The six senses cease, is there nothing else?

[Sunyo]

Hi,

Well, it’s not about the grammar, so I won’t argue into to much depth. But to not ignore you completely:

@josephzizys

If the agreggates cease and nothing remains
You have annihilationism (the aggregates are annihilated)

Then you have annihilation of suffering, yes, but not the annihilation of a self or any entity worthy of calling a self. The latter is the annihilationism of the suttas. Since you mislabeled the view like this, perhaps you’re not fully understanding my point of view, according to how I explained annihilation in the first post: the annihilation of a perceived self.

And if we’re going to use logic, although I’m not convinced that is the best approach: After the six senses either something remains to be experienced or nothing. That’s simple logic. Whether that “something” can be described in any way or not is irrelevant. Even it it can’t be described, it remains something.

To say there’s neither something or nothing, is a wrong view according to the sutta we’re discussing, no matter whose interpretation we go by. As Bhante Sujato notes at DN1 on the wrong view of neither-nor: “A sage is in a subtle state that cannot be characterized in terms of existence or non-existence.” Though such a view of “neither existence nor non-existence” sounds superficially deep, it’s completely meaningless. It’s refusing to take a stance, which is the view of the equivocators.

And to refuse to say either way is also equivocation:

whether a Realized One still exists after death … whether A Realized One no longer exists after death … whether a Realized One both still exists and no longer exists after death … whether a Realized One neither still exists nor no longer exists after death.

If I believed there was, I would say so. But I don’t say it’s like this. I don’t say it’s like that. I don’t say it’s otherwise. I don’t say it’s not so. And I don’t deny it’s not so.’

This is the fourth ground on which some ascetics and brahmins rely when resorting to verbal flip-flops and endless flip-flops. (DN1)

So unless we want to fall into equivocation, we have to take a position: does some kind of awareness/experience remain or not? I hold there is nothing after the six senses cease. (For the enlightened one, that is. That is of course implied in the sutta: when it says “the remainderless ceasing of the six senses”, it means the passing away of an enlightened being. If anybody else dies, they will just be reborn, and the senses will still be there, so they haven’t ceased.)

In SN12.51 it is also said that after the death of an enlightened being “only bodily remains will be left”, i.e. no type of awareness or consciousness.

And AN4.173 also allows for there to be nothing after the six senses cease, if translated properly. I see Ven. Sujato already updated it.

[Radius]

@josephzizys

It cant be that simple though, otherwise i could just kill myself and with the cessation of my sense organs i would achieve the cessation of suffering.

Another reason it can’t be that simple is that even if this be true, it concerns only one individual’s personal batch of suffering. Once you and I have ‘ceased’, there’ll still be metric binloads of suffering in the world.

[Jimh]

And AN4.173 also allows for there to be nothing after the six senses cease, if translated properly. I see Ven. Sujato already updated it.

Since AN 4.174 uses the same exact phrasing, it is expected that the translation of this sutta will be updated as well.

For AN 4.174, SuttaCentral shows “parallels in ancient texts (0)”, while for AN 4.173 it shows 1 parallel as SA 249 T ii 059c27.

B. Analyo’s translation of SA 249 in On the Six Sense-spheres (2) — A Translation of Saṃyukta-āgama Discourses 230 to 249, page 124, states in footnote 73: Parallel: AN 4.174 at AN II 161,1. So it appears that SA 249 is a parallel to both AN 1.73 and AN 1.74.

There is a difference in the final conclusion of AN 1.73 & AN 1.74 and SA 249:

B. Sujato AN 1.73 & AN 1.74: When the six fields of contact fade away and cease with nothing left over, proliferation stops and is stilled. ”Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā papañcanirodho papañcavūpasamo”ti.

B. Analyo SA 249: If one says: ‘When the six spheres of contact have been eradicated, faded away, ceased, appeased, and disappeared, one attains Nirvāṇa and is apart from all that is baseless and false, then this is indeed what the Buddha taught.”

Choong Mun-keat SA 249: “But if one says that after the extinction of the six sense-spheres of contact, and the fading away of desire, after cessation, after ending, there is fading away of all meaningless argument and the attaining of nirvāṇa, then this is the teaching of the Buddha.”

metta

[Ceisiwr]

@Sunyo

In SN12.51 it is also said that after the death of an enlightened being “only bodily remains will be left”, i.e. no type of awareness or consciousness.

