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Hi @Vaddha,
This response is excellent along with its corresponding questions and refutations. I do disagree with it and will respond in time, but at the moment I do not have such time 
as I think it will take some effort to clarify and expose if/where we actually disagree.
In the meantime, just wanted to say thank your for your response and continued friendly and respectful chat and that I will get back to you when I can.
If defiling states disappear. . ., nothing but happiness and delight develops, tranquillity, mindfulness and clear awareness - and that is a happy state. DN9, Walshe
Hello @Vaddha,
This is a long response as some of the questions you asked and points you made I think require some careful and elaborate (due to my own ineloquence I fear) answers, explanations and rebuttals.
Some confusion has arisen. To my mind you indicated a possible concession when you said:
Unless you mean an independent, unconditioned āsomeoneā equivalent to the absence of all arising and ceasing?
I took your unless to relate that youād concede if I had in fact meant what you conjectured. I confessed that I did and so I thought youād conceded. Anyway, the whole thing is silly. It was meant as a joke. We both acknowledge that there is no someone that fits the proverbial bill. 
Agreed. Dependent structures are involved. However, I want to spell out a possible difference with how weāre using words. When I use the word unconditioned I do not necessarily intend to imply something that is independent.
Short and long are mutually co-dependent notions, but short does not cause long and long does not cause short. Something that is unconditioned I generally take to mean something that was not caused, but can nevertheless be something that is dependent.
Similarly, something that arises is something born which is caused dependent upon some other thing.
BTW, when I asked:
Does this lack of an essence in dukkha arise dependent upon something? Does it cease dependent upon something?
And you answered:
Iād say no to both.
I thought you were acknowledging the lack of essence of dukkha as unarisen, unceasing, unchanging, and unconditioned, because it is not caused.
We agree! 
The lack of essence in a conditioned thing is dependent upon that conditioned thing existing. When a conditioned thing exists we can rightfully say:
When a conditioned thing does not exist we can rightfully say:
Which is not intended to imply that a non-existent conditioned thing has essence!
Yes, you presented this, but I do not think Iāve agreed. Here is what I proposed:
See here.
Since you mentioned an older post regarding language I think we should indeed go back to this and clarify even if it diverges into a meta-discussion of words, definitions and meanings.
Words are conventions; which is to say they are agreements between people used to communicate to enable shared understanding and meaning. With this in mind Iāve attempted to come to a common agreement with you regarding the word dukkha. Taking the definition from the common dictionary I proposed above - which again, if you want to agree to another common dictionary definition let me know - we have the Teacher saying the aggregates have:
Which may be shortened to just:
In keeping with the topic of this thread, we then ask what did the Teacher mean when he said this?
Some possible hypothesis for meanings Iāve come up with:
NOTE: This is not suggested as an exhaustive list. The list of possible meanings is probably dependent upon the perceiver.
Letās draw out each in turn.
The first meaning #1 is drawing an equivalence between the two words suggesting that when using these words in sentences we can more or less substitute one for the other and not lose the meaning.
The second meaning #2 is saying that regardless of the perceiver and the context, when one perceives or experiences the aggregates the quality or experience of inadequacy is necessarily concomitant.
Three beings walk into a bar and order a drink. The bartender lays out three cups and pours a liquid into each cup from the same bottle.
The first being drinks his cup and the God declares, āAhhhh Ambrosia!ā
The second being drinks his cup and the Human says, āwater.ā
The third being drinks his cup and the Hungry Ghost moans, āblood and piss :(ā
This famous story relates how the designated word depends upon the perceiver of the liquid. The second meaning #2 says this is not the case for the aggregates and the quality of being inadequate. Rather, all perceivers universally designate the aggregates as inadequate.
The third meaning #3 acknowledges that #2 isnāt the case, but says the Teacher intended to instruct all perceivers to try and see inadequacy as a quality of the aggregates. Which naturally raises the question why? One hypothesis is to inspire disillusionment and dispassion towards the aggregates.
The fourth meaning #4 is that while many perceivers do have the perception of the aggregates as inadequate it isnāt always the case. That there is no fundamental quality of inadequacy wedded to or concomitant with the aggregates.
With that overview letās go back to some of the things you said.
No, I donāt think there can be only one word for one thing. Synonyms are possible and one can more or less freely exchange synonyms without altering the meaning. Another possibility is translations from one language to the other. So I hope it is now clear that I do not think there can be only one word for one thing.
No, I donāt think words have substantial, essentialist referents. It is a possibility the Teacherās meaning was for the aggregates and inadequacy to be understood as synonymous. It is a possibility the Teacherās meaning was for the aggregates and inadequacy to be understood as universally concomitant.
