Are khandhas early or late EBT?

Discussion
141

Lets do AN! with @Danny 's helpful list we can attack AN;

AN3.133 no parallel
AN3.62 Does not contain the aggregates
AN4.124 MA168 the parallel omits the aggregates (and includes the formless attainments)
AN4.126 no parallel
AN4.181 no parallel (replicates AN3.133)
AN4.196 no parallel
AN4.200 SA985
AN4.254 no parallel
AN4.41 no parallel
AN4.90 no parallel
AN5.30 SA1250
AN6.63 MA111 (the parallel has the “in brief, the five grasping aggregates are suffering” pericope)
AN7.96 no parallel
AN8.2 no parallel
AN9.36 no parallel
AN9.66 no parallel
AN10.27 EA46.8 SA486 SA487 SA488 SA489 (the SA passages give 復有五法，謂五受陰。)
AN10.60 no parallel
AN10.81 no parallel
AN10.92 Does not contain the aggregates

So this boils down to just one sutta. What we are looking for, to remind you, are examples of

  1. The Buddha
  2. At a location
  3. Giving a teaching on the aggregates
  4. That is in the same collection in both the NIkayas and the Agamas.

So in the case of AN, there is only on known parallel in EA on @Danny 's list.
AN10.27 is paralleled at EA46.8.

drum roll please…

you guessed again didn’t you!

thats right! EA46.8 gives the five faculties at the 5th position, not the aggregates.

So there are no aggregates teachings by the Buddha in AN that have a parallel in EA.

So to summarize.

If we are seeking a standard by which to assert that there is good evidence that a doctrine is early even by the standard of EBT we might start with something Rhys Davids said, that the teachings most likely are those short passages, repeated verbatim, in all 4 of the principle Nikayas.

Now, since that time it has become apparent that there is another substantial canonical collection of sutras, the Agamas, preserved in Chinese. Sometimes a sutta in one of the NIkayas is preserved in a different Agama. When this occurs it is possible that the Therevada had it in the right collection and the Sarvastivada moved it to the wrong one, or vice versa.

So to fulfill our criteria that a passage occurs in all 4 collections we need to confine ourselves to those suttas/sutras that occur in the same collection in both the Pali and the Chinese. so DN with DA, MN with MA, SN with SA and AN with EA.

We may like to add another standard, that the teaching be given by the Buddha, not a disciple, on the grounds that a teaching made by a disciple but not made in the same collection by the Buddha may indicate that this is an innovation belonging to followers associated with that disciple.

If this standard is applied to the doctrinal category of the aggregates we get a picture like this:

DN14 parallel lacks the aggregates (as well as them being a very obvious insertion here anyway)
DN22 parallel not in DA
DN33 spoken by Sariputta
DN34 spoken by Sariputta

SO by our criteria the aggregates are not taught by the Buddha in the shared long collection

MN9 Spoken by Sariputta
MN22 MA200 Probably originates in Bu Pc 68
MN23 Agama parallel not in MA
MN28 Spoken by Sariputta
MN35 Agama parallel not in MA
MN44 Spoken by Dhammadinna
MN62 Agama parallel not in MA
MN64 The Agama parallel omits the aggregates and has only vedana
MN72 Agama parallel not in MA
MN75 MA153 The Agama parallel omits at least some occurrences of the aggregates
MN102 No Agama parallel
MN109 Agama parallel not in MA
MN112 MA187
MN122 MA191 focuses on the late attainment suññataṃ
MN131 No Agama parallel
MN132 MA167 Original at MN134 does not contain the aggregates
MN138 Spoken by Mahākaccāna
MN141 Spoken by Sariputta
MN143 Spoken by Sariputta
MN147 Agama parallel not in MA
MN148 Agama parallel not in MA
MN149 Agama parallel not in MA
MN151 Agama parallel not in MA

By our criteria the aggregates are taught once by the Buddha in the shared middle collection, at MN112

AN3.133 no parallel
AN3.62 Does not contain the aggregates
AN4.124 MA168 the parallel omits the aggregates (and includes the formless attainments)
AN4.126 no parallel
AN4.181 no parallel (replicates AN3.133)
AN4.196 no parallel
AN4.200 SA985
AN4.254 no parallel
AN4.41 no parallel
AN4.90 no parallel
AN5.30 SA1250
AN6.63 MA111 (the parallel has the “in brief, the five grasping aggregates are suffering” pericope)
AN7.96 no parallel
AN8.2 no parallel
AN9.36 no parallel
AN9.66 no parallel
AN10.27 EA46.8 omits the parallel, SA486 SA487 SA488 SA489 (the SA passages give 復有五法，謂五受陰。)
AN10.60 no parallel
AN10.81 no parallel
AN10.92 Does not contain the aggregates

By our criteria the aggregates are not taught by the Buddha in the shared numerical collection.

