What do you think about Ven Thanissaro’s view on Nibbāna?

Just to comment here that this is going beyond explicit statements about the limits of conventional language by the Buddha. I posted earlier from Snp 5.7:

If you say ‘the thing left over’ you have contradicted this passage IMO. Here’s another more explicit passage as well:

An 4.173
“Reverend, when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, does something else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

“Does nothing else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

“Do both something else and nothing else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

“Do neither something else nor nothing else exist?”

“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”

So the parinibbana of an arahant does not allow saying there is something left beyond the khandas.

IMO, this passage also contradicts the position posited by Ven @Sunyo since in that position there should be no problem saying ‘nothing else exists after.’

Personally to me it looks like a debate between two explicitly rejected views like @josephzizys mentioned earlier.

The parinibbana of an arahant is like a black hole. Beyond the event horizon there is literally nothing whatsoever that can be stated. Silence is the only option.

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Hullow again dear @Javier,

First, and most important, I feel like I made a friend here. I feel like I know a lot about what really matters to you, and I can’t say that of some of my “real life” friends. So that is cool. :slight_smile:

As I said, I was in doubt whether to post my last reply, because it felt I was addressing the wrong thing. I couldn’t really find the right words. Now, emotions and values aren’t unrelated, but, yes, value is better than emotion. I think that’s what I meant, anyway, but you seem to have a more well-defined idea of what a value is than I do. I’m happy you saw what I was really getting at despite the word ‘emotion’. I get the feeling you studied like philosophy or something, but just so you know, I did the exact opposite (engineering, lol), and my English vocabulary also isn’t the greatest. :wink: Thanks for explaining some of the terms, I like learning.

Yes, it’s been nice this discussion. I’m getting something out of it, looking at myself and seeing how you think, and learning how to address it in a courteous way (I try). I live in a monastery where we all have the same idea about nibbāna, and while that is great (no arguments!), the interaction you get with other views is usually through books, so the personal dimension isn’t there. In a way I’m exploiting you, by the way. I’ll be giving a workshop on nibbāna soon, and I’ll keep some of the things you said in mind when we address what we call “myths” about it. This gives some of them a personal touch for me, which is helpful. Because people in the audience will also have such views and I don’t want to be too insensitive, you know. :wink:

I was hoping we were winding things down, but your reply is quite long. :smiley: It’s very interesting though, I read it with a big smile. I’ll try to address most of it, but my writing style will suffer, because I do want to do finish it within a certain timeframe. I’ll be responding on the fly, basically. I hope you understand. :slight_smile: Even though your reply deserves better.

Anyway,

Of course I’ve also created values and emotions about this! In a sense that is exactly what I’m trying to get across, that cessationism can also be seen as something beautiful, something inspiring and emotionally uplifting. Because that is what you didn’t seem to see, and you were basing your reasoning on that. To simplify, I felt you sort of argued along the lines of, “There can’t be value in cessationism, therefore it can’t be what the Buddha taught.” But when I read the Buddha speaking of “the shelter”, I’m like WOW that is really a cool shelter! So there can be value in it, at least from a certain individual’s perspective.

(I’ll get back to values later, though, and I’ll say something which may seem like the opposite. Because this is just one way of looking at it. Hint: I don’t think things have inherent value.)

That is to say, I don’t think that only cessationalism is a candidate for a view that could be mistaken for annihilation.

I still find it unlikely that continuitism would be so mistaken, unless it was very poorly taught. But could we agree it at least more likely that cessationism would?

it’s dynamic […] It’s not something that you already have […] it’s something you attain […]

I see differences with the brahmin atman here, so that’s illuminating. But am I right, it’s changing and something that comes to be? That doesn’t align well with how the Buddha described the goal, as something stable and not created and so forth. Also, I never heard of this view before, so pardon my ignorance. I did assume until now that it was somewhat like the permanent mind ideas.

But the text says he found it, not that “I will find it when I die”.

He found it, but he hadn’t reached it yet. We can find a destination before we reach it, of course. When he said he found it, it means he understood it, and he knew it was going to happen.

By the way, the Buddha didn’t come right out and say that nibbana is non-existence either. So, your view also has some 'splaining to do.

Let me do that, then. We have “nibbāna is the cessation of existence” (technically not spoken by the Buddha but by others). It isn’t called “non-existence” per se because nibbāna refers primarily to the event of cessation rather than the resultant state. Because the extinguishment of a flame is an event too. Nibbāna is just a metaphorical synonym for cessation. Most people nowadays only call the result of this event nibbāna, but in the suttas that’s not the primary meaning.

Regardless, event or result, if we say “nibbāna is the cessation of existence”, the effective idea is the same. Which is that existence comes to an end. And I of course read this as all existence. So to me this is a pretty clear statement on what the goal is, what nibbāna is.

And nibbana is also just one word for the goal, a metaphorical one at that. Just simply “the cessation of existence” by itself (without “nibbana is”) already describes the goal, and this is repeated allover, especially in SN12. Likewise with the cessation of the five aggregates, of the six senses, nāmarūpa and consciousness, the six elements, the sensual, form, and formless, and so forth. Because I don’t posit anything beyond any of these groups, all talks on their cessation boil down to the same thing: the cessation of existence.

