What do you think about Ven Thanissaro’s view on Nibbāna?

[josephzizys]

@Preston

The parinibbana of an arahant is like a black hole. Beyond the event horizon there is literally nothing whatsoever that can be stated. Silence is the only option.

Just wanted to chime in and agree with @Preston 's agreement with the EBT’s (and me)

Just a couple of points:

1. Plenty can be said about what must be true inside black holes

2. The emphasis in the qoute should be on “stated”.

Other than that this is exactly right, and there are dozens of examples across the common core of nikaya and agama sources across D M S and E.

Plus the evidence of “anatta” and “niether the same nor different nor otherwise” being overlapping in SN and SA…

But hobby horses and all that.

[Preston]

@josephzizys

Plenty can be said about what must be true inside black holes

Don’t ruin my simile. Actually I realized the same after writing (I have an undergrad in physics actually), but I figured the imagery would get the point across well enough. To be fair there is a singularity somewhere within the event horizon where spacetime (and the current laws of physics) breaks down, and passing the event horizon guarantees getting pulled into it.

Anywho, it would be nice to see a few of the suttas besides those I cited which you think make this point most strongly if you have the chance to dig them up.

[Sunyo]

@Preston

IMO, this passage also contradicts the position posited by Ven @Sunyo since in that position there should be no problem saying ‘nothing else exists after.’

Hiya Preston!

In English, yes, I would have to concede, I’d say. (Though there are some things that I could respond with.)

But in Pāli there is no word for ‘nothing’ and it literally says “something else will not exist”. In my view there is not a “something else” apart from the six senses, so it’s wrong to say that it will not (or ‘no longer’) exist.

This sutta is just the tettralemma rephrased: will exist, will no longer exist, will both exist and no longer exist; will neither exist nor no longer exist. Unfortunately this gets lost in the English; it’s pretty obvious in the original. Well, to me anyway.

Didn’t we go over this before or was it somebody else with a P icon?

[josephzizys]

@Sunyo

In my view there is not a “something else” apart from the six senses, so it’s wrong to say that it will not (or ‘no longer’) exist.

This sutta is just the tettralemma rephrased: will exist, will no longer exist, will both exist and no longer exist; will neither exist nor no longer exist.

Its not language dependent, unless that language is first order logic?

There is a “something else”
There is not a “something else”
There both is and is not
There niether is nor is not

ALL of the above positions are wrong view, it says so over and over again here:

TO BE OR NOT TO BE, the undeclared points in the 4 principle Nikayas:

TO BE OR NOT TO BE (or both, or neither) The undeclared points in the 4 principle Nikayas. The undeclared points are a number of questions, typically ten, but sometimes as few as two, as at SN44.10, and sometimes as many as 11, as at AN10.95, and often 4, as at SN12.17. This essay focuses on the standard set of ten, and looks at the differing explanations given for the Buddha’s silence in the different suttas. We first see the undeclared points introduced at DN1 and DN2, where they are used to…

MN72 explains via the categorical mistake of taking “out” as a direction in a discussion of a fire goimg out.

So to say “there is nothing apart from the senses”

Is to say the same as “the fire went out to the west”.

[Preston]

@Sunyo

In English, yes, I would have to concede, I’d say. (Though there are some things that I could respond with.)

At least we can agree here.

@Sunyo

But in Pāli there is no word for ‘nothing’

Whenever arguments start this way I get suspicious. I think we have to be very careful to not read complicated and philosphical meanings into the grammar alone of Pali. Also even if in Pali there is no word meaning literally ‘nothing’ (what about akinca???) then we should still expect pali expressions or words to have the equivalent meaning in English. The idea of ‘nothing’ is a pretty basic one, and I’d be really surprised if there weren’t a family of words/phrases that map well to it. Seems to me the English translation is fine.

@Sunyo

literally says “something else will not exist”.

The meaning of a word is not determined by it’s “literal meaning” in English. For example kama in plural “literally” means “desires”, which you disagree with. Anyways, what you just quoted we can rewrite in English with no problem “Nothing else will exist”, as it is equivalent. So far, I’m not following your points here.

