What do you think about Ven Thanissaro’s view on Nibbāna?

[Preston]

Thanks for the response. I feel like we are getting somewhere now.

@Sunyo

“The six senses are everything [or ‘the all’]”

Great quote. It also includes:

“If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all’ —that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain

Which contradicts any idea of describing ‘something beyond the all’. A point we agree on.

@Sunyo

The idea is really quite pervasive in the suttas, I’d say.

Yes but what is that idea? That these sets are the true ‘building blocks’ of reality which is ‘behind experience’? Or that they are ways of pointing out different parts of our experiential world? The first idea results in an ontology that leads to the view “there is nothing left after the arahant’s parinibbana”. But the second requires making no assumptions because it doesn’t posit these different sets as anything other than conceptualizations of experience.

@Sunyo

That’s why I think we have to read this AN4.173 in light of all this, if possible.

It really depends on how we understand the things you’ve mentioned.

@Sunyo

then you are effectively saying you don’t know whether there is something beyond the six senses or not. Is that right? Is that your view?

No, definitely not! This is the “view” we can use when dealing with the tetralemma (which is closely tied to whether there is something beyond the sense bases):

AN 10.96
“When asked about all these points, you say that’s not your view.

Yet when asked whether you neither know nor see, you say, ‘That’s not so, reverend. I do know and see.’ How then should we see the meaning of this statement?”

“‘The cosmos is eternal. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly:’ that’s a misconception. ‘The cosmos is not eternal. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly:’ that’s a misconception. ‘The world is finite …’ … ‘The world is infinite …’ … ‘The soul and the body are the same thing …’ … ‘The soul and the body are different things …’ … ‘A Realized One exists after death …’ … ‘A Realized One doesn’t exist after death …’ … ‘A Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death …’ … ‘A Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly:’ that’s a misconception.

I know and see the scope of convictions, the scope of grounds for views, fixation on views, obsession with views, the origin of views, and the uprooting of views. Knowing and seeing thus, why should I say: ‘I neither know nor see?’ I do know and see.”

The answer here is to ‘see through’ the views. To understand their formation, and the escape from them. To be clear I see parinibbana as an apophatic absolute. So there is no description that can describe it nor limit it nor designate it as any of the four arms of the tetralemma. Even saying ‘it’ or ‘apophatic absolute’ is too much. It is beyond logic, reasoning, and description because the grounds for these have completely ceased. The view “there is nothing left” is an imagination about what happens at parinibbana that can fit into the mind. Therefore it’s a formation of the mind, a projection of the mind based on clinging. The same with the other options. All notions cease when all fabrications cease. This includes all notions/designations about the experiential world such as the sense bases, or aggregates. The experience of these all cease.

@Sunyo

It sounds perhaps profound but in actuality it isn’t. It’s just avoiding making any definite statements. I don’t think the Buddha did that.

I’m not just avoiding making definite statements. I’m rejecting the formation of all speculative views whatsoever based on an understanding of how they come to arise and cease in experience (see above sutta). This is a strong positive claim about epistemology. This differs a lot from your DN 1 quote.

EDIT: I think this will be my last post in this thread. The ideas are ironically bouncing around in my head too much. Anyways @Sunyo and @Javier (or anyone else) please respond if you would like and I’ll still make sure to read what you say.

[Pondera]

@Erika_ODonnell

here are more fetters than self-view though of course, but overcoming self-view and the conceit ‘I am’ seem central to me.

Central; but is there an underlying mechanism which the erroneous view of Self has, such that, by not identifying it as erroneous, it binds us to the khandas?

@Erika_ODonnell

We think the mind and body are “me” but on close inspection we discover those beliefs can’t be justified.

Not justified; but somehow integral to continued rebirth and suffering.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Pondera

Central; but is there an underlying mechanism which the erroneous view of Self has, such that, by not identifying it as erroneous, it binds us to the khandas?

DO is the underlying mechanism

Edit: But like, if you think existence contains your self, you’re going to want to keep existing (bhavatanha), AFAIK. Or, you’re going to want/desire to keep existence going since that’s where your self lives.

Edit2: That desire/wanting to exist fuels rebirth, that’s how I understand it anyway.

@Pondera

Not justified; but somehow integral to continued rebirth and suffering.

Yes. Are you implying that holding an unjustified belief is inconsistent with experiencing suffering? I’m not 100% sure what you’re saying here.

