The problem of action at a temporal distance

The Watercooler
107

Okay I think I understand the situation better. Let me highlight two things:

  1. Can you demonstrate Jayarava’s system leads to a logical contradiction?
  2. If you do so, can Jayarava show that you introduced any new assumptions?

If you accept the LEM, then 1 is potentially easier for you, but 2 is also potentially easier for Jayarava. If you do not accept LEM, then 1 may be harder for you, but 2 will also be harder for Jayarava. I initially did not understand why you wouldn’t want 1 to be as easy as possible, but it looks like it is because you also do not want 2 to be easy. Is that accurate?

Also some things worth considering:

  1. Is it valid for Yeshe to use the LEM when he derives a contradiction within Jayarava’s views, but also hold that Jayarava cannot use the LEM to derive a contradiction in Yeshe’s views?
  2. Is it valid for Yeshe to use the LEM when he derives a contradiction within Jayarava’s views, but also hold that Jayarava cannot use the LEM to show that Yeshe introduced a new view?
  3. Is it valid for Yeshe to use the law of non-contradiction when he analyzes Jayarava’s views, but also hold that Jayarava cannot use the LEM to show that Yeshe introduced a new view?

Right now 3 is up for debate.

  1. With regards to 3 being up for debate, can Jayarava concede this point about using the LEM, but instead shift gears and use the law of non-contradiction to show that Yeshe has already introduced a new view at this point in this debate?

Anyway, it would be a shame if the game never got properly started because 3 was debated.

108

I don’t know, but that was the proposal. To my mind, I haven’t started. Jayarava thinks the game has already been played and that he has won. I have no hope, desire, or motivation to try again.

It was my hypothesis that he could not unless he invoked LEM. I do not accept LEM as a premise. Saying that by my not accepting LEM I am therefore committed to a ‘fixed view’ is itself an invocation of LEM to my mind. It is equivalent to this:

  1. “All statements are either true or false.” ← LEM
  2. “That statement itself is either true or false.” ← App LEM
  3. “By not accepting 1 you must conclude 2 is false.” ← NEG
  4. “Therefore it is true that your fixed view is that LEM is false.” ← DNE

I don’t want to occupy or play in this binary world.

I do not think this is true.

No. I do not want a conclusion - a non-affirming negation - to be turned into an affirming negation by my opponent at the end. By showing that the view he puts forth is contradictory I am thus forced to conclude the opposite of his view as affirmatively true by indirect proof.

I don’t want to use LEM. I don’t want Jay to use LEM. LEM is not a part of what I’d agree to. Why? Because the rules are the rules we come to by mutual agreement. Jay says that by playing with the rule of non-contradiction that I’m somehow agreeing to the fixed view of non-contradiction and making it my own. That’s not at all how I define “fixed view.” I simply see no way that the law of non-contradiction can be omitted and still have any chance at communication. Jay’s foisting of this upon me as a “fixed view” is tantamount to saying that the only way I can truly have no fixed views is to stay completely silent. Since I have not stayed completely silent, then I have already lost. That simply is not what I think of as a fixed view. Jay and others are perfectly welcome to disagree.

No. I do not want to use LEM nor assert that I need to.

Only if Jay agreed would this have been acceptable. If he did not, then I would not have played. We could have just disagreed respectfully.

Jay states that he has won already. There is no point in playing again. Nor do I think it would be beneficial for anyone. :pray:

1 Like
109

Except itthattāya means existence (literally “such an existence” or “state of existence”), with the phrase pointing to no further rebirth. Same as the phrase cited by @Jayarava.

110

I made it up @Raftafarian ! ChatGPT3.5 helped me, and the Digital Pali Reader dictionary,

ChatGPT said;

nāparaṁ itthattāyā’ti: “no further identity with regard to this (existence)” - “nāparaṁ” is a negation meaning “no further,” “itthattāyā” is a compound noun meaning “identity with regard to this (existence),” and “ati” is a particle indicating quotation. This phrase suggests a realization or understanding that there is no further identification or attachment to the concept of self in this existence.

and then this;

Me: the itthattāyā compound, what are the parts of this compound?