@Sunyo

In my view there is not a “something else” apart from the six senses, so it’s wrong to say that it will not (or ‘no longer’) exist

This doesn’t make sense to me either. Your argument is basically suggesting that the questioner is actively asserting ‘something else’ besides six sense bases as a valid category and that the tetralemma is rejected because that ‘something else’ does not actually exist. But then all that Ven Sariputta would have had to do to explain the tetralemma was just simply say “Something else besides the six sense bases doesn’t exist” (which to me just looks like the second option, but I’m going along with your understanding for now). Instead he brings in the very profound expressions papanca/nippapanca:

If you say that, ‘When the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, something else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘both something else and nothing else exist’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. If you say that ‘neither something else nor nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated. The scope of proliferation extends as far as the scope of the six fields of contact. The scope of the six fields of contact extends as far as the scope of proliferation. When the six fields of contact fade away and cease with nothing left over, proliferation stops and is stilled.”

That’s a very complicated way to describe such a basic idea if you are correct.

So basically there is proliferation about the unproliferated going on here. Again this points nicely to the previous sutta I cited that talks about the impossibility of description. The unproliferated cannot be described by the proliferated conceptuality of the tetralemma’s options. (And I do not posit the unproliferated as what’s left over either! Just a placeholder in the sentence.)

@Sunyo

This sutta is just the tettralemma rephrased: will exist, will no longer exist, will both exist and no longer exist; will neither exist nor no longer exist. Unfortunately this gets lost in the English; it’s pretty obvious in the original. Well, to me anyway.

It’s the tetralemma which different phrasing,agreed. However the different phrasing makes it harder to avoid the implications of inexpressibility, because in this case we aren’t just talking about a person/being (anatta comes in then), but instead about anything at all being left.

@Sunyo

Didn’t we go over this before or was it somebody else with a P icon?

I don’t recall that.

Hopefully that gives you some interesting alternative ideas. I also hope my directness isn’t interpreted as hostility .

[Sunyo]

@Preston

Whenever arguments start this way I get suspicious. I think we have to be very careful to not read complicated and philosphical meanings into the grammar alone of Pali. Also even if in Pali there is no word meaning literally ‘nothing’ (what about akinca???) then we should still expect pali expressions or words to have the equivalent meaning in English. The idea of ‘nothing’ is a pretty basic one, and I’d be really surprised if there weren’t a family of words/phrases that map well to it. Seems to me the English translation is fine.

Hey,

I can understand that, and I also don’t like that it has to get down to this. But if you’re able to see the similarity with the tetralemma in the Pali of this discourse, you may rethink this. It has the exact same word structure.

You say we shouldn’t read complicated meanings in the grammar, but you’re doing just as complicated a thing from the English, so that’s not a fair standard to set on me. If anything, being closer to the source is better.

There is a word akincana, but that is not used here. That is what is so interesting to me.

How can you say it’s a fine translation? You’re going by what?

@Preston

The meaning of a word is not determined by it’s “literal meaning” in English. For example kama in plural “literally” means “desires”, which you disagree with. Anyways, what you just quoted we can rewrite in English with no problem “Nothing else will exist”, as it is equivalent. So far, I’m not following your points here.

You’re not following me indeed, because “nothing else will exist” is not the same as “something else [which exited before death, something apart from the six senses] will now [after death] no longer exist”. This is akin to the teaching of annihilation, that there is something else (like a self) that ceases along with the six senses.

@Preston

That’s a very complicated way to describe such a basic idea if you are correct.

To proliferate means ‘to add to’. When you propose that something else exists beyond the six senses (whether it continues after death or not) you are ‘proliferating’ beyond the six senses, you’re adding something that is not there. You shouldn’t do that, because such a thing doesn’t exist.

Look, the suttas often describe things in verbose ways which we could imagine being said more briefly. The length of a passage is not an argument for or against what it means.

@Preston

It’s the tetralemma which different phrasing,agreed. However the different phrasing makes it harder to avoid the implications of inexpressibility, because in this case we aren’t just talking about a person/being (anatta comes in then), but instead about anything at all being left.

True, here it is just anything. But the six senses are said to be “everything”, so if you propose something beyond them, in whatever way, you’re wrong. You’re proliferating what shouldn’t be proliferated.

@Preston

I don’t recall that.

Sorry about that, then. No offense taken.

[woodrow]

@Javier

nibbana that is equivalent to the materialist view of death

I’m not quite sure how these could be seen as equivalent, except from a materialist perspective.

From a materialist point of view, the external outcome is the same: the person dies and nothing remains. And so it looks the same. But from a cessationalist viewpoint, they’re very different.

For one, materialist death is the death of a self contained in the aggregates. Materialists aren’t enlightened so they necessarily identify with the khandhas. Which means they can’t fully conceive of an ending of the aggregates without annihilation of a self. Cessation, on the other hand, really does mean an ending of the aggregates without a self involved because it’s been taught by people who could understand anatta fully.

