Every Moment is an Event Horizon because of Destructive Change, even for things that remain the Same.
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Thank you @CurlyCarl !! I have updated my original post to include your examples!
Also, anattasaññ is quite interesting isn’t it?
VN: 0
DN: 7 (in DN16, DN33 and DN34)
MN: 0
SN: 3 (SN46.73, SN55.3)
AN: 30
KN: 18 (once in the Udana, once in the Theragatha, the other 16 in late books)
AB: 0
The SN occurrences are also “perceptual strategy” type occurrences like the ones in DN:
“Mendicants, when the perception of not-self in suffering is developed and cultivated it’s very fruitful and beneficial. …” “Dukkhe anattasaññā, bhikkhave …pe…”
in a sewuence with the impermanence, ugliness, giving up etc ,and
You should meditate observing the impermanence of all conditions, perceiving suffering in impermanence, perceiving not-self in suffering, perceiving giving up, perceiving fading away, and perceiving cessation. Idha tvaṁ, dīghāvu, sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassī viharāhi, anicce dukkhasaññī, dukkhe anattasaññī pahānasaññī virāgasaññī nirodhasaññīti. That’s how you should train.” Evañhi te, dīghāvu, sikkhitabban”ti.
Ud4.1
They should develop the perception of ugliness to give up greed, love to give up hate, mindfulness of breathing to cut off thinking, and perception of impermanence to uproot the conceit ‘I am’. asubhā bhāvetabbā rāgassa pahānāya, mettā bhāvetabbā byāpādassa pahānāya, ānāpānassati bhāvetabbā vitakkupacchedāya, aniccasaññā bhāvetabbā asmimānasamugghātāya.
When you perceive impermanence, the perception of not-self becomes stabilized. Aniccasaññino hi, meghiya, anattasaññā saṇṭhāti, Perceiving not-self, you uproot the conceit ‘I am’ and attain extinguishment in this very life.” anattasaññī asmimānasamugghātaṁ pāpuṇāti diṭṭheva dhamme nibbānan”ti.
Thag10.7
Developing the perceptions Bhāveyya ca aniccanti, of impermanence, non-self, and unattractiveness, Anattasaññaṁ asubhasaññañca; and displeasure with the whole world—Lokamhi ca anabhiratiṁ, this is appropriate for an ascetic. Etaṁ samaṇassa patirūpaṁ.
So it definitely seems like AN has the majority of occurrences, I will have to investigate some more and see whats of interest.
Metta.
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There are similar teachings in the DN and MN. For example:
- In DN 1, many of the wrong views listed generally are wrong views because they believe a self is eternal, or a self is annihilated, or a self attains a type of nibbana here & now.
- In DN 15, not regarding things as ‘self’ is a salient theme.
- In DN 22, the phrase “Or mindfulness is established that the body… feelings… states of mind… dhammas exist, to the extent necessary for knowledge and mindfulness” refers to not regarding these things as self.
Or at least MN 62 and MN 118 contain the following teaching on aniccasanna:
- Meditate on impermanence. For when you meditate on impermanence any conceit ‘I am’ will be given up. Aniccasaññañhi te, rāhula, bhāvanaṁ bhāvayato yo asmimāno so pahīyissati.
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Interesting thoughts. I’m finding your analysis of the various Nikayas at the very least thought provoking, even if none of this is 100% certain.
I think you missed one mention of anatta though, in MN 22, which is very similar to the accounts found in SN. Would be interested to see what you think of that.
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Yes, thanks again @CurlyCarl , this is true, in the second half of the sutta, after dealing with conditionality, the talk moves on to selfs:
DN15:
When there’s no feeling at all, with the cessation of feeling, would the thought “I am this” occur there?’”
Sabbaso vedanāya asati vedanānirodhā api nu kho tattha ‘ayamahamasmī’ti siyā”ti?“No, sir.”
“No hetaṁ, bhante”.“That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard self as that which is liable to feel.
“Tasmātihānanda, etena petaṁ nakkhamati: ‘na heva kho me vedanā attā, nopi appaṭisaṁvedano me attā, attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā’ti samanupassituṁ.
Yato kho, ānanda, bhikkhu neva vedanaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi appaṭisaṁvedanaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi ‘attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā’ti samanupassati.Not regarding anything in this way, they don’t grasp at anything in the world.
