What is dukkha?

The Watercooler
165

Hi, @yeshe.tenley . Thank you for sharing your experience! I’m so glad that you have practiced in this way and can reflect on this kind of experience! :smiley: May your practice be very fruitful in developing dispassion for the three kinds of feelings.

Would you say that, in your experience, it’s possible for the mind to both:

  1. Recognize a painful sensation as less comfortable or healthy than a pleasant one and
  2. Be dispassionate towards the painful sensation in such a way that the mind does not engage in trying to be averse or irritated at it, wishing it to be otherwise?

If so, to my limited mind that seems like a great example of how the valence of sensation does not need to imply craving. The opposite of craving is not aversion; that is a false opposite. The opposite of craving should be dispassion—disengagement from the attachment and lamenting at the rise and fall of suffering, recognizing it as unworthy of involvement, while still taking proper care of suffering as needed. Especially if we recognize that adding craving is just adding more suffering to the sum total, then only if we value non-suffering would it make sense to say “There is this suffering, but it would only be worse if there were the additional suffering of craving and lamenting. Therefore, the best possible solution would be to endure mindful, equanimous, and unbothered” in the face of suffering. Otherwise, if suffering were completely neutral, then there should be no problem in also adding craving and hatred, wouldn’t you say? Because no matter how much suffering, it would all be empty anyway. This to me would seem an unwise approach. Of course, we try our best in the meantime.

Also, to add a somewhat question: Do you think it’s possible for someone to be in a state of disease or discomfort, but only realize it by reflecting back once the discomfort is relieved? Such as being habituated to a certain level of tension without ever knowing of what it would be for that tension to be relieved. Does this seem like a possible scenario to you?

Mettā

166

This makes no sense if one at the same time defends that all mental khandhas are inherently suffering, painful, a dart, an illness, a boil, a cancer etc. Moreover, if mind is just suffering, why even begin to talk about the end of mental suffering? How can something like mind, that changes so rapidly, arises as one thing and ceases as another, ever be happy, peaceful, not suffering?

Being a Mere cessationalist just means one does not accept an end to suffering, not phyiscal nor mental. This whole complex of body and mind cannot escape suffering. Be honest about it.
In your view there cannot be an end to mental suffering.

167

Is this a word?
What does it mean?

(Maybe the same as ucchedavadin ?)

I find this on wikipedia:

“ Cessationism is a doctrine that spiritual gifts such as speaking in tongues, prophecy, and healing ceased with the Apostolic Age. The doctrine was developed in the reformation and is particularly associated with the Calvinists”

168

An escape from suffering can be a very easy thing. You can just ask some Deva to send you to Heaven, or you can receive a painless Blissful body in another Realm.

But it is not escape from suffering that one should only seek, but Enlightenment, even Buddhahood. Nibbana is the cessation of all material suffering, it ends the wheel of Samsaric existence, but Buddhahood and Nibbana are not the same thing. Enlightenment and Nibbana are not the same thing either. Nibbana is a certain cessation of suffering, but it is not a true cessation. Supreme Perfect Enlightenment posits that there is no limit to the Buddha-Vehicle. Nibbana is just a means to end suffering. It’s quite profound, but even true Enlightenment will only be the beginning of the Path.

169

What is a Buddha-vehicle?
That which can convey one to become a Buddha?

There doesn’t seem to be much discussion on a path to Buddha-hood in the Pali Canon.

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170

The Buddhayana is an aspect of Buddhahood that the Buddha posseses and Teaches; embodies. Everything that the Buddha Teaches comes from the Buddha-vehicle, not another, ultimately.

171

I concede that I also do not think the aggregates are synonymous with inadequacy.

Inadequacy is the abstract noun of ‘inadequate.’ I think that dukkha means (adj.) inadequate, and (n.) something inadequate. I don’t think dukkha means ‘inadequacy’; the Pāli for that would be ‘dukkhatā.’

That ‘dukkha’ means ‘something inadequate’ is standard, uncontroversial Pāli though. Just pointing out that clarification.

As I’ve pointed out before, and this is not trivial in the slightest, ‘inadequate’ is meaningless without more qualification. We must understand what ‘adequate’ and ‘inadequate’ mean, or in what respect?

