What is dukkha?

[Vaddha]

@yeshe.tenley

Things that are as we desire them to be and things that are not as we desire them to be. I do not think this schema is wise.

Do you think the bodhisatta had to do this to find awakening?

For example, when he decided that what his former teachers taught did not ultimately lead to permanent, perfect freedom from dukkha, was he merely allowing his desire for something more valuable to get in the way? Or when he distinguished between “cruelty” and “compassion,” is it simply that cruelty isn’t how he desired it to be, and therefore it is bad? If he set aside his desires, would cruelty be just as good as compassion?

@yeshe.tenley

It seems to me you are proposing a schema where we sort things into buckets of desirable and undesirable.

I would simplify it into buckets of “valuable” and “non-valuable.” Or we could say “adequate” and “inadequate.” If you want to call it desirable in the sense of it is the goal, aim, or desire of Buddhist values, then that works as well, yes. And I think we can find clear statements in the canon where this is precisely what the Buddha does. He says that if something does not fit the value of being permanent, it is inadequate (by this definition of ‘dukkha’).

An example again is if someone had the aim or desire to paint a wall the color red. They might sort red paint off from any other color paint. This activity does not demand some kind of craving or defilement to do, otherwise the Buddha wouldn’t be able to accomplish any task with an aim or purpose. “Desire” in this sense is functional.

[yeshe.tenley]

Hi @Vaddha,

I just want to say that I think these are excellent questions and that you are putting me to the task for sure Thank you!

@Vaddha

Do you think the bodhisatta had to do this to find awakening?

I think this is what all sentient beings do. Don’t we all divide the world into buckets of the desirable and undesirable? We run toward the desirable and run away from the undesirable?

@Vaddha

For example, when he decided that what his former teachers taught did not ultimately lead to permanent, perfect freedom from dukkha, was he merely allowing his desire for something more valuable to get in the way?

He was a bodhisatta and thus not completely free of desire; I suppose that is true. However, the amount of desire he must have harbored was very small at this point, I think. It wasn’t this small amount of desire that motivated his actions to move on from his former teachers though; at least I don’t hypothesize that.

@Vaddha

Or when he distinguished between “cruelty” and “compassion,” is it simply that cruelty isn’t how he desired it to be, and therefore it is bad?

Going to try and choose my words carefully here. The bodhisatta did not have a desire to be cruel, that is true. At that point he had very little desires left I imagine. Perhaps he did still harbor a desire to be compassionate?

@Vaddha

If he set aside his desires, would cruelty be just as good as compassion?

Definitely not. In the absence of desire I think he had trained himself for eons to develop perfected compassion. The altruistic wish to achieve Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. I think it is important to clarify that I do not think this altruistic wish was a form of desire. And that fact may help to clarify what it is I think desire consists of.

[Green]

@Vaddha

For example, when he decided that what his former teachers taught did not ultimately lead to permanent, perfect freedom from dukkha,

The point is very clear that the Buddha did not seek anything with the nature of decay, liable to arise and cease, the nature to desintegrate. From the beginning he sought asankhata, what has not those characteristics of arising, ceasing and changing.

He found it. His heartwish was fulfilled. His calling ended, the taks was done. There is protection, there is a refuge, there is an island, there is the stable, constant, not-desintegrating he taught, and I show you how to arrive there.

Dukkha is in all that what is liable to arise and cease.

[stephen]

@Vaddha

He says that if something does not fit the value of being permanent, it is inadequate (by this definition of ‘dukkha’).

This is where the spiritual faculity of saddhā, faith, comes into play. The Buddha taught these distinctions and it often seems counterintuitive, or just plain wrong.

An attempt needs to be made to at least ‘entertain the idea’ that his distinctions were right, as we might never conclude them ourselves. Also, trying to ‘logic them out’ as is being done here in large part, can have only limited success, as they can run so counter to the way our minds work.

[yeshe.tenley]

Hi @Stephen,

@stephen

The Buddha taught these distinctions and it often seems counterintuitive, or just plain wrong.

What do you make of this distinction:

Greedy intention is a person’s sensual pleasure.
Saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo,
The world’s pretty things aren’t sensual pleasures.
Nete kāmā yāni citrāni loke; Variant: Nete → na te (sya-all)
Greedy intention is a person’s sensual pleasure.
Saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo,
The world’s pretty things stay just as they are,
Tiṭṭhanti citrāni tatheva loke;
but a wise one removes desire for them.
Athettha dhīrā vinayanti chandanti.

AN 6.63

The Buddha taught this distinction as well. Why do you think that is?

