’re maintaining the metta mental source fuel, or any other nekhhamma/kusula/wholesome/renunciation based fuel, and happen to notice sounds, pleasurable bodily sensations, that’s blameless side effect physical pleasure, no problem with enjoying that in the first jhana.
that’s the buddha’s key insight, in contrast to the imperturbable attainemnts he learned from his 2 teachers, and the 6 years of austerity. there’s no reason to fear the physical pleasure of first jhana. and if merely cutting off contact from 5 sense objects was the answer, he’d already learned that from his 2 teachers. why did he reject that samadhi? blind men, deaf men, and babies through lack of contact could claim some kind of enlightenment.
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i hadn’t looked carefully at the pali for that sutta yet. what should i pay special attention to?
Hi Frank. I’m trying to locate the source for your physical/mental dichotomy. If you were not thinking of SN 36.6, perhaps it’s from SN 48.36? That would have been the next sutta I would actually have turned to, to argue that it does not speak of physical feeling but hedonic tone.
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Would you be outraged by my very pedestrian suggestion that both the internal sense base and its corresponding external sense base collectively constitute one sense base? See how the former is defined in eg SN 56.14, and how sense base (āyatana) is defined in SN 12.2. In fact, in MN 137, the analysis of the six sense bases (saḷāyatanavibhaṅga) quickly opens up to a discussion of the internal and external sense bases.
If I am correct, then there is no difference between the 2 types of feeling above.
I think the point of SN 14.4 and SN 14.9 is to point to the absolute dependency on both the internal and external sense bases for contact to come to be. Here, I’m taking dhātu to refer to each of the internal and external āyatanas.
Pls don’t be too outraged. 
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This is indeed the reading to overcome and I would definitely concede that a cogent case has not been formed to the alternative and that the onus is on forming such a case. Consider it an appeal for consideration of forming one.
And to continue the appeal, I would posit that working out a distinction between the internal and external of the heretical & outrageous kind (
) may yet have the advantage of tying together some loose ends. A prime example of such would be in being able to parse what’s going on here:
[MN 121 Cūḷa-suññata]
‘atthi cevidaṃ asuññataṃ yadidaṃ—imameva kāyaṃ paṭicca saḷāyatanikaṃ jīvitapaccayā’ti.
There is present only this non-voidness, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.
So the language here with the caveat of taking the translation at face value seems to be indicating that of the sixfold base, there’s some subset that’s “dependent on this body”. And if we parse the Pali I think we would have it that the stuff that is cevidaṃ asuññataṃ is namely saḷāyatanikaṃ that is imameva kāyaṃ paṭicca which is jīvitapaccayā.
So here we might have it that the saḷāyatanikaṃ that is “imameva kāyaṃ paṭicca” is some subset of the saḷāyatana. Whether we say this corresponds with the internal is something I’d prefer not to venture into, but it’s what I’ve got at the moment.
(Here again contingent on findings regarding “imameva kāyaṃ”. Forthcoming I promise. 
)
And just to quickly sketch a salient example of one possible distinct reading, I think there’s a possibility to say that the internal sense base usually includes forms that are of the external elements. Namely, that the practice is to initially divest one’s nāmarūpa-kāya, aka internal sense bases, of the external elements by focussing and burning them away at the internal sense base. Focussing on the external sense base would then be the internal acquisition of external elements tending towards more fuel for birth and suffering.
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Hee hee. Let’s try another outrageously pedestrian reading for kāya, dependant on which the sense bases arise.
I can assume that regardless how one parses rūpa (form or physical form?), there’s no disagreeing that the arūpa is definitely without a manomaya body, let alone a physical (oḷārika) body.
Isn’t it quite easy to take the pedestrian interpretation that for an arūpa being, its kāya that is the paccaya for the sense base would be nothing more than DN 9’s arūpa attapaṭilābha?
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I would concur. Made of pure perception (saññāmayo), perceptions from the sixfold base which are of the consciousness element. 