And because there is nothing beyond them, just saying “these things cease” is enough to explain nibbāna completely. The Buddha didn’t need to say anything more, because there isn’t anything more! That’s why the Buddha is always extremely clear to me. His fundamental ideas are all over the place.

But for your view, every time you read such statements on cessation, there is a “disclaimer” attached which says, “there’s still this pure awareness outside of the aggregates, six senses, and so forth”. The Buddha doesn’t tend to mention this though, certainly not very explicitly!

What’s more, every time the Buddha mentions the aggregates to be suffering, for example, I don’t have to think “but he leaves unmentioned this thing which is not suffering”. To me, suttas like the Dhammacakkappavattana, Aditta, and Anattalakkhana are all complete. Because they mention the aggregates/senses to be suffering. That says all I need to know about existence and the end of suffering. I don’t have to rely on a few references here and there. Do you see where I’m coming from?

And that’s the way the Buddha’s teachings should be, because nowadays we have the whole canon digitally and many other resources. But in the time of the Buddha you’d be lucky to hear a few discourses. So he had to make sure he conveyed the whole message as often as possible, not leaving out the essentials (like a pure being) only for occasional mentions. Of course, people also got right view after hearing teachings where no special awareness is spoken of.

Again, I think the Buddha was a very lousy teacher if he actually taught continuitism. I could have done a better job myself, let alone you.

Is your daily sense consciousness infinite or limitless?

No, but infinite or limitless consciousness is one of the formless states. And it is an aspect of the mind, hence it falls under mano-viññāṇa.

with a limitless mind […] So, it seems we can have a limitless mind unattached from consciousness. This seems to support a reading where there are different ontological forms of mind/consciousness.

Meaning “mind set free”, according to the PTS dictionary. It’s just another way to state that the mind is no longer attached to things. It doesn’t mean that it is something apart from them. (If I remember that’s also how the commentary explains it, but it’s been a while.)

We spoke about these claims by Bhikkhu Bodhi already. I haven’t changed my mind since, but I’ll watch that video later. I will grant you that it is some of the harder to rebuke evidence in favor of your view, which is probably why Bhikkhu Bodhi, whom I admire, sticks to that and not vinnana anidassana and so forth that other teachers bring up. (Unless he does mention it in the talk, which would be sort of disappointing.)

I can understand you not buying the emotional/ontological distinction I made with reference to some of these terms, but then there’s another option. Because I can also talk about a “sphere” of absence, a “state” of non-existence, a “realm” of nothingness, and all that doesn’t sound particularly odd to me. What “sphere” means is qualified by what follows, namely absence. And that is exactly how it is in the Ud8.1 on the āyatana, which is followed by a long list of things NOT being there, and nothing that is there.

It’s basically the spiritual form of suicide.

This term seems overly negative since it’s colored with people’s emotional ideas. Perhaps “spiritual euthanasia” would make it a bit less laden; or better, “spiritual voluntary end of life”. I myself don’t take it the wrong way, though, and I’ll go with it. I have no negative bias toward the word myself. So let’s say it is spiritual suicide, even though I’d never call it that myself.

Then there is still a huge difference. And that’s because there is no self to kill. People who are suicidal have a very strong sense of self. As you say, they have “the desire to annihilate themselves, to bring all their pain to an end”. To me, it’s only suffering that comes to an end and it’s nothing to do with “me”. So no, the logic is actually completely different. I have no personal interest in ending existence, it’s just what naturally happens if I let go of desire. So there is another thing that separates my view from suicide other than rebirth, and it is a very important thing.

But I also still don’t agree with your argument that rebirth makes no difference. It does, because the amount of suffering that ends is millions times greater. As the Buddha said: “Bhikkhus, this saṁsara is without discoverable beginning. […] Just that [knowledge] is enough to experience revulsion towards all formations, enough to become dispassionate towards them, enough to be liberated from them.” The ontological outcome of cessationism versus one-lifetime suicide is perhaps the same (we’re speaking hypothetically!), but its emotional value is measured against that of the antithesis. Cessation after one life is not very emotionally “rewarding”, because one life, especially if it’s a good and healthy life like I hope you have, may not be considered that bad. But cessation after “undiscoverable” many lives is very much more emotionally valuable, because the amount of suffering is compounded, and it’s not at all fun to do the same thing all over “again and again” as the Buddha said, even if it were a good life.

We argued before why cessationism isn’t annihilism, that it is the self view that’s makes the difference. Let’s keep that in mind. I prefer not to mix annihilism with nihilism though, because the latter has all sorts of meanings. In the Buddha’s times what is sometimes translated as “nihilism” was not believing in kamma for example. That’s not what we call “nihilism” nowadays. And even nowadays the word has many meanings, as you’ll probably know. So I won’t say whether my views are nihilistic or not, because that’s too vague a term to me. Also, like suicide, it just has too much of an emotional burden for people, to the extent that just calling someone a nihilist is already considered to be an argument sometimes. :smiley: (Luckily this discussion is not of that nature.) Perhaps define nihilism more clearly, and I can say what I think.