So I would contend that the aggregates are more or less absent from that part of the long collection that is shared by both the Nikaya and Agama traditions, except where it is taught by Sariputta, it is absent from that part of the middle length collection that is shared between the Nikaya and Agama traditions except MN112 MA187, MN22 MA200 , MN75 MA153, MN122 MA191 and MN132 MA167 and several of these suttas give us independant reasons to suspect they may be later compositions. And finally the aggregates are absent from that part of the numerical collection that is shared between the Nikaya and Agama traditions.

I would also note that a disproportionate number of both the MN and AN examples that do have Agama parallels but in different collections have those parallels in SA.

I would say that there is close to overwhelming evidence that as a doctrinal category the aggregates is associated with SA/SN, and that many of the appearances of it in the other books are later insertions, occurring in either Sarvastivada texts or Theravada ones but usually not both.

I can certainly imagine doing more work on this, a more comprehensive breakdown of SN and close analysis of the SA parallels, a close study of each of the MN suttas we have as exceptions, the converse study of all occurrences in MA and DA and EA that might have parallels in other collections in the Niakaya tradition and so on, but I think this is a pretty good start.

I hope it is useful to people who may be interested in how Buddhism may have evolved in the early period.

Metta.

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142

I also think that you collected enough material. Personally, the weakest criterium you bring is that a teaching should be in the “same” nikaya / agama. They generally have a limited overlap, so that a teaching is in MN vs SA shouldn’t be a contraindication on its own. But I don’t think that you rely too much on that.

The question arising now is if there are any core teachings that would pass your criteria. DO, 4NT, 8NP, gradual training, jhanas, brahmaviharas, bojjhangas. Beyond that, ayatanas and dhatus would be specifically interesting because, similar to the khandhas, they follow a function of anatta-fication.

Is part of that work done by other threads maybe?

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143

Yes I agree with this entirely, and my gold standard thus far has been the jhana formula, which i think would pass this test.

Leave it with me.

144

Are khandhas early or late EBT?

The Khandha Samyutta of SN/SA is certainly the early EBT, and had its origin in the first Buddhist council.

The collection regarding khandhas is mainly about knowing and seeing the four noble truths, the notion of anicca, dukkha, suñña (empty), anatta, and the middle way, which all are the core teachings of Early Buddhism:

Pages 24-72, The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism, Choong Mun-keat.

145

a non exhaustive look at the the jhanas shows that they occurs at;

LONG:
DN1 DA21 (both have the formula)
DN3 DA20 (both contain the formulas, DA20 includes the similes)

MIDDLE:
MN19 MA102 (both contain the formula)
MN25 MA178 (both contain jhanas)

CONNECTED:
SN16.9 SA1142 (both contain jhanas)
SN36.11 SA474 (both contain jhanas)

NUMERICAL:
AN7.67 EA39.4 (both contain jhanas)
AN7.69 EA39.2 (both contain the formula)

So it is possible to show at least 2 examples in each of the “common core collections” of the NIkaya/Agamas where the Buddha teaches the jhanas.

I have not attempted to be exhaustive in this case, merely to give sufficient evidence to contrast this with the aggregates.

Metta.

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146

I suggest to make a separate thread for the jhana research, no?

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147

Yes probably, but its not a rabbit hole im quite ready to go down yet :slight_smile:

148

According to G. C. Pande in Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, the conception of viññāṇa in the Nikaya went through three stages. The Khanda theory represents the third stage, with the development of psychological analysis resulting in the development of Anatmavada (pp. 496-504).