So evaṁ na samanupassanto na ca kiñci loke upādiyati,Not grasping, they’re not anxious. Not being anxious, they personally become extinguished.
anupādiyaṁ na paritassati, aparitassaṁ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati,They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’
‘khīṇā jāti, vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ, kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ, nāparaṁ itthattāyā’ti pajānāti.It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant whose mind is freed like this holds the following views:
Evaṁ vimuttacittaṁ kho, ānanda, bhikkhuṁ yo evaṁ vadeyya:‘A Realized One exists after death’;
‘hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.‘A Realized One doesn’t exist after death’;
‘Na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ. ‘A Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death’;
‘Hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.‘A Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death’.
‘Neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?A mendicant is freed by directly knowing this: how far language and the scope of language extend; how far terminology and the scope of terminology extend; how far description and the scope of description extend; how far wisdom and the sphere of wisdom extend; how far the cycle of rebirths and its continuation extend. It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant freed by directly knowing this holds the view: ‘There is no such thing as knowing and seeing.’
Yāvatā, ānanda, adhivacanaṁ yāvatā adhivacanapatho, yāvatā nirutti yāvatā niruttipatho, yāvatā paññatti yāvatā paññattipatho, yāvatā paññā yāvatā paññāvacaraṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭaṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭati, tadabhiññāvimutto bhikkhu, tadabhiññāvimuttaṁ bhikkhuṁ ‘na jānāti na passati itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ. Variant: yāvat
but contrast:
DA13:
“Therefore, Ānanda, some postulate a self and say feeling is not self, the self is not feeling, and what feels is not self, but craving is self. They are incorrect.
“Ānanda, this is the extent of language, the extent of answers, the extent of limits, the extent of explanations, the extent of wise observation, and the extent of sentient beings.
“Ānanda, when monks truly and correctly observe this [series of] principles, their minds will be uncontaminated and liberated. Ānanda, these monks should be called ‘those liberated by wisdom.’ Such a liberated monk will know the existence of the self, the non-existence of the self, both the existence and non-existence of the self, and neither the existence nor non-existence of the self. Why?
“Ānanda, this is the extent of language, the extent of answers, the extent of limits, the extent of explanations, the extent of wise observation, and the extent of sentient beings. Thus, having fully known it, a liberated monk whose mind is uncontaminated doesn’t know or see such knowing and seeing [of those four alternatives].”
So again, the actual word anattā does not occur, and what is critiqued is regarding things as self, the Agama parallel then explicitly claims that all four of “self” “not self” “both” and “neither” are understood (in the negative) by the wise monk.
So I think here we definitly see the idea of self critiqued, what I don’t think we see is anything like a positive doctrine of a metaphysical absence.
DN1 is just too complicated to deal with here, I will build up to it in a later post.
DN22 I think is imported from MN10 which in turn is imported from SN.
I totally agree that the Buddha %100 percent taught the total destruction of the conceit “I am” and the rejection of the view “A Self exists”.
What I don’t agree with is the idea the Buddha taught the view “A self does not exist”.
Metta
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Yes! this is an excellent one that I did miss, because there is no occurrence of anattā in it, but it is one of the best and most direct articulations of anattā in the canon.
I am afraid I will have to get back to you, as this might change everything I have been saying (for starters the parallel is in MA)
probably the first thing to say is that MN22 is one of the rare occurrences of anupalabbhamāne (“not a genuine fact”) which occurs only here and at SN22.85 and SN44.2 in the EBT’s.
sabbaṃ viññāṇaṃ (all consciousness) does not occur in DN, and in MN only occurs here (MN22) and the previously mentioned MN35 and MN109, it occurs once in the Vinaya, 3 times in AN, zero times in the early books of KN, never in the Abhidhamma, and 17 times in SN.
yampi taṃ diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṃ occurs:
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0 (including the late books)
AB: 0
VM: 0 (Visuddhimagga)
paripūro bāladhammo occurs:
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 1 (qouting MN22)
VM: 0
attaniyaṃ me occurs:
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 1 (qouting MN22)
VM: 0
na uppajjeyyuṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā occurs:
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 0
VM: 0
diṭṭhinissayaṃ nissayetha yaṃsa diṭṭhinissayaṃ nissayato na uppajjeyyuṃ occurs
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 0
VM: 0
ttavādupādānaṃ na samanupassāmi yaṃsa attavādupādānaṃ occurs:
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 0
VM: 0
pariggahaṃ pariggaṇheyyātha occurs:
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 0
VM: 0
ajjhattaṃ asati aparitassanā hoti occurs:
VN: 0
DN: 0
MN: 1 (MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 0
VM: 0
ucchijjissāmi nāmassu…
vinassissāmi nāmassu…
tathāgatasāvakassa vā sabbesaṃ…
so loko so attā (this one is qouted in AB again)…
diṭṭhiṭṭhānādhiṭṭhānapariyuṭṭhānābhinivesānusayānaṃ samugghātāya…
taṃ vatāhaṃ na labhāmī (this one is qouted in the Nidessa)…
taṃ vata me natthi…
So evaṃ samanupassanto asati na paritassatī…
sassatisamaṃ tatheva ṭhassāmīti (this one gets a shout-out in the Kathuvatthu)…
diṭṭhiṭṭhānāni just here in MN22 and in the patisambhidamagga
So I guess I would just say that there are quite a lot of words and phrases that appear to be unique to this sutta.