And AN4.173 also allows for there to be nothing after the six senses cease, if translated properly. I see Ven. Sujato already updated it.

I think its more nothing can be said, rather than “there is nothingness”.

[Jasudho]

@Radius

Once you and I have ‘ceased’, there’ll still be metric binloads of suffering in the world.

From AN10.95:
“Uttiya, I teach my disciples from my own insight in order to purify sentient beings, to get past sorrow and crying, to make an end of pain and sadness, to end the cycle of suffering, and to realize extinguishment.”

“But when Master Gotama teaches in this way, is the whole world saved, or half, or a third?” But when he said this, the Buddha kept silent.

…it’s not the Realized One’s concern whether the whole world is saved by this, or half, or a third. But the Realized One knows that whoever is saved from the world—whether in the past, the future, or the present—all have given up the five hindrances, corruptions of the heart that weaken wisdom. They have firmly established their mind in the four kinds of mindfulness meditation. And they have truly developed the seven awakening factors. That’s how they’re saved from the world, in the past, future, or present. Uttiya, you were just asking the Buddha the same question as before in a different way. That’s why he didn’t answer.”

[josephzizys]

@Sunyo

Well, it’s not about the grammar, so I won’t argue into to much depth.

Yes. I think the grammer argument stands or falls on its own, and its not my interest so i will try to be brief.

@Sunyo

But to not ignore you completely:

Ha! Thanks @Sunyo , I really appreciate your patience, and the patience of others like @sujato and @Dhammanando Nd @stephen who have been so forgiving of me and helpful in the face of my Pali ignorance.

@Sunyo

Then you have annihilation of suffering, yes, but not the annihilation of a self or any entity worthy of calling a self.

No.

My claim is that you have the annihilation of the aggregates and that this is the wrong interpretation of the dhamma.

Even suffering, (SN amd AN statements to the contrary notwithstanding) is not annihilated, because to take suffering as “real” “imaginary” “both” or “niether” is a mistake.

Suffering can be brought tonan end, that is there can be a cessation of suffering, by bringing about the ceasing of its neccesary conditions.

@Sunyo

And if we’re going to use logic, although I’m not convinced that is the best approach: After the six senses either something remains to be experienced or nothing.

I dont think this is right.

For example:

Either the person who acts experiences the results or they dont.

But the suttas say if the person who acts is the same as the one who later experiences the results then there is something that continues from person a (actor) and person r (results).

That is “eternalism”

And the suttas say that if the person who experiences the results is a different person to the one who experiences the results then the actor is annihilated.

That is “annihilationism”

If they are both the same and different (perhaps having both differences and identicals) then you have the third abyakata

And if you claim that there is something else, niether the actor nor the experiencer but somehow still relevent, for example some 3rd uncaused substantive “self” that works.

The 4th abyakata.

(The last 2 lack the neat explinations of the forst 2, but I am hopeful that these examples can be brought into understanding by examining all the cases and getting a.comsistant explimat I n.)

There is nothing inherently illogical in any of it as far as i can tell.

@Sunyo

Even it it can’t be described, it remains something.

That is clearly wrong, if you cannot say anything about it you cannot say of it that it is “something” you also cannot say about it that it is “nothing” or both somehow, or niether somehow.

@Sunyo

Though such a view of “neither existence nor non-existence” sounds superficially deep, it’s completely meaningless. It’s refusing to take a stance, which is the view of the equivocators.

This is wrong too.

The buddha shares the abyakata with the skeptics, but (refuses to) answer for completely different reasons, the equivocators claim not to know the amswers, the buddha claims that the questions cant be coherently answered for all the relevent terms for the life of someone seeking freedom.

Terms like beings, agents, actors, actions, motives, joy, sorrow, experiences, acts, consequences, etc

None of these can be real unreal both niether at the same time as being arrangable into a path to freedom or a solution to suffering.

@Sunyo

So unless we want to fall into equivocation, we have to take a position: does some kind of awareness/experience remain or not?

No.

The equivocators equivocate on all 4 abyakata, the dont answer either of the first 2 either.

And niether does the buddha.

The abyakata is not a riddle where you first reject 3 and 4 and then argue you have to pick between 1 amd 2 because of it is simply not what we see in the ebt.

The buddha rejects ALL 4 abyakata limbs.

@Sunyo

I hold there is nothing after the six senses cease.

“Mā hevaṁ, āvuso”.