“The lateness of the Khandha theory. - Still later, vinnana tended to lose its centrality. This is the stage represented by the full-fledged Khandha theory. Mrs. Rhys Davids has powerfully, and it seems in essentials at least convincingly, argued that this theory should be regarded as a comparatively later development. The arguments for this view may be thus summarized:

(i) There are certain “unorthodox fragments” about Atta and Vinnana, which are far from being negligible in quantity or import especially owing to their nearness to the Upanishads.
(ii) The fact that the khandha theory appears as a gloss in several important suttas lends support to it. Such “edited” suttas are, for instance, S. II. 95-96, the First Utterance, the Second Utterance, S-III. If. The examples have been pointed out in the course of the studies on stratification.
(iii) The silence of several texts about the khandha theory is extremely significant. As Mrs. Rhys Davids says “This comment will be appreciated only by readers who have noticed the untiring way in which the five are paraded in sutta conversations, and further, who know the editorial habit of parading them when the conversation touches on the fact and functions of body and mind”.
The Khandha theory thus fails to appear in almost the whole of the Digha N. till the very end, in the first nine suttas of the Majjhima N., in the first three Samyuttas of the Sam. N., in the Pancaka Nip. of the Anguttara N., and in the Sutta Nip.
(iv) It may be noted that the first four suttas of the khandha-sam are delivered not by Buddha but by his disciples Sariputta and Mahakaccana.”

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149

Yes @Jimh! Thank you so much for your comment! I do seem to be following in the footstepsnof Pande and Mrs Rhys Davids, Although my research has thus far been entirely independent of them except for coming across Pandes comment about DN14 after I had made the same observation myself.

It is honestly suprising that there does not seem to be very much work in this direction since, although I have not really done much looking, not being a student and therefore having no access to jstor and such.

I beleive Vetter has looked at the khandhas but I have not had the opportunity to look at Vetter.

Perhaps someone could pm me things?

Metta

150

I am unable to see the four arguments are convincingly (clear and precise) to conclude the lateness of the Khandha teachings/theory, indicated particularly in the Khandha Samyutta of SN/SA. How ‘late’?

As stated above, the collection regarding khandhas in SN/SA is essentially about knowing the four noble truths, seeing anicca, dukkha, suñña (empty), anatta, and the middle way. These all are the core teachings of Early Buddhism.

151

Basically there appears to be suttas where Theravadans have inserted the aggregates but the Sarvastivadans have not, and other suttas where the Sarvastivadans have inserted the aggregats but the Theravadans have not.

So it must have been a current and accepted teaching for both groups, i.e it is definitely pre-sectarian.

However it must not have been as wide spread in either canon as it is now, otherwise it would appear in the same suttas in both collections in all cases.

So, based on my take that when it comes to the “common core” of suttas agreed to be in a given collection of the four primary collections by both traditions, the aggregates are much more often attributed to Sariputta and Mahakaccana than to the Buddha, and the fact that in the “common core” the teachings occur much more often in SN/SA than elsewhere, I would guess that the aggregates as we have them now post date the Buddha. Clearly they pre-date the Abhidhamma and the 18 schools.

Depending on what dates you take for the Buddhas life and for the production of the Abhidhamma that should give you a ballpark.

(just as an aside, it should be clear that it is much more likely that a sutta be spoken by Sariputta then miss-attributed to the Buddha than the reverse, so in cases where there is a conflict I have always attributed to the follower rather than the founder.)

Metta

152

Agree and nicely expressed. In part, I think the change in emphasis is rooted, at least to some degree, in the rejection of rebirth. Once this is no longer at least entertained as a real possibility, then the Dhamma becomes a one-life project. And that leads to seeking ways to feel better day by day until this one life ends versus looking into how ignorance and craving propel beings into ongoing rebirths/saṁsāra.

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153

Its an intersting perspective, if, even more speculativley than my posts here already are, the pugglavada influenced the theravada to dial up the aggregates and anatta to a pitch, and the influence of the therevada on the secularvada ended up being that many felt entitled to appeal to anatta as a justification for one life buddhism.

This i asssume would have been appalling to both preceding groups.

That said, while i think its clear that annihilationism is condemned in the EBT, its less clear to me that rebirth-belief is endorsed. There are passages in MN102 and MN101 that appear at least to criticise the belief. The knowledge of rebirth is always praised, but the speculative view, outside of a broad endorsment of a conventional “good morals”, isn’t.

I think that it is therefor pretty clearly the case that both camps have thier problems from an orthodox EBT perspective.

154

Thanks for sharing.