If Devin wants to paint the wall red, red paint is adequate. Materials that can be used to paint the wall red or make red paint are adequate. Blue paint is inadequate. Materials that cannot be used to paint the wall red or make red paint are inadequate.

Inadequate is a negation of adequate. In order to have the quality of inadequacy, something must lack the quality of adequacy.

Red paint is not inherently adequate. It is adequate only insofar as it meets a list of dependent requirements for “adequacy.”
Blue paint is not inherently inadequate. It is inadequate only insofar as it does not meet a list of dependent requirements for “adequacy.”

“Blue paint” is not synonymous with “something inadequate.”
“Something inadequate” is not synonymous with “blue paint.”

“Clown” is not synonymous with “something funny.”
“Something funny” is not synonymous with “clown.”
Clown is not the same thing as something funny.
Clown is not a different thing than something funny.
Clown is not both the same and different than something funny.
Clown is not neither the same nor different than something funny.

Rather, ‘something funny’ can designate ‘clown’ insofar as ‘clown’ meets certain requirements for being ‘something funny.’
‘Blue paint’ can designate ‘something inadequate’ insofar as ‘blue paint’ meets certain requirements for being ‘something inadequate.’

If Devin wants to find true, perfect happiness, then when Devin encounters things that are not blissful but painful, they designate those things as ‘inadequate.’ Anything that is not blissful cannot be adequate for true, perfect happiness. Then, Devin may encounter things which do offer happiness, but they eventually change and vanish against their control. So things that are not stable, permanent, or eternal cannot be adequate for true, perfect happiness; rather, eternality is adequate. But as Devin searches, they find that many things that may seem to persist even for eons and eons are governed by or dependent on other conditions, and that dependency means they will arise and cease against their will or control. So Devin deems anything lacking true or independent existence as inadequate for true, lasting happiness.

Adequacy therefore is the quality of bliss, eternality, and being/true existence. Inadequacy is the lack of bliss, eternality, or being/true existence, in this case. ‘Adequacy’ does not mean ‘quality of true happiness.’ You will not find such a definition in the dictionary. Rather, ‘adequate’ can designate ‘quality of true happiness’ under certain circumstances.

‘The aggregates’ are not the same as ‘dukkha.’
‘The aggregates’ are not different than ‘dukkha.’
‘The aggregates’ are not both the same as and different than ‘dukkha.’
‘The aggregates’ are not neither the same as nor different than ‘dukkha.’

Rather, ‘the aggregates’ can designate ‘something inadequate’ insofar as they meet certain requirements for being ‘something inadequate.’
‘Something inadequate’ can designate ‘the aggregates’ insofar as ‘something inadequate’ meets certain requirements for being ‘the aggregates.’

As for perception:

A perception can be true or untrue. An untrue perception is a deluded perception, because it presents information that is actually not the case.

For example, suppose Devin has the perception of an eternal chair. The perception of eternality is real insofar as it is the arisen perception. But the perception of eternality is untrue insofar as the chair cannot actually be found, verified, or confirmed to have the quality of eternality.

Suppose Devin has the perception of an impermanent chair. The perception of impermanence is real insofar as it is the arisen perception. But the perception of impermanence is true insofar as the chair can be found, verified, or confirmed to lack the quality of eternality or permanence.

A perception of adequacy is perceiving some X to have the quality of adequacy.
A perception of inadequacy is perceiving some X to have the quality of inadequacy, i.e. to lack the quality of adequacy.
A true perception of adequacy is perceiving some X to have the quality of adequacy, and such quality can be found, verified, or confirmed.
An untrue perception of adequacy is perceiving some X to have the quality of adequacy, but such quality cannot be found, verified, or confirmed.
A true perception of inadequacy is perceiving some X to have the quality of inadequacy, and such lack of adequacy can be found, verified, or confirmed.
An untrue perception of inadequacy is perceiving some X to have the quality of inadequacy, but such lack of adequacy cannot be found, verified, or confirmed.

If Devin perceives a form to be adequate, then it will appear to Devin to be blissful, eternal, and truly existent, or some combination of these.
If Devin perceives a form to be inadequate, then it will appear to Devin to not be blissful, eternal, and truly existent, or some combination of these.