Shifting the goalposts by bracketing “something else” and then rewriting the 4 abyakata as if they all just resolve to refering to a falsehood is a poor argument.

For one thing it completely collapses for the kammic case, that is the sequence of suttas that ask if the one who acts is the same as the one who has results or different or both or niether.

In that sequence even if you make the person a fiction and bracket them out the sequence compelles you to reject the view that both the actor and the experincer are fictions.

That there are some cases where the revision can be made to work is a poor reason to revise when the other examples then become needlesly inconsistent.

I will try and find time to mine my survey of the abyakata at

TO BE OR NOT TO BE, the undeclared points in the 4 principle Nikayas:

TO BE OR NOT TO BE (or both, or neither) The undeclared points in the 4 principle Nikayas. The undeclared points are a number of questions, typically ten, but sometimes as few as two, as at SN44.10, and sometimes as many as 11, as at AN10.95, and often 4, as at SN12.17. This essay focuses on the standard set of ten, and looks at the differing explanations given for the Buddha’s silence in the different suttas. We first see the undeclared points introduced at DN1 and DN2, where they are used to…

But just to reiterate,

It doesnt matter if the subject of the abyakata is a

Self
World
Being
Act/Consequence
Shoe
Etc

It is always an argument about how these things might be part of our lives without being

Substantial
Insubstantial
Both
Niether

Or

Real
Unreal
Both
niether

Eternal
Mortal
Both
Niether

Etc.

[Sunyo]

@josephzizys

Even suffering, (SN amd AN statements to the contrary notwithstanding) is not annihilated, because to take suffering as “real” “imaginary” “both” or “niether” is a mistake.

But if suffering is not real, are we living in the Matrix or something?

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. (SN 22.94)

The five aggregates exist, they are real. What is not real is a self.

@josephzizys

My claim is that you have the annihilation of the aggregates and that this is the wrong interpretation of the dhamma.

But what’s holding back a discussion is, what you call annihilation is not the way the suttas use the term. Annihilationism in the suttas is the (imagined) destruction of a self or “existent entity” or inherent “person” (i.e. self), not the end of the mere aggregates. The aggregates are in many various wordings said to come to an end or “be eradicated” (SN22.55), and it’s always implied to be right view, not annihilationism. So you’re mixing up two things here. Or at the very least, you’re not engaging with my actual arguments and you’re just shifting the definition of “annihilation”. That alone isn’t an argument against what I said in the opening post.

I dont think this is right.

But you’re mixing up two different things here too. These statements you bring up again are about whether there is an inherent “person” (i.e. self-like entity) that creates suffering. They are not about whether something remains after suffering ends or not. That’s a different question, one that I posed.

Also I have to say again that “suffering is caused by neither the same person nor another” is NOT exactly what is said in the suttas, where the fourth statement always includes “but suffering is caused by chance”. You haven’t acknowledged this yet, and therefore we’re already going in circles.

That is clearly wrong, if you cannot say anything about it you cannot say of it that it is “something” you also cannot say about it that it is “nothing” or both somehow, or niether somehow.

But that’s not clear at all. You call something that remains an “it”. How is “it” different from “something”? And exactly why can’t I call it “something”? To deny it’s a “something” because “you can’t say anything about it” , is just playing with words to me. If there’s any kind of awareness or mind or state of existence or whatever you want to call it, it’s something in my book. And it would be in the book of every human being that uses language normally.

It’s like you’re holding a closed fist up to me and ask: “Do I have something in my hand or nothing?” And I answer, “something”. You’re actually holding a pebble but reply, “No, you’re clearly wrong, because you can’t call this pebble a ‘something’.” That’s the logic people use when they refuse to call some kind of eternal experience/nibbāna-thingy a “something” or “a type of existence” or whatever.

And it’s exactly the “neither-this-nor-that” statement! Because even in the former translation of AN4.173 “neither something nor nothing” is also not acknowledged. But isn’t that exactly what you’re doing when you say it can’t be called either something nor nothing?

The buddha rejects ALL 4 abyakata limbs.

He did. But you’re mixing things up again. I’m arguing that he did not deny that there will be nothing (to experience) after the six senses cease. That’s not what the four abyakatas are about.