ChatGPT:
The compound “itthattāyā” consists of the following parts:

itthā: This is the base form and represents “this” or “such.”

tattā: This is derived from the base “tad” and means “that” or “thus.”

When combined, “itthattāyā” forms a compound that can be translated as “identity with regard to this (existence)” or “self-identification in this.” It reflects the idea of recognizing or understanding one’s identity or sense of self in the context of the present existence or situation.

ME: could there be another way to analyze itthattāyā?

ChatGPT:

Certainly, let’s break down the compound “itthattāyā” in another way:

  1. itthā: This is a demonstrative pronoun meaning “this” or “such.”
  2. tattā: This is derived from the base “tad” and means “that” or “thus.”
  3. -yā: This is a suffix often used to form abstract nouns or concepts. In this context, it may be related to the idea of “-ness” or “having the nature of.”

Considering these components, an alternative interpretation could be:

  • itthattāyā: “the quality or nature of being this” or “the state of being such”

In this analysis, the compound emphasizes the inherent nature or quality of being identified with “this” or “such,” suggesting a focus on the present existence or situation and one’s sense of self in that context.

ME: what does demonstrative pronoun mean?

ChatGPT:

A demonstrative pronoun is a pronoun that is used to indicate or point to a particular noun or pronoun. Demonstrative pronouns help clarify which specific person, place, thing, or idea is being referred to in a sentence. In English, the most common demonstrative pronouns are “this,” “that,” “these,” and “those.” They are used as follows:

  • This: Used to point to a singular thing or person that is close to the speaker.
    • Example: “This book is interesting.”
  • That: Used to point to a singular thing or person that is farther away from the speaker.
    • Example: “That movie was fantastic.”
  • These: Used to point to multiple things or people that are close to the speaker.
    • Example: “These shoes are comfortable.”
  • Those: Used to point to multiple things or people that are farther away from the speaker.
    • Example: “Those buildings are impressive.”

Demonstrative pronouns replace specific nouns in a sentence and indicate the relative distance of the referred object or objects from the speaker. They play a crucial role in providing clarity and avoiding ambiguity in language.

ME: is tattā another demonstrative pronoun?

No, “tattā” is not a demonstrative pronoun. While it is related to demonstrative pronouns in terms of indicating something, “tattā” is specifically used as a third-person pronoun in Pali, an ancient Indian language. It is translated to English as “that” or “he/she” depending on the context.

In the context of the Pali compound “itthattāyā,” “tattā” contributes to the overall meaning of the compound, which refers to the quality or nature of being identified with “this” or “such.” It does not serve as a standalone demonstrative pronoun but rather plays a role in creating a compound term with a more specific meaning.

and DPR said;

Itthatta1 (nt.) [[ittha](javascript:void(0)) + *[tvaṃ](javascript:void(0)), abstr. fr. [ittha](javascript:void(0)). The curious BSk. distortion of this word is icchatta M Vastu 417 being here (in this world), in the present state of becoming, this (earthly) state (not “thusness” or “life as we conceive it”, as Mrs. Rh. D. in K. S. i.177; although a confusion between [ittha](javascript:void(0)) & [itthaṃ](javascript:void(0)) seems to exist, see [ittha](javascript:void(0))); “life in these conditions” K. S. ii.17; expld. by itthabhāva C. on S i.140 (see K. S. 318). – See also freq formula A of [arahatta](javascript:void(0)). – D i.18, 84; A i.63; ii.82, 159 203; Sn 158; Dhs 633; Pug 70, 71; DA i.112.

So I thought, why translate itthattāyā to “any state of existence” as @sujato does, when it could be much more in keeping with the given meanings of the parts of the word, and as a bonus give the “th”, “th” sounds and as another bonus not have “existence” which usually is bhava or atthi neither of which are actually there, and as yet another bonus not take a position on the whole rebirth debate, which as I am sure you are aware, many scholars have doubts about.

