The six senses cease, is there nothing else?

[stephen]

I mean, if dukkha wasn’t real, would the Buddha spend decades of his life teaching about a way to end it? Really?

[Ceisiwr]

If dukkha was real, how could it end? How could something which has existence be brought to cease? These are the kind of debates the Buddha’s contemporaries entangled themselves in, because they thought things were real to begin with. Some argued they cant cease, because they have independent existence. Others taught that they can still be made to cease despite them having independent existence (substances don’t rely on anything else for their existence). Others still like the Jains taught that these real existents can both exist and not exist at the same time (think of the unanswerable questions here). Instead the Buddha taught the middle way. We have experiences, there is dukkha, but conventionally. Ultimately, with wisdom, they can’t be established at all. Conventionally we say “You and I” but from a higher point of view, those words don’t apply. Conventionally we say the Buddha did this and that, but from a higher point of view he can’t be pinned down. What is true of the Buddha is true of all things.

[Ceisiwr]

Yes, for sure.
This kind of confusion occurs when highly abstract metaphysics gets blended with dhamma.

Highly abstract metaphysics, and the tendency behind it all, is what the Buddha was countering. All of his contemporaries (bar the sceptics) were steeped in it. To understand the Dhamma, you have to understand who and what it was he was arguing against.

[stephen]

The cessation of dukkha, the cessation of the aggregates, can be said to be the point of Buddhist practice.

This is what the word ‘nibbāna’ implies.
I’m surprised this is up for debate in this forum.

[Ceisiwr]

The teachings are also a raft towards the abandoning of all views, opinions and theories. That would include taking anything as being real or not real. In order to get to nibbāna we use the raft of Dhamma. Of aggregates, sense-spheres, meditation and Saṃsāra. When we get there, we give all of that up. We even give up the view of dependent origination. We give up understanding and nibbāna itself. Of course after we can still talk of those things, just like we can talk about “me and you”. We can talk about those things, conventionally. You mentioned highly abstract metaphysics. Well, for me, the path leads to giving up those very notions. Of there being any ultimate truth at all.

[cdpatton]

@Jimh

B. Analyo SA 249: If one says: ‘When the six spheres of contact have been eradicated, faded away, ceased, appeased, and disappeared, one attains Nirvāṇa and is apart from all that is baseless and false, then this is indeed what the Buddha taught.”

Choong Mun-keat SA 249: “But if one says that after the extinction of the six sense-spheres of contact, and the fading away of desire, after cessation, after ending, there is fading away of all meaningless argument and the attaining of nirvāṇa, then this is the teaching of the Buddha.”

Strangely, neither of them translate 般涅槃 as parinirvāṇa. I would think it matters in a sutra discussing remainder and no remainder after cessation.

I think @sunyo’s basic point is borne out by SA 249, for what it’s worth. There’s nothing like “any longer” in the Chinese parallel, and Ananda asks whether “there’s a remainder” (有餘) or “there isn’t a remainder” (無有餘) after cessation. Which could be translated more freely as “there’s something else” or “there isn’t something else.”

Honestly, I think the meaning of words like virāga (lack of desire or fading away?) and papañca (proliferation or falsity?) are more at issue when I compare SA 249 to AN 1.173-4, but this would probably stems from differing textual traditions. They understand words a bit differently and use variable formulae. The way passages are expanded makes them less ambiguous.

In SA 249, Ananda’s asking about something remaining after a liberated person dies, given the referrence to parinirvāṇa (not just nirvāṇa) at the conclusion. AN 1.173-174 sound like a question about whether something exists besides the six sense fields.

[Jimh]

In SA 249, Ananda’s asking about something remaining after a liberated person dies, given the referrence to parinirvāṇa (not just nirvāṇa ) at the conclusion. AN 1.173-174 sound like a question about whether something exists besides the six sense fields.

@cdpatton Thanks for adding this important clarification of the Chinese 般涅槃 in SA 249 as referring to parinirvāṇa rather than nirvāṇa as found in the two translations that I posted.