[Pondera]

@Erika_ODonnell

Edit2: That desire/wanting to exist fuels rebirth, that’s how I understand it anyway.

Fair enough

@Erika_ODonnell

Yes. Are you implying that holding an unjustified belief is inconsistent with experiencing suffering? I’m not 100% sure what you’re saying here.

Well … no. The belief is unjustified, I agree. And it is consistent with suffering.

I’m sort of pointing towards an “ontology” of the Self which would explain why and how it exists as the supporting condition for rebirth.

IMO, it’s not merely unjustified. It’s particularly pernicious and exists as a solid construct (ie. one which is very difficult to let go of).

I’m just speaking from experience here, but the Self is a mind made construct, which functions. It’s not merely a “invisible mermaid” - if you know what I mean. It isn’t real, but it acts as though it were - from one life time to the next. Just my take on things.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Pondera

I’m just speaking from experience here, but the Self is a mind made construct, which functions. It’s not merely a “invisible mermaid” - if you know what I mean. It isn’t real, but it acts as though it were - from one life time to the next. Just my take on things.

That’s interesting! I guess I think more in terms of identity view; i.e. a set of beliefs about the body and the mind & mental stuff that turn out to be wrong upon investigation. How do you come to discover or learn about the Self as a mind made construct? (and what is a ‘construct’ in this context?)

[Brahmali]

Thanks for the good discussion! For what it’s worth, here are a few additional comments.

@kolayi

The first is that it’s not a blank of nothingness. Instead, it’s a type of consciousness.

There are exactly six classes of consciousness, corresponding to the six senses. This is called the “all” (SN 35.23-29). There just isn’t any seventh class of consciousness that somehow relates to Nibbāna.

@Jhana4

I think TB in his book made a good point about ancient Indian metaphysics possibly altering our understanding of a fire being “extinguished”

The Buddha did not just accept Vedic ideas. The Buddha was a pragmatist who investigated all of his experience. It seems unlikely to me that he would have accepted an ancient idea of fire somehow existing in a latent state after being extinguished. What we see is the fire going out, and this would have been the basis for the Buddha’s similes. Otherwise he would have commented on it.

@Jhana4

There was also one sutta that stated that super advanced meditators could get momentary glimpses of what nibanna is like. The implication being living people could not do that if nibanna means there is zero left.

You can know Nibbāna inferentially. Once you know it inferentially, you can take an idea of Nibbāna as the object of samādhi.

@DhammaWiki

On another forum, one long-time member said something like “we’re wasting our time; we’re meditating to no longer exist.”

This sort of statement makes it clear why this discussion is so difficult. The point is that you don’t exist in the first place. All that exists is dukkha. And it’s only dukkha that no longer exists.

It takes insight to see this. Without that insight, it will always seem baffling.

@Erika_ODonnell

I wonder if this is a real pattern (can anyone disconfirm it?), but it seems like nibbana = eternal consciousness views tend to correlate with soft jhanas

Yes, this is how it seems to me too. If you think you have attained a jhāna when you haven’t, then you will have a hard time interpreting the real thing if and when it happens. A natural understanding will be to see the real jhāna as Nibbāna.

@Javier

I find it quite difficult to see how the “total extinguishment view” - what I call the classic Theravada view that all forms of consciousness or awareness disappear at nibbana - is different than the annihilationism of a materialist. I also find it difficult to see how its different than spiritual suicide.

Of course it’s difficult. In fact, it’s impossible. That’s what it means to be trapped in delusion. It’s the sense of self that gets in the way. Remove that and you open up the possibility of seeing all of experience as suffering.

Compared to materialist annihilation, cessation is like the ending of a stomach pain. You would never call the ending of such pain “annihilation”. It’s the same with the ending of the five aggregates.

@Javier

My main concern with this is that this annihilationism2 nibbana, as a spiritual goal, does not seem to be a very attractive goal at all.

Again, this is only so from the point of view of the sense of self. Remove that delusion and cessation seems like the most attractive thing possible.

@Javier

This is why I ultimately like Thanissaro’s interpretation more. It’s not due to textual or hermeneutic concerns, but philosophical ones.

Philosophical concerns are only as useful as the root assumptions they embody. Views that are derived from the sense of self must themselves be deluded.

@Javier

But just because there’s no fixed self that is annihilated does not mean there’s nothing, and that thus nothing is coming to an end at paranibbana.