Perhaps after @sujato 's Pali course I will be in a better position to asses the import of this fact.
Even antarāyikā is quite interesting;
VN: 28
DN: 0
MN: 8 (once in MN12 and all the rest in MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 2
KN: 3 (once in the Theri, then in Netti and Pet)
AB: 0
VM: 1
as is yathā yeme
VN: 18
DN: 0
MN: 6 (all in MN22)
SN: 0
AN: 0
KN: 0
AB: 0
VM: 0
Metta
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Given that I don’t know Pali, I wouldn’t know how to assess all this information. The only thing I could get was that the word antarayika, whatever that means, seems to occur in the vinaya describing the same event, I’m guessing the story is used to explain a certain rule? I don’t know.
Is there any specific reason you chose to search those specific words? One thing I would take into consideration is that searching for entire sentences may not be appropriate, since word combinations are endless. So it’s not surprising that that specific word combination is only found once. I don’t know what those sentences are, so I’m not sure what to make of them.
Perhaps a more fruitful way of investigating the sutta is to look at it’s narrative structure, which is very similar to MN 38, in the sense that both have the same story. The only difference is between their views. Sati says “As I understand the Buddha’s teachings, it is this very same consciousness that roams and transmigrates, not another.”
Meanwhile, Arittha says, "“As I understand the Buddha’s teachings, the acts that he says are obstructions are not really obstructions for the one who performs them.”
Alexander Wynne has an article on MN 38
And Another on MN 22
Just a few pointers that might help you on your research. Btw. MN 22 is one of my favorite suttas in the canon 
So I hope no one thinks I’m “out to get” this sutta 
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This view is not the Buddha’s doctrine on anattā, rather an annhilationist view.
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Thanks, thats all good advice, I was just sort of going through and pasting words at random into digital pali reader, lookimg for anything of interest. My impression is that MN22 has a large number of phrases and vocabulary that are unique, and alo a large number that it shares with the Vinaya that are not shared with other suttas. I havent really gotten all that far- I had just realised that the reason the Vinaya shared several words was because it was describing the same incident when my laptop went flat. I will spend some more time today polishing it up.
My tentative conclusion is that the sutta is compiled late relative to the bulk of MN though.
This is consistent with my speculation that anatta/aggregates is a “revised” version of the teaching, with jhana/kamma/conditionality being the first, primary exposition.
My speculation is that a “Brahman equals Atman” rose to pre-eminence and became the default view while some of the other schools faded and Buddhism had to focus on it as an opponent hence the change in emphasis.
This all starts to reinforce the impression for me that the EBT’s reperesnt a fairly long period, and probably dont directly reflect the statements of the Buddha, but rather his ideas.
I see no reason to reject the teachings in later texts, I just think its useful for me to get a picture in my head of whats what.
MN22 is one of my favourites too, in particular the similie of the raft, which i have found very useful.
Metta
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Natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati
That’s the question I am interrogating though @stephen, to get to an annhiliationist position from Natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati seem to require some mental gymnastics, even @sujato’s ahem, robust, gloss on the passage “‘My self does not exist in an absolute sense.” looks on the face of it to be the anatta position as a positive assertion of the non-existence of a self.
I guess what I am suggesting is that the line is not in fact a position along the lines “there is a real self which gets annihilated” rather the position “there is no such thing as a real self”.
I thin that texts are almost always scrupulous to avoid any assertion along the lines “a self does not exist” and rather elect to exhaustively reject all positive assertions of self as failing to obtain.
Even the most “extreme” (and in my opinion late) lines of argument stop short of anything like natthi atta rather attacking the converse view i.e attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne
I think that this is because of the 4 undeclared points, and as I point out above there seem to be plenty of places in the EBT’s where this tension was keenly felt.
Metta.
I think if you search, if my memory serves, there is a discussion on. this sort of Pali construction, with Vens Sujato, Sunyo, and myself.
But aside from the grammar, I think one can infer that it expresses the opposite of the first view offered.