The other major difference is that materialist death doesn’t involve the bliss and relief of cessation. Both cessation and materialist death are said to free one from suffering. But because the first noble truth is not found in the doctrine of materialism, there’s no way for materialists to understand the full scope of Dukkha. Without which, one can’t see how even the very existence of any kind of consciousness at all is a burden and an irritation. So instead of otherworldly bliss and relief, materialist death promises just kind of a “meh” ending to coarse suffering like physical pain.

[Pondera]

@woodrow

For one, materialist death is the death of a self contained in the aggregates. Materialists aren’t enlightened so they necessarily identify with the khandhas. Which means they can’t fully conceive of an ending of the aggregates without annihilation of a self. Cessation, on the other hand, really does mean an ending of the aggregates without a self involved because it’s been taught by people who could understand anatta fully.

I appreciate your distinction, but why does one need to practice?

Let’s say Buddhism is “right” and materialism is “wrong”.

The materialist merely thinks that his Self will cease to exist after death. Ergo, he dies and finds out that’s not the case. He was wrong. Why doesn’t he attain the Nibbana of the Buddha? There was never a Self to begin with, so why wouldn’t the materialist come to the “right” conclusion at death?

Put differently: Why does the Buddhist need to realize Anatta in order that when he dies his khandas cease without a Self?

[thomaslaw]

Nibbana/nirvana is not mine, I am not nibbana, nibbana is not my self, which is “the calming of all activities, renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, the fading away of desire, cessation, nibbana/nirvana.” (cf. SN 22.90 = SA 262)

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Pondera

The materialist merely thinks that his Self will cease to exist after death. Ergo, he dies and finds out that’s not the case. He was wrong. Why doesn’t he attain the Nibbana of the Buddha? There was never a Self to begin with, so why wouldn’t the materialist come to the “right” conclusion at death?

If someone believes in a Self that is annihilated at death, and they find out their conscious experience didn’t stop when their body died as they assumed – why would this experience lead them to anatta?

Isn’t it much more likely that they become a continuist instead? I.e. think that their Self persists despite the death of the material body?

@Pondera

Put differently: Why does the Buddhist need to realize Anatta in order that when he dies his khandas cease without a Self?

In dependent origination, it’s ignorance which drives the whole rebirth process. Self-view is part of that ignorance, so Buddhists need to realize anatta to eventually let the khandas cease.

If you think you have a self/Self, that is like thinking existence contains your most precious belonging. What could be worth more to anyone than their self? Is there any greater state of being invested in existence than the self?

[Javier]

First, and most important, I feel like I made a friend here. I feel like I know a lot about what really matters to you, and I can’t say that of some of my “real life” friends. So that is cool…Yes, it’s been nice this discussion. I’m getting something out of it, looking at myself and seeing how you think, and learning how to address it in a courteous way (I try).

If I’m ever in Australia, I’ll look you up! Do you like Indian food? I’m glad you’re getting something out of it! I am too, it’s helping me clarify some thoughts and ideas I’ve had for some time.

I also want to say that at the end of the day, nobody can truly know nibbana philosophically and that I consider all of what I’ve outlined as a tentative theory (it’s just a finger!). What matters the most is how we practice and how we treat others. Though of course, theory informs practice since it informs what we value.

I was hoping we were winding things down, but your reply is quite long*.*

Yes, sorry! I thought we were winding down too, but I guess I had wayyyy more thoughts to share than I thought… I will try to keep my last reply as short as possible and only address some key points in a cursory way. I also don’t really have any further arguments to introduce so I’ll just be clarifying some things.

But could we agree it at least more likely that cessationism would?

Yes, we can! But that’s because I think it is a species of annihilation. So, it’s not really being ‘mistaken’, and that’s kind of the crux of our disagreement isn’t it.

But am I right, it’s changing and something that comes to be?

It doesn’t arise or come to be, but it is something you attain when you let go.

Regardless, event or result, if we say “nibbāna is the cessation of existence”, the effective idea is the same. Which is that existence comes to an end. And I of course read this as all existence. So to me this is a pretty clear statement on what the goal is, what nibbāna is.

Yes this is a clear difference between my framework and yours. For me ‘existence’ here is not all existence (which would conflict with Kaccana sutta and be annihilationist), but the kind of samsaric existence that grasps at selves or essence (which are absolutist kinds of existence). I think this is one of the main points where we diverge.

