Certainly, this thread was much more sukkha than sukha, wouldn’t you say? 
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Certainly it seems you do not find this thread as sukha, but we’re discussing dhamma and sharing our dhamma (mis)understanding, aren’t we? Do you think I should drop or close the thread in favor of something more beneficial? I get the impression you find my misunderstanding as dukkha - something to be let go of - and wish I would stop spreading it around 
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All conditioned phenomena are dukkha, don’t worry about being any different.
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Yeah, when even the Noble Eightfold practice and the Tathagata are dukkha, what have I to worry about?
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Br. Thanissaro apparently translates Dukkha as “Stress”, which is interesting.
Kind of shows how much can be attached (pun unintended) to the understanding of a single word.
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Exactly.
People have tried to find loopholes in the Buddha’s Dhamma for thousands of years.
The track record has not exactly been great!
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I understand that you think I’m propounding a loophole in this thread. If you wish me to stop you merely need to say so in an unambiguous way and I’ll stop
FWIW, if I could have made a PM with @Vaddha I would have and not subjected everyone to my drivelings, but @Vaddha has his profile hidden so it is not possible to create a PM. It was not my intention to bother others with this thread, but rather to have a chat with @Vaddha to explain what I think and why, to jointly study dhamma and thereby perhaps come to a better understanding.
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Hello @Vaddha!
Since we’re on this thread let’s discuss dukkha (our favorite subject) 
and note that dukkha is conditioned, right? If we direct some single minded attention at dukkha and contemplate it searching for an essence it too disappears right? What essence can we find in dukkha?
Does this lack of an essence in dukkha arise dependent upon something? Does it cease dependent upon something? What would we be perceiving if we could directly perceive the essence of dukkha?
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Sure! 
Right.
Good question!
I’d say no to both. Though perception or knowledge of the lack of essence would arise and cease dependent on the aforementioned contemplation.
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@yeshe.tenley Maybe I can ask similar questions?
You would say that dukkha arises dependent on the defilements, and in the absence of defilements dukkha ceases, right? If that is so, aren’t the defilements inherently painful in nature? Or would you say that they do not have the nature of dukkha? In which case, believing that the defilements cause dukkha and must be made to cease would inherently entail a substantialist view of them? If the defilements are already empty and free of producing dukkha, any attempt to eradicate them would involve the wrong view that they are in fact producing real dukkha? And even an attempt to eliminate the delusion that they produce real dukkha would be reifying that delusion, which would be empty of dukkha from the start? So there is nothing to purify, no ignorance to end? Not even ignorance of emptiness?
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Desire, greed, hate. Yes, dukkha surely arises dependent upon these vile monsters
No, I believe the defilements are conditioned and as such if I tried to analyse them and reductively reduce them to some substantial thing, I’m likely to come up empty.
Hmm, I wonder if the word cause is doing a lot of hidden work there? Not sure I follow your logic to be honest. What is the substantialist implication in working to cease the defilements so as to prevent dukkha from arising?
The fact that conditioned phenomena are empty of essential nature does not imply that conditioned phenomena - such as the defilements and dukkha - do not exist. Sentient beings do not wish to experience dukkha. Dukkha is a dependent phenomena. Dependent upon the defilements, dukkha arises. With the cessation of the defilements, dukkha ceases. There is a path leading to the cessation of the defilements. Right?
I think this can be verified in the here and now. Practice the dhamma and see if you can notice a reduction to the arising of desire, greed and hatred. If so, this can give us faith in the dhamma. Knowing that the defilements are dependent we can continue to practice to eradicate them. This practice entails perfecting compassion, love, joy, and equanimity. It entails practicing the precepts against doing harm. Perfecting our wisdom and working for the liberation of beings.
Not following. Sorry.
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Interesting.
If the defilements must cease for dukkha to cease, but if they have not arisen, then how can they be made to cease?
If the defilements are empty then trying to destroy, annihilate, or obliterate them because they are by nature of their presence problematic is just the same as trying to remove, annihilate, or obliterate real dukkha, no? Either way there is some arisen thing which must be annihilated lest there be suffering, whether that be the defilements in this life or dukkha at the end of this one?
If the destruction of dukkha at the end of life is inherently substantialist, it would be reasonable to assume that any destruction of the defilements during life is just as substantialist. If there is such a thing that no matter when or where, if it is present then there is suffering, it doesn’t matter whether we call that thing “dukkha” or “kilesa” or what have you. If there is something which must be destroyed to end dukkha at any point in time, otherwise there is suffering, then wouldn’t that thing be inherently painful?
How can you say the defilements arise and cease if they cannot be found? And
How can a path lead to the cessation of something which has not arisen? Is there a path leading to the annihilation of the Self? Can you find such a path when you look for it?