ChatGPT 3.5 is already better at translating than I will ever be, it also has the advantage of not having opinions informed by religious views, and I am pretty sure that within a year or so it will be vastly more capable of translating texts than any human alive, that’s just the nature of large language models.

So it’s a great time to be a student of Buddhism! no more need to wait for our betters to tell us what words mean!!

Of course, LLM’s do hallucinate and make things up, so it’s a risky business, but the humans make things up too, or at least they talk sententiously about what they say as if they a certain of things about which they are almost certainly not certain :slight_smile:

I would also mention that the context here appears to be this one sentence, that is this is the only sentence in the prose nikayas that uses this word, although I haven’t actually checked thoroughly, so by all means find counter examples.

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111

except that no it doesn’t. bhava means existence, atthi means existence, hoti means existence, itthattāyā means “that this” or “this that” or something like that, if we are being “literal”.

and that’s the problem really, so many people here take monastic renderings into english as “literal” when they are most decidedly not, and so many people here really struggle with the idea that the claim that word or phrase X “points” to word or phrase Y is precisely begging the question. whether or not a given term or phrase “points” to and is therefore equivalent to some other, different word or phrase, is what is at issue.

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112

Sure. But that doesn’t mean that itthattāya in the context your quoting doesn’t point to this existence.
Check the DPD. Check Ven. Bodhi.

113

I have had a similar conversation about this word and phrase. To my mind - informed by my admittedly biased ideas about dhamma and practice - this word when put in context of that phrase could be rendered more poetically as, “never returning to just this as something other than just this” or maybe “no more ignorance that just this is otherwise.” :pray:

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114

To claim of a dynamic-equivalent (i.e., a sense-for-sense) rendering that it “begs the question” would be a premature judgment if one hasn’t yet enquired of the translators what considerations informed their choice of words.

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115

there is no other context than the one i am quoting @Jasudho it is the only sentence in which the word occurs in the prose nikayas. and I did check DPD, it’s literal rendering was “here state” via [ima + ttha + tta] but . itthā: This is a demonstrative pronoun meaning “this” or "such. and. tattā: This is derived from the base “tad” and means “that” or “thus.” seems to me to work just as well.

as for checking Bodhi, this is, again, to beg the question. Bodhi scrupulously relies on the commentarial gloss, and therefore defends a postion whereby buddhism is in fact about rebirth and the ending of rebirth. this thus becomes the alleged “context” of the obscure sentence or construction. If the debate is about that very question (i.e if the earliest buddhists might have meant something other than rebirth by itthattāyā) then relying on the monastic commentarial “context” of Bodhi is to beg the question raised in the first place.

Just a reminder, because people on here are so adept at compartmentalizing, the issue is how to reconcile the buddhas statement that “‘they’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply”. with the statement “there are no more future lives”.

Now my impression is that there are basically 2 choices, we can doubt the legitimacy of the undeclared points here or we can doubt the legitimacy of the no more future lives. I choose the latter and offer evidence in support of my claim; the rarity of the more definitive trope versus the more ambiguous one coupled with the commonality of the undeclared trope.

It’s easy enough to say, “well Bodhi says…” but how do you actually address the issue at hand?

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116

yes that’s true, I don’t mean this as a critique of the translators, rather the arguments I see here all the time along the lines of namarupa implies the aggregates doctrine, or the four noble truths imply the 12DO doctrine or 10DO implies 12DO from a certain perspective etc etc.