The problem is you don’t know how you will see things once you remove the delusion of a self. This is the issue. Once you remove the delusion, cessation seems entirely attractive. Because this view is inaccessible to the ordinary person, there will always have to be some degree of confidence or faith in this.

When you say

@Javier

And this is a kind of loss of value that is meaningful (especially when its the mind of an awakened being)

you are assuming you know how you will perceive after the sense of self is removed. But this is precisely what you cannot know. Whatever you think it will be like is still subject to delusion. Again, it here that confidence in the Buddha is paramount, not confidence in any other teacher.

@Javier

The value of this seems obviously superior than the value of non existence and its loss seems like a serious loss to the whole world.

The whole world has gained through the awakening of the Buddha. Yes, it is a loss to the world when he dies, but the consequence of awakening is cessation. If it wasn’t, it would be comparatively worthless.

@Javier

It still seems better for there to be some continuity after paranibbana of a blissful and liberated kind of subtle being than for there to be nothing after.

In the standard sequence of increasing happiness, found for instance in MN 59, the happiness of equanimity (fourth jhāna) is greater than the happiness of bliss (the first three jhānas). The sequence then continues through the formless attainments, including the sphere of nothingness, which is a greater kind of happiness than the fourth jhāna. It culminates in the cessation of perception and feeling, which is the highest happiness of all. Your view here is contrary to this standard sutta exposition.

@Javier

One of the interesting points he makes in this video is that nibbana is described in some suttas with terms which suggest a positive metaphysical reality, such as dhatu (element), ayatana (dimension), etc.

The suttas uses the word dhātu in relation to, for instance, renunciation and cessation. These words are not “elements” in the usual sense of the word, but could perhaps be rendered as “properties”. So a better rendering of dhātu might indeed be “property”. A similar argument holds for āyatana.

@Javier

But anyways, I don’t see my view as equivocation because I see the “existence” that the Buddha rejects as the existence of a self

But the idea of continuity after death is precisely the positing of a self. Any sort of existence can be taken as a self, and that is precisely why it is so attractive: you don’t cease to exist. Continuation after death and nonself are incompatible with each other.

@Javier

We exist as dependently arisen streams / processes, but this is not an absolute kind of existence.

You can only understand how a noble individual relates to the process of dependent origination once you have removed the sense of self. Any idea of existence coming from an ordinary person, whether it’s regarded as a process or something else, is bound to be deluded. This follows from the definition of an ordinary person.

@Javier

However, I think there is room for a kind of being that is not vijñana but neither non-existence.

An unconscious kind of being is surely a contradiction in terms.

@Javier

You cannot say much about what it is, though I would describe it as an unconditioned and transcendent reality.

Sorry, but this sounds like speculation to me. All human experiences are limited in time and space. Things that are endless, timeless, or beyond time/space cannot be experienced. Whenever an experience, such a samādhi, is labelled as endless or infinite, it adds speculation to the raw data of experience. In other words, such ideas are all figments of the imagination. To me, your ideas here fall into this category.

@Javier

Just because it is a positive reality does not mean it’s an atman.

The important point is whether it will be taken as an ātman, that is, perceived as an ātman by the ordinary person. And the answer to this must surely be yes.

@Javier

if we had a button that we could press that would delete the entire universe along with all beings in it, you would be logically entailed by cessationalism to press it.

This question is unanswerable without context. The Buddhist reality is that people are either awakened or not. If everyone were awakened, then there would be no problem pressing the button. If everyone were not, however, there would be no point in pressing it since they would just be reborn. The question as it stands is meaningless from a Buddhist point of view.

@Javier

if his view was not similar to positivism in some way, why did people keep mistaking it for a self?

Because this is the natural inclination of most people. Annihilationism is a minority view. They want to exists, to carry on. They will bend the Dhamma to this end. I mean, this is just how delusion works, like confirmation bias.

[Pondera]

@Erika_ODonnell

How do you come to discover or learn about the Self as a mind made construct?

Generally speaking, vippassana is the way. Mindfulness is established and penetrative insight into the three marks is accomplished on the basis of such “unrepentant” mindfulness.

Then, viewing external reality, one knows:

“All perceptions are marked by ill, by impermanence, and by not-Self.”

Perception itself is an illness; clinging to external objects; remaining conscious of external objects; clinging tightly to suffering.