No, I do not.
I do not take the aggregates and inadequacy to be synonymous and Iām not obligated to anymore than Iām obligated to take the aggregates and burning chaff synonymously.
Again, I acknowledge the possibility of meanings #1 and #2.
I love this question. First, I want to acknowledge that hatred has not ended in this world or at least my perception of hatred has not ended in this world. I do not think the Teacher intended to mean that he had put an end to the hatred in this world. I think the Teacher intended to mean that he had put an end to hatred in his heart; heād put an end to hatred internally.
When I practice dhamma over time I do experience less internal hatred. Iām very far from realizing it, but I do have faith that it might be possible one day to put an end to it internally altogether in my own heart.
The form aggregate includes the physical body or so I think Iāve read in sutta? Do you disagree? I can go and try and find the sutta if you like.
I never said anything about a substantial external world to my mind. Where did you hear me say this?? The Teacherās corpse remained after the parinibbana of the Teacher or so I have read in sutta? Sutta also says his relics were divided up I believe?
It seems just manifest that physical bodies do not wink out of existence with the death of a being. Iāve seen death and Iāve seen corpses. Iāve never witnessed them disappear completely with no remainder.
My own experience of the death of beings and corpses left behind.
Sure, but the point is the form aggregate of the Teacher - his physical body - which is dukkha - did not disappear without remainder after the life force left it, did it?
I donāt know where you think Iāve introduced substance.
The Teacher and the dream of the Teacher are not the same. Iām not sure what hypothetical youāve got going there, but I really donāt understand how what Iāve said is related
By āout thereā I suppose youāre suggesting that Iām making some kind of metaphysical or ontological statement when I say that bodies donāt just disappear without remainder aka wink out of existence. But Iām not making any kind of metaphysical or ontological statement. Iām relating a known experience - the lack of perception of physical bodies winking out of existence - and then drawing the inference that the same was true of the Teacherās physical body.
This inference was drawn from my own experiences and then extrapolating it to the Teacherās body and drawing as circumstantial evidence the testimony of the sutta.
I donāt think Iāve done any such thing. Iāve had the experience of watching beings die and have observed what happens to their physical bodies when life has grown completely cold - room temperature. They do not disappear without remainder. This is just a manifest experience I have that does not rely upon any metaphysical or ontological basis.
Well, there you go
I would. Hatred is still manifest in this world from my perception and unfortunately it still manifests from time to time in my own heart
However, with the NibbÄna of the Teacher I think it can rightfully be said that it no longer manifested in his heart.
Yeah, it was a lot Hope you are not too disappointed with the answers. This took a bit of energy and an attempt at clear thinking. I might not have that energy and clear thinking in coming days due to other obligations.
Now, as for what meaning I ascribe given the non-exhaustive list above I would say it is some combination of #3 and #4. That is, the Teacher intended, āthe aggregates are inadequateā to mean that one should aspire to see the aggregates as inadequate so as to generate dispassion and disillusionment towards them, but only up to that point. Once an enlightened one has succeeded in generating dispassion and disillusionment towards them I think they donāt necessarily see the aggregates as concomitant with being inadequate or having the experience of inadequacy. I acknowledge this is heresy for many.
It is also my general impression that many on this forum rather ascribe some combination of #1, #2 and #3 or other perhaps uncountable meanings not represented on the list.
As for you @Vaddha, I canāt say I rightfully know what meaning you ascribe or whether it is one or combination on the list or some other meaning completely non-represented. I was hazardous before in inferring what meaning you take from the statement so Iāll not repeat the mistake.
PS: In keeping with the thread this thread was spawned from one might say that meaning #2 imagines a universal ālaw of dukkhaā whereas #4 imagines a relativistic ālaw of dukkhaā
causes this reaction:
@yeshe.tenley , this seems out of character for you. It seems as if, in order to deny that the substance of the aggregates can cease, you are insisting that some āaggregate substanceā must continue exerting causal force āout thereā in a substantial world. Would you say the same for the form of a dream, a mirage, or a rainbow?
If someone perceived the Teacher in a dream, and the dream ended, would you insist that the Teacherās form must be persisting in a substantial time and space of that dream-world forever and ever because of causality? Or is the experience of the dream-Teacher merely a conditioned experience dependent on internal dream-form?
If someone were to perceive the form of a rainbowās color in the sky, would you insist that when the form of those colors ceases, the colors of the rainbow must still exist āout thereā exerting causal force on the world? Or is the experience of the form of a rainbow dependent on the internal form, perception, etc. there?