But for your view, every time you read such statements on cessation, there is a “disclaimer” attached which says, “there’s still this pure awareness outside of the aggregates, six senses, and so forth”…

Well yes but this is a feature of all exegesis, you interpret certain passages by looking at other statements in a text. And the Buddha is quite clear his middle way is something between existence and non-existence. So, when he says this you have to then also add a disclaimer which defines non-existence in a way that doesn’t contradict with your view. So pointing out that I interpret certain passages is not necessarily a problem since you also have to deal with other ones through further interpretation as well. This is a classic problem in Buddhist hermeneutics: which statements are definitive and which statements need further interpretation? The best we can do in compare theories and give arguments for both sides to see what seems to be most reasonable.

Again, I think the Buddha was a very lousy teacher if he actually taught continuitism. I could have done a better job myself, let alone you.

Well I certainly don’t think so lol! I just think he was very weary of confusing people. He didn’t want people to confuse his theory with an atman theory, which happened a lot. And here’s the kicker, if his view was not similar to positivism in some way, why did people keep mistaking it for a self? So, you see this concern cuts both ways.

I can understand you not buying the emotional/ontological distinction I made with reference to some of these terms, but then there’s another option. Because I can also talk about a “sphere” of absence, a “state” of non-existence, a “realm” of nothingness, and all that doesn’t sound particularly odd to me.

Well, this doesn’t seem odd when you have a mind that enters those states. But when you have a cessationalist view, there is no experience at all to know absence, and now it does sounds odd to me.

So let’s say it is spiritual suicide, even though I’d never call it that myself. Then there is still a huge difference. And that’s because there is no self to kill.

But I also still don’t agree with your argument that rebirth makes no difference.

I think your view is different from materialist view of death in this contextual sense (due to rebirth and not-self), so I agree its not exactly the same. However, cessationalism is still ontologically equivalent. On the ontological level, it’s the same thing: non-existence. So, I think the problems I outlined with this still apply.

The answer is, I don’t know if I would press that button, and I don’t feel I would be logically forced to either. Because since there is no self, it also doesn’t really matter if suffering continues.

Now that is a weird thing for a Buddhist to say! I am not sure how to respond! If ending suffering is not the central concern, then what are we doing?

Because what is value really? To me it’s a construct of the mind, not something intrinsic in the universe or in anything in itself. Value is what we give to things. Because it’s a mental construct to me, that’s exactly why I mixed it up with “emotion”, I hope you understand now.

Yes, it is a property of the mind, and it’s precisely because of this that a positive nibbana (which retains value) is more valuable than a cessationalist one (which destroys all value).

However, nibbana is still emotionally positive. Because it’s still suffering coming to an end.

Only for the short time that an arahant lives. After, it ceases to have any value of its own (or for anyone else in the world).

Exactly!!! Yes! YES. The Buddha was a genius. As I said, he wouldn’t have had to discover things for himself if he believed in continuism.

But I wasn’t referring to the Buddha in this case, I was referring to people who hold cessationalist views! So, while I think Buddha did discover new things (anatta for example), I don’t agree he taught cessationalism (and part of why I think so is that I see its strange and unusual features in the history of religions as evidence against it as an interpretation of the Buddha’s view).

That doesn’t make sense to me. If there is an experience, there must be some sort of awareness or consciousness. How can you experience something without awareness?

I would say this is why nibbana is so subtle and difficult to explain, and why the Buddha was worried about explaining it to people. I cannot really explain it further either (I mean, I am not a Buddha lol!). Suffice it to say, I do not think it is non-existence.

I think this has been a fruitful exchange. Thank you for helping me think through this issue further and also, thank you for being so gracious with your time and letting me have the last word. I know things are probably busy in the monastery!

[Pondera]

@Erika_ODonnell

If someone believes in a Self that is annihilated at death, and they find out their conscious experience didn’t stop when their body died as they assumed – why would this experience lead them to anatta?

Well … it wouldn’t. However, I’m assuming and entertaining and questioning the notion that “the Self doesn’t exist”. For example, The materialist dies thinking his Self will be annihilated and finds … what?

On the same token, the Buddhist doesn’t assume a Self will be annihilated … dies … and finds what?

What is the difference in the outcome? What is the importance to the Buddhist of holding the view “the Self does not exist”?

@Erika_ODonnell

Self-view is part of that ignorance, so Buddhists need to realize anatta to eventually let the khandas cease.

