What do you think about Ven Thanissaro’s view on Nibbāna?

[Pondera]

@Brahmali

Or are you suggesting that these people will simply cease?

Just as a follow up, you guys can all rest easy … I did not succeed at eradicating the universe with my annihilation anxiety. The universe decided to eradicate “me” (ie. my Self) instead

What if I, in whatever state I’m in when fear & terror come to me, were to subdue that fear & terror in that very state?’ So when fear & terror came to me while I was walking back & forth, I would not stand or sit or lie down. I would keep walking back & forth until I had subdued that fear & terror. When fear & terror came to me while I was standing, I would not walk or sit or lie down. I would keep standing until I had subdued that fear & terror. When fear & terror came to me while I was sitting, I would not lie down or stand up or walk. I would keep sitting until I had subdued that fear & terror. When fear & terror came to me while I was lying down, I would not sit up or stand or walk. I would keep lying down until I had subdued that fear & terror.

MN4

We aren’t all thoroughbreds like the Buddha, sadly. Some of us drooling idiots succumb to the fear and terror.

[Javier]

Hey everyone. Thanks for all the responses. At this point, I think I’ve made most of the arguments in defense of my perspective that I was going to make. So, this will likely be my last post in this thread. As you all likely know, this topic is one of those religious topics that has the potential to lead to endless back and forth discussions (there is a thread over at Dhammawheel with like 160+ pages stretching back to 2010 or something like that!). I don’t want to be like one of those posters that just relentlessly posts over and over in defense of his personal views - who wants that! Also, since the metaphysical nature of nibbana is ultimately beyond everyone but a Buddha, it seems excessive to keep arguing about it for days on end instead of just doing something else with my time. So, I think I will bring my contribution to this thread to a close for now. I think it was a fruitful discussion which helped us clarify where various individuals stand on this very difficult topic. Also, I want to say that I think Buddhism is a big tent, and there is room in there for different opinions on difficult topics. So I don’t think that us having different opinions on this makes none of us any less a student of the Buddha. After all, this is a question which can only be answered with certainty by our own experience of the end of the path.

With that said, I will respond to some concerns raised by some posters above.

@Preston

You stated that we should not be concerned with ontology at all, since for nibbana after death, there is no metaphysical description at all that can apply to it. In this case, all descriptions which have any ontological connotations of nibbana would be of the nibbana with residue. But this does not seem right to me. Obviously, the Buddha is concerned to rule out “non-existence” and “existence” as ontological descriptions of nibbana after death. So, he is concerned with the ontology of this! Why should we not? To me, it seems ontology, value theory, ethics, and philosophy of religion are all closely intertwined. This is because I have a holistic view of philosophy of religion, in which all these branches of philosophy have a role. And so, I think that the attempt to cut off all ontological concerns when it comes to nibbana after death is mistaken.

@Sunyo

Thanks again for all the discussion and ideas for me to further ponder. I will only respond to one thing here and that’s it! You stated that all value is illusory and doesn’t really matter if valuable things are lost since they’re made by mind. Well, the only response I have to this is that this view seems to be as a species of ethical nihilism which is defined in this IEP article as a view which “rejects the possibility of absolute moral or ethical values” or alternatively Wikipedia as “the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong.” The problem here for your position is obvious to me. If there is no ethical foundation for our values (such as the inherent value of certain mental states, like conscious states free of suffering), then you have no grounds with which to argue for any normative ethics. For example, you cannot argue that attaining nibbana is more valuable than not attaining nibbana.

@Brahmali

Some of your responses to me focused on restating the view that since the awakened stream of consciousness which ceases to exist is not seen from the point of view of a self (and has no view of self), its attainment of non-existence is not concerning at all. But to me this does not seem right. Even if you remove the view of a self, it seems obvious to me that the existence of a positive reality, state, or element which is free of suffering is more valuable than pure non-existence.

This leads to your second related concern: “you don’t know how you will see things once you remove the delusion of a self.” Yes, very well, I accept this. However, this cuts against cessationalism as well and would only land us in agnosticism (unless you are arguing from authority and are claiming to have removed the view of self, which would mean you’re some kind of stream enterer). The appeal to faith in the Buddha does not help cessationalism either, since it is precisely the issue of how best to interpret the Budhda’s view that is under dispute.