[Vaddha]

@yeshe.tenley

Don’t we all divide the world into buckets of the desirable and undesirable? We run toward the desirable and run away from the undesirable?

Definitely. I think that all ignorant beings carry with us a system of values which the Buddha deemed faulty for finding awakening. In Buddhist terms, I think the primary value system is of happiness. But we tend to have a low bar for value or adequacy. If something provides a little bit of sukha, we deem it ‘adequate’ and sort it into the sukha category. I think the Buddha was simply raising the bar, and showing us that these lower value systems keep us shackled to what is actually not adequate, or in other words, to what is actually dukkha. If we perceive something as valuable, how would it be logical to let go of it?

When he says that we perceive sukha in what is dukkha, we could take this as him saying that we perceive as adequate things that, when held to a higher standard, are not really adequate.

Clearly, the Bodhisatta (and the Buddha) had a high standard for value. As I said in a post above, I think that his value system was “if it is not perfect, unconditioned, permanent happiness, it is not adequate.” If we compare temporary sense pleasures to this standard, we see they fall apart and lose value. They are impermanent, conditioned, and imperfect. This means they are ultimately “inadequate” or “undesirable,” in the sense that they are not worthy of our desire.

The Buddha has said that sensual pleasures give little gratification and much suffering and distress, and they are all the more full of drawbacks.
MN 22

If the word for “undesirable” or “inadequate” is ‘dukkha’ as we discussed, this is all very coherent. The framework of “gratification, drawback, escape” shows us a way of measuring and testing our values to see if something is dukkha.

Especially when we consider some historical context. The self or attā would have often been believed to be an independently blissful and eternal thing. The Buddha says that if there were such a thing, he would advocate desiring it:

Mendicants, it would make sense to be possessive about something that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever.
MN 22

Pause and note here. I think this is confirming our discussion of ‘value.’ The Buddha is explicitly saying that if something were permanent and eternal, it would be desirable. But:

But do you see any such possession?”
“No, sir”
“Good, mendicants! I also can’t see any such possession.”
MN 22

This means that if we place as sukha only that which is eternal, unconditioned, etc., and we place as its negation, dukkha, everything else, then we should give up desire for everything that doesn’t fit those requirements.

This would mean that all conditioned experiences are dukkha. All changing or impermanent experiences are dukkha. And all experiences that are physically or mentally painful are, of course, dukkha from the start.

Some thoughts.

@yeshe.tenley

gs. I think it is important to clarify that I do not think this altruistic wish was a form of desire

But see what I wrote before. “Desire” can be functional in the sense of a simple system of values, like choosing to paint a wall red over blue. If the Bodhisatta did not value as desirable an altruistic wish, how could he engage in it, even with difficulty?

[stephen]

I don’t understand your point?
I never said the Buddha only made the distinctions Ven Vaddha has written about.
The Dhamma is a big subject with many details.

[Vaddha]

@Green

The point is very clear that the Buddha did not seek anything with the nature of decay, liable to arise and cease, the nature to desintegrate.

Yes, I think so. Dukkha being defined as what is impermanent or conditioned reflects this value system.

@stephen

This is where the spiritual faculity of saddhā, faith, comes into play.

Yes, this is a good point. I think some willingness to let go of prior values and try out the Buddha’s higher ones are required even to follow precepts.

[stephen]

@Vaddha

This would mean that all conditioned experiences are dukkha. All changing or impermanent experiences are dukkha. And all experiences that are physically or mentally painful are, of course, dukkha from the start

Yes, this is the Dhamma.

It is deeply counterintuitive, against the grain, hard to see.
Good thing we had such an excellent and persistent teacher !

[yeshe.tenley]

Hi @Stephen,

I didn’t intend to make a point. You had mentioned distinctions that the Teacher made and that one immediately came to mind and the thought occurred, “I wonder what Stephen would make of this one?” Hence the question

[stephen]

I still haven’t understood how what you’re asking me has to do with this discussion on dukkha.

A 100 posts later, we’ve cycled back to the standard definition of dukkha.
You may agree or disagree.

[yeshe.tenley]

@Vaddha

If something provides a little bit of sukha, we deem it ‘adequate’ and sort it into the sukha category. I think the Buddha was simply raising the bar, and showing us that these lower value systems keep us shackled to what is actually not adequate, or in other words, to what is actually dukkha. If we perceive something as valuable, how would it be logical to let go of it?