What is the difference between this view and the view of someone who works to eradicate the aggregates which are understood as dukkha? Either way, there is some thing which must be eradicated at some point in time lest dukkha persist, no?
In which case, if these things do not have substantial existence, the view of eradicating and annihilating their substantiality would entail ignorance. And so it would ultimately not be able to end dukkha. Even aiming at destroying the ignorance of their insubstantiality, if perceived similarly as one such defilement, would be a form of ignorance, right?
Not sure if that clarifies.
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Now I have a question for you
Supposing this lack of an essence of conditioned phenomena does not arise, does not cease, does not change, is unproduced, unmade, what do you think… is it worthy of possession? Should we desire to acquire this object of knowledge?
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Objection to ‘possession.’ If there is possession it must be possessed by someone. Otherwise the word is meaningless. (Equivalent to saying: “Is it worthy of gfyrtnmoffs?”)
Objection to ‘object of knowledge.’ If something is an object of knowledge then it is a conditioned phenomenon, no? Is not known conditioned by knowing?
The lack of conditions could not be known, only understanding about the lack of conditions could be known, because if lack of conditions were an object of knowledge, then it would be conditioned and therefore not a lack of conditions. Understanding can be known because understanding is an object of knowing.
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@Vaddha, you ask such good questions!
Ah, but I think this mistakes two different things? When you say the defilements have not arisen I think you mean the essence of the defilements has not arisen, right? It so, then I would answer it is precisely because the essence of the defilements has not arisen that the defilements themselves are liable to cease! If the essence of the defilements were not empty, then the defilements could not cease and we’d be in quite the predicament.
The defilements are liable to cease dependent upon the condition that there essence (which is empty) is not liable to cease.
Ah, this is tricky! When you say annihilated I read a substantialist non-existence. This is not what happens to the defilements.
It is because the defilements cannot be found (ie, that they lack an essence and are coreless when looked for) that they are liable to arising and ceasing.
I’m going to stop here and see what you make of these answers.
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Ah, but you do concede that if there was someone to possess it that they should 
Can the lack of an essence of conditioned phenomena be directly perceived and known? Is it conditioned?
Well then it would revert back to ‘object of knowledge.’ If there is someone possessing something else then it would be conditioned. Unless you mean an independent, unconditioned ‘someone’ equivalent to the absence of all arising and ceasing? In which case, if such a someone were to exist, I couldn’t stop them either way
I think if I answered this it would repeat the previous discussion.
Thank you for your responses about the kilesas! I agree we’d be in quite a predicament if the conditions for dukkha were permanent!
We could then say the same thing about dukkha then, or anything, right? If “the defilements” are “greed,” “hatred,” and “delusion,” and this does not mean that three separate substances are one substance (Buddhist trinity?), then could we not analogously refer to “dukkha” as “form,” “feeling,” “perception,” “choices,” and “consciousness”? And could we not speak analogously of the cessation of these, not their essences, at the end of life, and therefore the ending of dukkha, without there being a substantialist annihilation?
Mettā
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Yes, that is what I had in mind So you concede that in that situation it would be ok for that someone to seek to possess
I don’t understand. What previous discussion are you referring to?
We already have an analogous term for “form,” “feeling,” “perception,” “choices,” and “consciousness” → the aggregates. This is a dependent designation based on a finite set of elements. Dukkha is not such an analogous term.
We could speak of the cessation of the aggregates and we do. We can speak of the cessation of conditioned phenomena and we do. Conditioned phenomena arise and cease dependent upon conditions.
When the conditions for a river cease, the river dries up and ceases. This does not mean that the river pops out of existence in some substantial way. Conditions arise and cease all day and all night. The cessation of one conditional phenomena acts as a condition for the arriving of another conditional phenomena.
But this is not what I think is meant by those who speak of the cessation of the aggregates after the parinibbana of an enlightened one.
They do not quibble too much when I point out that the form of the enlightened one does not pop out of existence. Why? Because this is manifest. It simply isn’t the case that the form aggregate (the body) (which they maintain is dukkha) ceases with no remainder and pops out of existence with the parinibbana of an enlightened one. In fact, several claimed relics of Shakyamuni’s body (claimed to be dukkha) are said to exist to this day!
However, they do seem to insist and say that the mind-based aggregates do utterly cease without remainder and pop out of existence with the parinibbana of an enlightened one. That this dukkha - unlike the body - goes poof. They do not speak too much about the body not going poof; presumably because it is an inconvenient fact
Anyway, I have other obligations coming up so we can chat more later. As before I quite enjoyed our conversations and sharing of dhamma (mis)understandings
As I said, no, I don’t. ‘Seek’ to ‘possess’ both require dependent structures or experiences. Just as ‘object of knowledge’ imply. Which would then mean that ‘that someone’ would no longer be ‘that someone’ in reference to something unconditioned.
