What is dukkha?

[yeshe.tenley]

Hello @Vaddha,

This is a long response as some of the questions you asked and points you made I think require some careful and elaborate (due to my own ineloquence I fear) answers, explanations and rebuttals.

@Vaddha

As I said, no, I don’t.

Some confusion has arisen. To my mind you indicated a possible concession when you said:

Unless you mean an independent, unconditioned ‘someone’ equivalent to the absence of all arising and ceasing?

I took your unless to relate that you’d concede if I had in fact meant what you conjectured. I confessed that I did and so I thought you’d conceded. Anyway, the whole thing is silly. It was meant as a joke. We both acknowledge that there is no someone that fits the proverbial bill.

@Vaddha

‘Seek’ to ‘possess’ both require dependent structures or experiences. Just as ‘object of knowledge’ imply. Which would then mean that ‘that someone’ would no longer be ‘that someone’ in reference to something unconditioned.

Agreed. Dependent structures are involved. However, I want to spell out a possible difference with how we’re using words. When I use the word unconditioned I do not necessarily intend to imply something that is independent.

Short and long are mutually co-dependent notions, but short does not cause long and long does not cause short. Something that is unconditioned I generally take to mean something that was not caused, but can nevertheless be something that is dependent.

Similarly, something that arises is something born which is caused dependent upon some other thing.

BTW, when I asked:

Does this lack of an essence in dukkha arise dependent upon something? Does it cease dependent upon something?

And you answered:

I’d say no to both.

I thought you were acknowledging the lack of essence of dukkha as unarisen, unceasing, unchanging, and unconditioned, because it is not caused.

@Vaddha

If ‘emptiness’ means ‘conditions lack an essence’ then it is in dependence on ‘conditions’ to lack said essence that any such emptiness can be spoken of. We can’t speak of a cup being empty if in fact there is no cup. The emptiness of the cup would also turn up empty, without solid referent. So if there are no conditions, it makes no sense to say that such an absence of conditions could be ‘possessed’ or ‘sought.’

We agree!

The lack of essence in a conditioned thing is dependent upon that conditioned thing existing. When a conditioned thing exists we can rightfully say:

• It isn’t the case that this existent conditioned thing has an essence

When a conditioned thing does not exist we can rightfully say:

• It isn’t the case that it isn’t the case that this existent conditioned thing has an essence

Which is not intended to imply that a non-existent conditioned thing has essence!

@Vaddha

Well we’ve already discussed this before to some degree. If dukkha is a designation for anything that does not fit the value of being unconditioned or eternal happiness, then if the aggregates are conditioned or if they include painful sensation, then they are dukkha.

Yes, you presented this, but I do not think I’ve agreed. Here is what I proposed:

1. English translation of dukkha as the word “unsatisfactory” or “unsatisfactoriness”
2. We use a common dictionary definition for “unsatisfactory” or “unsatisfactoriness”
3. I gave such a common dictionary definition chosen as simply as possible - literally putting the word in google and taking a picture of what pops up
4. I offered we could use some other common dictionary definition of your choice if you so wished

See here.

@Vaddha

So “the aggregates” are merely an analogy to “dukkha.” Unless you think there can only be one word for one thing, which I’ve also already demonstrated is false to you before, such as with my example of the protective charm. I can do it briefly here as well, such as “the defilements” “the three poisons” “the cause of dukkha” “greed” “hatred” “delusion” “ignorance” “craving” etc. Unless you think words have substantial, essentialist referents then there is no problem with “dukkha” being a mere referent for “the aggregates” just as it can be for “the sense domains.” Ultimately, it merely categorizes “conditioned experiences,” hence it including those and other words.

Since you mentioned an older post regarding language I think we should indeed go back to this and clarify even if it diverges into a meta-discussion of words, definitions and meanings.