Moreover, if we encounter something that is seemingly sukha we start to form the habit or desire for it. It isn’t enough. We crave more. Until it is too much and then we desire for it to go away

@Vaddha

When he says that we perceive sukha in what is dukkha, we could take this as him saying that we perceive as adequate things that, when held to a higher standard, are not really adequate.

Yes, we perceive in that sukha something which it is not or we conceive of it being something it is not or we desire it to be something it is not. We desire the impermanent to be permanent. We desire for what has arisen to cease or to not cease.

@Vaddha

They are impermanent, conditioned, and imperfect.

Yes and no matter how much we may desire them to be otherwise they cannot so be.

@Vaddha

This means they are ultimately “inadequate” or “undesirable,” in the sense that they are not worthy of our desire.

Quibble with the word “ultimately” but precisely agree that they are not worthy of our desire.

@Vaddha

If the word for “undesirable” or “inadequate” is ‘dukkha’ as we discussed, this is all very coherent. The framework of “gratification, drawback, escape” shows us a way of measuring and testing our values to see if something is dukkha.

That which is subject to arising and cessation; that which is conditioned; that which is not self; that which is not eternal; none of this is worthy of generating desire or aversion towards.

@Vaddha

The Buddha says that if there were such a thing, he would advocate desiring it:

Such a thing would have an essence or core that could be found when looked for. Nothing has such a core or essence that I can find. Nothing that lacks such a core is worth a penny of desire.

@Vaddha

The Buddha is explicitly saying that if something were permanent and eternal, it would be desirable.

Yes, and then he goes on to say that nothing can be so found.

@Vaddha

then we should give up desire for everything that doesn’t fit those requirements

Just so.

@Vaddha

This would mean that all conditioned experiences are dukkha. All changing or impermanent experiences are dukkha. And all experiences that are physically or mentally painful are, of course, dukkha from the start.

All conditioned things are not worthy of generating desire towards. All impermanent things are not worthy of generating desire towards. All experiences are not worthy of generating desire towards.

@Vaddha

But see what I wrote before. “Desire” can be functional in the sense of a simple system of values, like choosing to paint a wall red over blue. If the Bodhisatta did not value as desirable an altruistic wish, how could he engage in it, even with difficulty?

Desire is rooted in selfish intention. The altruistic wish is not rooted in selfish intention.

[Vaddha]

@yeshe.tenley

Desire is rooted in selfish intention. The altruistic wish is not rooted in selfish intention.

Let’s bracket the word ‘desire.’

Selfish or not, how is it possible for there to be any intention at all if the outcome or pursuit of an action is not seen as in some sense adequate, worthy, beneficial, good?

Is what is adequate, worthy, beneficial, and good ‘desirable’?

If in a Buddhist value system, all dukkha is undesirable, this only has meaning, as mentioned before, in contrast to what is desirable. Otherwise a word like ‘inadequate’ or ‘undesirable’ is meaningless. In this case, it would be freedom from dukkha that is deemed desirable, adequate, worthy, beneficial, good. Is the altruistic wish aimed at freedom from dukkha?

If it were not perceived as such, how would it be possible for a mind to engage in it?

—

As for our discussion on the aggregates being dukkha, I’d say we’ve approached pretty near to an agreement @yeshe.tenley ! Dukkha is a word referring to a conventional value system that values perfect happiness. The aggregates, not being permanent, unconditioned, or perfect happiness, are inadequate, so they are deemed dukkha. All experiences that do not fit the highest value are dukkha. When assessing their worth and drawbacks, the drawbacks incline to escape. To escape them, the mind must let go of old values that desire what is dukkha, so it must let go of desire and attachment to the dukkha. It only can do this if it truly understands dukkha as dukkha, or in other words, if its values align with supreme freedom from inadequacy.

If the problem were desire and not the undesirability of the dukkha, then it would not make sense for the Buddha to encourage desire or grasping to something. In other words, if experiences were unconditioned, permanent, and blissful, then they would be deemed ‘desirable.’ This only makes sense if it is the inadequacy of the thing that is problematic. So the problem is the value assigned to the nature of the thing, not the desire itself fundamentally. The desire is a problem in so far as it perpetuates the presence of and entanglement with undesirable things.

We didn’t even get to discuss dependent arising and the condition for dukkha being jāti, or the concept of gradual cessation!

[Jasudho]

@stephen

A 100 posts later, we’ve cycled back to the standard definition of dukkha.

Indeed.

All conditional experiences are dukkha. CE = D.

This is can be directly known via pañña, beyond maññati (although the latter does play a role in the practice).