I can answer the extinction button thought-experiment, though. That’s a fun one! The answer is, I don’t know if I would press that button, and I don’t feel I would be logically forced to either. Because since there is no self, it also doesn’t really matter if suffering continues. Yeah, it’s suffering, but it’s like the rock in front of my hut: it’s just another thing in nature. Me not pressing the button is like paccekabuddhas didn’t start teaching. Why didn’t they? I think because it didn’t really matter to “them” if self-less aggregates kept continuing. :slight_smile: (Including their own, by the way. But it’s just natural that if seen as suffering, they can’t possibly continue.)

Now, I think cessation is a cool idea, and I can make it valuable to me. But in reality non-existence and existence both have no value, because there’s no-one to whom it applies.

Because what is value really? To me it’s a construct of the mind, not something intrinsic in the universe or in anything in itself. Value is what we give to things. Because it’s a mental construct to me, that’s exactly why I mixed it up with “emotion”, I hope you understand now.

However, nibbana is still emotionally positive. Because it’s still suffering coming to an end. If suffering is understood, it is a natural inclination of the mind (called disillusionment/fading away) to move away from it. Nibbana doesn’t need to have any intrinsic value for that to happen.

What I meant is, cessationalism is an extremely rare view in the history of religions, I dare say it is a unique view.

Exactly!!! :smiley: Yes! YES. The Buddha was a genius. As I said, he wouldn’t have had to discover things for himself if he believed in continuism. But he did have to, because nobody else had awoken to the truth, so nobody could teach him. Even though his society was extremely spiritual with all sorts of views. That’s why the Buddha had to teach “things not heard before”. The dhamma is indeed truly deep, difficult to see.

I don’t get how this would be an argument against my view, I think it heavily in favor of it, considering also what the Buddha himself said about few beings crossing over the river, most just walking down the bank.

Well, I don’t think that the nibbanic awareness that I accept is “holding on to awareness”. It’s precisely an awareness that has completely let go of all things, even sense consciousness, and even itself.

But that’s not the statement. The question is not are you holding on to it, but is it WORTH (alaṃ) holding onto? (Note: others may translate alaṃ differently, so you could argue the Buddha never posed this. I’ll just give you that. But I think that’s what he’s saying.)

This nibbanic awareness is something like the appatiṭṭha viññāṇa (unestablished consciousness or consciousness without barriers) of SN 22.87 that Mara could not find. It’s like the consciousness that is “unestablished, not coming to growth, nongenerative, liberated. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content…” (SN 22.53). It is similar to the anissita viññāṇa that the devas cannot find in MN 22: “When a mendicant’s mind was freed like this, the gods together with Indra, Brahmā, and the Progenitor, search as they may, will not discover: ‘This is what the Realized One’s consciousness depends on.’ Why is that? Because even in the present life the Realized One is not found, I say.” Thus, here we have a kind of consciousness that does not depend on anything.

Furthermore, this nibbanic awareness is similar to the unsupported consciousness that does not land on anything

I’ll send you a PM later with a draft paper explaining what I think this all means.

Similarly, nibbana is described as something that can be directly known (e.g. MN1), but can one “directly know” non-existence?

Yes. But not in the moment itself. It’s like the Buddha not having reached the destination yet, but being able to see it. Because he understood how existence is dependently originated and how it will cease when the conditions are no longer present. It goes deeper than that, since it’s not just a theory, and they have also seen the mind cease temporarily already. Coming back after that cessation, they have “directly known” what it is like.

I also want to say that even though I use terms like consciousness and awareness, this nibbanic experience is radically different than what we call “consciousness” in everyday speech, since it is contentless, unestablished, limitless, not suffering, and so on. Thus, even though it is a kind of subtle experience, it is only in a metaphorical or very loose sense that I say it’s a “consciousness.”

That doesn’t make sense to me. If there is an experience, there must be some sort of awareness or consciousness. How can you experience something without awareness? Perhaps this is just trying to fit a specific view in with the suttas, which mention the cessation of consciousness and so forth. What is the ontological difference between experience and awareness? To me it’s just different words for the same thing. A bit of the equivocators’ “I don’t say it’s this, I don’t say it’s that. I don’t say it’s so, I don’t say it’s not so.” (DN1) That is what it feels like. No offense meant at all. I just don’t understand it! :slight_smile:

I’ll end with this. (MN60, my translation, so check some others too. Added some brackets with my opinions.)

“Householders, there are some renunciants and brahmins who have the doctrine and view that there is no complete cessation of existence. [=continuitism] And there are some renunciants and brahmins whose doctrine directly contradicts this, saying that there is a complete cessation of existence. [=cessationism] Householders, tell me what you think. Don’t these doctrines directly contradict each other?”

“Yes, sir.”