A true perception of adequacy cannot co-exist with the quality of inadequacy.
A true perception of inadequacy cannot co-exist with the quality of adequacy.
An untrur perception of adequacy cannot co-exist with the quality of adequacy.
An untrue perception of inadequacy cannot co-exist with the quality of inadequacy.

If someone truly perceives the aggregates as inadequate, this true perception is of the nature to remove or be free of delusion.
If the aggregates lack the qualities of bliss, eternality, and being, then it follows that:
It is impossible for someone to have an untrue perception of inadequacy in dependence on the aggregates, as the aggregates lack the qualities of bliss, eternality, and being.
Therefore, any perception of inadequacy in regards to the aggregates must be true. It therefore follows that any perception of inadequacy in regards to the aggregates must be beneficial for removing delusion, for truth contradicts delusion.

It is possible for someone to have an untrue perception of adequacy in dependence on the aggregates. Example: perceiving form to be eternal or truly existent, etc. Therefore it follows that it is possible for beings to lack the perception of inadequacy in regards to form which lacks the characteristics of adequacy.

If the aggregates lack the qualities of bliss, eternality, and being, then it follows that
It is impossible for someone to have a true perception of adequacy in dependence on the aggregates. Therefore, it follows that a perception of adequacy in regards to the aggregates is not beneficial for the removal of delusion, as truth contradicts delusion.

The quality of inadequacy is dependent on the aggregates. The aggregates are not identical to the quality of inadequacy. The perception of inadequacy is dependent on the aggregates. The perception of inadequacy is not identical to the quality of inadequacy.

Perceiving dukkha as the khandhas
Or not perceiving them as that
In either case, with either fact,
Their attributes we can explore.

Dependent on the five khandhas
Of dukkha we can turn to speak
Not sep’rate, same, neither or both
Is dukkha in regards to each

So long as the khandhas are found
There, bliss, time, and being they lack
But with no khandhas more around
Such labels we cannot abstract.

The khandhas are not lit’rally dukkha
The khandhas are not other than dukkha
The dukkha is not just the perception
The khandhas are not both nor deception

Dukkha can describe the khandhas
The khandhas dukkha too describe
Not sep’rate, same, or fictional
Each one explains the others vibe.

The great compassionate Buddha
Declared the noble truths to us
Whether the khandhas or dukkha:
From both he taught deliverance.

Going to need to mention @josephzizys at this point :joy::pray:

And @yeshe.tenley I want to apologize for this horrific comment. I hope to have time at a later time to reply to other issues and offer more human explanations. I hope it is at least helpful in analyzing this issue in some way. The poem is just to offer some joy :smiley:

2 Likes
172

Love the poem @Vaddha !

I take dukkha to mean “ill”, “bad”, “inadequate”, “miserable”, “insufficient”, etc… I think that the idea is basically that phenomena provide no ground on which an eternal, unchanging, pure bliss might be infered or achieved, because phenomena, and the “philosophies” we draw from phenomena, are insufficient, ill-fitting, not up to the purpose, mutable, unstable, painful in their presence or their absence, etc etc and therefore anyone who relies on a phenomena, like say the cessation of perception and feeling, relies on something unstable, ill-fitting, changeable, unreliable etc, because if their happiness and peace of mind is dependent on the absence of perception and feeling, then if and when they have a perception or a feeling then they are unhappy. And of course, wether you think of the buddhas teaching as essentially epistamological or ontological, the buddha clearly denies (in DN1 for example) that any experience can warrant the claim to permanency, impermanency, both or neither of experience/being or non-experience/non-being.

Over time, as the material we see in MN about the aggregates emerges and solidifies into a rigid metaphysics in SN and is finally misinterpreted as a metaphysical doctrine of permanent non-being/non-experience as “pari” nibanna, we end up with conceptually incoherent claims about aggregates literally being suffering, which makes liberation in this life, and therefore the existence of the Budhha as a living teacher, literally impossible.

I have been avoiding posting here for a while as it has become quite crystal clear to me that there is in fact a defacto if not dejure interpretation of buddhism on this forum that places SN and a particular and I think pernicious interpretation of SN at the forefront and foundation of “buddhism” and I think it is wrong-headed and frankly foolish. So it’s not really all that useful to spend much time talking here, as you either get shouted down by the hegemons or have to spend countless words trying to clarify ones position with the heterodox.