If by the “speculative view” you mean exactly that": people trying to analyze and figure out rebirth and what happens after physical death then, yes, the Buddha appears to refute this in MN 102, for example. But I don’t see that teaching in that sutta as any kind of refutation or criticism of it.

Rather, the teachings of rebirth are frequently present, both explicitly and implicitly, in the Nikayas.
It’s present explicitly in the SN56.11: “Rebirth is suffering…jātipi dukkhā….” Jāti of course means birth and also rebirth, depedending on the context. Further, for the 2nd NT: “It’s the craving that leads to future lives….yāyaṁ taṇhā ponobbhavikā …” where ponobbhavikā clearly points to “leading to rebirth.”

Then there’s Snp 4.11: “The wise do not proceed to life after life.” Bhavābhavāya …”

And MN120: "They realize the undefiled freedom of heart and freedom by wisdom in this very life. And they live having realized it with their own insight due to the ending of defilements. And, mendicants, that mendicant is not reborn anywhere.” Ayaṁ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu na katthaci upapajjatī”ti.

And SN12.19: " Therefore, when their body breaks up, the astute person is not reborn in another body. Not being reborn in another body, they’re freed from rebirth, old age, and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress. They’re freed from suffering, I say. This is the difference here between the foolish and the astute, that is, leading the spiritual life.”

These, along with many other examples, appear to be pretty explicit in the teachings about rebirth. I take the knowledge of rebirth as simply meaning a direct knowledge of this without relying on, or perpetuating, speculative views about it. Same as the knowledge of being free from dukkha, as realized by an arahant. You know the stock phrase.

Maybe I’ve misunderstood your position. But, again, do we see the all the teachings of the Dhamma as being limited to a few decades of practice? Like an arahant-lottery? Maybe you realize dukkha-nirodha in this one and only life – and for the 99% who don’t: too bad.

Of course, people can choose to believe and accept what they wish. Speaking for myself, I just don’t see how the whole of the Buddha’s teachings can be maintained without it.

Peace

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155

I will work through your examples when i get a chance, but to answer your question I think that MN101 probably gives a better sense of what im talking about:

I said to them,
Tyāhaṁ evaṁ vadāmi:

‘But reverends, do you know
‘kiṁ pana tumhe, āvuso nigaṇṭhā, jānātha—

for sure that you existed in the past, and it is not the case that you didn’t exist?’
ahuvamheva mayaṁ pubbe, na nāhuvamhā’ti?

‘No we don’t, reverend.’
‘No hidaṁ, āvuso’.

…

‘So it seems that you don’t know any of these things.
‘Iti kira tumhe, āvuso nigaṇṭhā, na jānātha

In that case, it’s not appropriate for the Jain venerables to declare this.
evaṁ sante āyasmantānaṁ nigaṇṭhānaṁ na kallamassa veyyākaraṇāya:

‘Everything this individual experiences—pleasurable, painful, or neutral—is because of past deeds.
‘yaṁ kiñcāyaṁ purisapuggalo paṭisaṁvedeti sukhaṁ vā dukkhaṁ vā adukkhamasukhaṁ vā, sabbaṁ taṁ pubbekatahetu.

So this argument applies to anyone who can’t remember past lives, and it means that the dhamma has to be “visible here and now” i.e independent of such mere beliefs.

As for the rest, I am not claiming, as some secularvadins appear to, that rebirth was mere “cultural baggage” or somehow “added” to the teaching, there is ample evidence that the early buddhists did teach rebirth, my distinction is between belief and knowledge, and the views that depend on each.

As for the examples given, well MN120 is one of 75 instances of the pericope

āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati

in the canon, it is the only such example that appends

bhikkhu na katthaci upapajjatī

to the end of the pericope, and that sentence does not occur anywhere else in the canon.

having understood, is freed, and enters no dispute.
Ñatvā vimutto na vivādameti,
The wise do not proceed to life after life.”
Bhavābhavāya na sameti dhīro”ti.

I would say that there are at least equally acceptable approaches a secularvadin might take with this stanza,

understanding they are freed, and do not dispute.
the wise do not take sides with this or that.

for example. (something along those lines, anyway, I am no poet, nor a translator, but the idea that using the word bhava requires a commitment to rebirth is definitly a bridge to far for me).