“A clever person reflects on this as follows: ‘Some say there is a complete cessation of existence, but I have not seen so. Others say that there no complete cessation of existence, but I have not seen so either. As long as I don’t know and see, it would be inappropriate for me to take one side and declare that it is the only truth and other ideas are mistaken. If those who say there is no complete cessation of existence are correct, it is possible I will be guaranteed a rebirth among the formless gods consisting of perception. But if those who say that there is a complete cessation of existence are correct, it is possible I will get extinguished in this very life. The view of those who say there is no complete cessation of existence is close to desire, attachment, enjoyment, clinging, and taking up. But the view of those who say there is a complete cessation of existence is close to desirelessness, non-attachment, non-enjoyment, freedom from clinging, and freedom from taking up.’ After reflecting like this, they practice just [! (eva)] for disillusionment towards existence, for loss of desire for existence, and for the cessation of existence.”

Now, I’ll let you have the final word, then after that I can hopefully pinpoint our difference and summarize my thoughts for you to respond to, so we can finish this as nicely as it started. (Unless you already see the main disgreements, then perhaps you can summarize them.)

I know I skipped a few arguments, sorry 'bout that. Perhaps one day in the future I’ll come back to this. There were also some philosophers you mentioned that I didn’t know of, and I didn’t want to assume to understand what they were teaching. Hence I didn’t reply to those bits.

PS. “Like the monks who committed suicide after practicing death contemplation.” They did body contemplation, I belief. The difference is perhaps interesting, but let’s not get into it. I find it quite an unbelievable story anyway, if you’re referring to the one in the Vinaya. At least it’s highly exaggerated there for dramatic effect, I’d say. Anyway.

Thanks for the nice exchange. :slight_smile:

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Just wanted to chime in and agree with @Preston 's agreement with the EBT’s (and me)

Just a couple of points:

  1. Plenty can be said about what must be true inside black holes :slight_smile:

  2. The emphasis in the qoute should be on “stated”.

Other than that this is exactly right, and there are dozens of examples across the common core of nikaya and agama sources across D M S and E.

Plus the evidence of “anatta” and “niether the same nor different nor otherwise” being overlapping in SN and SA…

But hobby horses and all that.

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Don’t ruin my simile. Actually I realized the same after writing (I have an undergrad in physics actually), but I figured the imagery would get the point across well enough. To be fair there is a singularity somewhere within the event horizon where spacetime (and the current laws of physics) breaks down, and passing the event horizon guarantees getting pulled into it.

Anywho, it would be nice to see a few of the suttas besides those I cited which you think make this point most strongly if you have the chance to dig them up.

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Hiya Preston!

In English, yes, I would have to concede, I’d say. (Though there are some things that I could respond with.)

But in Pāli there is no word for ‘nothing’ and it literally says “something else will not exist”. In my view there is not a “something else” apart from the six senses, so it’s wrong to say that it will not (or ‘no longer’) exist.

This sutta is just the tettralemma rephrased: will exist, will no longer exist, will both exist and no longer exist; will neither exist nor no longer exist. Unfortunately this gets lost in the English; it’s pretty obvious in the original. Well, to me anyway. :smiley:

Didn’t we go over this before or was it somebody else with a P icon? :slight_smile:

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Its not language dependent, unless that language is first order logic?

There is a “something else”
There is not a “something else”
There both is and is not
There niether is nor is not

ALL of the above positions are wrong view, it says so over and over again here:

MN72 explains via the categorical mistake of taking “out” as a direction in a discussion of a fire goimg out.

So to say “there is nothing apart from the senses”

Is to say the same as “the fire went out to the west”.

At least we can agree here.

Whenever arguments start this way I get suspicious. I think we have to be very careful to not read complicated and philosphical meanings into the grammar alone of Pali. Also even if in Pali there is no word meaning literally ‘nothing’ (what about akinca???) then we should still expect pali expressions or words to have the equivalent meaning in English. The idea of ‘nothing’ is a pretty basic one, and I’d be really surprised if there weren’t a family of words/phrases that map well to it. Seems to me the English translation is fine.

The meaning of a word is not determined by it’s “literal meaning” in English. For example kama in plural “literally” means “desires”, which you disagree with. Anyways, what you just quoted we can rewrite in English with no problem “Nothing else will exist”, as it is equivalent. So far, I’m not following your points here.

This doesn’t make sense to me either. Your argument is basically suggesting that the questioner is actively asserting ‘something else’ besides six sense bases as a valid category and that the tetralemma is rejected because that ‘something else’ does not actually exist. But then all that Ven Sariputta would have had to do to explain the tetralemma was just simply say “Something else besides the six sense bases doesn’t exist” (which to me just looks like the second option, but I’m going along with your understanding for now). Instead he brings in the very profound expressions papanca/nippapanca:

If you say that, ‘When the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, something else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘both something else and nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘neither something else nor nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. The scope of proliferation extends as far as the scope of the six fields of contact. The scope of the six fields of contact extends as far as the scope of proliferation. When the six fields of contact fade away and cease with nothing left over, proliferation stops and is stilled.”

That’s a very complicated way to describe such a basic idea if you are correct.