If someone were to perceive water in a mirage, would you insist that the water must be obeying external laws of physics and be preserved, cycling in some substantial external āwater cycle out thereā once the appearance of the form of water ceased? Are there mirage-clouds āout thereā made of the mirage-vapor from mirage-lakes that create mirage-rain filling up mirage-oceans which cycle back to the mirage-lakes?
As I understand your whole point of emptiness is because of they are dependent, conditioned. When the conditions do not exist, they do not exist.
So there should be no objections to the notion that when all conditions for mental aggregates of the arahant ceases at death, thereās no mind to be found for the arahant. The body still has conditions to make it remain as a corpse, namely the law of conservation of mass-energy. But no such corresponding laws are there for the mind. So the mind ceases without remainder.
Here we donāt need to invoke ceases substantially. Itās enough to have insubstantial cessation. Itās the same thing. Insubstantial cessation doesnāt mean it will certainly arise again. Since all conditions are gone, it is gone. I think your issue is that when you see ceases without remainder, you just jump to map it to ceasing substantially, and have this unspoken assumption that ceasing insubstantially means that it arises again.
Yes, the lack of essence in conditioned things and dependent origination are in harmony and not discordant to my limited mind.
Mind is a conditioned phenomenon, right? When the conditions are not present how can the mind be found?
Can you define again? Once a moment of mind has ceased it is gone? Does it arise again?
When the conditions are gone, yes, it would seem it is gone.
What arises again? How can that which has ceased, arise again?
Then we are aligned in view. Youāre in the nothing after parinibbÄna camp.
Thanks for the welcome to camp, but I donāt self-identify as such a camper The Teacher I think said that he wasnāt such a camper either, famously refusing to answer such questions.
Venerable, Iām not sure if you are aware of this, but in some extant traditions Nibbana with remainder speaks of the experience of an enlightened one not in meditative equipoise with emptiness as object while Nibbana without remainder speaks of the experience of an enlightened one that is in meditative equipoise with emptiness as object.
While it might be the case that with the life force leaving the body an enlightened one enters into and dwells in the Nibbana without remainder, it isnāt necessarily the case that this is the first time they have entered into and so dwelled. At least that is what I understand some extant traditions to maintain although I could be mistaken in my presentation. Just some food for thought.
Would you hold that view as well, @yeshe.tenley?
Also, do you know what traditions say so? Iāve heard some TheravÄda-tradition teachers say similar things.
Me neither.
ā
Thank you, @yeshe.tenley for the answers and comments. I appreciate your gentle dialogue and will reply in more detail when I have a good opportunity.
Iād say it is my current working hypothesis? I canāt claim to know that it is true, but it is an interesting and quite dramatic difference I think to what is presented usually on this forum.
The extant traditions Iām speaking of are Tibetan and I believe Iāve traced this back to Chandrakirti, but I think he quotes an EBT sutta that from what I can tell does not exist in the Pali canon? I think @Ceisiwr has told me that some Theravada practice hold to something similar?
FWIW, I think the various understandings presented in this thread and many other threads are probably quite reminiscent of various understandings that are very old. Weāre all a part of a living tradition and probably not all that much new under the sun 
PS I should also mention that this is not a universal viewpoint within those extant Tibetan traditions. Monks in many Tibetan monasteries are encouraged to practice debate and to work out various understandings as they can and there exist quite a diverse set of views from what I understand!
Interesting! Maybe it would be clarifying to discuss that some eventually.
Do you know of any primary source texts in English translation discussing this?
Yes! And again I thank @Ceisiwr to alerting me to it, but now I have to go back and look at my research, but when I do so Iāll let you know.
Well that was easy. Thanks to an old email I have:
A reference from Chandrakirtiās commentary on Nagarjunaās Reason Sixty (Yuktisastika) on page 153-156 for an explanation of nirvana without remainder as occurring on the night of Shakyamuniās awakening under the Bodhi tree if I understand correctly. This is published in english as part of the Treasury of the Buddhist Sciences and translated by Joseph Loizzo
Thank you! I donāt have access to that copy as it seems it is a book that needs purchasing. Perhaps it is in an accessible library. Only glancing through some things in another version though, and this seems like a great treatise and interesting commentary!
It seems Ven. Chandrakirti speaks of dukkha referring to the aggregates and of NirvÄna with and without aggregates. Iām not sure what the idea ādukkha = aggregates is inherently problematicā is arising dependent on. TBH Iām really not aware of any ancient Buddhist school that said the aggregates were not dukkha. Although you say this view may seem like heresy, I have heard it quite often and frequently in modern times. It seems almost semi-standard for people to say that only the aggregates when clung to are dukkha. Iād love to see references to ancient texts making this claim. I donāt know of any that I can think of.