So, are you saying that the view of Self is not merely “mistaken”, but also that it “binds” the khandas - allows for them to generate another birth?

@Erika_ODonnell

If you think you have a self/Self, that is like thinking existence contains your most precious belonging. What could be worth more to anyone than their self? Is there any greater state of being invested in existence than the self?

Just the unconditioned unbinding of that Self. Yes, it is the most precious “commodity” we have, but it also causes us to “be the architect” of our horrible journey through Samsara!

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Pondera

@Erika_ODonnell

Self-view is part of that ignorance, so Buddhists need to realize anatta to eventually let the khandas cease.

So, are you saying that the view of Self is not merely “mistaken”, but also that it “binds” the khandas - allows for them to generate another birth?

Yes, that’s how I understand DO. Ignorance (e.g. of non-self) creates the energy that fuels the rebirth process. I like to think of stream-entry is as tipping point; ignorance is reduced to the extent where it’s only able to create fuel for at most 6 more lives.

@Pondera

Just the unconditioned unbinding of that Self.

I have to idea what this means or refers to

[Javier]

@Ceisiwr

To say there is a real thing which changes is substance theory.

I see my view more like a process metaphysics. Substance theory holds that there is a substance (which is eternal) and that substance has properties that it bears (which change). This is not my view, I don’t see nibbana as dualistic like this. Likewise, the Jaina view of the jiva is that it is something which desires, acts and experiences sense objects and that it is this which gets liberated and goes to another realm. My view does not affirm this, the nibbanic reality is not a transformed consciousness aggregate and does cease at nibbana. Furthermore, the Jains hold there are a plurality of jivas, my view holds that nibbanic awareness is neither a oneness (it’s not advaita Vedanta monism) nor a plurality of souls.

In this sense, the ocean is a great metaphor the Buddha uses. While its wetness never changes, it is also a dynamic process. Another example: the sun. The fact that it is shining never changes, but if you look closer there is a lot of flux and change going on in the sun, and it is always giving off new light. The light we receive today is not the same photons we got yesterday.

I don’t agree that any positive theory of reality is automatically a self. After all the Buddha had a theory of bhava, one which was a kind of process metaphysics, a metaphysics of change, mainly: dependent arising. He also has a theory which provides continuity across lifetimes, but this process of continuity is not a self either.

I think this excessive fear of having the view of a self leads many people to ‘go too far’ in the other direction and immediately attack any positive view as atmavada. But I think this is just a mistaken overuse of the term atman.

Also [spoiler alert] my view is also influenced by Mahayana ideas like Madhyamaka and Huayan. So in my view nibbanic awareness is not totally independent of the needs of sentient beings but remains responsive to them and influences them in a subtle manner. I did not bring this up because this is a strictly EBT focused discussion on an EBT focused forum. But your response led me to have to bring it up to further differentiate my view from substance theory. Anyways I don’t see nibbana as a totally disconnected eternal substance, it also is interdependent with the needs of sentient beings. As such it’s both transcendent and immanent (this is a feature of its limitlessness and its freedom). However, I’d rather not dwell on this since it would take the discussion away from being an EBT focused discussion. After all, this is not a Mahayana forum.

@Preston

Just to comment here that this is going beyond explicit statements about the limits of conventional language by the Buddha. I posted earlier from Snp 5.7:

This needs to be balanced with the sutta passages that do describe nibbana in various positive ways. I noted some above. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s video I shared goes more in depth as does that “the Island” book by Ajahn Amaro.

If you say ‘the thing left over’ you have contradicted this passage IMO. Here’s another more explicit passage as well: An 4.173

This must also be balanced with positive descriptions of nibbana from the suttas. Likewise, I see “existence” here as an absolute or essentialist kind of existence, not existence simpliciter. Otherwise, this would be in contradiction to positive descriptions of nibbana which have ontological connotations.

Thus, I see this sutta’s refusal to say anything about nibbana as contextual. For this individual not saying anything was the best move. But in other cases when talking to different people the Buddha made more positive assertions. There’s no contradiction here. This is like how in some sutras he refuses to say there is no self (and some like Thanissaro have claimed he didn’t really teach not-self other than as a ‘strategy’). But if you look at other suttas it’s clear the Buddha teaches anatta. He just remains silent when talking to certain people because they would become further confused if he said anything affirming anatta in that specific situation.

@Preston

The parinibbana of an arahant is like a black hole. Beyond the event horizon there is literally nothing whatsoever that can be stated. Silence is the only option.