While I cannot know for sure how I would see things if I totally uprooted my view of self, I also do not think that my sense of value would be so radically transformed either. After all, the Buddha did not toss out basic ethics when he became enlightened (indeed, he retained pretty much the same type of sramanic ethics as the Jains had, with a few differences), neither did he change the original view he had at the beginning of the path, that something which is deathless, eternal, and unconditioned is the supreme goal. What changed was his understanding of that goal, which became deeper. So, I just don’t buy that removing the view of self fully devalues the continuity of an awakened reality.

Regarding “the standard sequence of increasing happiness”, this is just one scale of attainments found in the suttas. Other passages focus on more positive experiences, such as the unestablished consciousness. Another interesting sutta is AN 9.38, which has a monk “enter and remain in the cessation of perception and feeling.” Immediately afterward, they are said to ‘see with wisdom.’ So whatever this state is, it is not a state of blank nothingness, but one which can also includes wisdom. Furthermore, there have been some concerns raised by some scholars, like Bronkhorst IIRC, regarding the authenticity or at least importance of the formless attainments in early Buddhism. So, I am just not sure if this is the strongest doctrine to support cessationalism.

Regarding your description of dhatu and ayatana being a “property”, this still has ontological connotations. SEP says “properties are those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them.”

I think the rest of your responses are mostly mere denials of my position, arguing that it is contradictory or that it’s a self. I think I have said enough about this in my previous responses. I can understand why people think I am positing a self, but I just disagree that anything that is not non-existent is automatically a self. I guess we just have somewhat different views of what counts as a self in this case. The cessationalist seems to have a less permissive view of it which to me just seems excessive.

Finally, I will just note that the fact that you would eradicate the universe in my thought experiment shows that cessationalism ultimately collapses into the view of a terminator (venayiko). At this point, all I can say is “come with me if you want to live.”

[Jasudho]

This has been an interesting discussion.

A few reflections:

@Javier

If there is no ethical foundation for our values (such as the inherent value of certain mental states, like conscious states free of suffering), then you have no grounds with which to argue for any normative ethics. For example, you cannot argue that attaining nibbana is more valuable than not attaining nibbana.

The Buddha never taught AFAIK that anything conditional – all “things”, experiences, khandhas, the All – had any inherent value. If this is not the case, could you please provide the sutta references?

Rather, everything conditional is taught as inherently dukkha: Dukkhameva uppajjamānaṁ uppajjati, dukkhaṁ nirujjhamānaṁ nirujjhatī Ettāvatā kho, kaccāna, sammādiṭṭhi hoti. “Whatever arises and ceases is only dukkha arising and ceasing. This is how right view is defined.” SN 12.125

Regarding ethics, the Buddha did say was that sīla was a necessary and integral part of the Path, as we know, but that it, alone, could not lead to full liberation from dukkha. Indeed, the N8FP itself is kamma, AN4.237, (so if anything were to have “inherent value” then we might reasonably assign it to the N8FP).

But the Buddha, of course, taught it as the Path that leads to the cessation of dukkha (SN35.145 in TB’s notation). So it has value insofar as it leads to liberation, nibbāna.
Since morality and ethics are integral to the N8FP, the opinion that practitioners who understand final nibbāna as cessation therefore adhere to a view of ethical nihilism is not supported.

@Javier

the Buddha did not toss out basic ethics when he became enlightened

Of course. But while still alive this was both a natural expression of enlightenment as well as teaching by example, among other benefits. As posted by Ven. Sunyo and others earlier on this thread, and on other threads, it’s helpful to differentiate nibbāna with residue from nibbāna without residue, Iti44, (sometimes these are referred to as kilesa-nirodha and khandha-nirodha, respectively). While alive there is ongoing expression and manifestation of ethics. No room for ethical nihilism.

@Javier

Another interesting sutta is AN 9.38, which has a monk “enter and remain in the cessation of perception and feeling.” Immediately afterward, they are said to ‘see with wisdom.’ So whatever this state is, it is not a state of blank nothingness, but one which can also includes wisdom.