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So. MN22. Further thoughts.
ariṭṭhassa first appears at Bu Pc 68 and is quoted for elaboration at Kd 11. In the suttas they appear only at MN22.
The Vinaya account includes the list of similes, but omits the raft and the not self parts.
The similes are rare outside of the three above mentioned texts:
Aṭṭhikaṅkalūpamā occurs only in the above, MN54, An5.76 and the Nidessa.
Maṁsapesūpamā the same plus once in the Therigatha.
tiṇukkūpamā the same as Aṭṭhikaṅkalūpamā
aṅgārakāsūpamā is slightly more common, occuring also at DN34, SN35.244, An8.28 and AN10.90
supinakūpamā as Aṭṭhikaṅkalūpamā
yācitakūpamā as Aṭṭhikaṅkalūpamā
rukkhaphalūpamā as Aṭṭhikaṅkalūpamā
asisūnūpamā as Aṭṭhikaṅkalūpamā
sattisūlūpamā is slightly more common, occurring also at SN5.1 and the Therigatha
sappasirūpamā also occurs in the Therigatha and Jataka.
After the first list of similes the Vinaya account stops, MN22 adds the raft and a lengthy discourse on not self:
kullūpamaṃ itself (“similar to a raft”) is attested only here (MN22) and at MN38.
diṭṭhiṭṭhānāni has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22 (it also occurs in the patisambhidamagga)
paritassatī has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22 (it also occurs in the visuddhimagga)
bahiddhā asati (thing not existing externally) has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22
ajjhattaṃ asati (thing not existing internally) has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22
so loko so attā (the self and the cosmos are the same) has it’s sole occurrence (apart from one quote in the Abhidhamma) in the EBT’s at MN22
diṭṭhiṭṭhānādhiṭṭhānapariyuṭṭhānābhinivesānusayānaṃ has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22
nassu nāma bhavissāmī has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22
pariggaṇheyyātha has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22
diṭṭhinissayaṃ (apart from the Nidessa) has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22
attaniyaṃ me has it’s sole occurrence in the EBT’s at MN22 (apart from an Abhidhamma qoute)
diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṃ occurs only here at M22, at AN10.96, an Abhidhamma qoute and the patisambhidamagga
MN22 then goes on to list a number of epithets for the monk who has reached final understanding:
bāladhammo occurs only here at MN22, the Nidessa and the Abhidhamma qoute
ukkhittapaligho occurs only at MN22, AN5.71 and AN5.72, the Nidessa and the Abhidhamma
saṃkiṇṇaparikkho occurs only at MN22, AN5.71 and the Nidessa
abbūḷhesiko occurs only at MN22, AN5.71 and AN5.72, the Nidessa and the Abhidhamma
niraggaḷo occurs only at MN22, AN5.71 and AN5.72, the Nidessa and the Abhidhamma
pannaddhajo pannabhāro visaṃyutto ccurs only at MN22, AN5.71 and AN5.72
ananuvijjoti vadāmi is unique to MN22
So in conclusion, the initial list of similes is rare, the language used for the doctrinal portion is even rarer, sometimes unique, and the list of epithets is also rare. I think this gives good evidence to suggest the sutta is a late addition to the pre-sectarian canon.
Metta
Sorry, an incorrect copy and paste. I was, of course referring to this view.
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yes I figured as much!
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Yes, the first 2 views in Sabbasava sutta are rather ‘dogmatic’ assertions, eternalism and annihilationism. The following 3 are more subtle, expressing the feeling of a ‘one who knows’ and what is known.
The 5th view is almost exactly what Sāti expresses in Mahatanhasankya sutta.
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In a sense, the first 2 views expressed in Sabbasava sutta are very similar, as they seem to assert a ‘solid self’ during a lifetime. The difference being that the first view states that this ‘solid self” continues on after death, and the second one states it ceases to exist after death.
Of course, the Buddha rejected both views (this is probably inconceivable to most), and is said to teach ‘by the middle’.
The Buddha’s idea of anatta is understandable via dependent origination.
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Ooh thanks for the link @stephen !
Yes i think this is absolutely right! But this means that selves arent fictions, they are just conditional.
I think the central criticism is not about Self or Soul but about Identicalness that is the incoherence of asserting any of
A is identical to B
A is not identical to B
A is both identical to and different from B
A is niether idential to nor different from B
Metta.
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I think, in a sense, you are right.
I think I wrote in a different thread that people existed as ‘empirical realities’.
Of course Rishi S ‘exists’ in a certain way. To deny that would raise a lot of eyebrows!
But Buddhism teaches that he is devoid of a permanent essence that can either persist after death, or cease to exist after death.
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