So basically there is proliferation about the unproliferated going on here. Again this points nicely to the previous sutta I cited that talks about the impossibility of description. The unproliferated cannot be described by the proliferated conceptuality of the tetralemma’s options. (And I do not posit the unproliferated as what’s left over either! Just a placeholder in the sentence.)

It’s the tetralemma which different phrasing,agreed. However the different phrasing makes it harder to avoid the implications of inexpressibility, because in this case we aren’t just talking about a person/being (anatta comes in then), but instead about anything at all being left.

I don’t recall that.

Hopefully that gives you some interesting alternative ideas. I also hope my directness isn’t interpreted as hostility :slightly_smiling_face:.

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Hey,

I can understand that, and I also don’t like that it has to get down to this. :laughing: But if you’re able to see the similarity with the tetralemma in the Pali of this discourse, you may rethink this. It has the exact same word structure.

You say we shouldn’t read complicated meanings in the grammar, but you’re doing just as complicated a thing from the English, so that’s not a fair standard to set on me. If anything, being closer to the source is better.

There is a word akincana, but that is not used here. That is what is so interesting to me.

How can you say it’s a fine translation? You’re going by what?

You’re not following me indeed, because “nothing else will exist” is not the same as “something else [which exited before death, something apart from the six senses] will now [after death] no longer exist”. This is akin to the teaching of annihilation, that there is something else (like a self) that ceases along with the six senses.

To proliferate means ‘to add to’. When you propose that something else exists beyond the six senses (whether it continues after death or not) you are ‘proliferating’ beyond the six senses, you’re adding something that is not there. You shouldn’t do that, because such a thing doesn’t exist.

Look, the suttas often describe things in verbose ways which we could imagine being said more briefly. The length of a passage is not an argument for or against what it means.

True, here it is just anything. But the six senses are said to be “everything”, so if you propose something beyond them, in whatever way, you’re wrong. You’re proliferating what shouldn’t be proliferated.

Sorry about that, then. :slight_smile: No offense taken.

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I’m not quite sure how these could be seen as equivalent, except from a materialist perspective.

From a materialist point of view, the external outcome is the same: the person dies and nothing remains. And so it looks the same. But from a cessationalist viewpoint, they’re very different.

For one, materialist death is the death of a self contained in the aggregates. Materialists aren’t enlightened so they necessarily identify with the khandhas. Which means they can’t fully conceive of an ending of the aggregates without annihilation of a self. Cessation, on the other hand, really does mean an ending of the aggregates without a self involved because it’s been taught by people who could understand anatta fully.

The other major difference is that materialist death doesn’t involve the bliss and relief of cessation. Both cessation and materialist death are said to free one from suffering. But because the first noble truth is not found in the doctrine of materialism, there’s no way for materialists to understand the full scope of Dukkha. Without which, one can’t see how even the very existence of any kind of consciousness at all is a burden and an irritation. So instead of otherworldly bliss and relief, materialist death promises just kind of a “meh” ending to coarse suffering like physical pain.

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I appreciate your distinction, but why does one need to practice?

Let’s say Buddhism is “right” and materialism is “wrong”.

The materialist merely thinks that his Self will cease to exist after death. Ergo, he dies and finds out that’s not the case. He was wrong. Why doesn’t he attain the Nibbana of the Buddha? There was never a Self to begin with, so why wouldn’t the materialist come to the “right” conclusion at death?

Put differently: Why does the Buddhist need to realize Anatta in order that when he dies his khandas cease without a Self?

Nibbana/nirvana is not mine, I am not nibbana, nibbana is not my self, which is “the calming of all activities, renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, the fading away of desire, cessation, nibbana/nirvana.” (cf. SN 22.90 = SA 262)

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If someone believes in a Self that is annihilated at death, and they find out their conscious experience didn’t stop when their body died as they assumed – why would this experience lead them to anatta?

Isn’t it much more likely that they become a continuist instead? I.e. think that their Self persists despite the death of the material body?

In dependent origination, it’s ignorance which drives the whole rebirth process. Self-view is part of that ignorance, so Buddhists need to realize anatta to eventually let the khandas cease.

If you think you have a self/Self, that is like thinking existence contains your most precious belonging. What could be worth more to anyone than their self? Is there any greater state of being invested in existence than the self? :slight_smile:

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First, and most important, I feel like I made a friend here. I feel like I know a lot about what really matters to you, and I can’t say that of some of my “real life” friends. So that is cool…Yes, it’s been nice this discussion. I’m getting something out of it, looking at myself and seeing how you think, and learning how to address it in a courteous way (I try).

If I’m ever in Australia, I’ll look you up! Do you like Indian food? I’m glad you’re getting something out of it! I am too, it’s helping me clarify some thoughts and ideas I’ve had for some time.

I also want to say that at the end of the day, nobody can truly know nibbana philosophically and that I consider all of what I’ve outlined as a tentative theory (it’s just a finger!). What matters the most is how we practice and how we treat others. Though of course, theory informs practice since it informs what we value.

