Agreed Assuming âinherent satisfactorinessâ is ontologically positive.
Hello @Vaddha,
I apologize if I was not clear. Iâm going to stick to our discussion, because it is possible Iâm getting confused by other discussions going on as well.
I didnât mean to imply that for me âlack of inherent satisfactorinessâ was the operative definition for my understanding. You asked me if rocks depended upon the absence of desire for them to have a lack of inherent satisfactoriness and I said no and then we went with âlack of inherent satisfactorinessâ as the definition of âdukkhaâ for the sake of the discussion to see if that would help us clarify understanding.
Letâs leave âinherentâ out of whatever definition we use, okay? I think since weâve both agreed to dispense with substantialism that this might lead to a more lucid discussion.
In keeping with my earlier contention of not insisting upon my own definitions letâs use this one:
or
NOTE: I literally just put âunsatisfactoryâ and âunsatisfactorinessâ in google and this is what came up. If you wish to use another common dictionary definition that would be fine as well.
Dukkha is when things are âunacceptable because poor or not good enough.â
Dukkha is the state of âthe quality of being inadequate or unsuitable.â
I believe thinking about dukkha in terms of unprotected, unsafe, unreliable is not that bad. That kind of connotation.
This also directly relates to anicca, things being unstable, temporary, fleeting, conditional.
And also to anatta, lacking core, substantial existence etc.
And it was in fact also this kind of dukkha that entered Buddhaâs heart.
And i also feel this what we suffer from most.
This was what made me talk to a teacher. I shared to him that i had lost all faith or trust in life. He said to meâŚthat is why we practice DhammaâŚ
Buddha also had this existential crises.
If one translates:
what is impermanent is suffering, âŚ
that makes no sense, but if one translates:
'what is impermanent is unstable, cannot protect, is not trustworthy, that makes sense.
Ofcourse, i believe Buddha found the stable, the constant, ansankhata and has shown the Path to asankhata his whole life. It is up to us to discover it, the reliable.
Buddha, i believe was not so desperate that he saw no other escape then to cease.
I would suggest that if this discussion is to be limited to only 2 people then it should be taken off the discussion board and be made private.
Others can join! Sorry, wasnât trying to be exclusive. Iâll just have to sharpen my attention so as not to get confused with multiple conversations. I apologize.
I believe, he was seeking safety, protection.
No worries. Iâm grateful for the discussion and opportunity to learn. Iâm also happy to see what others say here.
I can see how you didnât mean or want to imply that. But if you go back and read our conversation, I think youâll see that I did not just propose this as something provisional. I derived it by taking your statements at face value and asking you questions about them with a series of premises. I think the conversation only makes sense in this respect, namely, of me asking you questions to learn your perspective, regardless of what you intended the perspective originally to be. Keep in mind that this started with you making an assertion that the five aggregates are not literally suffering. So I am simply asking you questions to learn from your position and deriving what I perceive as logical conclusions from what you say. Let me know if at some point I misunderstand or make a mistake and this is not the case.
Sure, sounds good. For what itâs worth, I donât think dukkha can be said to substantially or independently exist, so itâs substantial annihilation could not follow either.
Okay. So dukkha is the quality of unacceptability, not being good enough, unsuitability, inadequacy, etc. I think this could be summed up as âundesirable,â as some synonyms suggest there.
It seems to me that these are words about value, would you agree? If I say something is âinadequateâ or ânot good enough,â it would seem that Iâm making some kind of value judgement about the thing. So in order to understand my statement on value, someone would have to understand what my values are, right? Namely, what is good enough? What is good? What is desirable, or at least, why is something undesirable?
Yes, thatâs right. And perhaps I havenât been careful enough in answering them or perhaps Iâve read into them or assumed views you hold that are not actually in evidence. Iâll try and do better.
Undesireable does seem to fit pretty decently with the operative way Iâve been describing how dukkha arises and ceases. Lots of puns intended.
Yes, I think this makes sense.
Cool I think we should clarify one more thing.
Would you agree that âdukkhaâ can by extension refer to the things which have the quality of dukkha, i.e. undesirable experiences? In PÄli, adjectives and nouns are the same class of word. So often dukkha is used as a noun, like âthe arising of vision is the arising of dukkhaâ or âdukkha arises and ceases.â I noticed many people here have kind of assumed this at times at least provisionally, but itâs been left somewhat ambiguous.
Or would you define âdukkhaâ only as the experience of being unsatisfied? Like the feeling of disappointment or upset. Rather than âunacceptable or unsatisfying experiencesâ (which includes the former).
Then it should be all the more seen that all aggregates are dukkha. By means of all aggregates are undesirable. By seeing this, all desires can cease and the goal reached.
Yeshe, what is the reason, what is the cause that those devaâs, apparantly, do not get bored with their pleasure, entertainment, way of life? It seems extremely boring how they live. It is almost as if those devaâs have some inherent satisfaction in there pleasures and way of living. But why and how?