(Of course, I donāt mean the idea that there is a dukkha essence, but just that the word ādukkhaā refers to āthe aggregatesā as conditional appearances).
Maybe some MahÄyÄna suttas/treatises say this when speaking of ānon-abiding nirvanaā? But even there Iād imagine theyād still refer to ādukkha,ā just that it is of no burden? Iām not sure.
Well, I think you can find in many ancient texts that the aggregates are not inherently dukkha because they are not inherently anything, right? And I donāt dispute that the Teacher equated the aggregates with dukkha. It isnāt viewed as problematic when I donāt dispute that. And it isnāt viewed as problematic when I point out that the aggregates are not literally burning chaff. I mean some might raise their eyebrows and ask me why Iām pointing it out, but seldom do I get pushback from people saying that Iām wrong when I point out the aggregates are not literally burning chaff.
But when I point out that the aggregates are not literally dukkhaā¦ whew boy Immediately the pushback begins.
It seems to me that seeing the aggregates as inadequate is dependent upon the perceiver just as the liquid labeled as āwaterā or āambrosiaā or āblood and pusā is dependent upon the perceiver. This is possible because the aggregates - like the liquid - lack essence. It seems to me that in someone without any desire for the aggregates to be other than they are they cannot be perceived as inadequate. Maybe Iām wrong! The inadequacy comes with desire for them to be other than they are. I could be wrong!
But that is where I get this problematic idea I am unaware of any Mahayana treatise or sutta that directly spells out this problematic idea though, but Iāll be on the lookout and if I find one Iāll let you know.
Thanks, @yeshe.tenle! Just FYI, Iām not saying it is a problematic idea. I mean, Iām not saying it isnāt one either.
Yes. But to be clear, if ādukkhaā is a term for the aggregates, we could change this sentence to:
Dukkha is not inherently dukkha.
In other words, X is by inherent nature independently X. This is just plain substantial independent existence or svabhÄva. I would agree that many many Buddhist texts say that dukkha does not exist of its own being. That doesnāt mean that ādukkhaā cannot be synonymous with āthe aggregates.ā It doesnāt mean that dukkha does not exist.
Of course. Sacred religious ideas and views.
This will have to wait for the future! āIs dukkha just a strategic perception for un-enlightened beings?ā is a good topic!
Agreed. Agreed. Agreed.
BTW, I will still hesitate to speculate you agree that dukkha and the aggregates are synonymous. You only indicated that lack of essence does not mean that the aggregates and dukkha are not synonymous which does not indicate that you think they are.
Yes, Iāve read those suttas and there exist a few more if Iām not mistaken which recount the Teacher or other arahants manifesting physical pain.
A question that comes to my mind reading those: did the Teacher desire for that pain to cease? Is that desire synonymous with tanha? What do you think? If he did not have such desire for it to cease I try and imagine what might that experience have been like?
Another thing that comes to my mind is accounts of humans who do not have aversion to various kinds of physical pain. Also, I remember times when Iāve been indifferent to limited pain - neither wishing it to continue or cease. Finally, when confronted with extreme pain at times Iāve tried to concentrate on its lack of essence and to know pain as pain. While I canāt say I was free from the desire for it to be other than it was it did seem to help somewhat.
I think it would not be wise if the training, the Path would make us insensitive towards suffering, pain, wounds, misery, etc. This would lead to trouble, misery, sickness, early death.
Tanha refers to the wish or desire to engage in/with something. 1. The wish or desire to engage in sensual pleasures, 2. in dying and not feeling anything anymore,3. the wish to continue to exist and engage for example in the happiness of deva states.
So if tanha ceases, this desire to engage in such things cease. But one does not become insensitive or wishless, i believe. Ofcourse one still avoids things that cause misery, pain, sickness, etc.
I believe that these people really have realised that in reality things are not mixed up. The citta that knows is not really mixed up with feelings, but defilements hinder us to realise this. Which means that there remains a perception of me having that pain and me being owner of it, burdened by it.
Defilements mix up things that are by nature not mixed up.
I am far away from this. Thanks for sharing your experiences with pain and how you use(d) it as object of training. Maha Boowa also did a lot, and came to a point that the citta that knows and the pain are not experienced as mixed up. So at that time the citta is not at all affected by pains.
The Buddha did lean back when a yakkha with needle skin approached.