So, one examines the nature of consciousness. It has the tendency to cling. However, the further one examines the three marks, the less he clings to suffering and perception via consciousness.

Then Consciousness is eventually let go of by the mind. This occurs at the point of dispassion and disenchantment.

And the mind is released from external perceptions. There is only internal bodily feeling and perception remaining. This is the “event horizon” of the Self, as I see it. It is a mind-made framework upon which feelings and perceptions rest.

It’s a bit like when the world system begins to evolve and the palace of Brahma appears out of nothing, as it were, but it is empty.

We are like that. At our foundation, our mind-made bodies just form out of consciousness. Like the architecture of Brahma’s Empty Palace, our mind-made bodies are these holy, mystical forms that sentient beings are composed of.

There is no point of origin for them. They are our own personal “blueprints”. And we carry them with us throughout Samsara as we get bogged down in perception, feeling, form, and volition.

That’s how I view it anyways. In my younger years, I endured four years of binding. Then four months of spiritual journey, resulting in, maybe, 15 minutes of knowing what this Self is and also what happens when it deconstructs.

It was a good 15 minutes, but ultimately it only informed me of reality. It did not become my reality. I only rant here for the purpose of informing. I should say, I mention these observations for the purpose of discussion. It is not, for example, the object of my own life to recreate those 15 minutes of Unbinding; mainly because it was a culmination of too many years of suffering in the making.

I’ve settled for minor spiritual accomplishments at this stage. I’ve settled into the householders life. I cultivate my own minor accomplishments and hope for the best.

[Dan]

@Brahmali

@Erika_ODonnell

I wonder if this is a real pattern (can anyone disconfirm it?), but it seems like nibbana = eternal consciousness views tend to correlate with soft jhanas

Yes, this is how it seems to me too. If you think you have attained a jhāna when you haven’t, then you will have a hard time interpreting the real thing if and when it happens. A natural understanding will be to see the real jhāna as Nibbāna.

There are quite a few “internet stream enterers” who don’t seem to be bad people and seem actually lovely but I suspect stumbled into first jhana once and then thought they were enlightened . Its less innocent when they confront the fetters again then instead of thinking “hey I might be wrong here” I dunno… literally go and write a book… and instead have the arrogance and delusion to reconsider the model of the fetters and instead redefine enlightenment to match their experience then they cut off generations behind them from the dhamma and confuse lots of people it is kind of sad. Ah! the perils of an internet connection and trying to evaluate ones own practice to identify with experiences (personality view). What was initially born of good and cause for humility becomes more sakayaditthi.

[Sunyo]

@Brahmali

This question is unanswerable without context. The Buddhist reality is that people are either awakened or not. If everyone were awakened, then there would be no problem pressing the button. If everyone were not, however, there would be no point in pressing it since they would just be reborn. The question as it stands is meaningless from a Buddhist point of view.

But Bhante, the proposition was that button eradicates the whole universe, it doesn’t just kill people. The ultimate Bodhisattva device Everybody parinibbānas straight away.

Then would the fully enlightened cessationist logically be forced to press it?

It’s a nice way to investigate our attachments and views.

I still hold that it ultimately doesn’t matter, and that one isn’t logically forced to.

[Brahmali]

@Sunyo

But Bhante, the proposition was that button eradicates the whole universe, it doesn’t just kill people.

To evaluate this we need to ask what will happen to those who are not awakened. Just because you eradicate the entire universe does not mean they will attain Nibbāna, right? So they will presumably be stuck somewhere, in which case eradicating the universe will be a bad idea.

Or are you suggesting that these people will simply cease? If this is the case, you have effectively given them final awakening for free, the highest gift! Surely in such a case you should eradicate the universe.

[Pondera]

@Brahmali

Surely in such a case you should eradicate the universe.

I have to smile when I read this. I wonder if the Bhante and the Venerable really know what they’re talking about.

There is a state where one person eradicates the universe. It is not a hypothetical. I pause, for it is an interesting scenario faced by many with psychosis.

It may be one of those topics that should remain hush hush. Wikipedia had an entry on this a long time ago. I’m surprised I even found the entry rehashed by another website.

When I endured this psychosis, the information was readily available. 20 years later it exists as an obscure reference on an obscure website. At least it still exists.