As you noted, “immediately afterward.…”; there cannot be seeing with wisdom while in this state which, by definition, is without perception, feeling, and hence, consciousness. In MN 44 the Buddha says that the only difference between the cessation of final niibbāna and a being in this state is the presence of vital life energy in the living being:

"“What’s the difference between someone who has passed away and a mendicant who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling?”

“When someone dies, their physical, verbal, and mental processes have ceased and stilled; their vitality is spent; their warmth is dissipated; and their faculties have disintegrated. When a mendicant has attained the cessation of perception and feeling [and consciousness], their physical, verbal, and mental processes have ceased and stilled. But their vitality is not spent; …"

Nowhere in the suttas, including in this one, does the Buddha then say that such beings have known or “seen” an ineffable alternate consciousness or a dynamic yet unconditioned “being-ness”.

Words like āyatana and dathu are needed to form intelligible sentences. They have a range of meanings and we might take them in that way, when the indescribable is being “described.”

[Sunyo]

@Javier

Thanks again for all the discussion and ideas for me to further ponder. I will only respond to one thing here and that’s it! You stated that all value is illusory and doesn’t really matter if valuable things are lost since they’re made by mind. Well, the only response I have to this is that this view seems to be as a species of ethical nihilism which is defined in this IEP article as a view which “rejects the possibility of absolute moral or ethical values” or alternatively Wikipedia as “the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong.” The problem here for your position is obvious to me. If there is no ethical foundation for our values (such as the inherent value of certain mental states, like conscious states free of suffering), then you have no grounds with which to argue for any normative ethics. For example, you cannot argue that attaining nibbana is more valuable than not attaining nibbana.

Also thanks again! I never thought about it this abstractly. I have no immediate retort to it either, so maybe you’re right. I indeed don’t think there is inherently right and wrong per se (if I’m correct in understanding that is what meta-ethics is about). Actions are just skillful and unskillful. Although I’ve never really thought about it, as I said. Maybe this is something for a future discussion. For now I can only say that I feel no ethical or philosophical conflicts with it.

Thanks for bringing it to my attention. And I also agree we are all equal students of the Buddha!

(Edit: Oops. I said I was going to give you the final word… but since I’m not disagreeing or arguing with you I hope you don’t mind.)

[Brahmali]

@Javier, thanks for your responses! I appreciate that you do not wish to carry on with this discussion. At the same time I think it is useful to continue until the important lines of arguments are exhausted. And so I shall reply to you in brief.

@Javier

The appeal to faith in the Buddha does not help cessationalism either, since it is precisely the issue of how best to interpret the Budhda’s view that is under dispute.

Well, I made this argument in part because of your own statement earlier on that

@Javier

Textually, I think Thanissaro’s view is difficult to establish on EBTs alone, though it’s a fair interpretation. However, it seems like the EBTs do not posit anything positive ontologically about nibbana.

@Javier

While I cannot know for sure how I would see things if I totally uprooted my view of self, I also do not think that my sense of value would be so radically transformed either.

I think you underestimate the impact of full insight. Here is a nice quote from the suttas:

What others say is happiness
the noble ones say is suffering.
What others say is suffering
the noble ones know as happiness. (SN 35.136)

@Javier

neither did he change the original view he had at the beginning of the path, that something which is deathless, eternal, and unconditioned is the supreme goal

I am guessing you are referring to MN 26. The context here is the Buddha-to-be seeing the danger in death, etc. He then seeks the freedom from this, called the amata. So context makes it quite clear that amata is not a “deathless state”, but rather a liberation from death. The same applies to all the other dangers he sees.

And I am not sure where you get “eternal” from. So far as I know, the Buddha-to-be is never said to have sought this.

@Javier

Regarding “the standard sequence of increasing happiness”, this is just one scale of attainments found in the suttas. Other passages focus on more positive experiences, such as the unestablished consciousness.

Indeed. But my point is precisely that there is no contradiction here. From your point of view, the suttas are inconsistent. In my opinion, we should avoid seeing inconsistencies in the suttas unless there is no other alternative.

@Javier

Another interesting sutta is AN 9.38, which has a monk “enter and remain in the cessation of perception and feeling.” Immediately afterward, they are said to ‘see with wisdom.’ So whatever this state is, it is not a state of blank nothingness, but one which can also includes wisdom.