Anyway, good luck with your journey!

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173

Well I think your focus on the undeclared points and other excursions offer a healthy perspective here and I hope you can organize the ideas and refutations into something neat for reflection and discussion!

Good point :slightly_smiling_face:

All the best.

174

I don’t see how this is different from your previous paragraph.

Buddha still had physical suffering, but no mental suffering.

175

No. The Buddha was not reckonable in terms of suffering, was not attached to nor understandable by his physical body, did not depend in any way for his peace of mind or personal freedom on either physical pleasure or physical pain, had achieved complete freedom, had put down what had been taken up.

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176

Then there’s no issue to recognize that the 5 aggregates are dukkha as you don’t identify the Buddha with the 5 aggregates.

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177

I think this is a good question that may elucidate differences or similarities with @josephzizys ‘s view.

178

There are lots of issues! But i will need some time to put my response together

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179

I think one thing that is helpful to understand is metaphysics. I think for many Buddhists more familiar with the classical concepts and Abhidhamma scholarship, it may be difficult to conceptualize what is being refuted.

One way of talking about metaphysics is that it’s a study of what exists. What are the materials and stuff and immaterial things and so on operating out in the world. What are the fundamental building blocks of reality.

The idea that ‘ultimate reality’ is built out of a list of things, such as: earth, water, fire, air, derived materiality, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness, nibbāna, etc. is fundamentally a metaphysical idea. It’s about the stuff that reality is made of. What we now think of as “science” in the West is really just a branch of metaphysics. The separation of these things into separate departments is not how it was historically, and it causes a series of issues. This is also why we see “Buddhist philosophy” approaching what looks like ancient Greek science.

Then there are more epistemological approaches. One way this term can be used is in describing not what exists and what the world is made of, but rather in investigating knowledge, knowing, the nature of experience and so on. It isn’t really about what reality is made of, but it might approach questions like “can we know or talk about ‘reality’ and what does it refer to?” Etc.

Often, each of these camps will argue with the other. Sometimes they also fight internally. Here, one big theme seems to be on how “dukkha” fits into this picture. Hence my initial comment that this word and the word “is” need further clarification.

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180

“Mahāli, if form were exclusively painful—soaked and steeped in pain and not steeped in pleasure—sentient beings wouldn’t be aroused by it.
But because form is pleasurable—soaked and steeped in pleasure and not steeped in pain—sentient beings are aroused by it. …
Mahāli, if form were exclusively pleasurable—soaked and steeped in pleasure and not steeped in pain—sentient beings wouldn’t grow disillusioned with it.
But because form is painful—soaked and steeped in pain and not steeped in pleasure—sentient beings do grow disillusioned with it.”
SN 22.60

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182

The perspective of the Buddha expressed in SN22.60 (@Vaddha already refered to it) is that if the khandha’s were only suffering, the mind of beings would not be defiled. This sutta but also many others teach that there is an element of happiness and gratification in the khandha’s.

183

Of course. That’s why the Buddha spoke about how difficult it is to let go of all clinging to the khandhas.

But you’re neglecting the subsequent part of his teachings that speaks of the danger and escape from all conditional experiences, including the khandhas.

Pleasurable experiences can be deceiving in their pleasure, as they are unreliable for freedom from dukkha.
Everyone understands that being struck by a rock is painful and dukkha. It’s a bit more subtle to see dukkha at the birthday party.

As in SN12.15

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184

Don’t know if this pertains to Dharma’s specific use, but I learned about the term & concept “Buddha vehicle” in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of “A Treatise on the Paramis” by Acariya Dhammapala. (I just updated my Samsung tablet and appear to have lost my special keyboard for pali, hence no diacritics.)

Per BB it’s a reference to the three spiritual careers “toward which a disciple could aspire in the hope of some distant future attainment” and mirror, as a later development, the three types of individuals who “attain to the consummate state” – sammāsambuddha, paccekabuddha, and arahat.

Which then evolved to the bodhisattva-vehicle of the Mahayana…

In any case, the bodhisattva career invokes the cultivation of the parami (pl. in pali – I can’t type the diacritic). Which is a long way of explaining why I was asking elsewhere on SuttaCentral for a copy of Dhammapala’s original commentary in pali :thinking:

Which I found!