This third view which one could dub “absolute apophasis” cannot be right either. If the Buddha’s view on nibbana was an absolute refusal to describe it at all, then he would really have not used any positive language to describe it and would have always used apophatic descriptions. Or worse he would not have taught it at all since any time he opened his mouth to promote nibbana as a goal he would be using language and would be confusing people even more. So perhaps he would have taught a religion without a goal. But he didn’t.

This is also too similar to the eel wriggler position for me. If you’re going to teach and promote a view as a spiritual goal, you have to explain it somehow, you have to say something (this is why Buddha was hesitant to teach at first).

If I try to sell you a car and do not describe it at all why would you buy it? Why would I try to sell it at all since it can’t say anything about it? This does not match the Buddha’s behavior, he spent years teaching and explaining these issues to people. To tell people they should sacrifice everything for a goal without giving any metaphysical description of that goal whatsoever is just not skillful.

[Preston]

I’m not going to respond further to the ideas about grammar. I still disagree, and the Pali here isn’t too complex for me to understand. I could make your argument work with ‘nothing else’ as well, but your claim was that the Pali made your argument more correct so I responded to that.

I have no problem understanding the similarity to the tetralemma. The ‘something else’ is being substituted into the four arms. I just don’t have an issue with reading nothing else for the negation.

@Sunyo

“something else [which exited before death, something apart from the six senses] will now [after death] no longer exist”.

This is the interpretation in question. I understand what you’re saying. Like I mentioned earlier you are taking ‘something else’ to be a positive assertion of existence besides the aggregates. Then the whole tetralemma fails in your view because that something else doesn’t actually exist. Right? Again, that could’ve been simply expressed in one sentence in the sutta. Which takes us to your point about Ven Sariputta’s response:

@Sunyo

To proliferate means ‘to add to’. When you propose that something else exists beyond the six senses (whether it continues after death or not) you are ‘proliferating’ beyond the six senses, you’re adding something that is not there.

I don’t think this does justice to papanca which is closely tied to the formation of concepts and ideas about the world (see concept and reality by Ven Nanananda). It’s not ‘to add to’ that I’ve seen. I’ve never seen such a translation, do you have reason for it? It more has a meaning of ‘spreading apart, diffuseness, expansion’ of concepts/thinking.

So if the meaning of ‘conceptual proliferation’ is correct than both ideas of something and nothing could be criticized here. Anyways I agree that proposing something beyond the six sense bases is papanca (because it is an imaginary conceptual proliferation). The same can be said about proposing nothing else (or if you prefer “something else doesn’t exist”) which is also an imaginary conceptual proliferation because there is quite literally 0 evidence or logical basis to make such a claim-it’s a purely philosophical game/exercise. All we can talk about is our world of experience, there is no basis for discussions past this. When all phenomena have vanished so have all means of speaking.

The parinibbana of an arahant is described as being beyond language yet both of these positions fit the arahant’s parinibbana into a simply and easy to understand answer. If it’s beyond language (stated multiple times in the suttas) then why can you so easily state in language “well they didn’t exist before so they don’t exist after” or else for our sutta “something else didn’t exist before so it doesn’t exist after”?

Anyways here’s another good sutta for this as well SN 44.11:

“Master Kaccāna, when asked these questions, you say that this has not been declared by the Buddha. What’s the cause, what’s the reason why this has not been declared by the Buddha?”

“In order to describe him as ‘possessing form’ or ‘formless’ or ‘percipient’ or ‘non-percipient’ or ‘neither percipient nor non-percipient’, there must be some cause or reason for doing so. But if that cause and reason were to totally and utterly cease without anything left over, how could you describe him in any such terms?"

Notice it’s the ‘cause and reason [for description]’ that’s “totally and utterly ceasing” here. So more explicitly: the cause and reason for describing the arahant as not existing after death (tetralemma is mentioned before this) has totally ceased. There is no basis for designation of any kind.

@Sunyo

You shouldn’t do that, because such a thing doesn’t exist.

Again, it seems much easier to just say “such a thing doesn’t exist” like you do here, yet the sutta doesn’t.

@Sunyo

Look, the suttas often describe things in verbose ways which we could imagine being said more briefly. The length of a passage is not an argument for or against what it means.

The problem is that the sutta isn’t just explaining simple ideas verbosely. It’s bringing in more subtle ideas and explanations. Those ideas and explanations don’t easily simplify to the point you’re trying to make IMO. If they were equivalent there would be no problem like you say here.