With internal sense bases divested of external elements, and decidedly even divested of internal elements. Consisting only of the consciousness element and equanimity.
I would want to further posit that first jhana would then be complete divestment, withdrawal, relinquishment of the internal sense bases from external elements.
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Thanks Frank. This was the point I have been waiting for you to raise. It appears to be the mainstay of those who argue that sukha is a feeling rooted in a physical sense base, given that SN 48.36 uses the adjective kāyika to describe sukha. But first, a clarification, if you do not mind.
You say -
If we take sukha in 3rd jhana definition to be “sukha vedana”, sukha vedana contains both sukhindriyam and somanass-indriyam,
What exactly do you mean by “contain”? Presumably, you’re thinking of SN 48.38?
Now, coming to the substantive bit of your proposition -
i know 3rd jhana doesn’t say somanassa. but the fact that somanassa is used in the samisa sukha sets up the dichotomy there, meaning “sukha” in samisa and nira-misa take on the sukha-indriyam (physical pleasure definition) of SN 48.36.
I propose not to examine sukha, as it is a great deal more difficult to tease apart sukha from somanassa; as a hint, think of the last time you were happy about a pleasant memory, and then when you were equanimous about that same pleasant memory.
Instead, I will look at the dukkha indriya and how it is distinguished from the domanassa indriya. For simplicity, I’ll drop the term indriya, and just look at dukkha and domanassa.
The most well-know example of this dukkha and domanassa dichotomy would be SN 36.6. That sutta refers to the 2 types of feelings like two darts. It uses the same predication used in SN 48.36 to describe the 2 types of feeling, namely kāyika and cetasika.
While it does not say that cetasika dukkha is domanassa, it does use this pericope for domanassa/grief -
socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati
he sorrows, grieves and laments; he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught (per BB)
So, clearly, SN 36.6 also follows the SN 48.36 typology in putting dukkha into 2 distinct baskets, the kāyika and the cetasika.
Now, the interesting question would be - can the mind, when contacting mental data give rise to painful kāyika feeling, or must the mind experience only painful cetasika feeling? This is what MN 148 posits (abriged to the anusayas and the consequences) -
Bhikkhus, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; with contact as condition there arises a feeling felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one delights in it, welcomes it, and remains holding to it, then the underlying tendency to lust lies within one. When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one sorrows, grieves and laments, weeps beating one’s breast and becomes distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion lies within one. When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one does not understand as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to ignorance lies within one…
Ditto for the other 4 “physical” senses
Dependent on the mind and dhammas, mind-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; with contact as condition there arises a feeling felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one delights in it, welcomes it, and remains holding to it, then the underlying tendency to lust lies within one. When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one sorrows, grieves and laments, weeps beating one’s breast and becomes distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion lies within one. When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one does not understand as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to ignorance lies within one…
(per BB)
To make it clear that the dukkha/ painful feeling above is not a cetasika dukkha, the sutta continues -
Dependent on the mind and dhammas mind-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; with contact as condition there arises a feeling felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one does not delight in it, welcome it, and remain holding to it, then the underlying tendency to lust does not lie within one. When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one does not sorrow, grieve and lament, does not weep beating one’s breast and become distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion does not lie within one. When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one understands as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to ignorance does not lie within one.
So, you see, the mind is more than equipped to contact the dukkha indriya as a mental phenomenon. Kāyika feelings therefore include feelings engendered at the mind,
Why the heck are the sukha and dukkha indriyas called kāyika? I would say why not? If we get pass our own predilection for reading kāyika to mean “of the physical body” and go back to its most basic meaning in connection with a “heap”, then it becomes so easy to read the kāya in kāyika as “the (entire) heap of sense faculties”, while cetasika is contrasted as “(only) the mind-faculty”.
Which brings me to the thought experiment. When confronting an unpleasant memory, do you necessarily grieve?