Without further ado; for those wondering what it’s like to eradicate the universe with one’s mind, please refer to:

Annihilation Anxieties | Encyclopedia.com

[sood]

Hi Bhante,
If it is okay, I would like to probe a bit on this point.

@Brahmali

You can know Nibbāna inferentially. Once you know it inferentially, you can take an idea of Nibbāna as the object of samādhi.

By samādhi, do you refer to the usual EBT idea of the 4 absorptions but this time with a new object to calm the mind, or does this samādhi include some qualitatively new things?

For example, one possibility of a new feature that some meditation traditions propose is a kind of meditation that involves a peaceful cessation of the aggregates for extended periods of time before the aggregates re-arise for a noble person. Would something like this fall in this samādhi for you?

Such a thing seems plausible to me because once there is the knowledge of the 4 noble truths for a noble person, their mind should naturally incline towards cessation, so with the intention to cease for a period of time, it should be possible for them to let go and cease for that period of time. Maybe, this is related to this thread because if there is great peace and happiness involved in such a cessation, it would contradict the view that cessation has no value that was posited earlier.

[Pondera]

@Brahmali

Or are you suggesting that these people will simply cease?

Just as a follow up, you guys can all rest easy … I did not succeed at eradicating the universe with my annihilation anxiety. The universe decided to eradicate “me” (ie. my Self) instead

What if I, in whatever state I’m in when fear & terror come to me, were to subdue that fear & terror in that very state?’ So when fear & terror came to me while I was walking back & forth, I would not stand or sit or lie down. I would keep walking back & forth until I had subdued that fear & terror. When fear & terror came to me while I was standing, I would not walk or sit or lie down. I would keep standing until I had subdued that fear & terror. When fear & terror came to me while I was sitting, I would not lie down or stand up or walk. I would keep sitting until I had subdued that fear & terror. When fear & terror came to me while I was lying down, I would not sit up or stand or walk. I would keep lying down until I had subdued that fear & terror.

MN4

We aren’t all thoroughbreds like the Buddha, sadly. Some of us drooling idiots succumb to the fear and terror.

[Javier]

Hey everyone. Thanks for all the responses. At this point, I think I’ve made most of the arguments in defense of my perspective that I was going to make. So, this will likely be my last post in this thread. As you all likely know, this topic is one of those religious topics that has the potential to lead to endless back and forth discussions (there is a thread over at Dhammawheel with like 160+ pages stretching back to 2010 or something like that!). I don’t want to be like one of those posters that just relentlessly posts over and over in defense of his personal views - who wants that! Also, since the metaphysical nature of nibbana is ultimately beyond everyone but a Buddha, it seems excessive to keep arguing about it for days on end instead of just doing something else with my time. So, I think I will bring my contribution to this thread to a close for now. I think it was a fruitful discussion which helped us clarify where various individuals stand on this very difficult topic. Also, I want to say that I think Buddhism is a big tent, and there is room in there for different opinions on difficult topics. So I don’t think that us having different opinions on this makes none of us any less a student of the Buddha. After all, this is a question which can only be answered with certainty by our own experience of the end of the path.

With that said, I will respond to some concerns raised by some posters above.

@Preston

You stated that we should not be concerned with ontology at all, since for nibbana after death, there is no metaphysical description at all that can apply to it. In this case, all descriptions which have any ontological connotations of nibbana would be of the nibbana with residue. But this does not seem right to me. Obviously, the Buddha is concerned to rule out “non-existence” and “existence” as ontological descriptions of nibbana after death. So, he is concerned with the ontology of this! Why should we not? To me, it seems ontology, value theory, ethics, and philosophy of religion are all closely intertwined. This is because I have a holistic view of philosophy of religion, in which all these branches of philosophy have a role. And so, I think that the attempt to cut off all ontological concerns when it comes to nibbana after death is mistaken.

@Sunyo

Thanks again for all the discussion and ideas for me to further ponder. I will only respond to one thing here and that’s it! You stated that all value is illusory and doesn’t really matter if valuable things are lost since they’re made by mind. Well, the only response I have to this is that this view seems to be as a species of ethical nihilism which is defined in this IEP article as a view which “rejects the possibility of absolute moral or ethical values” or alternatively Wikipedia as “the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong.” The problem here for your position is obvious to me. If there is no ethical foundation for our values (such as the inherent value of certain mental states, like conscious states free of suffering), then you have no grounds with which to argue for any normative ethics. For example, you cannot argue that attaining nibbana is more valuable than not attaining nibbana.