[josephzizys]

@Sunyo

But if suffering is not real, are we living in the Matrix or something?

yes, exactly, suffering cannot be real in any independant self-existent sense, it cannot be a mere figment of the imagination, it cannot be both, i.e a combination of a delusion and a “reality” and it cannot be niether of these things, i.e uncaused, or random “arisen by chance or caprice”.

@Sunyo

The five aggregates exist, they are real. What is not real is a self.

no. the argument from abyaktaka applies to the aggregates too.

take perception:

perception cannot be it’s own cause
it cannot be the caused by another
it cannot be both
niether.

etc.

the argument is always the same.

@Sunyo

Annihilationism in the suttas is the (imagined) destruction of a self or “existent entity” or inherent “person” (i.e. self)

I think we just disagree here, and I have expressed elsewhere my views about those passages.

@Sunyo

But you’re mixing up two different things here too. These statements you bring up again are about whether there is an inherent “person” (i.e. self-like entity) that creates suffering. They are not about whether something remains after suffering ends or not. That’s a different question, one that I posed.

no. they are the same question.

the question is about any entity having the property of temporal or spatial extension while simultaneously being the cause or condition for other entities, all of which can appear remain and disappear.

you are refusing to acknowledge the “or cosmos” parts of the standard list and barely acknowleging the existence of questions we have from the ebts where they are applied to at least 20 or more entities other than a “self” and multiple examples regarding space and time that do not even rely on the presense of “entities” per se.

the argument is deeper than one about “selves” and merely includes it as a (divinely) practical case.

[josephzizys]

@Sunyo

That is clearly wrong, if you cannot say anything about it you cannot say of it that it is “something” you also cannot say about it that it is “nothing” or both somehow, or niether somehow.

But that’s not clear at all. You call something that remains an “it”. How is “it” different from “something”? And exactly why can’t I call it “something”? To deny it’s a “something” because “you can’t say anything about it” , is just playing with words to me.

I think it is you who are playing with words @Sunyo , it is you who have a “something” that you claim you can tell me “nothing” about but that you are allowed to call “it” whatever you like.

I have asked for no such entity.

@Sunyo

It’s like you’re holding a closed fist up to me and ask: “Do I have something in my hand or nothing?” And I answer, “something”. You’re actually holding a pebble but reply, “No, you’re clearly wrong, because you can’t call this pebble a ‘something’.” That’s the logic people use when they refuse to call some kind of eternal experience/nibbāna-thingy a “something” or “a type of existence” or whatever.

you seem to consistently confuse me with someone who holds the view that there is some type of continued existence, but I do not hold that view.

I am asserting that you hold the view “nothing exists after” and that this is a wrong view. that is all.

[josephzizys]

@Sunyo

He did. But you’re mixing things up again. I’m arguing that he did not deny that there will be nothing (to experience) after the six senses cease. That’s not what the four abyakatas are about.

He denied the four statements on the Tathagata after death because they all imply a self. Likewise, in AN4.173 he denied them all because they all imply something beyond the six senses. In SN44.8 it is explicitly said that all four wrong statements on the Tathagata after death are held because people see a self with respect the aggregates:

“Vaccha, wanderers of other sects regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. They regard feeling as self … perception as self … volitional formations as self … consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the wanderers of other sects are asked such questions, they give such answers as: ‘The world is eternal’ … or ‘The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.’

But, Vaccha, the Tathagata, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One, does not regard form as self … or self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the Tathagata is asked such questions, he does not give such answers.”

That is the reason the four statements on the Tathagata are wrong: that they assume a self. To say they are unanswered because things are unknowable or unexplainable or “you can’t say anything about it”, is just not in line with the suttas. The Buddha had more logical reasons why he didn’t affirm any of these statements.

you are mistaken. if you would just read my survey of the bulk of instances of discussion in the nikayas about the topic you would see that there is much more to it.

I will bow out of this thread now and see if I can gather my thoughts elsewhere.