You can expect very profound wisdom when you emerge from a state of complete cessation. Why? Because you will see for the first time that the ending of all things is the highest happiness. By “seeing” I mean that you infer the state of cessation from how the mind behaved just prior to it and how it emerged from it.

@Javier

Regarding your description of dhatu and ayatana being a “property”, this still has ontological connotations. SEP says “properties are those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them.”

Well, the problem then is my translation. The real issue is that dhātu is used very broadly in the suttas to include things like cessation (nirodha) and renunciation (nekkhamma). In other words, the word dhātu does not necessarily refer to something as positively existing.

@Javier

I guess we just have somewhat different views of what counts as a self in this case.

Right. I think a good guide here is to consider this from a psychological perspective. When one posits some sort of eternal existence after parinibbāna, does it feel like some sort of continuation? If it does, then I would say one is still holding on to a sense of self.

@Javier

At this point, all I can say is “come with me if you want to live.”

Gee, I’ve never really seen myself as the terminator! But my question to you is this: aren’t you here suggesting some sort of eternal life, with a concomitant self?

There is one important point that you did not reply to. I made the point that eternal things can never be known by a human mind, which must always be limited in time and space. All we ever see is transient phenomena. It follows that whenever anyone claims to have seen something eternal, infinite, or beyond time and space, it must be speculation. They are adding something to the raw data of their experience. Even deep states of samādhi, which are some of the most profound experiences available to humanity, are always limited in time. Yet the temptation to see them as eternal is very strong, as can be seen from the history of human thought. So again, when you posit an eternal mind, I say this is mere speculation, metaphysical speculation. It is not something that has a counterpart in experience. This is deeply troubling, for the Buddha was a pragmatist who only taught what he had actually experienced.

I rest my case! (Sorry, I am just being silly!)

[Sunyo]

@Sunyo

We spoke about these claims by Bhikkhu Bodhi already. I haven’t changed my mind since, but I’ll watch that video later. I will grant you that it is some of the harder to rebuke evidence in favor of your view

Having listened to the relevant section of Ven. Bodhi’s talk and done a cursory search through the suttas, I take this back. There are various instances of both dhātu and āyatana that do not support Bodhi’s notions that it is an ontologically positive, a certain existential state. Quite the opposite.

I won’t list all I found. Ven. Brahmali already mentioned nirodhadhātu, the “cessation-property”. In a sutta specifically called Dhātu-sutta in the Itivuttaka (Iti51), this is clearly a synonym for nibbāna, called there also the deathless (or ‘death-free’) “property” (amata dhātu).

MN102 (Pañcattaya Sutta) lists five categories of wrong views which among which is annihilationism. These are called āyatanas. I would translate it maybe as ‘options’; Sujato has ‘theses’.

Of course both cessation and annihilationism are the very opposite of an existential/ontological reality.

Perhaps I just trusted Bhikkhu Bodhi too much by assuming it would be hard to refute.

Ven. Bodhi also mentioned dhamma, but I’m not even going to search that word. It’s probably the most fluent word in the Pāli and vayadhamma, ‘nature to vanish’, is very common.

I touched upon padaṃ a while ago.

@Javier, not wanting to start a new argument.

[Radius]

@Ajahn Brahmali

… Nibbana cannot be regarded … as a form of consciousness … Final Nibbana is no more than the cessation of the five khandhas.

^^ for anyone who has not had their fill on the topic. I mention it, in part, because it appears to be a counterweight to…

@kolayi

it’s a type of consciousness

It also has a section titled “If Final Nibbāna is Mere Cessation, How is this Different from annihilation?”, which was being discussed upstream in this thread.

[kolayi]

@Brahmali

You can know Nibbāna inferentially. Once you know it inferentially, you can take an idea of Nibbāna as the object of samādhi

Excuse me bhante, which sutta is this from?

[Brahmali]

@kolayi

Excuse me bhante, which sutta is this from?

AN 10.7:

Bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbāna’’nti kho me, āvuso, aññāva saññā uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati

“The cessation of existence is nibbāna, The cessation of existence is nibbāna”, one perception arose in me, and another perception ceased.