Words are conventions; which is to say they are agreements between people used to communicate to enable shared understanding and meaning. With this in mind I’ve attempted to come to a common agreement with you regarding the word dukkha. Taking the definition from the common dictionary I proposed above - which again, if you want to agree to another common dictionary definition let me know - we have the Teacher saying the aggregates have:

Which may be shortened to just:

• The aggregates are inadequate or unsuitable

In keeping with the topic of this thread, we then ask what did the Teacher mean when he said this?

Some possible hypothesis for meanings I’ve come up with:

1. That the words “aggregate” and “inadequate” are synonymous
2. That the aggregates are universally perceived as having the quality of inadequacy independent of the perceiver
3. That the aggregates should be universally perceived as having the quality of inadequacy independent of the perceiver
4. That the aggregates are perceived as having the quality of inadequacy dependent upon the perceiver

NOTE: This is not suggested as an exhaustive list. The list of possible meanings is probably dependent upon the perceiver.

Let’s draw out each in turn.

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The first meaning #1 is drawing an equivalence between the two words suggesting that when using these words in sentences we can more or less substitute one for the other and not lose the meaning.

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The second meaning #2 is saying that regardless of the perceiver and the context, when one perceives or experiences the aggregates the quality or experience of inadequacy is necessarily concomitant.

Three beings walk into a bar and order a drink. The bartender lays out three cups and pours a liquid into each cup from the same bottle.

The first being drinks his cup and the God declares, “Ahhhh Ambrosia!”

The second being drinks his cup and the Human says, “water.”

The third being drinks his cup and the Hungry Ghost moans, “blood and piss :(”

Three beings walk into a bar

This famous story relates how the designated word depends upon the perceiver of the liquid. The second meaning #2 says this is not the case for the aggregates and the quality of being inadequate. Rather, all perceivers universally designate the aggregates as inadequate.

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The third meaning #3 acknowledges that #2 isn’t the case, but says the Teacher intended to instruct all perceivers to try and see inadequacy as a quality of the aggregates. Which naturally raises the question why? One hypothesis is to inspire disillusionment and dispassion towards the aggregates.

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The fourth meaning #4 is that while many perceivers do have the perception of the aggregates as inadequate it isn’t always the case. That there is no fundamental quality of inadequacy wedded to or concomitant with the aggregates.

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With that overview let’s go back to some of the things you said.

@Vaddha

Unless you think there can only be one word for one thing

No, I don’t think there can be only one word for one thing. Synonyms are possible and one can more or less freely exchange synonyms without altering the meaning. Another possibility is translations from one language to the other. So I hope it is now clear that I do not think there can be only one word for one thing.

@Vaddha

Unless you think words have substantial, essentialist referents then there is no problem with “dukkha” being a mere referent for “the aggregates”

No, I don’t think words have substantial, essentialist referents. It is a possibility the Teacher’s meaning was for the aggregates and inadequacy to be understood as synonymous. It is a possibility the Teacher’s meaning was for the aggregates and inadequacy to be understood as universally concomitant.

@Vaddha

Just as when the Buddha says something like “hatred is a corruption” or “hatred is fire” or “hatred has a poisonous root,” etc., you don’t take this literally?

No, I do not.

@Vaddha

If so, why not the same with ‘dukkha’ and ‘burning chaff’ and so on.

I do not take the aggregates and inadequacy to be synonymous and I’m not obligated to anymore than I’m obligated to take the aggregates and burning chaff synonymously.

@Vaddha

I say that any qualification you apply to hatred → defilement can equally be applied to the aggregates → dukkha. Whether it be about their arising and ceasing, or their nature, etc.

Again, I acknowledge the possibility of meanings #1 and #2.

@Vaddha

So what is the difference between hatred ceasing in the Teacher and hatred ceasing temporarily in a normal sentient being? If the Teacher really ended hatred, why do we still see it arise in the world?

I love this question. First, I want to acknowledge that hatred has not ended in this world or at least my perception of hatred has not ended in this world. I do not think the Teacher intended to mean that he had put an end to the hatred in this world. I think the Teacher intended to mean that he had put an end to hatred in his heart; he’d put an end to hatred internally.