Always a genuine pleasure to argue the point with you @Sunyo

[Sunyo]

@josephzizys

you are refusing to acknowledge the “or cosmos” parts of the standard list

Hey,

I didn’t want to go into too much detail, but the Brahmins considered the cosmos (loka) to be the self: “That which is the self is the world (loka); after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change”. (e.g. DN1) That explains why views of the cosmos were also views of a self, as SN44.8 states rather clearly.

@josephzizys

I think it is you who are playing with words @Sunyo , it is you who have a “something” that you claim you can tell me “nothing” about but that you are allowed to call “it” whatever you like.

No, I don’t claim there is something after parinibbāna.

@josephzizys

you seem to consistently confuse me with someone who holds the view that there is some type of continued existence, but I do not hold that view.

Just trying to tease out what you’re actually saying. I also “confused” you for holding the neither-nor view, or the view of the equivocators who said you can’t say either way.

Thanks for the exchange too. But perhaps we should get back on topic:

@cdpatton

I think @sunyo’s basic point is borne out by SA 249,

I hadn’t checked the parallels, thanks for that.

[stephen]

There probably is a later school of Buddhism that denies suffering as real, the truth of suffering and its ending as a type of upāya, etc.

[Ceisiwr]

The idea of things being intrinsically real, truly real, comes with the various Abhidharmas and the sabhava-dhammas. When EBT folk say things like the aggregates or dukkha are truly real (anicca, dukkha and anatta are just perceptions anyway) they are starting to go down the same path. For Madhyamaka things are real, conventionally. It’s a warning against grasping the Buddha’s teachings, as some kind of scheme of how things truly are, rather than being a means to let go. It’s a return to the original message.

Think of the earth element. Is that truly real, or was it a convention the Buddha used?

[thomaslaw]

According to SN 22.95 (= SA 265) and SN 35.197 (= SA 1172), the five aggregates or the sense-spheres are just void (rittaka), just vain (tucchaka), just empty (su~n~naka), lacking essence (asaaraka).

So, dukkha, being not real, arises by causal condition (nidāna); having arisen it ceases completely by causal condition. It is a result of previous action, but there is no doer (not-self, anatta ).

Cf. pp. 54, 92-3, 95-6 (SA 335) in Choong Mun-keat, The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism.

[stephen]

There are some who are aware of the suffering in the world very acutely.

This organization, started by a Buddhist monk, is devoted to alleviating some of that suffering.

They are devoted to food assistance, education, and many other aid efforts.

Dukkha, the pain of the 5 aggregates subject to clinging, is not just a theoretical concept.

Compassion for those in need is a very real thing.

Perhaps we can say the idea began when the Buddha first looked out across the world and, moved by the suffering he witnessed, was inspired to teach others out of compassion.

Buddhist Global Relief

[thomaslaw]

Dukkha arises by causal condition (nidāna), and it ceases by causal condition.

[stephen]

Indeed, the truth of dukkha must be understood.

Perhaps this essay is helpful in understanding why the truth of dukkha is the first noble truth, and its cause the second.

1. The Truth of Suffering - The Wisdom Experience

When we begin to understand the nature of dukkha, when it moves from something theoretical in our minds to a directly felt understanding, our compassion for all sentient beings increases.

[josephzizys]

@Ceisiwr

Highly abstract metaphysics, and the tendency behind it all, is what the Buddha was countering. All of his contemporaries (bar the sceptics) were steeped in it. To understand the Dhamma, you have to understand who and what it was he was arguing against.

Yes, but even more than the metaphysicians the buddha was arguing against the skeptics.

In fact it seems to me that the basic picture is of the 10fold abayakata being “state of the art” skepticism at the time, and the Buddhas principle contribution is to show how we can overcome scepticism, not metaphysics.

Buddha uses metaphysics (essentially the argument that terms always depend on other terms for thier presence or absense) to defeat the consequenses of skepticism (essentially by claiming that knowlege is possible about the dependence of terms and that questions about the abayakata cannot be the subject of true knowlege if they appeal to facts beyond possible (and by definition dependent) terms.)

This is all grounded in an experiential “verification” of this by the sekkha patipada jhana practice.