I was hoping we were winding things down, but your reply is quite long*.*

Yes, sorry! :flushed:I thought we were winding down too, but I guess I had wayyyy more thoughts to share than I thought… I will try to keep my last reply as short as possible and only address some key points in a cursory way. I also don’t really have any further arguments to introduce so I’ll just be clarifying some things.

But could we agree it at least more likely that cessationism would?

Yes, we can! But that’s because I think it is a species of annihilation. So, it’s not really being ‘mistaken’, and that’s kind of the crux of our disagreement isn’t it.

But am I right, it’s changing and something that comes to be?

It doesn’t arise or come to be, but it is something you attain when you let go.

Regardless, event or result, if we say “nibbāna is the cessation of existence”, the effective idea is the same. Which is that existence comes to an end. And I of course read this as all existence. So to me this is a pretty clear statement on what the goal is, what nibbāna is.

Yes this is a clear difference between my framework and yours. For me ‘existence’ here is not all existence (which would conflict with Kaccana sutta and be annihilationist), but the kind of samsaric existence that grasps at selves or essence (which are absolutist kinds of existence). I think this is one of the main points where we diverge.

But for your view, every time you read such statements on cessation, there is a “disclaimer” attached which says, “there’s still this pure awareness outside of the aggregates, six senses, and so forth”…

Well yes but this is a feature of all exegesis, you interpret certain passages by looking at other statements in a text. And the Buddha is quite clear his middle way is something between existence and non-existence. So, when he says this you have to then also add a disclaimer which defines non-existence in a way that doesn’t contradict with your view. So pointing out that I interpret certain passages is not necessarily a problem since you also have to deal with other ones through further interpretation as well. This is a classic problem in Buddhist hermeneutics: which statements are definitive and which statements need further interpretation? The best we can do in compare theories and give arguments for both sides to see what seems to be most reasonable.

Again, I think the Buddha was a very lousy teacher if he actually taught continuitism. I could have done a better job myself, let alone you.

Well I certainly don’t think so lol! I just think he was very weary of confusing people. He didn’t want people to confuse his theory with an atman theory, which happened a lot. And here’s the kicker, if his view was not similar to positivism in some way, why did people keep mistaking it for a self? So, you see this concern cuts both ways.

I can understand you not buying the emotional/ontological distinction I made with reference to some of these terms, but then there’s another option. Because I can also talk about a “sphere” of absence, a “state” of non-existence, a “realm” of nothingness, and all that doesn’t sound particularly odd to me.

Well, this doesn’t seem odd when you have a mind that enters those states. But when you have a cessationalist view, there is no experience at all to know absence, and now it does sounds odd to me.

So let’s say it is spiritual suicide, even though I’d never call it that myself. Then there is still a huge difference. And that’s because there is no self to kill.

But I also still don’t agree with your argument that rebirth makes no difference.

I think your view is different from materialist view of death in this contextual sense (due to rebirth and not-self), so I agree its not exactly the same. However, cessationalism is still ontologically equivalent. On the ontological level, it’s the same thing: non-existence. So, I think the problems I outlined with this still apply.

The answer is, I don’t know if I would press that button, and I don’t feel I would be logically forced to either. Because since there is no self, it also doesn’t really matter if suffering continues.

Now that is a weird thing for a Buddhist to say! I am not sure how to respond! :sweat_smile: If ending suffering is not the central concern, then what are we doing?

Because what is value really? To me it’s a construct of the mind, not something intrinsic in the universe or in anything in itself. Value is what we give to things. Because it’s a mental construct to me, that’s exactly why I mixed it up with “emotion”, I hope you understand now.

Yes, it is a property of the mind, and it’s precisely because of this that a positive nibbana (which retains value) is more valuable than a cessationalist one (which destroys all value).

However, nibbana is still emotionally positive. Because it’s still suffering coming to an end.

Only for the short time that an arahant lives. After, it ceases to have any value of its own (or for anyone else in the world).

Exactly!!! Yes! YES. The Buddha was a genius. As I said, he wouldn’t have had to discover things for himself if he believed in continuism.

But I wasn’t referring to the Buddha in this case, I was referring to people who hold cessationalist views! So, while I think Buddha did discover new things (anatta for example), I don’t agree he taught cessationalism (and part of why I think so is that I see its strange and unusual features in the history of religions as evidence against it as an interpretation of the Buddha’s view).

That doesn’t make sense to me. If there is an experience, there must be some sort of awareness or consciousness. How can you experience something without awareness?

I would say this is why nibbana is so subtle and difficult to explain, and why the Buddha was worried about explaining it to people. I cannot really explain it further either (I mean, I am not a Buddha lol!). Suffice it to say, I do not think it is non-existence.

I think this has been a fruitful exchange. Thank you for helping me think through this issue further and also, thank you for being so gracious with your time and letting me have the last word. I know things are probably busy in the monastery! :grinning:

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Well … it wouldn’t. However, I’m assuming and entertaining and questioning the notion that “the Self doesn’t exist”. For example, The materialist dies thinking his Self will be annihilated and finds … what?

On the same token, the Buddhist doesn’t assume a Self will be annihilated … dies … and finds what?