I think a human being is not able. I also feel this is an interesting point, that we loose that ability to enjoy things quit easily, and have a constant urge for other or more intens input.
This year i really enjoyed the first day of warm weather. And it is somehow absurd how quickly this becomes common, i feel. After day 3 it was annoying Oh ohâŚwhat a madness
I also had a time, long ago⌠i watcht porn, and i also noticed that it went from mild to more extreme. I stopped this madness. I think it also is something personal but in general we tend to go more and more extreme.
Experiences are just experiences. We say an experience is undesirable if we find the experience âinadequateâ or ânot good enoughâ; if we have some expectation that is not wholly met or fulfilled by that experience, right? Iâm not sure if that answers your question though.
If you have a ton of passionate desire for the aggregates, then practicing to see them as undesirable will counter that passionate desire to some degree. If you donât have passion at all for the aggregates, then practicing to see them as undesirable can act as a condition for the arising of passionate aversion for the aggregates to some degree. Disillusionment is in the middle and involves an absence of passion.
Well, thatâs certainly understated. Indeed, for beginners it is a danger to fall into aversion. But in vipassana practise one of the basic skills to learn is to observe without aversion or greed for anything which is observed. Just as it is.
And seeing the aggregates as it is, undesirable, a dart, a boil, unsatisfactory, danger, etc, does help to cultivate disillusionment then dispassion. Anytime aversion shows up, one has to deal with the aversion first by asking what is being attached to, or do metta. Then continue to see the dukkha side of aggregates until it sinks in deep. This is not just about the balance between aversion and greed.
An issue with limiting dukkha to âundesirableâ experiences is that itâs limited to a personâs cognitive-emotional reaction(s) to a given experience.
These reactions are ever-changing, so is this to imply that todayâs experience is dukkha because itâs considered/feels âinadequateâ, but a similar experience next month is not because it feels âgood enough?â
Perhaps Iâm missing the main point here?
If a general wins a battle and revels in the victory after all the killing, is that not dukkha because their experience is âadequateâ?
Or is it dukkha despite the generalâs reaction to the experience?
Well this is why I made the point that this is a statement of value, and that in order for it to be meaningful, there have to be some underlying or unspoken values assumed that inform the judgement.
Youâve rightly pointed out that different people can have different values, so the value judgements they make (X is of worth, Y is unworthy) will vary.
If dukkha is indeed a value judgement, then the values underlying it must be Buddhist values. If we can identify Buddhist values, or how early Buddhism engages with value, then we can identify what is considered of less value, i.e. inadequate or undesirable.
So long as the values are consistent, thereâs no problem in dukkha being a value judgement. So if the Buddha had a coherent set of values or statements about value, then so long as we stick to those, itâs not a problematic definition.
Right. Again, this goes back to value. Value is a quality attributed to something. Rocks are rocks. But a rock can be deemed more or less valuable once we establish a schema or system of values to sort things into.
This means that a word like âinadequateâ is really meaningless unless we define what is âadequateâ or why something is inadequate, as weâve both agreed already.
But it seems you would say that if an experience were in fact considered âinadequateâ within the Buddhist system of values, then it could be called âdukkha,â right?
Itâs not that we need a kind of emotional expectation. Just a system of values. If we decide that we are going to paint a wall red, then any blue paint would be inadequate. But that doesnât mean that we must have emotional cravings and expectations involved in order to reject blue paint and engage in such a system of value. I assume youâd agree with this?
I think I provided one above then. The ultimate value is of permanent happiness which doesnât depend on any conditions to remain as it is.
Since no conditioned thing satisfies this value, all conditioned things are inadequate.
Yes, I think this is a correct assessment of the Buddhaâs position.
I think that âdukkhaâ, in this particular sense, is primarily a negation. So the value system is something like this:
If X is not a permanent, unconditioned source of happiness, then it is not sukha.
Whatever is not sukha is deemed dukkha.
A similar statement is when the Buddha says âWhatever is impermanent is dukkha.â If we go by this agreed upon definition, then heâs simply stating a basic value system: if it isnât permanent, it isnât fully adequate. Therefore, it is deemed âinadequate.â
Here, âgoodâ or âadequateâ basically meaning âsupreme, perfect, permanent happiness.â
Painful feeling of any kind is automatically excluded, because it isnât even happiness, let alone perfect happiness.
Impermanent or changing things are excluded, because they are not perfect or permanent happiness.
Conditioned or dependent things are excluded, because they are not permanent or independent happiness.
In this way, we can see how a mere system of values places conditioned experienced in the category of âdukkha.â
Rather, I say it goes back to desire. A rock can be deemed adequate or inadequate depending upon what desire we hold for the rock to be and whether it is what we desire. I contend that dukkha cannot arise in the absence of desire for something to be other than it is or a view of something that is not concordant with what it is.
It seems to me you are proposing a schema where we sort things into buckets of desirable and undesirable. Things that are as we desire them to be and things that are not as we desire them to be. I do not think this schema is wise.
Instead, I propose we should look at what desire is and is not and what it is rooted in.