As for the SN passages, well, more or less this entire thread centers around an argument that gives evidence to think that it represents an intermediate stage of the teachings, and I would welcome any secularvadin who wishes to take it up and use it for their arguments :slight_smile:

but regardless, taṇhā ponobbhavikā again need not imply future lives, but merely indicate being this or that in the future as a result of pursuing ones cravings.

however, even if we grant that it is evidential, it occurs nowhere in DN that is paralleled in DA, where it occurs in MN at MN9, MN10, MN44, MN141, i note that the speaker in 2 cases is Sariputta, in one case Dhammadina, and in the only remaining case is a sutta that the founder of this site beleives eminates form SN. The phrase does not occur in AN or KN. in SN it is confined to SN56 while a variant that drops one of the b’ is confined to SN22

Finally SN12.19 makes use of kāyo samudāgato a phrase that occurs in it ad the Paṭis and the Visuddhi and nowhere else.

dvayaṃ paṭicca phasso contact depends on this duality

is unique to this sutta

kāyūpago hoti producing another body

is unique to this sutta

So I am not very much convinced by your examples, nor do I think that a secularvadin need be too concerned with them.

I would just like to be clear on my own position, which is that I cannot remember any past lives, but the idea that one can end all suffering merely by dropping dead is also not something I believe, and
it seems clear to me that the buddha (or the early buddhists if you would rather) did teach that people where reborn, although I suspect they may also have taught people not to “believe” in rebirth as a matter of speculative philosophy but rather encouraged people to “find out for themselves” .

Metta

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156

Agree.
But then I’m not sure why you offer some challenges to the very teachings on rebirth you believe were taught by the Buddha.

Regarding the section of MN101 you quoted, the Buddha is clarifying his teachings on kamma to Jain practitioners who accepted that all experiences were due to kamma. It’s more of a analytical teaching than the many declarative teachings on rebirth that recur again and again in the Nikayas.

In the contexts of the examples I offered, ponobbhavikā means rebirth in the same way that water means H2O.

Then there’s SN12.19: Therefore, when their body breaks up, the astute person is not reborn in another body. Tasmā paṇḍito kāyassa bhedā na kāyūpago hoti. I don’t know how else one would interpret this line in ther context of this sutta.

The Dhamma is here and now, but that doesn’t mean we see it. In fact, none of us do completely since we’re not arahants. So saddhā plays a role here along with whatever insights we’ve experienced, as in SN12.23.

IMO, holding the possibility of rebirth lightly in the heart while continuing to practice offers one the opportunity to know it for oneself at some point. However, when people – not saying you – discard it from consideration or reject it because they don’t see it yet, then that opportunity and possibility is closed off.

And not to repeat the same point too much, but when we look at the entirety of the Buddha’s teachings, does it really come across as a one-life one-chance practice? Doesn’t a holistic view of the Dhamma count for something beyond, and in addition to, certain words and phrases?

Thanks for sharing. :pray:
All best

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I dont interpret it at all, i merely point out that it uses words that appear only in it and texts known to be late.

I know what the sutta is about, I am pointing out that the argument as its given applies just as well to Buddhist beleivers in rebirth as it does to Jain believers.

I am not doing anything of the kind, i am pointing out that there is a distinction between belief and knowing, and that views based merely on belief are often the subject of critique in the EBT’s.

I dont understand what you mean by this, bhav means being or to be doesnt it? I dont really understand what pono means, perhaps ypu can explain it to me.

Metta

158

Ponobbhavikā is an adjective form of punabbhava or punarbhava in Skt. This word always means rebirth (renewed existence), and never something like “becoming a new tradesperson” in this life for instance. ‘Bhava’ literally means ‘life’ (as in “eight lives,” “future lives,” “my past life,” “a new life”) almost always. Sometimes it is used in more abstract sense as non-countable ‘existence/life’: “existence is suffering,” for instance.

People who interpret the term otherwise, like the possibilities you suggested, would be like non-native English speakers interpreting “craving that leads to reincarnation” as “craving that leads to looking different ways via makeup, physical appearance, aging, etc.” It’s possible for someone to do it and it is very vaguely related to the word ‘reincarnation,’ but it is not what is meant.

Mettā

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159

Again, thanks for sharing. :slightly_smiling_face:

As @Vaddha offered in his post, ponobbhavikā / punabbhava mean rebirth. Fortunately, words like these,and their contexts in the suttas have clear definitions and uses, (perhaps less so in some verses, which as we know can be more poetical with broader meanings).