He denied the four statements on the Tathagata after death because they all imply a self. Likewise, in AN4.173 he denied them all because they all imply something beyond the six senses. In SN44.8 it is explicitly said that all four wrong statements on the Tathagata after death are held because people see a self with respect the aggregates:

“Vaccha, wanderers of other sects regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. They regard feeling as self … perception as self … volitional formations as self … consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the wanderers of other sects are asked such questions, they give such answers as: ‘The world is eternal’ … or ‘The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.’

But, Vaccha, the Tathagata, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One, does not regard form as self … or self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the Tathagata is asked such questions, he does not give such answers.”

That is the reason the four statements on the Tathagata are wrong: that they assume a self. To say they are unanswered because things are unknowable or unexplainable or “you can’t say anything about it”, is just not in line with the suttas. The Buddha had more logical reasons why he didn’t affirm any of these statements.

@Radius

Another reason it can’t be that simple is that even if this be true, it concerns only one individual’s personal batch of suffering . Once you and I have ‘ceased’, there’ll still be metric binloads of suffering in the world.

Well, the text is talking on the individual level, of course. It’s the same with so many other things the Buddha taught. Take the four noble truths, for example. If person A stops craving, it doesn’t cause the cessation of suffering for person B.

@Ceisiwr

I think its more nothing can be said, rather than “there is nothingness”.

I’d reply in similar vein as to Joseph. If we can’t talk about it, that would mean there is at least no more awareness, because awareness is something we can easily talk about, as did the Buddha. And if there is no more awareness, how does it differ from there being nothing?

By the way, “there is nothingness” would probably be misunderstood as the state of nothingness (aka the 7th “jhana”). People also tend to turn nothing into Something (e.g. The Great Emptiness). This may be why the Buddha didn’t really use such terms and preferred to talk about what ceases rather than “what” remains.

But what ceases includes consciousness. So at least there remains no experience, and, as the sutta I quoted earlier say,s “only bodily remains will be left”. To me, we can call that nothing, even if some people might objectify that.

[Sasha_A]

@Sunyo

…

If an interpretation of the Teaching contradicts itself, then that interpretation is illogical, irrational, false, and nonsensical. If this illogicality, irrationality, fallacy, and nonsensicality of such an interpretation is not acknowledged, but only cultivated, proliferated, and defended in every possible way, then the immediate and inescapable conclusion is that the Teaching itself is illogical, irrational, false, and nonsensical. Consequently, the Buddha himself, as the author of the Teaching, was illogical, irrational, erroneous and ridiculous in his explanations.

So the choice is very simple: either the self-contradictory interpretation is correct, and the Buddha was teaching nonsense, or the self-contradictory interpretation is wrong, because the Buddha certainly wasn’t contradicting himself.

[Ceisiwr]

@Sunyo

I’d reply in similar vein as to Joseph. If we can’t talk about it, that would mean there is at least no more awareness, because awareness is something we can easily talk about, as did the Buddha. And if there is no more awareness, how does it differ from there being nothing?

By the way, “there is nothingness” would probably be misunderstood as the state of nothingness (aka the 7th “jhana”). People also tend to turn nothing into Something (e.g. The Great Emptiness). This may be why the Buddha didn’t really use such terms and preferred to talk about what ceases rather than “what” remains.

But what ceases includes consciousness. So at least there remains no experience, and, as the sutta I quoted earlier say,s “only bodily remains will be left”. To me, we can call that nothing, even if some people might objectify that.

In order for there to be truly nothing there has to be something which truly exists to begin with (ignoring the contradictions of nothingness existing here for a moment). This brings us to the Dravyasat type thinking of the Blessed One’s contemporaries. Some thought that there really is something (or things), and one of these truly existing things is the substratum for the self (be it form, feeling, consciousness etc). From that perspective various views are arrived at. For some that which truly exists, and is the basis of the self, exists forever. It can never lose its existence, for its independent. For others that which truly exists, and so is the basis for the self, does not exist forever. It can or will be destroyed. The necessary condition for Eternalism and Annihilationism is in grasping things as truly existing. That thing then either always is, or can be made to cease. The Buddha avoided all of this via dependent origination. All we experience arises and ceases due to conditions. Because of that, nothing can be said to be Dravyasat. Since all we experience is dependent, nothing we experience can be said to exist independently. As such substances (the atta being a type of substance) can’t be established. Without all that, nothing can be established as being real or unreal. We have experiences. That can’t be denied. Those experiences rise and cease, but they are dreamlike. Matrixlike in modern lingo. This is why when someone sees dependent origination they see nibbāna. To see arising, ceasing, coming and going is to see no arising, no ceasing, no coming or going. Nibbāna then isn’t nothingness, or something. Its the abandoning of thinking in those terms. Its abandoning the tendency to reify words into something real. You mentioned earlier that the aggregates are real. I couldn’t disagree more. In the end, not even dukkha can be said to be or not to be.