@Brahmali

Some of your responses to me focused on restating the view that since the awakened stream of consciousness which ceases to exist is not seen from the point of view of a self (and has no view of self), its attainment of non-existence is not concerning at all. But to me this does not seem right. Even if you remove the view of a self, it seems obvious to me that the existence of a positive reality, state, or element which is free of suffering is more valuable than pure non-existence.

This leads to your second related concern: “you don’t know how you will see things once you remove the delusion of a self.” Yes, very well, I accept this. However, this cuts against cessationalism as well and would only land us in agnosticism (unless you are arguing from authority and are claiming to have removed the view of self, which would mean you’re some kind of stream enterer). The appeal to faith in the Buddha does not help cessationalism either, since it is precisely the issue of how best to interpret the Budhda’s view that is under dispute.

While I cannot know for sure how I would see things if I totally uprooted my view of self, I also do not think that my sense of value would be so radically transformed either. After all, the Buddha did not toss out basic ethics when he became enlightened (indeed, he retained pretty much the same type of sramanic ethics as the Jains had, with a few differences), neither did he change the original view he had at the beginning of the path, that something which is deathless, eternal, and unconditioned is the supreme goal. What changed was his understanding of that goal, which became deeper. So, I just don’t buy that removing the view of self fully devalues the continuity of an awakened reality.

Regarding “the standard sequence of increasing happiness”, this is just one scale of attainments found in the suttas. Other passages focus on more positive experiences, such as the unestablished consciousness. Another interesting sutta is AN 9.38, which has a monk “enter and remain in the cessation of perception and feeling.” Immediately afterward, they are said to ‘see with wisdom.’ So whatever this state is, it is not a state of blank nothingness, but one which can also includes wisdom. Furthermore, there have been some concerns raised by some scholars, like Bronkhorst IIRC, regarding the authenticity or at least importance of the formless attainments in early Buddhism. So, I am just not sure if this is the strongest doctrine to support cessationalism.

Regarding your description of dhatu and ayatana being a “property”, this still has ontological connotations. SEP says “properties are those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them.”

I think the rest of your responses are mostly mere denials of my position, arguing that it is contradictory or that it’s a self. I think I have said enough about this in my previous responses. I can understand why people think I am positing a self, but I just disagree that anything that is not non-existent is automatically a self. I guess we just have somewhat different views of what counts as a self in this case. The cessationalist seems to have a less permissive view of it which to me just seems excessive.

Finally, I will just note that the fact that you would eradicate the universe in my thought experiment shows that cessationalism ultimately collapses into the view of a terminator (venayiko). At this point, all I can say is “come with me if you want to live.”

[Jasudho]

This has been an interesting discussion.

A few reflections:

@Javier

If there is no ethical foundation for our values (such as the inherent value of certain mental states, like conscious states free of suffering), then you have no grounds with which to argue for any normative ethics. For example, you cannot argue that attaining nibbana is more valuable than not attaining nibbana.

The Buddha never taught AFAIK that anything conditional – all “things”, experiences, khandhas, the All – had any inherent value. If this is not the case, could you please provide the sutta references?

Rather, everything conditional is taught as inherently dukkha: Dukkhameva uppajjamānaṁ uppajjati, dukkhaṁ nirujjhamānaṁ nirujjhatī Ettāvatā kho, kaccāna, sammādiṭṭhi hoti. “Whatever arises and ceases is only dukkha arising and ceasing. This is how right view is defined.” SN 12.125

Regarding ethics, the Buddha did say was that sīla was a necessary and integral part of the Path, as we know, but that it, alone, could not lead to full liberation from dukkha. Indeed, the N8FP itself is kamma, AN4.237, (so if anything were to have “inherent value” then we might reasonably assign it to the N8FP).

But the Buddha, of course, taught it as the Path that leads to the cessation of dukkha (SN35.145 in TB’s notation). So it has value insofar as it leads to liberation, nibbāna.
Since morality and ethics are integral to the N8FP, the opinion that practitioners who understand final nibbāna as cessation therefore adhere to a view of ethical nihilism is not supported.