There are many examples of other words that point to rebirth as well. Again, even jāti, as noted in my first post, means rebirth in some contexts. Then there are uppapatt*(birth and rebirth), pubbenivāsa, and many other examples.

So if someone doesn’t wish to believe in or entertain the teaching of rebirth that’s up to them. But it doesn’t appear tenable to take a position that it isn’t an integral part of the Buddha’s teachings in the Nikayas. I know you’re not arguing this point, but many folks, particularly in the secular-Buddhism movement do.

Regarding believing vs knowing – again, in MN101 the Buddha leads the Jain practitioners in a logical way so they could understand how untenable their utterly deterministic views/beliefs of kamma were. They appeared to accept this teaching, but there’s no clear evidence they experientially knew kamma as the Buddha taught them. So should they have discarded it? Or would it have been better for their spiritual practices to accept the Buddha’s teaching even provisionally until, with Right View, they eventually knew it? It’s a choice they and all practitioners have to make with respect to aspects of the Teachings that may not yet be seen and known clearly.

This, imo, is different from the “clinging to views” that the Buddha spoke about.

Peace and ease :pray:

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@josephzizys @knotty36 :wave: Hello! Hope you are both well.

This is a half-continuation from the other comment I tagged you both in. It is its own subject though.

In regards to the Dīgha Nikāya and DN 14/15, I’m really interested in the missing avijjā and sankhārā links (plus missing salāyatana). It seems that the DN bhānakas had their own stock of somewhat unique concepts, formulas, and narrative motives / structures that they were drawing from (some of which can be found in smaller form in the SN as well). These narrative structures vary somewhat from the other nikāyas, while still having other things in common with the canon as a whole (unsurprisingly).

The alternative to a select group of bhānakas having their own proto-stock of formulas is that the reciters responsible for constructing and compiling DN-type discourses did so intentionally (to some extent) with particular motives and purposes behind them. I think we can observe these motivational and narrative distinctions descriptively across the nikāyas, so long as we understand them as generalizations. I also find this approach more hypothesis more plausible.

For example:

  • SN is clearly focused on more plain doctrinal formulae, technical Buddhist terminology and concepts, etc.
  • DN is overflowing with Brahmanical motifs and references: from deities and beings, to parallel myths and cosmologies, to genealogies and lineages, to speculative and contemplative philosophical refutations or discussions, and much more.
  • MN, especially the first two books, seems especially interested in more daily interactions of the Buddha and his disciples in monastic life. They include a range of philosophical and narrative material woven together in a neat balance without a tendency to veer to either extreme.
  • AN is kind of its own thing, but is full of advice for lay people, classifications of Buddhist concepts and cosmology in terms of lists, etc.

So to my first point on dependent origination and the DN, we can observe that the interplay between nāmarūpa and viññāna is especially relevant to the DN because of its relevance to the cosmological and philosophical speculation/theory of, especially, the contemplative brahmins. @sujato has made a post on DN 14, where we first see this interplay in the collection, and has shown how even the underlying, unspoken narrative elements are interacting with Brahmanical mythology and dialectics on several levels.

Then at DN 15, I and others have pointed out that the sutta contains the closest resemblance to the Brahmanical motif of the Ātman descending into nāmarūpa to make contact with itself/reality in the canon, and that the sutta goes into a following section precisely on very refined attā speculation. I have also pointed out that the 8 liberations seem pre-Buddhist and likely Brahmanical, and we can see that the formulaic definitions for the links are modified. For instance, the definition of jāti at DN 15 differs from the more common formula in the MN/SN/etc. and it contains more Brahmanical beings (gandhabbas, etc.). I have also shown that this seems to refer to parallels in the Brhadāranyaka Upnisad!

When we look at suttas like the Aggañña Sutta, scholars have already demonstrated it being a parallel to philosophical cosmologies in Brahmanical texts, and I have made a post here doing an extensive comparison with the BĀU/SB. We have seen that DN 3 makes early references to Krishna or a character much like him. The Tevijjā Sutta has been a subject of much scholarship on Upanisadic and Brahmanical ideas discussed in the suttas. The list of examples goes on and on.

When we do a survey of the DN in general, it’s actually much easier to list suttas that aren’t an obvious narrative related to Brahmanical dialectics and packed with Brahmanical motifs/imagery. Once we set those aside, we also have the complex sections related to the “Mahāparinibbāna cycle” and all of the suttas that are extensions of it, and clearly later forms of narrative compilation and developing mythologies, etc.