10. To say “it is” is to grasp for permanence.
    To say “it is not” is to adopt the view of nihilism.
    Therefore a wise person
    Does not say “exists” or “does not exist.

11. “Whatever exists through its essence
    Cannot be nonexistent” is eternalism.
    “It existed before but doesn’t now”
    Entails the error of nihilism.

Venerable Nāgārjuna’s MMK

The Buddha teaches us concepts to help us let go. He taught about the aggregates because people were clinging to them as real. Instead he showed how they can’t be what they claimed. That doesn’t mean the aggregates are real. It means he was undoing people’s clinging to concepts. He was undoing a vast delusion. With all this in mind then, conventionally we can say that the aggregates cease. Ultimately however, we can’t speak of anything.

“When there are words, there is the fetter of birth and death. When words do not exist, there is nirvāṇa. Those who have words have birth, death, arising and cessation; those who have no words have no birth, no death, no arising and no cessation.” - EĀ 30:1

“The is nothing to understand, nothing at all to understand. For nothing in particular has been indicated, nothing in particular has been explained.” - Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra

I think when you understand that the Buddha was teaching against substance metaphysics, against the tendency to reify, then the Dhamma becomes quite clear. That’s my Madhyamaka influenced exegesis at any rate.

[stephen]

You seem to be trying to retro-fit later Buddhist philosophical ideas into the Pali suttas.

[Ceisiwr]

I see Venerable Nāgārjuna’s exegesis as valid. The Buddha’s contemporaries, mostly, were substance metaphysicians (Jains still are to this day). The atta they preached was a substance. One among many substances (earth, aether etc). Theirs was a world of real things and their modalities. The very basis for their views, Eternalism or Annihilationism, is that there is something real. The suttas are quite clear on this. For the Eternalists a real substance exists and always exist. For the Annihilationists a real substance is destroyed. They argued that something has independent existence, and so is therefore real. That is how you make something real. You assign it independent existence, an essence, a substratum. Even today when people want to say something is real they say its a substance which exists independently (such as matter). What the Buddha said in turn was that everything we experience is dependent, not independent. As such, he undermined the metaphysics of his contemporaries. The atta can’t exist forever or be destroyed, because an atta-substance can’t be established to begin with. He also went deeper. The cause for these views is in grasping, which occurs due to the taints which “pour into” our experiences. The taint of ignorance, the taint of sensual pleasure (something is pleasing) and the taint of Being (something truly exists). There is a reason why the very first fetter given up is Sakkāyadiṭṭhi, literally “truly existing being view”. What is true of the atta is true for all other substances, such as matter or truly existing aggregates (the view of all the various Abhidharmas that we know of). Ultimately then the highest truth is that of nibbāna. Of no arising, no ceasing, no coming, no going, no stars, no moon.

[stephen]

It certainly seems true that as Buddhist philosophical ideas developed there was an increasing emphasis on a systematic metaphysics and ontology.

The Buddha himself, as represented in the suttas, did not seem overly interested in these ideas, rather he presented a plan for liberation.

Those of us today who are philosophically inclined struggle with our mind’s desire to speculate on the nature of ultimate reality, and the different mode of teaching the Buddha used.

[Ceisiwr]

Yes, and the Buddhas teachings were warnings against that. Something Venerable Nagarjuna was also arguing against. Like when people say the aggregates are “real”.

[stephen]

The five aggregates subject to clinging are really the source of dukkha. For real!

[Ceisiwr]

When the Buddha set out on his journey he thought that there was a self who suffered. That he suffered. Then, when he awakened, he realised that there wasn’t anyone who suffered all along. It’s was a delusion. What is true of the atta substance is true of all other substances too. When one awakens then they realise there never was dukkha to begin with. There never was a journey. There never was samsara, ultimately. The aggregates, sense spheres and elements are just as conventional as “I am”.

[stephen]

Can you provide a Pali sutta reference for your idea that there is no dukkha nor samsara?

Again, this seems a later philosophical idea.

This thread is very helpful on this subject:

Did The Buddha Only Teach Dukkha and Its Cessation?