If ‘emptiness’ means ‘conditions lack an essence’ then it is in dependence on ‘conditions’ to lack said essence that any such emptiness can be spoken of. We can’t speak of a cup being empty if in fact there is no cup. The emptiness of the cup would also turn up empty, without solid referent. So if there are no conditions, it makes no sense to say that such an absence of conditions could be ‘possessed’ or ‘sought.’
The one before related to the question if emptiness is unconditioned or not, etc.
Well we’ve already discussed this before to some degree. If dukkha is a designation for anything that does not fit the value of being unconditioned or eternal happiness, then if the aggregates are conditioned or if they include painful sensation, then they are dukkha.
So “the aggregates” are merely an analogy to “dukkha.” Unless you think there can only be one word for one thing, which I’ve also already demonstrated is false to you before, such as with my example of the protective charm. I can do it briefly here as well, such as “the defilements” “the three poisons” “the cause of dukkha” “greed” “hatred” “delusion” “ignorance” “craving” etc. Unless you think words have substantial, essentialist referents then there is no problem with “dukkha” being a mere referent for “the aggregates” just as it can be for “the sense domains.” Ultimately, it merely categorizes “conditioned experiences,” hence it including those and other words.
Just as when the Buddha says something like “hatred is a corruption” or “hatred is fire” or “hatred has a poisonous root,” etc., you don’t take this literally? If so, why not the same with ‘dukkha’ and ‘burning chaff’ and so on. I say that any qualification you apply to hatred → defilement can equally be applied to the aggregates → dukkha. Whether it be about their arising and ceasing, or their nature, etc.
So what is the difference between hatred ceasing in the Teacher and hatred ceasing temporarily in a normal sentient being? If the Teacher really ended hatred, why do we still see it arise in the world?
I think this is a misunderstanding of ‘form.’ ‘Form’ is not metaphysical matter or substance. It is a conditioned experience. Sentient beings may have the conditioned experience of external form with what they perceive as “the form of the Teacher”, just as sentient beings may experience anger. They may even experience anger when encountering what they perceive as the form of the Teacher! No such “Teacher’s body” can even be designated without other aggregates like perception and so on as mentioned briefly there. How can you say some “Teacher’s form” is persisting and must persist in a substantial external world? Where are you basing these conclusions?
External form is the experience of that own sentient being’s aggregate of form. The aggregate of form includes both internal and external form, as is said directly in the discourses. If a sentient being had no form, there could not be any designation of a “Teacher’s form,” because external and internal form are dependent and part of the same form aggregate.
So if someone were to see relics of the Teacher, they would be experiencing their own aggregate of form. Just as if someone were to get angry at relics of the Teacher, they would experience their own anger.
@yeshe.tenley , this seems out of character for you. It seems as if, in order to deny that the substance of the aggregates can cease, you are insisting that some “aggregate substance” must continue exerting causal force “out there” in a substantial world. Would you say the same for the form of a dream, a mirage, or a rainbow?
If someone perceived the Teacher in a dream, and the dream ended, would you insist that the Teacher’s form must be persisting in a substantial time and space of that dream-world forever and ever because of causality? Or is the experience of the dream-Teacher merely a conditioned experience dependent on internal dream-form?
If someone were to perceive the form of a rainbow’s color in the sky, would you insist that when the form of those colors ceases, the colors of the rainbow must still exist “out there” exerting causal force on the world? Or is the experience of the form of a rainbow dependent on the internal form, perception, etc. there?
If someone were to perceive water in a mirage, would you insist that the water must be obeying external laws of physics and be preserved, cycling in some substantial external “water cycle out there” once the appearance of the form of water ceased? Are there mirage-clouds ‘out there’ made of the mirage-vapor from mirage-lakes that create mirage-rain filling up mirage-oceans which cycle back to the mirage-lakes?
It seems you’ve created the same predicament analogous to the commentarial Abhidhamma that seems to reify a kind of externally-independent stream of momentary consciousnesses that must be sustained via causality in time and space ‘out there.’ Do you remember that discussion?
I’m interested in your answers!!
Would you say that hatred did not pop out of existence and utterly cease without remainder with the nibbāna of the Teacher? Or would you say that this dukkha - namely, hatred - unlike the aggregates pops out of existence? If not, could you clarify?
I have further questions about hatred and suffering, but I feel that there are already plenty of questions here.
EDIT: Updated some questions.
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Yes, quite so. A good way of putting it.