[Invo]

I’m not really taking sides on this debate, because I’m too small to answer such great questions. But I have a question. I don’t know if this was already discussed, but what would “cessasionists” say to fact that Buddha said for example in SN56.11 that craving to end existence (vibhava tanha) is a cause of suffering?

Now this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering.
It’s the craving that leads to future lives, mixed up with relishing and greed, chasing pleasure in various realms. That is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving to continue existence, and craving to end existence.

What cessasionists describe sounds like craving to end existence, and what eternalists describe sounds like craving to continue existence.

Maybe this whole question is impossible to resolve, and the aim of practice is to let go of both kinds of cravings? This approach is in line with Buddha answer to the tetralemma of tathagatha after death, taking neither of these options.

PS: Interestingly, in polish translation of metta sutta (Snp1.8), Piotr Jagodziński translates final passage to something like:
“By not holding to any views,
but by ethical conduct one attains insight” - points to understanding, that it is conduct that leads to liberating insight, not philosophical deliberations. In other words, it cannot be resolved by intellect, only by practice.

I wonder if too much pondering nature of Nibbana could be similar to MN63 simile of the arrow, or is it kusala to ponder it so much?

[Viveka]

@Invo

the aim of practice is to let go of both kinds of cravings?

@Invo

In other words, it cannot be resolved by intellect, only by practice.

yes
Also as one just sees Dependent Arising and Ceasing… (due to perception having been altered through the conditioning of practice - the N8fP) there is no-thing to let go of

[anys]

Personally, I’m a fan. They point one to a goal that’s presented in a positive way. And once you get there, all questions or thoughts of self and not-self, existence and non-existence, etc. fall away. The important part, and what Thanissaro Bhikkhu continually stresses, is the path to this realization; and I find his teachings in this regard to be well laid out. Whatever happens afterwards is pure speculation. We’ll know the destination if and when we finally arrive.

[Jasudho]

@anys

The important part, and what Thanissaro Bhikkhu continually stresses, is the path to this realization; and I find his teachings in this regard to be well laid out.

The potential issue with believing, as Ven. Thanissaro does, that there is a consciousness not related to the senses or khandhas and which is outside of time and space, is that it can inform a practitioner’s approach to the practice – and potentially lead them to stop short at a state in which there is a very refined, subtle, “timeless” consciousness – and interpret that as liberation/nibbāna.

Of course, people are free to choose to practice as they wish and there are debates about this among a number of Venerables.
However, as discussed a number of times on this forum, there is no clear support for this interpretation in the Nikāyas.

And

If one assumes cessation for final nibbāna and it turns out that there is some form of ineffable awareness/being-ness as the true final goal, then one will not be able to proceed any further. No problem.
But if one assumes the goal to be an indescribable, ineffable, awareness/being-ness, then one may stop short at that kind of experience, missing the final goal: cessation.

[Jasudho]

And just to add the the prior post –

The view of final nibbāna as being an ineffable kind of awareness or unconditional beingness is essentially the same as liberation into the “Absolute” in the Brihadaranyaka and Chandogya Upanisads.

Leaving aside the terms and labels that are used, these texts describe ultimate liberation in ways quite similar to the “ineffable, indescribable, bliss/awareness” used by Dhamma practitioners who adhere to this view. Again, we can all choose for ourselves.

But

Is this what the Buddha’s teachings come down to – the Upanisads speak of an unchanging Atman and an unchanging Absolute while the Buddha taught impermanence – but otherwise, the final goal is essentially the same? If so, why choose one form of practice over the other if both have the same “end”? And what is the essential difference between the two forms of spiritual practices if both lead to the same “outcome?”

What would be the real and deep difference between the Buddha’s Dhamma teachings and the Upanisads if in the end, the end is the same? Self or not-self, both practices would lead to the same goal so pick whichever one you like.

Did the Buddha teach only to differentiate the Dhamma in terms of rituals, ethics, and anatta while knowing the final goal was essentially no different than in the Brahmanical practices?

Admittedly, none of these points prove either side of the final nibbāna debate. But it seems hard to believe the entirety of the Dhamma was taught as just another way to realize a goal that is very close to, if not identical with, the goal in the two Upanisads.