[Pondera]

@Erika_ODonnell

Yes, that’s how I understand DO. Ignorance (e.g. of non-self) creates the energy that fuels the rebirth process.

Is it knowledge of non-self specifically which depletes the fuel of the rebirth process, IYO?

@Erika_ODonnell

I have to idea what this means or refers to

It is like this:

I’ve seen you, house-builder!
You won’t build a house again!
Your rafters are all broken,
your roof-peak is demolished.
My mind, set on demolition,
has reached the end of craving.

Dhp154

Ie. when the Self is seen for what it is, the “spokes” that bind us to the wheel of becoming, those spokes are utterly destroyed, and the hub of the wheel falls out. The Self is extinguished.

It’s interesting, IMO, that the Buddha often explains the Self as being that which would say, “I would be this!” And that wish would be granted.

But since we cannot say of our Self, “let me be this!” - then what kind of Self do we assume to have?

Yet, the Buddha could travel to the Brahma worlds and beyond as easily as a man would stretch and flex his arm.

[Preston]

@Javier

This must also be balanced with positive descriptions of nibbana from the suttas.

Yes I agree actually.

@Javier

Otherwise, this would be in contradiction to positive descriptions of nibbana which have ontological connotations.

I don’t think need to worry about ontology at all. What matters is our world of experience and suffering within this ‘fathom long body’. Even here and now worrying about the nature of existence isn’t relevant. Actually I think trying to fit nibbana into any ontological category is based on not understanding how views are formed. Any view of existence or nonexistence is just based on a ‘feeling of the real’ or a ‘feeling of the unreal’. That feeling is taken seriously and due to craving and clinging transforms into a held view. But the view is still rooted in the ‘evocative impact’ of that original feeling and perception, that’s it!

@Javier

Likewise, I see “existence” here as an absolute or essentialist kind of existence, not existence simpliciter.

Whether it’s labelled as ‘existence simpliciter’ or not it’s still a view of existence after the death of an arahant. No description whatsoever left.

@Javier

Thus, I see this sutta’s refusal to say anything about nibbana as contextual.

I agree. But I’d say the context is wherever we are talking about nibbana here and now or nibbana after death (i.e. the ‘fate’ of an arahant).

@Javier

But in other cases when talking to different people the Buddha made more positive assertions.

Can you give a clearcut example where after the parinibbana of an arahant they are said to be in an experience (or state of wellbeing) of any kind? (Sorry if you already cited this before)

@Javier

If the Buddha’s view on nibbana was an absolute refusal to describe it at all, then he would really have not used any positive language to describe it and would have always used apophatic descriptions.

Isn’t the positive language usually about living arahants? See above question.

@Javier

If you’re going to teach and promote a view as a spiritual goal, you have to explain it somehow, you have to say something

Of course, but I’m not saying to avoid describing nibbana at all. The Buddha did describe the desirability of nibbana as the destruction of greed/hate/delusion, but he refused to describe in any way the existence/nonexistence of the after-death arahant.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Pondera

Is it knowledge of non-self specifically which depletes the fuel of the rebirth process, IYO?

There are more fetters than self-view though of course, but overcoming self-view and the conceit ‘I am’ seem central to me.

@Pondera

But since we cannot say of our Self, “let me be this!” - then what kind of Self do we assume to have?

I tend to focus more on the “this is me, I am this” / “this is not me, I am not this” part than the self/Atman. Anatta (not my Self) seems more aimed at religious theories, but IMO, the underlying problem is anyway our relationship to our mind and body. We think the mind and body are “me” but on close inspection we discover those beliefs can’t be justified.

[Sunyo]

@Javier

I think this has been a fruitful exchange. Thank you for helping me think through this issue further and also, thank you for being so gracious with your time and letting me have the last word. I know things are probably busy in the monastery!

Thanks! I don’t know if it’s busy in “the monastery”. I’m staying in another vihara (hence the opinion to use the internet more than usual).

Let me summarize.

You see cessation as a kind of annihilation, and I agreed: it’s the annihilation of suffering. But I argued it’s not the annihilation denied in the suttas, because it’s only impersonal processes of flux come to an end, no entity living inside of us is destroyed. It’s like the flame being blown out: nothing is eradicated when it does. You agreed what I espouse is not the annihilation denied by the Buddha, but disagreed with it on various other grounds.

Your view we called continuitism. It still seems to me that this is the same as eternalism, because there is some subtle essence which continues on eternally, whether or not we call this a self is just a matter of definition to me. Sorry for failing to understand the difference.