What is the difference in the outcome? What is the importance to the Buddhist of holding the view “the Self does not exist”?

So, are you saying that the view of Self is not merely “mistaken”, but also that it “binds” the khandas - allows for them to generate another birth?

Just the unconditioned unbinding of that Self. Yes, it is the most precious “commodity” we have, but it also causes us to “be the architect” of our horrible journey through Samsara!

Yes, that’s how I understand DO. Ignorance (e.g. of non-self) creates the energy that fuels the rebirth process. I like to think of stream-entry is as tipping point; ignorance is reduced to the extent where it’s only able to create fuel for at most 6 more lives.

I have to idea what this means or refers to :cowboy_hat_face:

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I see my view more like a process metaphysics. Substance theory holds that there is a substance (which is eternal) and that substance has properties that it bears (which change). This is not my view, I don’t see nibbana as dualistic like this. Likewise, the Jaina view of the jiva is that it is something which desires, acts and experiences sense objects and that it is this which gets liberated and goes to another realm. My view does not affirm this, the nibbanic reality is not a transformed consciousness aggregate and does cease at nibbana. Furthermore, the Jains hold there are a plurality of jivas, my view holds that nibbanic awareness is neither a oneness (it’s not advaita Vedanta monism) nor a plurality of souls.

In this sense, the ocean is a great metaphor the Buddha uses. While its wetness never changes, it is also a dynamic process. Another example: the sun. The fact that it is shining never changes, but if you look closer there is a lot of flux and change going on in the sun, and it is always giving off new light. The light we receive today is not the same photons we got yesterday.

I don’t agree that any positive theory of reality is automatically a self. After all the Buddha had a theory of bhava, one which was a kind of process metaphysics, a metaphysics of change, mainly: dependent arising. He also has a theory which provides continuity across lifetimes, but this process of continuity is not a self either.

I think this excessive fear of having the view of a self leads many people to ‘go too far’ in the other direction and immediately attack any positive view as atmavada. But I think this is just a mistaken overuse of the term atman.

Also [spoiler alert] my view is also influenced by Mahayana ideas like Madhyamaka and Huayan. So in my view nibbanic awareness is not totally independent of the needs of sentient beings but remains responsive to them and influences them in a subtle manner. I did not bring this up because this is a strictly EBT focused discussion on an EBT focused forum. But your response led me to have to bring it up to further differentiate my view from substance theory. Anyways I don’t see nibbana as a totally disconnected eternal substance, it also is interdependent with the needs of sentient beings. As such it’s both transcendent and immanent (this is a feature of its limitlessness and its freedom). However, I’d rather not dwell on this since it would take the discussion away from being an EBT focused discussion. After all, this is not a Mahayana forum.

This needs to be balanced with the sutta passages that do describe nibbana in various positive ways. I noted some above. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s video I shared goes more in depth as does that “the Island” book by Ajahn Amaro.

If you say ‘the thing left over’ you have contradicted this passage IMO. Here’s another more explicit passage as well: An 4.173

This must also be balanced with positive descriptions of nibbana from the suttas. Likewise, I see “existence” here as an absolute or essentialist kind of existence, not existence simpliciter. Otherwise, this would be in contradiction to positive descriptions of nibbana which have ontological connotations.

Thus, I see this sutta’s refusal to say anything about nibbana as contextual. For this individual not saying anything was the best move. But in other cases when talking to different people the Buddha made more positive assertions. There’s no contradiction here. This is like how in some sutras he refuses to say there is no self (and some like Thanissaro have claimed he didn’t really teach not-self other than as a ‘strategy’). But if you look at other suttas it’s clear the Buddha teaches anatta. He just remains silent when talking to certain people because they would become further confused if he said anything affirming anatta in that specific situation.

This third view which one could dub “absolute apophasis” cannot be right either. If the Buddha’s view on nibbana was an absolute refusal to describe it at all, then he would really have not used any positive language to describe it and would have always used apophatic descriptions. Or worse he would not have taught it at all since any time he opened his mouth to promote nibbana as a goal he would be using language and would be confusing people even more. So perhaps he would have taught a religion without a goal. But he didn’t.

This is also too similar to the eel wriggler position for me. If you’re going to teach and promote a view as a spiritual goal, you have to explain it somehow, you have to say something (this is why Buddha was hesitant to teach at first).

If I try to sell you a car and do not describe it at all why would you buy it? Why would I try to sell it at all since it can’t say anything about it? This does not match the Buddha’s behavior, he spent years teaching and explaining these issues to people. To tell people they should sacrifice everything for a goal without giving any metaphysical description of that goal whatsoever is just not skillful.

I’m not going to respond further to the ideas about grammar. I still disagree, and the Pali here isn’t too complex for me to understand. I could make your argument work with ‘nothing else’ as well, but your claim was that the Pali made your argument more correct so I responded to that.

I have no problem understanding the similarity to the tetralemma. The ‘something else’ is being substituted into the four arms. I just don’t have an issue with reading nothing else for the negation.

