in the other thread the sentence netaṁ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attā “this is not mine, this is not what I am, this is not my essence” has come up, now, esohamasmi does not occur in DN, but eso me attā occurs, just once, in DN15 where there is a section called attasamanupassanā, “on perceiving a self”.
As many on here by now know, I take DN to contain material that is early relative to SN in the EBT’s. However I think that even ignoring this thesis, the attasamanupassanā section of DN15 can almost certainly be said to have one of the most detailed discussions of views about self in the canon, and obviously, is regarded as buddhavaccana by all, so it’s well worth study. here is a section:
Now, as to those who say:
Tatrānanda, yo so evamāha:
‘Feeling is definitely not my self. But it’s not that my self does not experience feeling. My self feels, for my self is liable to feel.’
‘na heva kho me vedanā attā, nopi appaṭisaṁvedano me attā, attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā’ti.
You should say this to them,
So evamassa vacanīyo—
‘Suppose feelings were to totally and utterly cease without anything left over.
vedanā ca hi, āvuso, sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ aparisesā nirujjheyyuṁ.
When there’s no feeling at all, with the cessation of feeling, would the thought “I am this” occur there?’”
Sabbaso vedanāya asati vedanānirodhā api nu kho tattha ‘ayamahamasmī’ti siyā”ti?
“No, sir.”
“No hetaṁ, bhante”.
“That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard self as that which is liable to feel.
“Tasmātihānanda, etena petaṁ nakkhamati: ‘na heva kho me vedanā attā, nopi appaṭisaṁvedano me attā, attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā’ti samanupassituṁ.
Yato kho, ānanda, bhikkhu neva vedanaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi appaṭisaṁvedanaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi ‘attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā’ti samanupassati.
Not regarding anything in this way, they don’t grasp at anything in the world.
So evaṁ na samanupassanto na ca kiñci loke upādiyati,
Not grasping, they’re not anxious. Not being anxious, they personally become extinguished.
anupādiyaṁ na paritassati, aparitassaṁ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati,
They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’
‘khīṇā jāti, vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ, kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ, nāparaṁ itthattāyā’ti pajānāti.
It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant whose mind is freed like this holds the following views:
Evaṁ vimuttacittaṁ kho, ānanda, bhikkhuṁ yo evaṁ vadeyya:
‘A Realized One exists after death’;
‘hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
‘A Realized One doesn’t exist after death’;
‘Na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
‘A Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death’;
‘Hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
‘A Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death’.
‘Neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?
A mendicant is freed by directly knowing this: how far language and the scope of language extend; how far terminology and the scope of terminology extend; how far description and the scope of description extend; how far wisdom and the sphere of wisdom extend; how far the cycle of rebirths and its continuation extend. It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant freed by directly knowing this holds the view: ‘There is no such thing as knowing and seeing.’
Yāvatā, ānanda, adhivacanaṁ yāvatā adhivacanapatho, yāvatā nirutti yāvatā niruttipatho, yāvatā paññatti yāvatā paññattipatho, yāvatā paññā yāvatā paññāvacaraṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭaṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭati, tadabhiññāvimutto bhikkhu, tadabhiññāvimuttaṁ bhikkhuṁ ‘na jānāti na passati itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
So firstly, the cases of identifying the self with a feeling and identifying the self outside a feeling have already been disposed of earlier in the sutta, the next case, that it is the self that feels is dealt with above, and the conclusion is that there is no possibility of the thought “I am this” would occur (there being no “this” to identify with). The Sutta then goes on to say that the mendicant who practices like this, not regarding anything as “theirs” stops clinging to things and becomes extinguished.
So the argument really is that thinking of something as our self leads to attachment to that thing which leads to suffering, freedom from attachment is freedom form suffering, at no point is the idea that things in themselves have some special property that is “not-ones-self-ness” rather that they depend on vedana to be anything at all and that the views about self in turn depend on the things.
It is then said that someone who is liberated like this would not endorse “exists” “not exists” “both” or “neither” about the status of one “gone this way” tathāgato.
The REASON given for not endorsing the tetralemma is “directly knowing this: how far language and the scope of language extend; how far terminology and the scope of terminology extend; how far description and the scope of description extend”
finally it is stated that “It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant freed by directly knowing this holds the view: ‘There is no such thing as knowing and seeing.’”
So knowing and seeing is endorsed while “knower” and “seer” are not endorsed.
So to recap, I think that it is pretty clear in DN15 that the argument being made is phenomenological, not metaphysical and that the non endorsement of the view “a self exists” is not considered as equivalent to the endorsement of the view “a self doesn’t exist” as both of those views (and even two more) are explicitly rejected.
Metta.