@Javier

the Buddha did not toss out basic ethics when he became enlightened

Of course. But while still alive this was both a natural expression of enlightenment as well as teaching by example, among other benefits. As posted by Ven. Sunyo and others earlier on this thread, and on other threads, it’s helpful to differentiate nibbāna with residue from nibbāna without residue, Iti44, (sometimes these are referred to as kilesa-nirodha and khandha-nirodha, respectively). While alive there is ongoing expression and manifestation of ethics. No room for ethical nihilism.

@Javier

Another interesting sutta is AN 9.38, which has a monk “enter and remain in the cessation of perception and feeling.” Immediately afterward, they are said to ‘see with wisdom.’ So whatever this state is, it is not a state of blank nothingness, but one which can also includes wisdom.

As you noted, “immediately afterward.…”; there cannot be seeing with wisdom while in this state which, by definition, is without perception, feeling, and hence, consciousness. In MN 44 the Buddha says that the only difference between the cessation of final niibbāna and a being in this state is the presence of vital life energy in the living being:

"“What’s the difference between someone who has passed away and a mendicant who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling?”

“When someone dies, their physical, verbal, and mental processes have ceased and stilled; their vitality is spent; their warmth is dissipated; and their faculties have disintegrated. When a mendicant has attained the cessation of perception and feeling [and consciousness], their physical, verbal, and mental processes have ceased and stilled. But their vitality is not spent; …"

Nowhere in the suttas, including in this one, does the Buddha then say that such beings have known or “seen” an ineffable alternate consciousness or a dynamic yet unconditioned “being-ness”.

Words like āyatana and dathu are needed to form intelligible sentences. They have a range of meanings and we might take them in that way, when the indescribable is being “described.”

[Sunyo]

@Javier

Thanks again for all the discussion and ideas for me to further ponder. I will only respond to one thing here and that’s it! You stated that all value is illusory and doesn’t really matter if valuable things are lost since they’re made by mind. Well, the only response I have to this is that this view seems to be as a species of ethical nihilism which is defined in this IEP article as a view which “rejects the possibility of absolute moral or ethical values” or alternatively Wikipedia as “the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong.” The problem here for your position is obvious to me. If there is no ethical foundation for our values (such as the inherent value of certain mental states, like conscious states free of suffering), then you have no grounds with which to argue for any normative ethics. For example, you cannot argue that attaining nibbana is more valuable than not attaining nibbana.

Also thanks again! I never thought about it this abstractly. I have no immediate retort to it either, so maybe you’re right. I indeed don’t think there is inherently right and wrong per se (if I’m correct in understanding that is what meta-ethics is about). Actions are just skillful and unskillful. Although I’ve never really thought about it, as I said. Maybe this is something for a future discussion. For now I can only say that I feel no ethical or philosophical conflicts with it.

Thanks for bringing it to my attention. And I also agree we are all equal students of the Buddha!

(Edit: Oops. I said I was going to give you the final word… but since I’m not disagreeing or arguing with you I hope you don’t mind.)

[Brahmali]

@Javier, thanks for your responses! I appreciate that you do not wish to carry on with this discussion. At the same time I think it is useful to continue until the important lines of arguments are exhausted. And so I shall reply to you in brief.

@Javier

The appeal to faith in the Buddha does not help cessationalism either, since it is precisely the issue of how best to interpret the Budhda’s view that is under dispute.

Well, I made this argument in part because of your own statement earlier on that

@Javier

Textually, I think Thanissaro’s view is difficult to establish on EBTs alone, though it’s a fair interpretation. However, it seems like the EBTs do not posit anything positive ontologically about nibbana.

@Javier

While I cannot know for sure how I would see things if I totally uprooted my view of self, I also do not think that my sense of value would be so radically transformed either.

I think you underestimate the impact of full insight. Here is a nice quote from the suttas:

What others say is happiness
the noble ones say is suffering.
What others say is suffering
the noble ones know as happiness. (SN 35.136)

@Javier

neither did he change the original view he had at the beginning of the path, that something which is deathless, eternal, and unconditioned is the supreme goal

I am guessing you are referring to MN 26. The context here is the Buddha-to-be seeing the danger in death, etc. He then seeks the freedom from this, called the amata. So context makes it quite clear that amata is not a “deathless state”, but rather a liberation from death. The same applies to all the other dangers he sees.

And I am not sure where you get “eternal” from. So far as I know, the Buddha-to-be is never said to have sought this.

@Javier

Regarding “the standard sequence of increasing happiness”, this is just one scale of attainments found in the suttas. Other passages focus on more positive experiences, such as the unestablished consciousness.