Sorry for kicking an old topic. But I just stumbled upon it googling. Bodhi wrote: In SN22.86 the point is rather that there is no Tathagata (i.e. no Self) before death so the four phrases on the Tathagata after death also don’t apply. The annihilists, though, think there is a Self that does get destroyed at death. And that is what the Buddha is deying. So both instances of this often misunderstood phrase “I declare only suffering and the cessation of suffering” are the Buddha denying a Self…

This quoted footnote by Ven Bodhi (for MN 22) is very helpful:

“The import of this statement is deeper than appears on the surface. In the context of the false accusations of §37, the Buddha is stating that he teaches that a living being is not a self but a mere conglomeration of factors, material and mental events, linked together in a process that is inherently dukkha, and that Nibbāna the cessation of suffering, is not the annihilation of a being but the termination of that same unsatisfactory process. This statement should
be read in conjunction with SN 12:15/ii.17, where the Buddha says that one with right view, who has discarded all doctrines of a self, sees that whatever arises is only dukkha arising, and whatever ceases is only dukkha ceasing.”

[Ceisiwr]

Nibbana is said to be the highest truth

See how the world with its gods imagines not-self to be self; habituated to name and form, imagining this is truth.

For whatever you imagine it is, it turns out to be something else. And that is what is false in it, for the ephemeral is deceptive by nature.

Extinguishment has an undeceptive nature, the noble ones know it as truth. Having comprehended the truth, they are hungerless, extinguished.”

Snp 3.12

And what is that highest truth?

“There is, mendicants, that dimension where there is no earth, no water, no fire, no wind; no dimension of infinite space, no dimension of infinite consciousness, no dimension of nothingness, no dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; no this world, no other world, no moon or sun. There, mendicants, I say there is no coming or going or remaining or passing away or reappearing. It is not established, does not proceed, and has no support. Just this is the end of suffering.” Ud 8.1

The characteristics of the conditioned are arising, ceasing, persisting and change. The characteristics of nibbana are no arising, no ceasing, no persisting, no change. If the highest truth is emptiness of arising, ceasing, change, causality, self, objects etc then where is dukkha?

When you see arising, ceasing, persisting, change then you see no arising, no ceasing, no persisting, no change. When you see dependent origination then you see nibbana too.

[Sunyo]

@Ceisiwr

You mentioned earlier that the aggregates are real. I couldn’t disagree more.

I don’t follow. I think you need to explain what you mean by real and unreal. What I mean by real is that we experience them. That’s as real as things get. I suppose I do not mean real in a “substance metaphysics” kind of way. I certainly do not mean “real” in the sense of permanent.

Although I do think parinibbāna is the cessation of the aggregates, not just to stop thinking about them as real, we may not be so far apart on the rest.

[stephen]

@Sunyo

I don’t follow. I think you need to explain what you mean by real and unreal. What I mean by real is that we experience them

Yes, for sure.
This kind of confusion occurs when highly abstract metaphysics gets blended with dhamma.

[Ceisiwr]

@Sunyo

I don’t follow. I think you need to explain what you mean by real and unreal. What I mean by real is that we experience them. That’s as real as things get. I suppose I do not mean real in a “substance metaphysics” kind of way. I certainly do not mean “real” in the sense of permanent.

Although I do think parinibbāna is the cessation of the aggregates, not just to stop thinking about them as real, we may not be so far apart on the rest.

Real would be substantial existence. Dravyasat. Independent existence. The kind of thing Kaṇāda taught, Aristotle taught, or Jains still teach, or Vedanta or Christians with their Triune God and souls, or we scientists when we assume matter and an external world to do science. When people say trees are real, they mean its because they have their own identity and exist independently. Essentialism basically. There is something really there in sense experience. I too think there is a cessation of the aggregates, but conventionally. I’m much influenced by Tsongkhapa in my views, where we can’t deny sense experience its just merely dreamlike, rather than Gorampa who, for him, even sense experience is denied. From one perspective there are aggregates, sense-spheres, gods and dependent origination. From another perspective there is none of those things. Just like how EBT folk and Theravādins and the other early schools said that conventionally we can talk of a Buddha doing this and that, but ultimately we cannot, so to with the aggregates etc.

Luke, you’re going to find that many of the truths we cling to depend greatly on our own point of view.

• Ācariya Obi-Wan Kenobi