I guess what I am getting at is that if one is suspicious about precisely what implies what it helps to keep the things that are different in the letter separated until actual arguments can be put forward that bring them together, and the argument I see very often here is simply an appeal to authority, usually Bodhi, or in a vocal minority of cases, Choong Mun Keet :wink:

117

For the record, Nāgārjuna is relevant to the problem of action at a temporal distance, whether you think he solved it or not, primarily because he gives a clear statement of the problem before he attempts to solve it:

tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet karma tan nityatām iyāt /
niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalaṃ janayiṣyati // MMK_17.6 //

If the action endures to the time of maturation, then it would be permanent.
If it is destroyed, then being destroyed, what fruit will it produce. (Siderits and Katsura)

While I am interested, to some extent, in how modern Buddhists interpret such texts and make arguments about it, my main use of this passage has been to show that ancient Buddhists were aware that this problem existed. Nāgārjuna begins his exposition by attacking two existing approaches to the problem which later commentators attribute to Sautrāntika sect and to pudgalavāda. His attack on these is notably weak. In the second case he just says that the approach is erroneous without saying anything at all about why.

This issue is about reconciling two doctrines that were widely accepted. The first of which occurs a dozen times in Pāli and the second only attested explicitly once (AN 63.6). These are likely well known to readers here:

(1) imasmin sati idam hoti…
(2) cetanāhaṃ kammaṃ vadāmi.

If cetanā is karma, and cetanā is a citta (Theravāda) or dharma (everyone else), then it cannot endure beyond the moment in which it occurs without effectively becoming a permanent entity. And if the cetenā qua condition does not persist, then how can it be a condition for the maturation of the action at a later time?

That is to say, at least as they are stated in Pāli suttas, dependent arising and karma are not compatible.

  • Dependent arising doesn’t allow delayed reactions.
  • Karma requires delayed reactions.

Probably at this point Sutta Central folk reading this are sharpening their pencils and are already thinking of ways to denounce this narrative (and probably me personally). However, this much was also asserted by Nāgārjuna in MMK Chp 17. His value here is less his solution than his historic acknowledgement of the problem as stated. This is not a problem that I invented, this is a problem that Nāgārjuna clearly states and tries to solve in his inimitable way. And he also tells us that he believed that at least two solutions were known to his contemporaries. So this was not a problem that he invented either. This was a general problem in Buddhist doxology around the time when Nāgārjuna lived (whenever that might have been).

To support this narrative, I cite David Bastow’s study of the Vijñānakāya (1995) a Sarvāstivādin text which also describes and tries to solve the problem. In fact, Bastow argues, the whole idea of sarva-asti is a result of thinking about the problem of action at a temporal distance, that is to say the maturation of karma at some later time when the cetanā has long ceased to exist.

The Vijñānakāya argues that the imasmin formula tells us that the condition must be present for the effect to occur (this reading is disputed by some modern Theravādins, but it is how the Vijñānakāya treats it). Ergo, if some action in the past is causing some effect now, then it must still be present. And if some presently existing dharma can somehow cause effects in the future, then that dharma will still exist in the future. Ergo, dharmas must be always existent (sarvam asti). This is a straightforward logical consequence of a literal reading of dependent arising. It causes its own problems, but the Sarvāstivāda were well aware of this and continued to develop the doctrine to address these.

Similarly, Amber Carpenter (2015) shows that the pudgala in pudgalavāda is precisely a solution to this problem. It is an “entity” (comprising the skandhas associated with a particular individual) that does one and only one thing: it carries karma forward so that it can ripen after the fact.

As weird and unsatisfactory as these doctrines may seem to Buddhist modernists, this was how mainstream Indian buddhists thought for over 1000 years.

From this, I argue that the problem was generally known and that we must look again at the kṣanavāda or doctrine of moments, which can be found in both Theravāda and Yogācaravāda. Interestingly, both of these approaches led to the invention of previously unknown entities: the bhavaṅgacitta on one hand, and the alāyavijñāna on the other, since kṣanavāda doesn’t explain what it needs to explain without them. Both of which were correctives required by faults in the doctrine as original posed.

However in going beyond merely describing changes and trying to explain them, I have broken an academic Buddhist Studies taboo and I have yet to get this published (I’ve also been working full-time on the Heart Sutra for some years now and having work rejected by religious buddhists in academia is disheartening).

To me the details of any given solution are not interesting enough for me to want to defend any of them. I don’t care which solution appeals to modern Buddhists. I’m a historian trying to explain the past, not a religious trying proselytise in the present.