If all that the mind feels are cetasika feelings, there would be no point to sense restraint of the mind in this pericope -
Having cognized a mental phenomenon with the mind, a bhikkhu does not grasp its marks and features. Since, if he left the mind faculty unrestrained, bad unwholesome states of longing and dejection might invade him, he practices restraint over it; he guards the mind faculty, he undertakes the restraint of the mind faculty.
The kāyika feeling at the mind is inexorable; the cetasika feeling is optional.
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A few quotes:
An 3.101, iddhis description: He dives in and out of the earth as if it were water. He walks on water without sinking as if it were dry land.
Vinaya (Pr 1): It would be good, Master, if I inverted the earth, so that the monks might enjoy the nutritive essence of the water-plants.”
“But what will you do with those creatures, Moggallāna, who are supported by the earth?”
“Master, I will make one of my hands broad, like the great earth,and I will make those creatures who are supported by the earth go there. Then with the other hand I will invert the earth.
AN 8.30: Then the Blessed One, realizing with his awareness the line of thinking in Ven. Anuruddha’s awareness — just as a strong man might extend his flexed arm or flex his extended arm — disappeared from among the Bhaggas in the Deer Park at Bhesakala Grove, near Crocodile Haunt, and re-appeared among the Cetis in the Eastern Bamboo Park, right in front of Ven. Anuruddha. There he sat down on a prepared seat.
I thought we were discussing in general the possibility of a connection between mental and bodily phenomena. It seems to me that it is a triviality that bodily contact can arise as a consequence of mental phenomena. First I decide to take that glass of water and then as a result a contact between my finger and the glass arises. In a plausible scenario, mental activity translates as a bodily feeling through inner processes. That does not mean that the mind feels the body or the body feels the mind. If there was no connection whatsoever, body and mind would be completely separate, which is obviously not the case. Or am I misunderstanding your point?
Not necessarily. Saying there is a cause-consequence relationship between bodily and mental phenomena (which seems obvious to me) is not the same as saying the mind “cognizes” the body or vice versa.
Are you therefore saying that ALL mental states are mere epiphenomena of physiology (be it neurology or immunology)?
I don’t know about this, and it’s certainly not my point.
We agree on this
I would rather think it is not the case. It seems to me that the kāma refers to contacts that trigger raga (or sometimes dosa) in other words it is connected with samisa vedana. The bodily contacts that would be present in the jhanas would be connected to niramisa vedana, so there would be tactility-born pleasure that would not be part of kāma.
Well, that is still not so clear as far as I am concerned. And it sounds… improbable.
But does the presence of “imameva” in “imameva kāyaṃ” not already prove that kāya is to be understood adnominally? Is there any case of ayaṃ referring to an adverb?
Where does this expression occur in the EBTs?
Seriously, I don’t understand anything to the points you are making above. Would you indulge me and improve their clarity with more detailed explanations? After reading this, I still think the mind feels both kayika and cetasika vedana and I don’t see how this means that sukha cannot be physical. Perhaps you can enlighten me?
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[details=…] @Sylvester
I might frame it that the decidedly kāyika pītisukha that Frank mentions does not always engender cetasika sukha.
Eg: Aggisutta SN 46.53
I would also posit that what we colloquially take as mental, eg memories, are also decidedly of the four great physical dynamics.
[/details]
It seems that it’s usually/always in abbreviation.
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So we find ourselves to be riders of the lost expression 
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I think you mean “elission”? Yup. Tucked away in the elided peyyalas.
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Then you have understood my point, which is the same position as yours. It is however different from Frank’s point that kāyika is exclusively "physical ". That was the point I was belabouring.
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In my current view I regard it as due diligence. While I’m not certain of your exact question here and the acuity to look it up eludes me at the moment, I think if the ever-transitivity of the four jhāna verbs (abhisandeti et. al.) can be demonstrated, it provides an extra leg to stand on.