Indeed. But my point is precisely that there is no contradiction here. From your point of view, the suttas are inconsistent. In my opinion, we should avoid seeing inconsistencies in the suttas unless there is no other alternative.

@Javier

Another interesting sutta is AN 9.38, which has a monk “enter and remain in the cessation of perception and feeling.” Immediately afterward, they are said to ‘see with wisdom.’ So whatever this state is, it is not a state of blank nothingness, but one which can also includes wisdom.

You can expect very profound wisdom when you emerge from a state of complete cessation. Why? Because you will see for the first time that the ending of all things is the highest happiness. By “seeing” I mean that you infer the state of cessation from how the mind behaved just prior to it and how it emerged from it.

@Javier

Regarding your description of dhatu and ayatana being a “property”, this still has ontological connotations. SEP says “properties are those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them.”

Well, the problem then is my translation. The real issue is that dhātu is used very broadly in the suttas to include things like cessation (nirodha) and renunciation (nekkhamma). In other words, the word dhātu does not necessarily refer to something as positively existing.

@Javier

I guess we just have somewhat different views of what counts as a self in this case.

Right. I think a good guide here is to consider this from a psychological perspective. When one posits some sort of eternal existence after parinibbāna, does it feel like some sort of continuation? If it does, then I would say one is still holding on to a sense of self.

@Javier

At this point, all I can say is “come with me if you want to live.”

Gee, I’ve never really seen myself as the terminator! But my question to you is this: aren’t you here suggesting some sort of eternal life, with a concomitant self?

There is one important point that you did not reply to. I made the point that eternal things can never be known by a human mind, which must always be limited in time and space. All we ever see is transient phenomena. It follows that whenever anyone claims to have seen something eternal, infinite, or beyond time and space, it must be speculation. They are adding something to the raw data of their experience. Even deep states of samādhi, which are some of the most profound experiences available to humanity, are always limited in time. Yet the temptation to see them as eternal is very strong, as can be seen from the history of human thought. So again, when you posit an eternal mind, I say this is mere speculation, metaphysical speculation. It is not something that has a counterpart in experience. This is deeply troubling, for the Buddha was a pragmatist who only taught what he had actually experienced.

I rest my case! (Sorry, I am just being silly!)

[Sunyo]

@Sunyo

We spoke about these claims by Bhikkhu Bodhi already. I haven’t changed my mind since, but I’ll watch that video later. I will grant you that it is some of the harder to rebuke evidence in favor of your view

Having listened to the relevant section of Ven. Bodhi’s talk and done a cursory search through the suttas, I take this back. There are various instances of both dhātu and āyatana that do not support Bodhi’s notions that it is an ontologically positive, a certain existential state. Quite the opposite.

I won’t list all I found. Ven. Brahmali already mentioned nirodhadhātu, the “cessation-property”. In a sutta specifically called Dhātu-sutta in the Itivuttaka (Iti51), this is clearly a synonym for nibbāna, called there also the deathless (or ‘death-free’) “property” (amata dhātu).

MN102 (Pañcattaya Sutta) lists five categories of wrong views which among which is annihilationism. These are called āyatanas. I would translate it maybe as ‘options’; Sujato has ‘theses’.

Of course both cessation and annihilationism are the very opposite of an existential/ontological reality.

Perhaps I just trusted Bhikkhu Bodhi too much by assuming it would be hard to refute.

Ven. Bodhi also mentioned dhamma, but I’m not even going to search that word. It’s probably the most fluent word in the Pāli and vayadhamma, ‘nature to vanish’, is very common.

I touched upon padaṃ a while ago.

@Javier, not wanting to start a new argument.

[Radius]

@Ajahn Brahmali

… Nibbana cannot be regarded … as a form of consciousness … Final Nibbana is no more than the cessation of the five khandhas.

^^ for anyone who has not had their fill on the topic. I mention it, in part, because it appears to be a counterweight to…

@kolayi

it’s a type of consciousness

It also has a section titled “If Final Nibbāna is Mere Cessation, How is this Different from annihilation?”, which was being discussed upstream in this thread.

[kolayi]

@Brahmali

You can know Nibbāna inferentially. Once you know it inferentially, you can take an idea of Nibbāna as the object of samādhi

Excuse me bhante, which sutta is this from?