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118

Exactly. Not this or that. How words are put together doesn’t always correlate with their meaning(s) is different contexts.

The teachings on ending rebirth and re-existence appear everywhere in the Nikāyas, both explicitly and implicitly. So the rendering of “no further or state of existence” appears quite compatible with this and with the buddha’s teachings in general, is all I’m saying here.

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119

Yes, I agree it does seem broadly compatible. However, it also appears quite incompatible with the Teachers specific teaching that, “‘they’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply.” I take it that is the point Joseph is referring to when he says:

I’ve seen many proposals over the years how to reconcile. Here is a non-exhaustive list in no particular order:

  • Find an alternative pali translation of one or both passages
  • Deny that rebirth was ever taught by the Buddha
  • Dismiss suttas that seemingly indicate otherwise as fake or late
  • Assume that rebirth was taught only to lay people and no-rebirth was taught to mendicants
  • That rebirth applies to sentient beings, but upon awakening one should no longer regard a Tathagata as a sentient being and hence rebirth does not apply to them
  • Saying only suffering is reborn and since a Tathagata is no longer suffering then ‘not reborn’ does not apply
  • Regarding rebirth as a conventional truth while ‘reborn doesn’t apply’ an ultimate truth and they are somehow different
  • Saying that rebirth never ends and the Buddha never taught that rebirth ends
  • Dismiss any suttas that seemingly disagree with any of the above - by adherents of the above - as fake or late

I take no position here on the above. Just trying to point out some ways I’ve seen people answer the problem that @josephzizys is seemingly pointing out.

:pray:

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120

Thanks.

While there’s been much debate over these points, one approach by a number of teachers has been to point out that the questions assumed the existence of a self or persistent entity, which the Buddha refuted.
“Will this self/Tathagata be reborn?” (with “self” and Tathagata here indicating an ongoing essence or entity), the Buddha replies “It doesn’t apply.”
It’s like asking, “Will this blue be reborn?”
Doesn’t apply.
I believe this also ties in with SN35.30.

This does not deny the presence of a being as an ongoing collection if selfless processes.

This fits in with so much of the other teachings in the Nikāyas, including with respect to the Three Characteristics.

Also you may wish to have a look at:

And other related posts that can be read via the Search function.

:pray:

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121

Yes, but how do we understand “this does not deny the presence of a being as an ongoing collection” since in some of the suttas under question it very much says “No” is the proper answer to:

  • Do you regard the being as the same as the collection of ongoing selfless processes?

  • Do you regard the being as distinct from the collection of ongoing selfless processes?

Or at least that is what some people read those suttas to very much be saying. :pray:

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122

Hi,

Part of the challenge with these discussions is how different people understand abstract nouns like “beings”, and"existence".
In addition, terms like “existence” can vary in the meaning and connotation in different contexts.

In DN15 the Buddha “defined” birth, death, and beings in common-sense ways:
"Suppose there were totally and utterly no rebirth for anyone anywhere. That is, there were no rebirth of sentient beings into their various realms—of gods, centaurs, spirits, creatures, humans, quadrupeds, birds, or reptiles, each into their own realm. When there’s no rebirth at all, with the cessation of rebirth, would old age and death still be found?”

In MN38 the combining of consciousness and nāma-rūpa in the mother’s womb is said to lead to the arising of a new being"
“Mendicants, when three things come together an embryo is conceived. In a case where the mother and father come together, but the mother is not in the fertile phase of her menstrual cycle, and the virile spirit is not ready, the embryo is not conceived. In a case where the mother and father come together, the mother is in the fertile phase of her menstrual cycle, but the virile spirit is not ready, the embryo is not conceived. But when these three things come together—the mother and father come together, the mother is in the fertile phase of her menstrual cycle, and the virile spirit is ready—an embryo is conceived.”

The point is, there are many words in these sections that could be analyzed and debated, but the context is one of everyday usage. A being is born into a particular realm of existence. Not much more elaboration is given.