The ontological outcome of one-life materialist death may imaginably be the same as cessationism, but we shouldn’t forget that this is just a thought experiment. I don’t think we’re living in a purely material universe, which would be fundamentally different from ours in many ways that we can’t even imagine. I want to also emphasize that your concerns about people committing suicide because of being attracted to non-existence don’t seem to apply. People who commit suicide have a completely different mindset than I have, and if they commit suicide because of my ideas, then they haven’t understood them correctly. Luckily, though, in my experience depressed people are actually helped by hearing from somebody who can accept with a smile that life is suffering, that that’s OK, and that you don’t have anything special to attain.

And that was the main thing I’ve hoped to get across: that it can be accepted with a smile. Because people might imagine that cessationists are by default some sort of depressed nihilists, but that’s not the case. I think cessation is beautiful and inspiring, and worthy of being called marvelous by the Buddha. But it does require a big change of perspective, namely to depersonalize both existence and nibbāna, to see them from a 3rd person perspective as it were. When there’s no “I”, it’s just suffering ending itself. I think that’s cool.

You said in your last post that value disappears at that point as well. But there’s only the idea of “value”, and since that idea is created by the mind, is ultimately doesn’t matter if it is lost. We might even say that value itself, being made by the mind, is suffering! Since value itself is not inherently valuable, I don’t see why it is preferable to keep it in existence. It seems that is just the continuance of an illusion for its own sake. And let’s say it’s not an illusion, then still, if you say continuity is more valuable because something of value continues, then that seems circular to me.

Despite us not coming to a single conclusion, I feel we still came closer together. I’ve learned from this discussion not to jump to conclusions about the views of others, that their views may be more subtle than I assume. Thank you for reminding me of that, it will be very helpful for me.

I might still pop into this discussion later. But I think we reached a good end point. Would like to hear if you have any final words.

Thanks for the exchange.

[Sunyo]

@Preston

Then the whole tetralemma fails in your view because that something else doesn’t actually exist. Right? Again, that could’ve been simply expressed in one sentence in the sutta.

Yup, right! But it is stated more briefly in other places. “The six senses are everything [or ‘the all’]” is one. And another: “This being/person consists of the six senses.” SN5.10, on the aggregates comprising the ‘being’, that there’s “nothing but suffering arising and passing way”. Nibbāna being the end of existence is also another, effectively. Even the definition of the aggregates to include any kind of perception/consciousness whatsoever, and then being defined as the six senses. The idea is really quite pervasive in the suttas, I’d say. That’s why I think we have to read this AN4.173 in light of all this, if possible.

And then I showed how that is possible. You don’t want to discuss the Pali further, so then I’ll just assume you agree it’s at least possible that the phrase on “nothing” be read differently.

If you say that both “there is something else beyond the senses” and “there is nothing else beyond the senses” are proliferation, then you are effectively saying you don’t know whether there is something beyond the six senses or not. Is that right? Is that your view?

Either case, I think the Buddha did know. He always said he knew and see things as they really are. This is not just a philosophical game, it can actually be realized, by seeing the six senses temporarily cease and having nothing remaining. It is insight into what life is, insight into what extent there is existence and consciousness (just the six senses). And I think AN4.173 can very easily be read so it’s in agreement with that knowledge. It’s not a major grammatical twist or anything. To me it’s actually the most natural reading, it’s the translation “nothing” which adds the twist.

Parinibbāna is exactly the cessation of it all. This is why it also is called “remainderless”. Because nothing is left to be experienced. It is also said in SN12.51 that after parinibbāna “only bodily remains are left”. To me it’s clear what that means. There’s nothing beyond the six senses.

Don’t take this personal, but this concept of existence or nibbana being unknowable is to me just an elaborated version of the equivocators in DN1. “I don’t say it’s like this; I don’t say it’s like that.” It sounds perhaps profound but in actuality it isn’t. It’s just avoiding making any definite statements. I don’t think the Buddha did that.

@Preston

but he refused to describe in any way the existence/nonexistence of the after-death arahant.

How does this differ from:

whether there neither is nor is not fruit and result of good and bad deeds … whether a Realized One exists after death … whether a Realized One doesn’t exist after death … whether a Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death … whether a Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death. If I believed there was, I would say so. But I don’t say it’s like this. I don’t say it’s like that. I don’t say it’s otherwise. I don’t say it’s not so. And I don’t deny it’s not so.’ (DN1)