[yeshe.tenley]

Hi @Vaddha, other obligations are drawing me away at the moment, but thank you for the chat and hope to pick it up and continue with your latest very good questions another time!

[NgXinZhao]

@yeshe.tenley

And that fact may help to clarify what it is I think desire consists of.

Here the english word desire is not enough.

Use taṇhā or chanda instead.

Arahants eradicated taṇhā, the cause of suffering, hence, they do not suffer mentally. Arahants still have chanda to be able to walk, eat, teach, sleep, go into the Jhānas, have compassion for the world etc.

taṇhā requires the ignorance of possibly seeing something with the value of possible permanent, unconditional happiness. Eg. likely the non-returner still might have some of it with regards to the form and formless realms, hence the fetters of attachment to form and formless realms are not yet eradicated for the non-returner.

chanda can still choose the relative better option of Jhāna vs staying in physical pain of the body. Despite knowing full well that ultimately both sides are dukkha of change and conditionality, but Jhānas lack the dukkha of unpleasant physical feeling. Note here that the arahant knows pain and just pain, without inserting a self in there (like Buddha’s advice to bahiya). There is no mental suffering corresponding to the physical pain, but he is still able to choose to go into Jhāna to get relief from the physical pain. Simply because the Jhānas has less dukkha.

chanda can still choose to act out of compassion, for recognising that the act of teaching produces happiness in the world, and may even lead people to the permanent happiness they have found. Compassion only is able to work by clearly discerning which outcome is less dukkha and which is not. So the overall dukkha of change and conditionality might play a role in the guide of compassion is to lead sentient beings from the conditioned to Nibbāna.

The dukkha dukkha of unpleasant feeling suffering also plays a role for compassion to recommend Jhānas compared to being in physical pain. Or worldly success, Being rich as opposed to being poor etc, to avoid hunger. So Buddha taught how lay people can be successful, living in the world. Sigalovada sutta, maṅgala sutta. etc.

[Green]

@Vaddha

As for our discussion on the aggregates being dukkha, I’d say we’ve approached pretty near to an agreement @yeshe.tenley ! Dukkha is a word referring to a conventional value system that values perfect happiness. The aggregates, not being permanent, unconditioned, or perfect happiness, are inadequate, so they are deemed dukkha. All experiences that do not fit the highest value are dukkha. When assessing their worth and drawbacks, the drawbacks incline to escape

I believe it is like this:

There is a certain element of happiness/gratification due to grasping, attachment, clinging. And we all know this. We cannot denie this and do not have to denie this too. The Buddha knew this and teaches this too. But this happiness/gratification is always liable to cease, merely a feeling of reward (a brainproces) which does not exist for long. It has also a dangereous aspect. We can see this with addicts. Following the desire for rewarding feelings, sukha vedana and somanassa vedana, is a slippery slope and easily results in dependendcy. It also easily gives rise to evil unwholesome states when something or someone stand in our way to attain such rewarding gratifying feelings.
These pleasures are seen as low and not that subtle and great as happiness or peace arrived at when all conditions for grasping, clinging, attachment are uprooted from mind and Nibbana is personally attained.

So the core value system in Dhamma is:

-any happiness due to clinging is lower than happiness due to detachment, freedom from clinging.

This state of imperishable (in the sense of not-desintegrating) peace relies on an stable and constant element in our lifes, called asankahata. An element or aspect of stillness, dispassion, peace, emptiness that is not build up, is not a construction of the mind (like sukha and somanassa vedana’s are) . Because this element of emptiness, stillness is not constructed it is also not liable to desintegrate. That is why there is a real base for peace.
If all would be constant arising and ceasing, there is no ground/base for peace and stability. That is what we need to see, i feel. I think we can think about this element of stillness, dispassion, emptiness in our lifes as something that is often overlooked and is not really investigates, ignored, it tends to be ignored. Buddha did not. I think it is not that bad to see it as something that pervades any experience but at the same time is not that experience. It has no characteristic to arise, cease and change, like any experience has.

At this point people often become over-exited and think it describes an atta, an essence, eternal something…No.

[Pasanna]

@stephen

Are internet discussions about what dukkha is dukkha or sukkha?

They are both suffering and dry

Maybe you meant sukha or suka or sukka

[Malunkyaputta]

The nasal cycle is also Dukkha.

[har1ndu15]

I think your point is that some experience is not dukkha. But do you agree that all experience is conditional? That all experience arise due to causes and end when causes end. Thus all experience is not-self.
Since experience arise due to conditions and is not under any control(from self/us), all experience is a prison. Why do you think such a prison is not dukkha?