This is the interpretation in question. I understand what you’re saying. Like I mentioned earlier you are taking ‘something else’ to be a positive assertion of existence besides the aggregates. Then the whole tetralemma fails in your view because that something else doesn’t actually exist. Right? Again, that could’ve been simply expressed in one sentence in the sutta. Which takes us to your point about Ven Sariputta’s response:

I don’t think this does justice to papanca which is closely tied to the formation of concepts and ideas about the world (see concept and reality by Ven Nanananda). It’s not ‘to add to’ that I’ve seen. I’ve never seen such a translation, do you have reason for it? It more has a meaning of ‘spreading apart, diffuseness, expansion’ of concepts/thinking.

So if the meaning of ‘conceptual proliferation’ is correct than both ideas of something and nothing could be criticized here. Anyways I agree that proposing something beyond the six sense bases is papanca (because it is an imaginary conceptual proliferation). The same can be said about proposing nothing else (or if you prefer “something else doesn’t exist”) which is also an imaginary conceptual proliferation because there is quite literally 0 evidence or logical basis to make such a claim-it’s a purely philosophical game/exercise. All we can talk about is our world of experience, there is no basis for discussions past this. When all phenomena have vanished so have all means of speaking.

The parinibbana of an arahant is described as being beyond language yet both of these positions fit the arahant’s parinibbana into a simply and easy to understand answer. If it’s beyond language (stated multiple times in the suttas) then why can you so easily state in language “well they didn’t exist before so they don’t exist after” or else for our sutta “something else didn’t exist before so it doesn’t exist after”?

Anyways here’s another good sutta for this as well SN 44.11:

“Master Kaccāna, when asked these questions, you say that this has not been declared by the Buddha. What’s the cause, what’s the reason why this has not been declared by the Buddha?”

“In order to describe him as ‘possessing form’ or ‘formless’ or ‘percipient’ or ‘non-percipient’ or ‘neither percipient nor non-percipient’, there must be some cause or reason for doing so. But if that cause and reason were to totally and utterly cease without anything left over, how could you describe him in any such terms?"

Notice it’s the ‘cause and reason [for description]’ that’s “totally and utterly ceasing” here. So more explicitly: the cause and reason for describing the arahant as not existing after death (tetralemma is mentioned before this) has totally ceased. There is no basis for designation of any kind.

Again, it seems much easier to just say “such a thing doesn’t exist” like you do here, yet the sutta doesn’t.

The problem is that the sutta isn’t just explaining simple ideas verbosely. It’s bringing in more subtle ideas and explanations. Those ideas and explanations don’t easily simplify to the point you’re trying to make IMO. If they were equivalent there would be no problem like you say here.

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Is it knowledge of non-self specifically which depletes the fuel of the rebirth process, IYO?

It is like this:

I’ve seen you, house-builder!
You won’t build a house again!
Your rafters are all broken,
your roof-peak is demolished.
My mind, set on demolition,
has reached the end of craving.

Dhp154

Ie. when the Self is seen for what it is, the “spokes” that bind us to the wheel of becoming, those spokes are utterly destroyed, and the hub of the wheel falls out. The Self is extinguished.

It’s interesting, IMO, that the Buddha often explains the Self as being that which would say, “I would be this!” And that wish would be granted.

But since we cannot say of our Self, “let me be this!” - then what kind of Self do we assume to have?

Yet, the Buddha could travel to the Brahma worlds and beyond as easily as a man would stretch and flex his arm.

Yes I agree actually.

I don’t think need to worry about ontology at all. What matters is our world of experience and suffering within this ‘fathom long body’. Even here and now worrying about the nature of existence isn’t relevant. Actually I think trying to fit nibbana into any ontological category is based on not understanding how views are formed. Any view of existence or nonexistence is just based on a ‘feeling of the real’ or a ‘feeling of the unreal’. That feeling is taken seriously and due to craving and clinging transforms into a held view. But the view is still rooted in the ‘evocative impact’ of that original feeling and perception, that’s it!

Whether it’s labelled as ‘existence simpliciter’ or not it’s still a view of existence after the death of an arahant. No description whatsoever left.

I agree. But I’d say the context is wherever we are talking about nibbana here and now or nibbana after death (i.e. the ‘fate’ of an arahant).

Can you give a clearcut example where after the parinibbana of an arahant they are said to be in an experience (or state of wellbeing) of any kind? (Sorry if you already cited this before)

Isn’t the positive language usually about living arahants? See above question.

Of course, but I’m not saying to avoid describing nibbana at all. The Buddha did describe the desirability of nibbana as the destruction of greed/hate/delusion, but he refused to describe in any way the existence/nonexistence of the after-death arahant.

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There are more fetters than self-view though of course, but overcoming self-view and the conceit ‘I am’ seem central to me.

I tend to focus more on the “this is me, I am this” / “this is not me, I am not this” part than the self/Atman. Anatta (not my Self) seems more aimed at religious theories, but IMO, the underlying problem is anyway our relationship to our mind and body. We think the mind and body are “me” but on close inspection we discover those beliefs can’t be justified.