Really it seems DN 1 and DN 2 are the only good examples of suttas that contain good chunks of early material and compilation. But then again, DN 1 has Brahmanical dialectics in various forms and is also at the very beginning of the canon: how convenient for this to be the sutta that goes into the analysis of views rejected by Buddhists. Things like the Mahāsatipatthāna Sutta are also just very late compilations for copies of the sutta in the MN, and the last two recitation suttas of the DN have a transparent function as well.

So, while at first it seems tempting to see DN 15 as very early, that hypothesis starts to fade away as I see that, actually, the question of early or lateness is far less relevant and deducible than the fact that DN 15 and its narrative/doctrinal formulas, structure, etc. all fit into the larger basket of characteristics that the DN as a whole exemplifies: long narrative discourses imbued with Brahmanical motifs and philosophical interplay. Having seen that the DN commonly contains discourses which are elaborate re-tellings and expansions on smaller formulas/suttas in the SN/MN, we can also note that DN 15 bears much resemblance to Snp 4.11 as some of us have discussed before.

Now we can turn and observe the things found in the SN that are missing in the DN, for instance. No technical and plain variations on doctrinal formulae like the characteristics on the sense fields, the aggregates, or the noble truths. It becomes unsurprising that no such correspondences exist: the two collections seem to be intentionally distinct in purpose and composition. When I consider many of Shulman’s points about the dynamics involved with formulas and narratives, it contributes to this understanding.

I think @josephzizys has raised some really good points about the content of the SN. Thanks for putting so much interest in shedding light and looking at this! Despite some methodological differences of opinion and whatnot, there are very important questions to be asked that are not being pursued much, and you (joseph) are helping to demonstrate that need.

I think the picture we get when considering all of this is that the nikāyas, especially the DN/MN/SN, are in many ways intentionally distinct types of collections compiled with the help of historical, doctrinal, narrative, literary, etc. information / tools, such as formulas and recitation structure.

The SN is a kind of oral doctrinal manual that records more detailed categories for practice and philosophical self-inquiry. This type of material is clearly more useful for those who were interested in the later Abhidhamma project/movement in the tradition, and so it is a great stepping-stone and work base. The fact that they are similar would only be natural even if the SN and its organization were the earliest.

If I’m not mistaken, @josephzizys used to (or still does?) think that the SN contained the more advanced/technical material in comparison to the more beginners material in the DN, which I find is a fair hypothesis (if taken generally/loosely) and could be close to the truth. The DN places Buddhism in relation to other religions, especially Brahmanism, and the types of views at the time. It gives a history of the Buddha and his life/death, as well as of past buddhas and the coming Buddha. It contains interesting mythology and narratives to welcome people to the religion and thought-world while also bearing a lot of resemblance (more, even, than the other nikāyas) to contemporary non-Buddhist religious beliefs, like the cosmology/deities. The MN goes further into the doctrine of Buddhism and monastic life and the SN goes further into doctrine. The AN contains easily accessible lists for giving sermons, teaching laity, etc.

Setting aside the whole discourses and nikāya as a whole though, it is still possible that some of the formulas within the DN are early — and that the DN was distributed certain types of early formulae not as common elsewhere for the contextual reasoning behind its compilation. For example, the sekha patipadā formulas may very well be ‘earlier’ ideas than the noble eightfold path and the formulas discussing it, and we may see those versions of the formulas found in the DN, and yet the DN as a whole is not as early nor are the individual discourses within it that are made up of some early formulas. Still, these I find rather marginal anyway; a minority of DN suttas contain these types of early formulas it seems.

I’m interested in your (and everyone’s) opinions on this. Its relationship to the khandhas discussion is because the khandhas discussion is inherently tied into dating the types of material found in the SN and other nikāyas. If I were to summarize my main points, it would be that different formulas, all of which can be early to some degree at least in the general content matter, are distributed across the nikāyas according to other literary, narrative, and functional purposes. We can see some of this in the dynamics of the use of formulas and by looking at the types of formulas/discourses made of formulas that result. The DN’s play of formulas and underlying narrative motives appear later, even if some formulas within it appear earlier than those underlying compilation motives.

Mettā :slight_smile:

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