When I practice dhamma over time I do experience less internal hatred. I’m very far from realizing it, but I do have faith that it might be possible one day to put an end to it internally altogether in my own heart.

@Vaddha

I think this is a misunderstanding of ‘form.’

The form aggregate includes the physical body or so I think I’ve read in sutta? Do you disagree? I can go and try and find the sutta if you like.

@Vaddha

How can you say some “Teacher’s form” is persisting and must persist in a substantial external world?

I never said anything about a substantial external world to my mind. Where did you hear me say this?? The Teacher’s corpse remained after the parinibbana of the Teacher or so I have read in sutta? Sutta also says his relics were divided up I believe?

It seems just manifest that physical bodies do not wink out of existence with the death of a being. I’ve seen death and I’ve seen corpses. I’ve never witnessed them disappear completely with no remainder.

@Vaddha

Where are you basing these conclusions?

My own experience of the death of beings and corpses left behind.

@Vaddha

So if someone were to see relics of the Teacher, they would be experiencing their own aggregate of form. Just as if someone were to get angry at relics of the Teacher, they would experience their own anger.

Sure, but the point is the form aggregate of the Teacher - his physical body - which is dukkha - did not disappear without remainder after the life force left it, did it?

@Vaddha

@yeshe.tenley , this seems out of character for you. It seems as if, in order to deny that the substance of the aggregates can cease, you are insisting that some “aggregate substance” must continue exerting causal force “out there” in a substantial world. Would you say the same for the form of a dream, a mirage, or a rainbow?

I don’t know where you think I’ve introduced substance.

@Vaddha

If someone perceived the Teacher in a dream, and the dream ended, would you insist that the Teacher’s form must be persisting in a substantial time and space of that dream-world forever and ever because of causality? Or is the experience of the dream-Teacher merely a conditioned experience dependent on internal dream-form?

The Teacher and the dream of the Teacher are not the same. I’m not sure what hypothetical you’ve got going there, but I really don’t understand how what I’ve said is related

@Vaddha

If someone were to perceive the form of a rainbow’s color in the sky, would you insist that when the form of those colors ceases, the colors of the rainbow must still exist “out there” exerting causal force on the world?

By “out there” I suppose you’re suggesting that I’m making some kind of metaphysical or ontological statement when I say that bodies don’t just disappear without remainder aka wink out of existence. But I’m not making any kind of metaphysical or ontological statement. I’m relating a known experience - the lack of perception of physical bodies winking out of existence - and then drawing the inference that the same was true of the Teacher’s physical body.

This inference was drawn from my own experiences and then extrapolating it to the Teacher’s body and drawing as circumstantial evidence the testimony of the sutta.

@Vaddha

It seems you’ve created the same predicament analogous to the commentarial Abhidhamma that seems to reify a kind of externally-independent stream of momentary consciousnesses that must be sustained via causality in time and space ‘out there.’ Do you remember that discussion?

I don’t think I’ve done any such thing. I’ve had the experience of watching beings die and have observed what happens to their physical bodies when life has grown completely cold - room temperature. They do not disappear without remainder. This is just a manifest experience I have that does not rely upon any metaphysical or ontological basis.

@Vaddha

I’m interested in your answers!!

Well, there you go

@Vaddha

Would you say that hatred did not pop out of existence and utterly cease without remainder with the nibbāna of the Teacher?

I would. Hatred is still manifest in this world from my perception and unfortunately it still manifests from time to time in my own heart

However, with the Nibbāna of the Teacher I think it can rightfully be said that it no longer manifested in his heart.

@Vaddha

I have further questions about hatred and suffering, but I feel that there are already plenty of questions here.

Yeah, it was a lot Hope you are not too disappointed with the answers. This took a bit of energy and an attempt at clear thinking. I might not have that energy and clear thinking in coming days due to other obligations.