The Buddha taught, we agree, that there is no lasting essence to anything. In many contexts, this was in response to the Upanishadic doctrines of an eternal atman and its fusion with an eternal absolute, Brahman. So “self” was used and imho many folks latch onto this word with their many interpretations and things can get complicated.

But whatever we call it, in the suttas there are only selfless processes which lead to rebirth/samsāra until the processes are finally stopped with the cessation of ignorance and craving.

Whether we want to say the processes “are” the being or the same, etc. can lead to papañca, proliferations and conceptualizations. but what if we settled for how the Buddha taught about beings, as processes of grasping?

However, I can’t see how what’s called a “being” can be truly distinct from the collection of selfless processes any more than a particular cloud can be distinct from the processes of water condensation and the atmosphere.

:pray:

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123

Sure but that argument doesn’t work because the buddha taught that a self didnt exist for anyone, including non-awakened, and everyone agrees that for non-awakend “they’re reborn” does apply.

The question is why “they’re not reborn” doesnt apply to the Tathagata but “they’re reborn” does apply to the unawakened.

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124

I think I understand your point.

It comes down to “they”.
Again, in the presence of ignorance and craving, selfless processes are perpetuating over and over, i.e. rebirth. While there are particular characteristics to sets of processes, there is no “they” as ongoing entities. So no “they” is reborn but there is rebirth, re-accumulations of processes based on prior processes, (kamma). This applies to the unenlightened ones.
.
The Tathagata ended ignorance and craving so with the dissolution of the processes at death there was no perpetuation or re-arising of any processes. or rebirth.

Again, no “they” ceases in terms of “they” as an essence or unchanging self, but “they” as defined as a set of processes with particular characteristics did end, nirodha.

The wording of the Tetralemmas is open to interpretation and imo that’s why there is much debate about the points.
It holds together for me when the questions are assumed to come from a point of view that assumes even a subtle self, or essence, or persistent entity. And the Buddha refutes all these positions on that basis. This fits with the Buddha saying the senses are the All, as in SN35.23.
And there isn’t any “they” in that.

But that’s just my general take.

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125

But thats exactly why the explination doesnt work, if there is no “they” then “they” are not reborn, just as you said, unawakened and awakened alike, but the undeclared applies to the awakened, not the unawakened, despite niether group having a “they”.

This would be great except that firstly, as i point out above, it doesnt resolve the question, and secondly its an esoteric explination, in the sense that instead of what is actually in the text, we have to assume that what is really being answered is some question not in the text.

However the Buddha could have just said something, like, I dont know…

“But Poṭṭhapāda, do you believe in a self?”
“Kaṁ pana tvaṁ, poṭṭhapāda, attānaṁ paccesī”ti?
DN9

But he doesn’t.

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126

Right. So again, the Tathagata is not asking the question. An unenlightened one is. And from this standpoint – with the questioner assuming some enduring essence to the Tathagata is the questions, is refuted or is told “doesn’t apply” since what’s la led a Tathagata isn’t reborn nor not reborn.
It’s like asking if blue is reborn, not reborn, both, neither. What can be said except “Not so” or “Doesn’t apply.”

What gets esoteric, at least for me, are the conceptual gyrations around the Tetralemma. Clearly, we’re all free to choose what we wish to look into and discuss.
But it’s not in the 4NTs, not in DO, not in DL, not in the suttas on the Three Characteristics, and not in the 37 “Wings of Awakening.”

We don’t know the particular circumstances or people being addressed in many of the suttas and I don’t think we can ask the suttas to say things in the way we want, or expect, them to say in any given situation.
However, I’m guessing we agree that a foundational teaching in the Nikāyas is that no self or enduring essence is present in/as any conditional “things”/experiences.
Working from this foundational premise is what I’m getting at.
In this way, to ask if a Tathagata is reborn or not, or whatever misses the point

Again, what’s the response to “Is blue reborn?” “Not reborn?” “Neither?” 'Both?"
It’s not that there is no “blue.” And yet…

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