Just offered for consideration…

[Ceisiwr]

@Jasudho

The potential issue with believing, as Ven. Thanissaro does, that there is a consciousness not related to the senses or khandhas and which is outside of time and space, is that it can inform a practitioner’s approach to the practice – and potentially lead them to stop short at a state in which there is a very refined, subtle, “timeless” consciousness – and interpret that as liberation/nibbāna.

Which is just another atta theory without using the naughty word.

[deva]

@Jasudho

Is this what the Buddha’s teachings come down to – the Upanisads speak of an unchanging Atman and an unchanging Absolute while the Buddha taught impermanence – but otherwise, the final goal is essentially the same? If so, why choose one form of practice over the other if both have the same “end”? And what is the essential difference between the two forms of spiritual practices if both lead to the same “outcome?”

Eh. The same can be said about the belief that anupādisesā-nibbāna is phenomenologically identical to what materialists believe happens after death. After hearing this argument, a believer in this might rightfully say “Even though it is phenomenologically the same as this, it is ontologically framed differently than a mundane materialist death.” Likewise, a believer in a parinibbānic experiential reality could say something similar about their beliefs in contrast to that of the Upaniṣads. A better argument would be that there’s a lack of textual evidence for a parinibbānic consciousness.

[Ceisiwr]

@deva

Eh. The same can be said about the belief that anupādisesā-nibbāna is phenomenologically identical to what materialists believe happens after death. After hearing this argument, a believer in this might rightfully say “Even though it is phenomenologically the same as this, it is ontologically framed differently than a mundane materialist death.” Likewise, a believer in a parinibbānic experiential reality could say something similar about their beliefs in contrast to that of the Upaniṣads. A better argument would be that there’s a lack of textual evidence for a parinibbānic consciousness.

The basis for Eternalist beliefs is that there is something existing and it always will exist. The basis for Annihilationist beliefs is that there is something existing and it will be destroyed. For the Buddha because things arise and cease they can’t be said to be truly existing or not. The middle way.

[Jasudho]

Thanks.

@deva

A better argument would be that there’s a lack of textual evidence for a parinibbānic consciousness.

Agree. Since there are many posts about this issue on previous threads, I didn’t believe it was necessary to re-state them.
My above posts were not meant as logical proofs, but rather as points to consider that weigh against the “ineffable consciousness/being-ness” viewpoint.

Regarding anupādisesā-nibbāna, the difference between the cessation teachings and the materialist viewpoint is that the latter rejects rebirth – so death after a particular life according to them is final and, in this sense, is the ending of dukkha.

But that’s not what the Buddha taught in the Nikāyas where rebirth and dukkha reoccur ad infinitum until awakening.

[Nikolas]

@Javier

Describing nirvana as turning off a computer just does not cut it I’m afraid. At least not for me (and I suspect, many others). You have to think about that computer as something which holds infinitely valuable data for example, as well as the mind of a living being. Now, turning off the computer seems quite problematic…

So the fact is that the illusion of the value of something or files just gives rise to clinging. happiness is a value, permanent is a value, personality is a value, beauty is a value. And vice versa - empty, hollow, dart, tumor, abscess - this is not a value.

The Buddha taught disappointment in… and depreciation of the aggregates. Why? because that’s what they are, that’s their nature: to break down and bring problems, especially by clinging to them and trying to generate them further. The aggregates of a Buddha or an Arahant are essentially the same. The Yamaka Sutta says that in the case of an Arahant, the aggregates that are dukkha ceased and disintegrated, nothing more. The mind shining with virtues at the deep ontological level remains just as empty, hollow and futile. Just like branches and leaves in the forest. By burning them, we will not say that they are burning us in the fire, or that they are destroying some kind of value. Returning to the computer example. Let’s say you had a computer with primitive games as a child. You have grown, your interests have changed. What was important to you at the age of 5 has lost all appeal and you erase files without hesitation.

[Pondera]

@Invo

By not holding to any views,
but by ethical conduct one attains insight” - points to understanding, that it is conduct that leads to liberating insight, not philosophical deliberations. In other words, it cannot be resolved by intellect, only by practice.

Dzien dobry!

It would make sense. At least one of the hindrances must be overcome by compassion (ie. ill will).